RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[John F. Sowa]

Gary F> For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or
propositions that are publicly verifiable.  
But a huge amount of
information that we get every day is reported by people whose observations
cannot be  verified by any other sources.  When your friends or family
discuss their experiences, they rarely have photographic evidence or other
confirming sources about what they did or saw.
Over time, we learn
that some people are more reliable or truthful than others.  We also learn
that people whose reports are usually truthful may hide or distort some
issues that may be painful or embarrassing.
For dreams and feelings,
the subject's introspective reports are the only sources for the details. 
But neuroscientists have found those reports to be extremely valuable for
interpreting the data they receive from brain scans.
Modern
technology can provide important resources for enhancing the science of
phaneroscopy.
John
Gary F> For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that are publicly verifiable.  But a huge amount of information that we get every day is reported by people whose observations cannot be  verified by any other sources._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you would mean by 
stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver 
its immediate object” — if you stated that in an earlier post, I must have 
missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to the proposition that “the 
dynamical object of the science is reality,” so I can’t guess whether it would 
be true or not. Peirce says that phaneroscopy is a “science,” not that the 
semiotic distinction between dynamic and immediate objects applies to it as if 
it were a sign, at least not in any text that I can recall. 

I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the universal categories 
“do not have a role in reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality.” 
Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles from phaneroscopy, not the other 
way round. The object of attention in phaneroscopy is obviously the phaneron. I 
could say more about Peirce’s use of the word “object” in connection with 
phaneroscopy, and give some examples, but that probably wouldn’t answer your 
question either, so I’ll have to leave it at that.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 14:38
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary F., list,

Nice summary of pheneroscopy.  But that was not the issue. The issue was 
whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object of which 
phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I stated, or not. 

best,

Auke

Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca  
: 

Auke, Gary R, list, 

For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that are 
publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do so 
honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any 
independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t claim veracity for 
what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually occurred and thus was 
real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain how the content of the dream 
relates to any reality external to it; and that is the reality which might be 
definable as the totality of facts expressible in true propositions. The 
phaneron includes much more than that, including dreams, possibilities and so 
on.

The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments about 
(metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern the 
essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear is what 
generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, Peirce says 
that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is that 
which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than the 
mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and metaphysics have to develop their 
senses of truth and reality from some method of observing and generalizing that 
does not presuppose them, and that is what Peirce called phenomenology or 
phaneroscopy. 

By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think 
Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a 
terminological change (he decided there were too many other established uses of 
the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday suggested that as 
phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he expected it would), it may 
develop other “branches” or parts to serve as bridges to other sciences such as 
semeiotics. Then the researchers involved will have to make more terminological 
decisions about what to call these branches or whether to call them “branches” 
of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to 
do (so far) is to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of what the science 
is that Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy. 

I hope this helps … 

  

Gary f. 

  

  

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 08:36
To: 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary, List

I wrote:

Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.

--

You wrote:

“Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.

--

In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe honest or 
single minded would have been a better choice. 

But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions. And, I 
did apply it to the excercize.   

 

The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal 
categories.”

--

yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role in 
reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder what 
your conception is of reality. 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary F., list,

Nice summary of pheneroscopy.  But that was not the issue. The issue was 
whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object of which 
phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I stated, or not. 

best,

Auke

> Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> Auke, Gary R, list,
> 
> For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that 
> are publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do 
> so honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any 
> independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t claim veracity 
> for what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually occurred and 
> thus was real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain how the content 
> of the dream relates to any reality external to it; and that is the reality 
> which might be definable as the totality of facts expressible in true 
> propositions. The phaneron includes much more than that, including dreams, 
> possibilities and so on.
> 
> The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments about 
> (metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern the 
> essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear is what 
> generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, Peirce 
> says that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is 
> that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other 
> than the mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and metaphysics have to 
> develop their senses of truth and reality from some method of observing and 
> generalizing that does not presuppose them, and that is what Peirce called 
> phenomenology or phaneroscopy.
> 
> By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think 
> Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a 
> terminological change (he decided there were too many other established uses 
> of the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday suggested that 
> as phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he expected it would), 
> it may develop other “branches” or parts to serve as bridges to other 
> sciences such as semeiotics. Then the researchers involved will have to make 
> more terminological decisions about what to call these branches or whether to 
> call them “branches” of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. In this slow read 
> though, all we’re trying to do (so far) is to try to develop a clear and 
> distinct idea of what the science is that Peirce called phenomenology or 
> phaneroscopy.
> 
> I hope this helps …
> 
>  
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  
> On Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
> Sent: 18-Jun-21 08:36
> To:
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
> 
>  
> 
> Gary, List
> 
> I wrote:
> 
> Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.
> 
> --
> 
> You wrote:
> 
> “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, 
> because what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.
> 
> --
> 
> In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe 
> honest or single minded would have been a better choice. 
> 
> But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions. 
> And, I did apply it to the excercize.   
> 
>  
> 
> The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal 
> categories.”
> 
> --
> 
> yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role 
> in reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder 
> what your conception is of reality. The totality of facts expressible in 
> (trutfunctional) propositions?
> 
> best,
> 
> Auke
> 
> > > 
> > Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca 
> > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca :
> > 
> > Helmut, Auke, list,
> > 
> > I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit 
> > overstated): it’s very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts 
> > so violently to a word (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability 
> > to focus on the object of the sign or the subject under discussion. 
> > Consequently I don’t think either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving 
> > Cathy away from the discussion; neither of them could have guessed that 
> > their use of the word “embodied” would have such an effect on her.
> > 
> > Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from the other 
> > thread, because it does have a bearing on phaneroscopy. Here it is complete:
> > 
> > [[ Jon,
> > 
> > CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent 
> > forcing themselves upon our recognition.
> > 
> > CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Gary Richmond]

Gary f, Auke, JAS, List,

Gary F wrote:

GF: I think Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was
strictly a terminological change (he decided there were too many other
established uses of the term “phenomenology” already).


GR: I agree. In my opinion, there are still today  "too many other
established uses of the term 'phenomenology'," and this is, perhaps, one of
the reasons why Peirce's first cenoscopic science has been sorely neglected
and, as a consequence, and in my opinion, not fully developed.

GF: Gary R’s post yesterday suggested that as phaneroscopy develops beyond
Peirce’s version (as he expected it would), it may develop other “branches”
or parts to serve as bridges to other sciences such as semeiotics.


I think that those of us who are drawn to Peirce's 'science egg' do so
principally because it seems to offer unique insights not only into how one
might approach phaneroscopic *practice*, that is, the 'observation' of the
phaneron, but how in positioning it where he does in the *classification of
sciences,* it is strongly suggested that what is gleaned in phenomenology
might, and indeed ought to inform the other sciences, especially the other
cenoscopic sciences, notably Peircean semeiotic and metaphysics.

Gary F continued:

GF: Then the researchers involved will have to make more terminological
decisions about what to call these branches or whether to call them
“branches” of phenomenology or  phaneroscopy.


For now I cleave to the idea that if Peirce's first cenoscopic science is
to develop as a science with branches, then the first branch, being a
unique *practice* among all the 'phenomenologies' which I know of (such as
Husserlian, Merleau-Pontyan, etc.), might very well -- near optimally, in
my thinking -- be termed 'phaneroscopy'. As for other possible branches
should they develop (which I believe *at least* one must if Peircean
phenomenology is to become a full-fledged science which, I think,
phaneroscopic practice cannot in itself be considered), both De Tienne and
I have voiced reservations about what we've tentatively called our proposed
branches. Andre discusses this in his "Iconoscopy, etc." paper; and I have
occasionally noted here and elsewhere that "(trichotomic) category theory"
is the name Joseph Ransdell gave it on the List long ago, one which has
stuck.

I just read Jon's remark on the whole of your post, Gary F, and I
completely agree with him that it is a "remarkably concise and lucid
explanation of why it is important to recognize phaneroscopy as a distinct
science, and why Peirce situates it where he does within his overall
classification."

So, I hope those who are interested in the current slow read will closely
read it, and as I have already, re-read it.

Best,

Gary R


“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Fri, Jun 18, 2021 at 10:13 AM  wrote:

> Auke, Gary R, list,
>
> For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that
> are *publicly* verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night,
> I do so *honestly* if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but
> lacking any independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t
> claim *veracity* for what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream *actually
> occurred* and thus was real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain
> how the *content* of the dream relates to any reality *external* to it;
> and *that* is the reality which might be definable as the totality of
> facts expressible in true propositions. The phaneron includes much more
> than that, including dreams, possibilities and so on.
>
> The focus of phaneroscopy on what *appears* precludes any judgments about
> (metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern
> the essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can *appear* is
> what generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically,
> Peirce says that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for
> the real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as
> something *other* than the mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and
> metaphysics have to develop their senses of truth and reality from some
> method of observing and generalizing that does not presuppose them, and
> that is what Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.
>
> By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think
> Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a
> terminological change (he decided there were too many other established
> uses of the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday
> suggested that as phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he
> expected it would), it may develop other “branches” or parts to serve as
> bridges to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Thank you for this remarkably concise and lucid explanation of why it is
important to recognize phaneroscopy as a distinct science, and why Peirce
situates it where he does within his overall classification. I find the
following statement to be especially illuminating, and I have bolded the
key phrase within it.

GF: Logic and metaphysics have to develop their senses of truth and reality
from some method of observing and generalizing *that does not presuppose
them*, and that is what Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.


It is another helpful reminder to me as someone who has a tendency to jump
straight into logic/semeiotic and metaphysics.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Jun 18, 2021 at 9:13 AM  wrote:

> Auke, Gary R, list,
>
> For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that
> are *publicly* verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night,
> I do so *honestly* if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but
> lacking any independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t
> claim *veracity* for what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream *actually
> occurred* and thus was real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain
> how the *content* of the dream relates to any reality *external* to it;
> and *that* is the reality which might be definable as the totality of
> facts expressible in true propositions. The phaneron includes much more
> than that, including dreams, possibilities and so on.
>
> The focus of phaneroscopy on what *appears* precludes any judgments about
> (metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern
> the essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can *appear* is
> what generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically,
> Peirce says that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for
> the real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as
> something *other* than the mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and
> metaphysics have to develop their senses of truth and reality from some
> method of observing and generalizing that does not presuppose them, and
> that is what Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.
>
> By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think
> Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a
> terminological change (he decided there were too many other established
> uses of the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday
> suggested that as phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he
> expected it would), it may develop other “branches” or parts to serve as
> bridges to other sciences such as semeiotics. Then the researchers involved
> will have to make more terminological decisions about what to call these
> branches or whether to call them “branches” of phenomenology or
> phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to do (so far) is
> to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of *what the science is* that
> Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.
>
> I hope this helps …
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Auke van Breemen
> *Sent:* 18-Jun-21 08:36
> *To:*
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
>
>
>
> Gary, List
>
> I wrote:
>
> Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.
>
> --
>
> You wrote:
>
> “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition,
> because what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.
>
> --
>
> In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe
> honest or single minded would have been a better choice.
>
> But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions.
> And, I did apply it to the excercize.
>
> The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal
> categories.”
>
> --
>
> yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role in
> reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder
> what your conception is of reality. The totality of facts expressible in
> (trutfunctional) propositions?
>
> best,
>
> Auke
>
> Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
>
> Helmut, Auke, list,
>
> I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated):
> it’s very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently
> to a *word* (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus
> on the *object* of the sign or the subject under discussion. Consequently
> I don’t think either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving Cathy away
> from the discussion; neither of them could have guessed that their use of
> the word “embodied” would have such an effect on her.
>
> Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Auke, Gary R, list,

For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that are 
publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do so 
honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any 
independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t claim veracity for 
what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually occurred and thus was 
real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain how the content of the dream 
relates to any reality external to it; and that is the reality which might be 
definable as the totality of facts expressible in true propositions. The 
phaneron includes much more than that, including dreams, possibilities and so 
on.

The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments about 
(metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern the 
essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear is what 
generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, Peirce says 
that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is that 
which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than the 
mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and metaphysics have to develop their 
senses of truth and reality from some method of observing and generalizing that 
does not presuppose them, and that is what Peirce called phenomenology or 
phaneroscopy.

By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think 
Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a 
terminological change (he decided there were too many other established uses of 
the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday suggested that as 
phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he expected it would), it may 
develop other “branches” or parts to serve as bridges to other sciences such as 
semeiotics. Then the researchers involved will have to make more terminological 
decisions about what to call these branches or whether to call them “branches” 
of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to 
do (so far) is to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of what the science 
is that Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.

I hope this helps …

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 08:36
To: 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary, List

I wrote:

Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.

--

You wrote:

“Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.

--

In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe honest or 
single minded would have been a better choice. 

But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions. And, I 
did apply it to the excercize.   

 

The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal 
categories.”

--

yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role in 
reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder what 
your conception is of reality. The totality of facts expressible in 
(trutfunctional) propositions?

best,

Auke

Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca  
: 

Helmut, Auke, list, 

I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated): it’s 
very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently to a 
word (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus on the 
object of the sign or the subject under discussion. Consequently I don’t think 
either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving Cathy away from the discussion; 
neither of them could have guessed that their use of the word “embodied” would 
have such an effect on her. 

Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from the other thread, 
because it does have a bearing on phaneroscopy. Here it is complete: 

[[ Jon, 

CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves 
upon our recognition.

CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is 
that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than 
the mind's creation.

This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:

CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of being as 
it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432, EP 2:343, 1905)

And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality.

In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it is 
because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about the 
truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. ]]

GF: This is all accurate and to the point, except your last sentence. It is the 
predominance of Secondness 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The 1913 EGs are identical to the 1911 EGs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List, All:

None of this is new information, and the following statement is still false.

JFS: In that note, I showed that any logical or philosophical idea
expressed in or explained by any EGs prior to June 1911 could be expressed
or explained as well or better by the EGs of R670 and L231.


The logical and philosophical idea that negation is not a primitive
relation, but instead is derived from the implication of falsity, is
expressed in and explained by the EGs prior to June 1911 (on multiple
occasions) and *cannot *be expressed in nor explained by the EGs of R 670
and RL 231.

JFS: Since Peirce's version of 1913 is identical to the 1911 EGs, the more
complete specification of L231 would be his best and final version.


This is a subjective opinion, since Peirce himself never states or implies
that his explanation of EGs in RL 231 is "his best and final version,"
and "nobody can claim that anything other than an exact quotation is what
Peirce intended."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Jun 17, 2021 at 10:46 PM John F. Sowa  wrote:

> On 8 November 1913, Peirce described a version of EGs that is identical to
> the 1911 version.  See the copy below.  My summary:
>
> A universe of discourse is described by the graphs scribed on a sheet of
> assertion (AKA phemic sheet).  The structure and meaning of an EG is
> determined by five conventions [plus a default convention 0]:
>
> 0. Conjunction (AND) is the implicit logical operator that relates the
> graphs scribed in any area.
>
> 1. The existential quantifier (there exists something) is represented by a
> heavy dot.
>
> 2. A heavy dot extended to a heavy line asserts the identity of the
> objects denoted at each end.
>
> 3. A bifurcation of a line (a ligature) to form a teridentity asserts the
> co-identity of the objects denoted at the three ends.
>
> 4. Shading an area negates whatever is scribed in that area.
>
> 5. Evaluation of a nest of negations proceeds from the outside-in
> (endoporeutic).  This implies that a nest of two negations, such as "not-(A
> not-B)", is equivalent to a conditional "if A then B".
>
> This confirms my reply to Francesco on June 10.  In that note, I showed
> that any logical or philosophical idea expressed in or explained by any EGs
> prior to June 1911 could be expressed or explained as well or better by the
> EGs of R670 and L231.  Since Peirce's version of 1913 is identical to the
> 1911 EGs, the more complete specification of L231 would be his best and
> final version.
>
> John
>
> -
>
> Peirce described a version of EGs in the excerpt dated 8 November 1913 of
> "Letters to F. A. Woods" (L477, July 1911 to December 1913):
>
> Of course, not only are two terms often connected by a bond of relational
> identity as in "son's wife" (represented by the graph (Fig...) and in
> "wife's son" (Fig...) but also every term is bound to the real universe,
> though in my graphs this is only represented by the term's being scribed on
> the sheet, which denotes the universe.  Then only about four conventions
> more complete the definition of the method of representation.  These are:
>
> First, that a heavy dot stands for something or a real object.
>
> Second, dot prolonged into a heavy line asserts the identity of the
> objects denoted by its extremities.
>
> Third, a node of point of bifurcation of such a line asserts the
> co-identity of the three ends; and co-identity is the more usual meaning of
> the word 'and'.  (Fig...)
>
> Fourth, shading an area of the phemic sheet denies whatever is scribed on
> that area.
>
> Fifth, the interpretation proceeds endogenously [endoporeutic].  That is,
> Fig... means "It is false that A is false while B is true", i.e. "If A is
> true so is B" and the interpretation is not B is true and A is false which
> would be an exogenous  interpretation, i.e. beginning in the inside and
> proceeding outward.
>
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary, List

I wrote:

Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.

--

You wrote:

“Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.

--

In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe honest or 
single minded would have been a better choice. 

But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions. And, I 
did apply it to the excercize.   


The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal 
categories.”

--

yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role in 
reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder what 
your conception is of reality. The totality of facts expressible in 
(trutfunctional) propositions?

best,

Auke

> Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> Helmut, Auke, list,
> 
> I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated): 
> it’s very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently 
> to a word (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus on 
> the object of the sign or the subject under discussion. Consequently I don’t 
> think either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving Cathy away from the 
> discussion; neither of them could have guessed that their use of the word 
> “embodied” would have such an effect on her.
> 
> Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from the other thread, 
> because it does have a bearing on phaneroscopy. Here it is complete:
> 
> [[ Jon,
> 
> CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing 
> themselves upon our recognition.
> 
> CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real 
> is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other 
> than the mind's creation.
> 
> This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:
> 
> CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of 
> being as it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432, EP 
> 2:343, 1905)
> 
> And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality.
> 
> In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it 
> is because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about 
> the truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. ]]
> 
> GF: This is all accurate and to the point, except your last sentence. It 
> is the predominance of Secondness that separates logic as a normative science 
> from phaneroscopy, which for Peirce is a positive but not normative science. 
> “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
> what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.
> 
> CSP: Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in 
> their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, 
> treats of Phenomena in their Firstness (CP 5.122, 1903).
> 
> GF: The Firstness of Secondness is what Peirce called “dyadic 
> consciousness.” But in phenomenology, we don’t talk about “what is 
> independent of individual thought,” because the existence of individual 
> thinkers does not appear in the direct consciousness of the phaneroscopist. 
> That is why Peircean phaneroscopy pointedly ignores the differences between 
> individual minds and treats all possible minds as one mind.
> 
> CSP: Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron 
> I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present 
> to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or 
> not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these 
> questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of 
> the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all 
> minds. (CP 1.284, 1905)
> 
> CSP: I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to denote the 
> total content of any one consciousness (for any one is substantially any 
> other), the sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of its 
> cognitive value. (EP2:362, 1905)
> 
> GF: If you say this is unrealistic, you are exactly right. Reality is not 
> an issue in phenomenology/phaneroscopy. The issue is the elements of the 
> phaneron, also known as the “universal categories.”
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> 
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
> mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
> Sent: 17-Jun-21 02:57
> To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> 
> List,
> 
>  
> 
> the term "red flag" is a red flag for me. When I hear or read it, I 
> suspect people at work, who are not interested in a fair discussion, but in 
>