RE: [PEIRCE-L] Diagrams in mathematics, phaneroscopy, and language (was Modeling

[John F. Sowa]

Edwina, Gary F, List,

ET:  Thank you for this excellent
post...  I'd like to note that I 
think a key problem with the
arguments over 'where does mathematics 
or phaneroscopy fit into this
process' is the old issue of the
differentiation of Mind and Matter
and their relations.

ET: I feel that De Tienne separates the
two in a Cartesian method - and
slots each into a separate time and
place.  But Peirce, with his
hylomorphic synechism doesn't separate
the two and therefore, the one is
always informing and analyzing the
other.  I think the quotes and
outline you have provided show this
quite clearly.  The other issue is
HOW Mind portrays our world to us
- and your answer is:  diagrams.
That's a separate issue...and well
argued by your comments.

Those are important issues, which
Peirce had resolved in a way that is
consistent with Aristotle's
response to Plato.  Mathematical forms are
real in the sense that
they are independent of anything that anybody may
think about them. 
The forms (or diagrams that represent them) are
discovered, not
invented by mathematicians, but they exist in actuality
only when
embodied.  That embodiment may be on paper, in a computer, or in our
neurons.

GF:  why [do] you bother to repeat all this, since
it’s all been said
before and nobody has questioned any of it.  The
only question I have is
why you insert “phaneroscopy” in your new
subject line, as there is
nothing in the entire post about
“phenomenology/phaneroscopy in
particular,” because there is nothing
in it that differentiates
phaneroscopy from “Peirce's thought in
general.”

First, I am delighted that we all agree on the
central role of diagrams
in Peirce's thought.  But Gary R did
question it by accusing me of
putting too much emphasis on diagrams
-- because, as he said, diagrams
are the foundation of my research on
conceptual graphs.  I wanted to
emphasize that I learned the
importance of diagrams from Peirce.

GF:  It’s a good summary of
the role of diagrams in Peirce’s thought,
but it does nothing to
explain the unique role of phaneroscopy in his
classification of
sciences or in his philosophy.

Second, I wanted to emphasize
that the central role of phaneroscopy is
the transition from
experience to diagrams.  Contrary to ADT's slide 25,
there is no
transition out of mathematics, since diagrams can (a) relate
experience to any pattern or structure of any branch of science or
common sense, (b) allow mathematics and formal logic to be applied to
any and every representation of 1-ness, 2-ness, and 3-ness, and (c)
furnish all the data required for the normative sciences to evaluate
the
truth or relevance of hypotheses (guesses) to other diagrams
from
memories, reading, or dialogues with other people.

GF:  What does make [phaneroscopy] unique is precisely the subject of
the current “slow read” of ADT’s slides.

Third, I have read
each of the slides from ADT's original and from each
of the
transcriptions.  I believe that he has made many important
points. 
But as I showed about slide 25, he could have made his
presentation
more precise and more general if he had recognized the
role of
diagrams.  In short, phaneroscopy is the process of mapping
experience to diagrams that can be interpreted by all later sciences.
The normative sciences evaluate them by the criteria of esthetics,
ethics, and truth.

Finally, ADT's phrase "the rest of
us" suggested that Peirce's
mathematics is inadequate to support
common sense.  Yet every textbook
from elementary school to the most
advanced research is illustrated with
diagrams, which could be mapped
to and from EGs.  In particular, the
diagrams that linguists use to
represent the syntax and semantics of
ordinary languages have a
direct mapping to and from EGs. I also believe
that some kinds of
diagrams can even represent the exotic languages that
Dan Everett has
studied.

For reference, I put the nine quotations from my
previous note and my 
nine brief summaries in the file
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/diagrams.txt

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[John F. Sowa]

Jeff, List,

JBD:  Some have suggested that the aim of
phenomenology is to provide
an analysis and account of human
consciousness.

Peirce made a sharp distinction between
phaneroscopy, the science that
provides the raw data for all the
empirical sciences, and psychology,
which is one of the psychic
sciences.  He had a high regard for the
work in psychology by William
James, but he did not consider James a
phenomenologist.  Issues about
unconscious processes would be a task for psychology, not
phenomenology.

JBD:  The business of the phenomenology, I
believe, is to provide
resources and techniques needed to make more
exacting analysis of
scientific observations.  Careful
phenomenological analysis puts
scientists in a better position to
develop models, make measurements
and frame hypotheses.

I
agree.

JBD:  Assuming this is on the right track, what should
we say about
unconscious forms of bias and prejudice that might
effect the validity
of reasoning?  Does phenomenology supply us with
the resources needed
to analyze such forms of bias and prejudice?

The analysis and evaluation of truth, bias, and prejudice is a
task
forthe normative sciences.  A psychologist might discover
evidence of
unsconscious bias.  But the use of that evidence for
evaluating truth
would be a task for methodeutic, not
phaneroscopy.
John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Helmut, John, Jon, List,


Some have suggested that the aim of phenomenology is to provide an analysis and 
account of human consciousness. I have a question about the focus on 
consciousness.


The business of the phenomenology, I believe, is to provide the resources and 
techniques needed to make more exacting analysis of scientific observations. 
Careful phenomenological analysis puts scientists in a better position to 
develop models, make measurements and frame hypotheses.


Take inquiry in logic as an example. Phenomenological analysis of surprising 
observations about arguments that we hold to be valid or invalid will put the 
logician in a better position to frame hypotheses about the principles of logic.


Assuming this is on the right track, what should we say about unconscious forms 
of bias and prejudice that might effect the validity of reasoning? Does 
phenomenology supply us with the resources needed to analyze such forms of bias 
and prejudice?


If the sole object of inquiry in phenomenology is conscious experience, 
unconscious forms of bias and prejudice would appear to be outside of the scope 
of phenomenological inquiry.


Here is my question:  is phenomenological analysis restricted to conscious 
experience, or are we capable of making analyses of unconscious forms of bias 
and prejudice that might shape our experience?


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Friday, August 27, 2021 12:46:29 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

Gary F., List

So, isnt it so, that phenomenology is just a method, and not an ontology or a 
metaphysics? Like, the phenomenologist does not deny, that any appearance is 
triadic, he/she merely tries to limitate her/his view to the firstness-aspect? 
From Wikipedia "phenomenology":

"Though many of the phenomenological methods involve various reductions, 
phenomenology is, in essence, 
anti-reductionistic; the reductions 
are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, 
not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions."

So phenomenologists do not claim, that an object is identical with itself, they 
just treat it as if it were, in order to better understand consciousness? So is 
phenomenology not an -ism, like Jon Awbrey suspected?

Best,
Helmut



 27. August 2021 um 19:31 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:
Helmut, what you say here is true IF you assume that an “appearance” or 
“seeming” is a representation of an object with is other than itself. The 
phenomenologist or phaneroscopist DOES NOT make that assumption. That is why 
percepts, which are signs for psychology (or even semiotics), are NOT signs for 
phenomenology. Signs appear, but not everything that appears is a sign. In 
phenomenology, some “things” appear triadically, some dyadically, and some 
monadically. This mathematical analysis of what appears is the origin of the 
three “categories.” As Peirce says, this is “a singular sort of thought.”

Gary f.

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 27-Aug-21 13:07
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

Gary F., List

You wrote:
"what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt 
whatever that what appears, appears.".

I think, seeming and appearing are the same, just with emphasizing different 
points of view. Both are triadic: A system "A" makes an object "B" accessible 
to observer "C". The object may be accessible because it is a part of universal 
reality, but it may as well be so, that the object is merely a part of the 
system´s reality. Meaning that outside of the system it may not be able to 
serve as an object. If an object deliberately, with intention, appears, this 
intention cannot be the object´s alone, but as well the system´s intention, and 
can only work, if the observer is integrated in the system´s structure (shares 
relations, is structurally coupled).

Best,
Helmut

 27. August 2021 um 17:52 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:
Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, 
you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial 
observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and 
external objects. By the time you have classified something as an external 
object, you are past that initial stage, and you are perceiving the object as 
something that has aspects or qualities that are not revealed to your present 
sense experience of it, no matter how you may adjust your point of view. This 
implies that you implicitly regard your sense experience as a representation of 
something existing independently 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1))

[Bernard Morand]

List,

Robert Marty has shown below how a manipulation of pieces of quotes, 
then reassembled, can finally betray a text as a whole.


It is a good illustration of my feeling about the bad quality level of 
the discussions on Peirce-l.


We have recourse to quotes since it is undoubtely the simpler secure way 
for refering to Peirce's writings.


But, as I said in a previous post, an abusive usage makes them 
authoritative (dogmatic) arguments, lacking of textual context, and 
despite the fact that Peirce himself claimed to be a faillibilist.


To my sense this tendency to restrict the discussions to quotes, 
multiplying them infinitely, repeating them as if they were mantras 
impoverishes the debates.


Contributors to the list seem to have become specialists of electronic 
searches by keywords through Peirce writings at the expense of their own 
reflexion.


Not to speak of repeated personal attacks and so called tribal behaviours.

Something (I don't know really what) ought to be made in order to revive 
the quality of the discussions.


Bernard Morand


Le 27/08/2021 à 18:49, robert marty a écrit :

Jon Alan, List

*A MAGIC TRICK*

/How to make a pseudo-quote from a quote to create a desired meaning/

It is straightforward: you choose in the last sentence a piece that 
suits you (1), then you go back to the beginning of the text by 
selecting another piece (2), which you link with two others (3) and 
(4) in the logic of the text. You obtain the following demonstration 
(which you attribute to Peirce!) according to which:


 "the mathematician "/without inquiring or caring whether it [the pure 
hypothesis] agrees with the actual facts or not *(1)*, /while the 
phaneroscopist (now an engineer)/ " finds it suits his purpose to 
ascertain what the necessary consequences of possible facts would be" 
*(2)*,/ then " calls upon a mathematician and states the question 
*(3)*,  and concludes whether the result "/simpler but quite 
fictitious problem *(4)* /are consistent with observed facts.


**

*PROOF :*

**

JAS > This is a straw man, since no one is advocating what is 
described here as an "impossibility." I have explicitly and repeatedly 
acknowledged the role of mathematicians in /formulating /the pure 
hypotheses ("skeleton-sets") from which they subsequently draw 
necessary conclusions in accordance with the concluding sentence of CP 
3.559 (1898). Nevertheless, as Peirce himself goes on to observe, they 
do this */"without inquiring or caring whether it [the pure 
hypothesis] agrees with the actual facts or not /**/(1)/*." It is the 
phaneroscopist who */"finds it suits his purpose to ascertain what the 
necessary consequences of possible facts would be/*"*/(2) /*and thus 
/"calls upon a mathematician and states the question"/*/(3)/**,***and 
it is the phaneroscopist who inductively evaluates whether the 
mathematician's deductive conclusions from the resulting */"simpler 
but quite fictitious problem /**/(4)/**"*are consistent with observed 
facts.


PEIRCE >  CP 3.559

A simple way of arriving at a true conception of the mathematician's 
business is to consider what service it is which he is called in to 
render in the course of any scientific or other inquiry. Mathematics 
has always been more or less a trade. An engineer, or a business 
company (say, an insurance company), or a buyer (say, of land), or a 
physicist, */finds it suits his purpose to ascertain what the 
necessary consequences of possible facts would be/*//*/(2)/*; but the 
facts are so complicated that he cannot deal with them in his usual 
way. */He calls upon a mathematician and states the question 
/**/(3)./*Now the mathematician does not conceive it to be any part of 
his duty to verify the facts stated. He accepts them absolutely 
without question. He does not in the least care whether they are 
correct or not. He finds, however, in almost every case that the 
statement has one inconvenience, and in many cases that it has a 
second. The first inconvenience is that, though the statement may not 
at first sound very complicated, yet, when it is accurately analyzed, 
it is found to imply so intricate a condition of things that it far 
surpasses the power of the mathematician to say with exactitude what 
its consequence would be. At the same time, it frequently happens that 
the facts, as stated, are insufficient to answer the question that is 
put. Accordingly, the first business of the mathematician, often a 
most difficult task, is to frame another */simpler but quite 
fictitious problem (4)/*(supplemented, perhaps, by some supposition), 
which shall be within his powers, while at the same time it is 
sufficiently like the problem set before him to answer, well or ill, 
as a substitute for it. This substituted problem differs also from 
that which was first set before the mathematician in another respect: 
namely, that it is highly abstract. All features that have no bearing 
upon the relations of the premisses to the conclusion 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary F., List

 

So, isnt it so, that phenomenology is just a method, and not an ontology or a metaphysics? Like, the phenomenologist does not deny, that any appearance is triadic, he/she merely tries to limitate her/his view to the firstness-aspect? From Wikipedia "phenomenology":

 

"Though many of the phenomenological methods involve various reductions, phenomenology is, in essence, anti-reductionistic; the reductions are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions."

 

So phenomenologists do not claim, that an object is identical with itself, they just treat it as if it were, in order to better understand consciousness? So is phenomenology not an -ism, like Jon Awbrey suspected?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 
 

 27. August 2021 um 19:31 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:




Helmut, what you say here is true IF you assume that an “appearance” or “seeming” is a representation of an object with is other than itself. The phenomenologist or phaneroscopist DOES NOT make that assumption. That is why percepts, which are signs for psychology (or even semiotics), are NOT signs for phenomenology. Signs appear, but not everything that appears is a sign. In phenomenology, some “things” appear triadically, some dyadically, and some monadically. This mathematical analysis of what appears is the origin of the three “categories.” As Peirce says, this is “a singular sort of thought.”

 

Gary f.

 



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 27-Aug-21 13:07
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34



 



Gary F., List



 



You wrote:



"what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears.".



 




I think, seeming and appearing are the same, just with emphasizing different points of view. Both are triadic: A system "A" makes an object "B" accessible to observer "C". The object may be accessible because it is a part of universal reality, but it may as well be so, that the object is merely a part of the system´s reality. Meaning that outside of the system it may not be able to serve as an object. If an object deliberately, with intention, appears, this intention cannot be the object´s alone, but as well the system´s intention, and can only work, if the observer is integrated in the system´s structure (shares relations, is structurally coupled).



 



Best,



Helmut



  



 27. August 2021 um 17:52 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:





Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and external objects. By the time you have classified something as an external object, you are past that initial stage, and you are perceiving the object as something that has aspects or qualities that are not revealed to your present sense experience of it, no matter how you may adjust your point of view. This implies that you implicitly regard your sense experience as a representation of something existing independently of your perception of it. 

But when, as a phaneroscopist, you focus directly on what appears (instead of jumping to the conclusion that it is only an appearance of something else external to your perception), what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears. The question in phaneroscopy is then: what are the indecomposable elements of this appearing? 

I should mention that the change in terminology is only that, in this case. Peirce’s account of phaneroscopy does not differ in essence from his account of phenomenology, for instance this one from 1902 (CP 2.197):

CSP: Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but mathematics lays the foundation on which logic builds; and those mathematical chapters will be quite indispensable. After them, it is my purpose to invite the reader to take up the study of Phenomenology. In the derivation of this word, “phenomenon” is to be understood in the broadest sense conceivable; so that phenomenology might rather be defined as the study of what seems than as the statement of what appears. It describes the essentially different elements which seem to present themselves in what seems. Its task requires and exercises a singular sort of thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost service throughout the study of logic. It can hardly be said to involve reasoning; for reasoning reaches a conclusion, and asserts it to be true however matters may seem; while in Phenomenology there is no assertion except that there are certain seemings; and even these are not, and cannot be asserted, because they cannot be described. Phenomenology can only tell the reader which way to look and to see what he shall see. The question of how 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

I am glad that we agree on the interpretation of CP 5.589. As for CP 3.559,
there is no "magic trick" involved in simply recognizing that its last
sentence is a *summary *of the entire paragraph. That is why it begins with
"Thus, ..." Moreover, I was not laying out the *chronological *sequence of
events, which is actually (2) (3) (1) (4). This is evident if we replace
(1) with the following sentences, which say basically the same thing and
come between (3) and (4) in the original text.

CSP: Now the mathematician does not conceive it to be any part of his duty
to verify the facts stated. He accepts them absolutely without question. He
does not in the least care whether they are correct or not.


Instead, I first quoted the summary (1) since it succinctly makes the point
that I was primarily emphasizing, and then the other relevant phrases in
order (2) (3) (4).

I also did not claim or imply that the phaneroscopist is "now an engineer."
Peirce *begins *the paragraph by stating, "A simple way of arriving at a
true conception of the mathematician's business is to consider what service
it is which he is called in to render in the course of *any scientific or
other inquiry*" (emphasis added). He gives as examples not only an
engineer, but also "a business company (say, an insurance company), or a
buyer (say, of land), or a physicist." I see no reason why it would somehow
be illegitimate to add a phaneroscopist to this list.

For the record, I have no issue with the actual quote from de Waal, just
how it was misrepresented as applied to the current List discussion. In
fact, I have previously cited Daniel Campos likewise discussing Peirce's
identification of imagination, concentration, and generalization as the
intellectual abilities required for mathematical reasoning, and thus for
the proper practice of phaneroscopy as well as pure mathematics (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-07/msg00052.html). Please
stop repeatedly alleging hostility to mathematics and mathematicians where
it does not exist.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 11:50 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> Jon Alan, List
>
> *A MAGIC TRICK*
>
>
>
> *How to make a pseudo-quote from a quote to create a desired meaning*
>
>
>
> It is straightforward: you choose in the last sentence a piece that suits
> you (1), then you go back to the beginning of the text by selecting another
> piece (2), which you link with two others (3) and (4) in the logic of the
> text. You obtain the following demonstration (which you attribute to
> Peirce!) according to which:
>
>
>
>  "the mathematician "*without inquiring or caring whether it [the pure
> hypothesis] agrees with the actual facts or not (1), *while the
> phaneroscopist (now an engineer)*  " finds it suits his purpose to
> ascertain what the necessary consequences of possible facts would be" (2),*
> then " calls upon a mathematician and states the question *(3)*,  and
> concludes whether the result "*simpler but quite fictitious problem (4) *are
> consistent with observed facts.
>
>
>
> *PROOF :*
>
>
>
> JAS > This is a straw man, since no one is advocating what is described
> here as an "impossibility." I have explicitly and repeatedly acknowledged
> the role of mathematicians in *formulating *the pure hypotheses
> ("skeleton-sets") from which they subsequently draw necessary conclusions
> in accordance with the concluding sentence of CP 3.559 (1898).
> Nevertheless, as Peirce himself goes on to observe, they do this *"without
> inquiring or caring whether it [the pure hypothesis] agrees with the actual
> facts or not **(1)*." It is the phaneroscopist who *"finds it suits his
> purpose to ascertain what the necessary consequences of possible facts
> would be*"*(2) *and thus *"calls upon a mathematician and states the
> question"**(3)**,* and it is the phaneroscopist who inductively evaluates
> whether the mathematician's deductive conclusions from the resulting *"simpler
> but quite fictitious problem **(4)**"* are consistent with observed facts.
>
>
>
> PEIRCE >  CP 3.559
>
>
>
> A simple way of arriving at a true conception of the mathematician's
> business is to consider what service it is which he is called in to render
> in the course of any scientific or other inquiry. Mathematics has always
> been more or less a trade. An engineer, or a business company (say, an
> insurance company), or a buyer (say, of land), or a physicist, *finds it
> suits his purpose to ascertain what the necessary consequences of possible
> facts would be* *(2)*; but the facts are so complicated that he cannot
> deal with them in his usual way. *He calls upon a mathematician and
> states the question **(3).* Now the mathematician does not conceive it to
> be any part of his duty to verify the facts stated. He accepts them
> absolutely without 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[gnox]

Helmut, what you say here is true IF you assume that an “appearance” or 
“seeming” is a representation of an object with is other than itself. The 
phenomenologist or phaneroscopist DOES NOT make that assumption. That is why 
percepts, which are signs for psychology (or even semiotics), are NOT signs for 
phenomenology. Signs appear, but not everything that appears is a sign. In 
phenomenology, some “things” appear triadically, some dyadically, and some 
monadically. This mathematical analysis of what appears is the origin of the 
three “categories.” As Peirce says, this is “a singular sort of thought.”

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 27-Aug-21 13:07
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

 

Gary F., List

 

You wrote:

"what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt 
whatever that what appears, appears.".

 

I think, seeming and appearing are the same, just with emphasizing different 
points of view. Both are triadic: A system "A" makes an object "B" accessible 
to observer "C". The object may be accessible because it is a part of universal 
reality, but it may as well be so, that the object is merely a part of the 
system´s reality. Meaning that outside of the system it may not be able to 
serve as an object. If an object deliberately, with intention, appears, this 
intention cannot be the object´s alone, but as well the system´s intention, and 
can only work, if the observer is integrated in the system´s structure (shares 
relations, is structurally coupled).

 

Best,

Helmut

  

 27. August 2021 um 17:52 Uhr
  g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:

Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, 
you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial 
observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and 
external objects. By the time you have classified something as an external 
object, you are past that initial stage, and you are perceiving the object as 
something that has aspects or qualities that are not revealed to your present 
sense experience of it, no matter how you may adjust your point of view. This 
implies that you implicitly regard your sense experience as a representation of 
something existing independently of your perception of it. 

But when, as a phaneroscopist, you focus directly on what appears (instead of 
jumping to the conclusion that it is only an appearance of something else 
external to your perception), what appears is entirely open to assured 
observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears. The 
question in phaneroscopy is then: what are the indecomposable elements of this 
appearing? 

I should mention that the change in terminology is only that, in this case. 
Peirce’s account of phaneroscopy does not differ in essence from his account of 
phenomenology, for instance this one from 1902 (CP 2.197):

CSP: Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but mathematics lays the 
foundation on which logic builds; and those mathematical chapters will be quite 
indispensable. After them, it is my purpose to invite the reader to take up the 
study of Phenomenology. In the derivation of this word, “phenomenon” is to be 
understood in the broadest sense conceivable; so that phenomenology might 
rather be defined as the study of what seems than as the statement of what 
appears. It describes the essentially different elements which seem to present 
themselves in what seems. Its task requires and exercises a singular sort of 
thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost service 
throughout the study of logic. It can hardly be said to involve reasoning; for 
reasoning reaches a conclusion, and asserts it to be true however matters may 
seem; while in Phenomenology there is no assertion except that there are 
certain seemings; and even these are not, and cannot be asserted, because they 
cannot be described. Phenomenology can only tell the reader which way to look 
and to see what he shall see. The question of how far Phenomenology does reason 
will receive special attention. [end CSP]

 

Gary f.

 

 

From:   peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
<  peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 27-Aug-21 10:37
To: Peirce-L <  peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

 

Jon A., List:

 

I assume that this a response to the last two statements quoted from Peirce in 
the referenced slide.

 

CSP:I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, phaneron, to 
denote whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation. No 
external object is throughout its entirety open to observation. (R 337:7, 1904)

 

I can see how this 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF: One thing I would add: the *initial* observation of the phaneron does
not divide its ingredients into *internal* and *external objects*.


I agree, but this raises the question of where in Peirce's classification
of the sciences the external/internal distinction *does *first come into
play. As I have said many times before, the real/fictional distinction only
arises in metaphysics as informed by the normative science of logic as
semeiotic. However, as Robert Lane spells out succinctly in his excellent
book, *Peirce on Realism and Idealism*, these two distinctions are *not *
coextensive.

RL: Peirce also distinguished between that which is independent of what
anyone thinks *about it*--the real--and that which is independent of what
anyone thinks *about anything at all*. The latter is, in his terminology,
the *external*, that which is external to the mind (i.e., not within my
mind or your mind or anyone else's mind) ... (p. 3)


Consequently, as Lane goes on to observe, the popular equation of "real"
with "mind-independent" is not strictly accurate from a Peircean
standpoint, since some realities are *internal*. Lane then summarizes the
thesis of his book as follows.

RL: An understanding of Peirce's basic realism and of precisely how he used
the terms "real," "external," and "internal" illuminates a number of other
aspects of his philosophy, including his views on truth, his pragmatism,
his idealism, and his so-called scholastic realism. (p. 7)


If Lane is right about this, and if the external/internal distinction is
properly an outcome of phaneroscopy despite not pertaining to "the *initial
*observation of the phaneron," then the unique role of phaneroscopy in
Peirce's classification of sciences and in his philosophy would seem rather
obvious. However, I am curious whether anyone would argue for situating the
external/internal distinction under *another *science instead.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 10:53 AM  wrote:

> Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is
> right, you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the
> *initial* observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients
> into *internal* and *external objects*. By the time you have classified
> something as an *external* object, you are past that initial stage, and
> you are perceiving the object as something that has aspects or qualities
> that are not revealed to your present sense experience of it, no matter how
> you may adjust your point of view. This implies that you implicitly regard
> your sense experience as a *representation* of something existing
> independently of your perception of it.
>
> But when, as a phaneroscopist, you focus directly on *what appears*
> (instead of jumping to the conclusion that it is *only* an appearance *of
> something else* external to your perception), *what appears* is *entirely
> open to assured observation*. There is no doubt whatever that what
> appears, *appears*. The question *in phaneroscopy* is then: what are the
> indecomposable elements of this *appearing*?
>
> I should mention that the change in terminology is *only* that, in this
> case. Peirce’s account of phaneroscopy does not differ in essence from his
> account of phenomenology, for instance this one from 1902 (CP 2.197):
>
> CSP: Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but mathematics lays the
> foundation on which logic builds; and those mathematical chapters will be
> quite indispensable. After them, it is my purpose to invite the reader to
> take up the study of Phenomenology. In the derivation of this word,
> “phenomenon” is to be understood in the broadest sense conceivable; so that
> phenomenology might rather be defined as the study of what seems than as
> the statement of what appears. It describes the essentially different
> elements which seem to present themselves in what seems. Its task requires
> and exercises a singular sort of thought, a sort of thought that will be
> found to be of the utmost service throughout the study of logic. It can
> hardly be said to involve reasoning; for reasoning reaches a conclusion,
> and asserts it to be true however matters may seem; while in Phenomenology
> there is no assertion except that there are certain seemings; and even
> these are not, and cannot be asserted, because they cannot be described.
> Phenomenology can only tell the reader which way to look and to see what he
> shall see. The question of how far Phenomenology does reason will receive
> special attention. [end CSP]
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary F., List

 

You wrote:

"what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears.".

 


I think, seeming and appearing are the same, just with emphasizing different points of view. Both are triadic: A system "A" makes an object "B" accessible to observer "C". The object may be accessible because it is a part of universal reality, but it may as well be so, that the object is merely a part of the system´s reality. Meaning that outside of the system it may not be able to serve as an object. If an object deliberately, with intention, appears, this intention cannot be the object´s alone, but as well the system´s intention, and can only work, if the observer is integrated in the system´s structure (shares relations, is structurally coupled).

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 27. August 2021 um 17:52 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:




Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and external objects. By the time you have classified something as an external object, you are past that initial stage, and you are perceiving the object as something that has aspects or qualities that are not revealed to your present sense experience of it, no matter how you may adjust your point of view. This implies that you implicitly regard your sense experience as a representation of something existing independently of your perception of it. 

But when, as a phaneroscopist, you focus directly on what appears (instead of jumping to the conclusion that it is only an appearance of something else external to your perception), what appears is entirely open to assured observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears. The question in phaneroscopy is then: what are the indecomposable elements of this appearing? 

I should mention that the change in terminology is only that, in this case. Peirce’s account of phaneroscopy does not differ in essence from his account of phenomenology, for instance this one from 1902 (CP 2.197):

CSP: Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but mathematics lays the foundation on which logic builds; and those mathematical chapters will be quite indispensable. After them, it is my purpose to invite the reader to take up the study of Phenomenology. In the derivation of this word, “phenomenon” is to be understood in the broadest sense conceivable; so that phenomenology might rather be defined as the study of what seems than as the statement of what appears. It describes the essentially different elements which seem to present themselves in what seems. Its task requires and exercises a singular sort of thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost service throughout the study of logic. It can hardly be said to involve reasoning; for reasoning reaches a conclusion, and asserts it to be true however matters may seem; while in Phenomenology there is no assertion except that there are certain seemings; and even these are not, and cannot be asserted, because they cannot be described. Phenomenology can only tell the reader which way to look and to see what he shall see. The question of how far Phenomenology does reason will receive special attention. [end CSP]

 

Gary f.

 

 


From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 27-Aug-21 10:37
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34


 



Jon A., List:


 



I assume that this a response to the last two statements quoted from Peirce in the referenced slide.



 






CSP:I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, phaneron, to denote whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation. No external object is throughout its entirety open to observation. (R 337:7, 1904)






 



I can see how this might bring to mind "the unknowable object in itself" for someone who is otherwise unfamiliar with Peirce's writings, but it surprises me that it is coming from someone who has studied them carefully. For example ...



 






CSP: The present writer was a pure Kantist until he was forced by successive steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be conceived; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly, and he will find himself to have become a Critical Common-sensist. (CP 5.452, EP 2:353-354, 1905)






 



Besides, in R 337, Peirce is talking about observation rather than knowledge. His point is not that any external object is unknowable in itself, but that phaneroscopy studies only that which is or could be present to the mind, and thus "throughout its entirety open to assured observation." What we know about external objects is the result of inference rather than direct observation, beginning with 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[robert marty]

Jon Alan, List

*A MAGIC TRICK*



*How to make a pseudo-quote from a quote to create a desired meaning*



It is straightforward: you choose in the last sentence a piece that suits
you (1), then you go back to the beginning of the text by selecting another
piece (2), which you link with two others (3) and (4) in the logic of the
text. You obtain the following demonstration (which you attribute to
Peirce!) according to which:



 "the mathematician "*without inquiring or caring whether it [the pure
hypothesis] agrees with the actual facts or not (1), *while the
phaneroscopist (now an engineer)*  " finds it suits his purpose to
ascertain what the necessary consequences of possible facts would be" (2),*
then " calls upon a mathematician and states the question *(3)*,  and
concludes whether the result "*simpler but quite fictitious problem (4) *are
consistent with observed facts.



*PROOF :*



JAS > This is a straw man, since no one is advocating what is described
here as an "impossibility." I have explicitly and repeatedly acknowledged
the role of mathematicians in *formulating *the pure hypotheses
("skeleton-sets") from which they subsequently draw necessary conclusions
in accordance with the concluding sentence of CP 3.559 (1898).
Nevertheless, as Peirce himself goes on to observe, they do this *"without
inquiring or caring whether it [the pure hypothesis] agrees with the actual
facts or not **(1)*." It is the phaneroscopist who *"finds it suits his
purpose to ascertain what the necessary consequences of possible facts
would be*"*(2) *and thus *"calls upon a mathematician and states the
question"**(3)**,* and it is the phaneroscopist who inductively evaluates
whether the mathematician's deductive conclusions from the resulting *"simpler
but quite fictitious problem **(4)**"* are consistent with observed facts.



PEIRCE >  CP 3.559



A simple way of arriving at a true conception of the mathematician's
business is to consider what service it is which he is called in to render
in the course of any scientific or other inquiry. Mathematics has always
been more or less a trade. An engineer, or a business company (say, an
insurance company), or a buyer (say, of land), or a physicist, *finds it
suits his purpose to ascertain what the necessary consequences of possible
facts would be* *(2)*; but the facts are so complicated that he cannot deal
with them in his usual way. *He calls upon a mathematician and states the
question **(3).* Now the mathematician does not conceive it to be any part
of his duty to verify the facts stated. He accepts them absolutely without
question. He does not in the least care whether they are correct or not. He
finds, however, in almost every case that the statement has one
inconvenience, and in many cases that it has a second. The first
inconvenience is that, though the statement may not at first sound very
complicated, yet, when it is accurately analyzed, it is found to imply so
intricate a condition of things that it far surpasses the power of the
mathematician to say with exactitude what its consequence would be. At the
same time, it frequently happens that the facts, as stated, are
insufficient to answer the question that is put. Accordingly, the first
business of the mathematician, often a most difficult task, is to frame
another *simpler but quite fictitious problem (4)* (supplemented, perhaps,
by some supposition), which shall be within his powers, while at the same
time it is sufficiently like the problem set before him to answer, well or
ill, as a substitute for it. This substituted problem differs also from
that which was first set before the mathematician in another respect:
namely, that it is highly abstract. All features that have no bearing upon
the relations of the premisses to the conclusion are effaced and
obliterated. The skeletonization or diagrammatization of the problem serves
more purposes than one; but its principal purpose is to strip the
significant relations of all disguise. Only one kind of concrete clothing
is permitted -- namely, such as, whether from habit or from the
constitution of the mind, has become so familiar that it decidedly aids in
tracing the consequences of the hypothesis. Thus, the mathematician does
two very different things: namely, he first frames a pure hypothesis
stripped of all features which do not concern the drawing of consequences
from it, and this he does *without inquiring or caring whether it agrees
with the actual facts or not **(1**);* and, secondly, he proceeds to draw
necessary consequences from that hypothesis."



*The magic is that (2) (3) (4) (1) chosen in CP 3.559 became (1)(2)(3) (4)
... **Well done, artist!*



For the record, the quote from *Cornelis de Waal* was as follows:



"*'The results of experience have to be simplified, generalized, and
severed from fact so as to be perfect ideas before they arc suited to
mathematical use. They have, in short, to be adapted to the powers of
mathematics and of the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1)

[robert marty]

Dear Jon Alan, List



Until the assertion that I discuss below, your answer is a simple
paraphrase of my text. The discrepancy occurs here:



JAS > *"On the contrary, phaneroscopy is a distinct science in Peirce's
mature classification, so in his view there are phaneroscopists, distinct
from mathematicians and other kinds of inquirers; and as quoted below, he
states explicitly that "phaneroscopic research requires a previous study of
mathematics" (R 602; emphasis added). This is not to say that they cannot
or should not "collaborate with mathematicians," just that their purpose is
different--they are studying whatever is or could be present to the mind in
any way, rather than strictly hypothetical states of things".*

*"*

In fact, you recognize the indispensable role of mathematics in the
process, but you try to empower phase 3 artificially below to oppose it to
the whole process in which it is embedded:



RM > "3. Phenomenology - Phaneroscopy (1904-) - study of Universal
Categories (all present in any phenomenon): Firstness, Secondness,
Thirdness. *Phaneroscopic work driven by the mathematics of 1*. " [
emphasize mine]"



For that you forget that mathematicians can be, like everyone,
"phaneroscopists." Yet ADT explicitly recognizes this:



EDT > slide 22:


" Shocking news!

*Mathematicians are phaneroscopists, too!*

They must be, somehow.

After all, before they come up with fundamental theorems of all sorts, they
have to conduct a ton of observations based on diagrams and imaginative
constructions. They contemplate ideal forms. They are looking for patterns
and patterns of patterns, which they need to *manifest* one way or another
– but artificially (though not arbitrarily).

Yet, phaneroscopy as such does not and cannot provide mathematics with any
fundamental principle."


RM-Comment > The rhetoric of irony employed by EDT ("Shocking news!") makes
mathematicians into a kind of sect devoted to the contemplation of ideal
forms cut off from a world where they would take pleasure in manipulating
"patterns and patterns of patterns." His obsession is such that in the
following slide (23), he modifies a quotation from Peirce to hammer home
the point that mathematicians are only good for that! Dubbed "sense of
humor" by its supporters, it is the cover for pure and simple
discrimination which tends to make mathematicians the "useful idiots" of a
self-proclaimed science which would be phaneroscopy (for this purpose, the
term "phaneroscopist" is a recent ad hoc creation of its promoters). They
are so stupid that "The world might cease to exist, but for pure
mathematicians, this would be at most an inconvenience." (slide 23). This
is paradoxical revisionism since both you and EDT acknowledge the existence
of a cyclic self-increasing process in which the purely "phaneroscopic
phase is considered necessary. It is practiced by ALL actors in the
production of scientific knowledge, mathematicians included.  Of course,
some of them, Peirce being the first, have this capacity to identify
"skeleton-sets," which turn out to be universal forms "free from any
disguise." Wherever they come from, all researchers are "phaneroscopists";
some of them are also mathematicians. This is an asymmetrical situation
that I will study in part C, "sociological analysis," because you end up
saying that mathematicians would be deprived of the inductive capacity
reserved only for "phaneroscopists":

JAS* > *"*and it is the phaneroscopist who inductively evaluates whether
the mathematician's deductive conclusions from the resulting "simpler but
quite fictitious problem" are consistent with observed facts."*

 RM > This is still humorous anthropology: how will "phaneroscopists" do if
they don't have the means to apprehend these "fictitious problems," these
mathematical objects that will be proposed to them? That is the question!

But you have found a magic trick to answer it, as explained in the
following post

Following ...

Robert Marty...
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le ven. 27 août 2021 à 03:28, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Robert, List:
>
> RM: To state the logical order (of the discovery), we must follow Peirce "*I
> am partially inverting the historical order, in order to state the process
> in its logical order*"(CP 5.589, EP 2:54-55, 1898), as quoted by Jon Alan
> Schmidt.
>
>
> I agree, but in that passage he is not *specifically *addressing
> phaneroscopy, since at the time (1898) he had not yet even recognized it as
> a distinct science that needed to come between mathematics and logic in his
> classification. Instead, he is talking about the scientific method *in
> general* and giving "the process in its logical order," which is
> induction followed by retroduction.
>
> CSP: The only end of science, as such, is to learn the lesson that the
> universe has to teach it. In induction it 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[gnox]

Jon A, allow me to point out that slide 34 (except for its title) consists 
*entirely* of a quotation from Peirce. There are two more slides coming which 
give definitions of the phaneron, and all three present some challenges to 
interpretation, but to begin by assigning them (or ADT's interpretation) to 
some academic "-ism" or other does not strike me as a good strategy. So yes, 
give it a while.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Awbrey
Sent: 27-Aug-21 11:16
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

Dear Gary,

I've really been trying my level best to hold off comment on ADT's 
interpretation of Peirce until the whole show wraps up, but every now and then 
the byte on my tongue lets a bit slip, as the selection and stress just seem 
too twisted and warped.
It leads me to think he's trying assimilate Peirce into some new-fangled 
never-say-die reanimation of analytic philosophy.
I could be wrong so I'll give it a while, but right now it's not looking so 
good ...

Regards,

Jon


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[gnox]

Jon S, assuming that your assumption about what Jon A had in mind is right, 
you’ve clarified the matter effectively. One thing I would add: the initial 
observation of the phaneron does not divide its ingredients into internal and 
external objects. By the time you have classified something as an external 
object, you are past that initial stage, and you are perceiving the object as 
something that has aspects or qualities that are not revealed to your present 
sense experience of it, no matter how you may adjust your point of view. This 
implies that you implicitly regard your sense experience as a representation of 
something existing independently of your perception of it. 

But when, as a phaneroscopist, you focus directly on what appears (instead of 
jumping to the conclusion that it is only an appearance of something else 
external to your perception), what appears is entirely open to assured 
observation. There is no doubt whatever that what appears, appears. The 
question in phaneroscopy is then: what are the indecomposable elements of this 
appearing? 

I should mention that the change in terminology is only that, in this case. 
Peirce’s account of phaneroscopy does not differ in essence from his account of 
phenomenology, for instance this one from 1902 (CP 2.197):

CSP: Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but mathematics lays the 
foundation on which logic builds; and those mathematical chapters will be quite 
indispensable. After them, it is my purpose to invite the reader to take up the 
study of Phenomenology. In the derivation of this word, “phenomenon” is to be 
understood in the broadest sense conceivable; so that phenomenology might 
rather be defined as the study of what seems than as the statement of what 
appears. It describes the essentially different elements which seem to present 
themselves in what seems. Its task requires and exercises a singular sort of 
thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost service 
throughout the study of logic. It can hardly be said to involve reasoning; for 
reasoning reaches a conclusion, and asserts it to be true however matters may 
seem; while in Phenomenology there is no assertion except that there are 
certain seemings; and even these are not, and cannot be asserted, because they 
cannot be described. Phenomenology can only tell the reader which way to look 
and to see what he shall see. The question of how far Phenomenology does reason 
will receive special attention. [end CSP]

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 27-Aug-21 10:37
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

 

Jon A., List:

 

I assume that this a response to the last two statements quoted from Peirce in 
the referenced slide.

 

CSP:I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, phaneron, to 
denote whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation. No 
external object is throughout its entirety open to observation. (R 337:7, 1904)

 

I can see how this might bring to mind "the unknowable object in itself" for 
someone who is otherwise unfamiliar with Peirce's writings, but it surprises me 
that it is coming from someone who has studied them carefully. For example ...

 

CSP: The present writer was a pure Kantist until he was forced by successive 
steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his 
heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be 
conceived; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine accordingly, and he 
will find himself to have become a Critical Common-sensist. (CP 5.452, EP 
2:353-354, 1905)

 

Besides, in R 337, Peirce is talking about observation rather than knowledge. 
His point is not that any external object is unknowable in itself, but that 
phaneroscopy studies only that which is or could be present to the mind, and 
thus "throughout its entirety open to assured observation." What we know about 
external objects is the result of inference rather than direct observation, 
beginning with quasi-abductive perceptual judgments as "the first premisses of 
all our reasonings" (CP 5.116, EP 2:191, 1903).

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
 

 

On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 8:49 AM Jon Awbrey mailto:jawb...@att.net> > wrote:

oh goody,

after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i guess 
we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself.

jon

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Jon Awbrey]

Dear Gary,

I've really been trying my level best to hold off comment on
ADT's interpretation of Peirce until the whole show wraps up,
but every now and then the byte on my tongue lets a bit slip,
as the selection and stress just seem too twisted and warped.
It leads me to think he's trying assimilate Peirce into some
new-fangled never-say-die reanimation of analytic philosophy.
I could be wrong so I'll give it a while, but right now it's
not looking so good ...

Regards,

Jon

On 8/27/2021 10:19 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

O joy, another cryptic and slippery message from the Oracle Jon Awbrey, who of 
course will not deign to explain what connection it might have with Slide 34.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey 
Sent: 27-Aug-21 09:49
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

oh goody,

after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i guess 
we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself.

jon




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jon A., List:

I assume that this a response to the last two statements quoted from Peirce
in the referenced slide.

CSP:I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, *phaneron*,
to denote whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation.
No external object is throughout its entirety open to observation. (R
337:7, 1904)


I can see how this might bring to mind "the unknowable object in itself"
for someone who is otherwise unfamiliar with Peirce's writings, but it
surprises me that it is coming from someone who has studied them carefully.
For example ...

CSP: The present writer was a pure Kantist until he was forced by
successive steps into Pragmaticism. The Kantist has only to abjure from the
bottom of his heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however
indirectly, be conceived; and then correct the details of Kant's doctrine
accordingly, and he will find himself to have become a Critical
Common-sensist. (CP 5.452, EP 2:353-354, 1905)


Besides, in R 337, Peirce is talking about observation rather than
knowledge. His point is *not *that any external object is unknowable in
itself, but that phaneroscopy studies *only *that which is or could be *present
to the mind*, and thus "throughout its entirety open to assured
observation." What we *know *about external objects is the result of *inference
*rather than direct observation, beginning with quasi-abductive perceptual
judgments as "the first premisses of all our reasonings" (CP 5.116, EP
2:191, 1903).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Aug 27, 2021 at 8:49 AM Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> oh goody,
>
> after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i
> guess we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself.
>
> jon
>
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[gnox]

O joy, another cryptic and slippery message from the Oracle Jon Awbrey, who of 
course will not deign to explain what connection it might have with Slide 34.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: Jon Awbrey  
Sent: 27-Aug-21 09:49
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

oh goody,

after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i guess 
we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself.

jon

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Jon Awbrey]

oh goody,

after the revival of positivism and empiricism,
logical or otherwise, i guess we should expect
the revenge of the unknowable object in itself.

jon
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[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 34

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. Here we reach 
the point where Peirce invents a new English word to replace “phenomenon” 
(which, he said, had too many other uses) as the key term in defining what he 
would now call “phaneroscopy.”

Gary f.

 



 

Text: Etymological definition 

The word φανερόν is next to the simplest expression in Greek for manifest. ... 
There can be no question that φανερός means primarily brought to light, open to 
public inspection throughout ... 

I desire to have the privilege of creating an English word, phaneron, to denote 
whatever is throughout its entirety open to assured observation. No external 
object is throughout its entirety open to observation. (R 337:4-5 & 7, 1904)

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Diagrams in mathematics, phaneroscopy, and language (was Modeling

[gnox]

John, I am puzzled as to why you bother to repeat all this, since it's all
been said before and nobody has questioned any of it. The only question I
have is why you insert "phaneroscopy" in your new subject line, as there is
nothing in the entire post about "phenomenology/phaneroscopy in particular,"
because there is nothing in it that differentiates phaneroscopy from
"Peirce's
thought in general." It's a good summary of the role of diagrams in Peirce's
thought, but it does nothing to explain the unique role of phaneroscopy in
his classification of sciences or in his philosophy. Phaneroscopy is
certainly not unique in requiring a previous study of mathematics. What does
make it unique is precisely the subject of the current "slow read" of ADT's
slides, especially the recently posted ones which you have chosen to ignore
- which is your privilege, of course, but why do you claim to be saying
something about "phenomenology/phaneroscopy in particular" when you are not?

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 26-Aug-21 22:42
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Diagrams in mathematics, phaneroscopy, and language (was
Modeling

 

Robert M, Gary F, Gary R, Jon AS, List,

I changed the subject line to emphasize the role of diagrams in Peirce's
thought in general and in phenomenology/phaneroscopy in particular.  I
cited some of these quotations in previous notes, and I copied others
from a note by Robert.  All of them are relevant to recent discussions
with Gary, Gary, and Jon.

At the end of this note, I include seven quotations by Peirce, and two
by Cornelis de Waal.  The following nine points summarize the issues
that Peirce or de Waal make in those quotations.

1. In the first quotation, Peirce explains why "phaneroscopic research
requires a previous study of mathematics."

2. "The results of experience have to be simplified, generalized, and
severed from fact so as to be perfect ideas before they are suited to
mathematical use."

3. A diagram is an "icon, which exhibits a similarity or analogy to the
subject of discourse."

4. "we construct an icon of our hypothetical state of things and proceed
to observe it...  We not only have to select the features of the diagram
which it will be pertinent to pay attention to, but it is also of great
importance to return again and again to certain features."

5. A diagram may be "a concrete, but possibly changing, mental image of
such a thing as it represents."

6. "We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is,
iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible."

7. "Diagrammatic reasoning is the only really fertile reasoning."

8. According to de Waal, Peirce argues that it is the mathematician who
is best equipped to translate the more loosely constructed theories
about groups of positive facts generated by empirical research into
tight mathematical models.

9. Finally, "The three mental qualities that in Peirce's view, come into
play are imagination, concentration, and generalization."

I agree with these nine points.  And I emphasize that they are not
just my opinions.  The first eight are by Peirce himself.  The ninth is
de Waal's summary of quotations by Peirce.

And by the way, I mentioned language as the third item in the subject
line above.  I plan to send another note to P-list to show the role of
diagrams in representing the semantics of language.  The roots of
language are found in phaneroscopy, but they develop into diagrams that
can represent the semantics of everything that people think or say.

John

--

1. "Phaneroscopy... is the science of the different elementary
constituents of all ideas.  Its material is, of course, universal
experience, -- experience I mean of the fanciful and the abstract, as
well as of the concrete and real.  Yet to suppose that in such
experience the elements were to be found already separate would be to
suppose the unimaginable and self-contradictory.  They must be separated
by a process of thought that cannot be summoned up Hegel-wise on demand.
They must be picked out of the fragments that necessary reasonings
scatter, and therefore it is that phaneroscopic research requires a
previous study of mathematics.  (R602, after 1903 but before 1908")

2. The results of experience have to be simplified, generalized, and
severed from fact so as to be perfect ideas before they are suited to
mathematical use.  They have, in short, to be adapted to the powers of
mathematics and of the mathematician.  It is only the mathematician who
knows what these powers are; and consequently the framing of the
mathematical hypotheses must be performed by the mathematician.'
(R 17:06)

3. there are three kinds of signs which are all indispensable in all
reasoning; the first is the diagrammatic sign or icon, which exhibits a
similarity or analogy to the subject of discourse.  [second is index;
third is symbol] (CP 1.369)

4. All necessary 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Diagrams in mathematics, phaneroscopy, and language (was Modeling

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, List

Thank you for this excellent post. I think it clarifies the process
of 'How We Understand Our World'.

I'd like to note that I think a key problem with the arguments over
'where does mathematics or phaneroscopy fit into this process is the
old issue of the differentiation of Mind and Matter and their
relations.

I feel that De Tienne separates the two in a Cartesian method - and
slots each into a separate time and place.

But Peirce, with his hylomorphic synechism doesn't separate the two
and therefore, the one is always informing and analyzing the other. 
I think the quotes and outline you have provided show this quite
clearly.

The other issue is HOW Mind portrays our world to us - and your
answer is: diagrams. That's a separate issue...and well argued by
your comments. 

Edwina
 On Thu 26/08/21 10:42 PM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Robert M, Gary F, Gary R, Jon AS, List,
 I changed the subject line to emphasize the role of diagrams in
Peirce's
 thought in general and in phenomenology/phaneroscopy in particular. 
I
 cited some of these quotations in previous notes, and I copied
others
 from a note by Robert.  All of them are relevant to recent
discussions
 with Gary, Gary, and Jon.
 At the end of this note, I include seven quotations by Peirce, and
two
 by Cornelis de Waal.  The following nine points summarize the issues
 that Peirce or de Waal make in those quotations.
 1. In the first quotation, Peirce explains why "phaneroscopic
research
 requires a previous study of mathematics."
 2. "The results of experience have to be simplified, generalized,
and
 severed from fact so as to be perfect ideas before they are suited
to
 mathematical use."
 3. A diagram is an "icon, which exhibits a similarity or analogy to
the
 subject of discourse."
 4. "we construct an icon of our hypothetical state of things and
proceed
 to observe it...  We not only have to select the features of the
diagram
 which it will be pertinent to pay attention to, but it is also of
great
 importance to return again and again to certain features."
 5. A diagram may be "a concrete, but possibly changing, mental image
of
 such a thing as it represents."
 6. "We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is,
 iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible."
 7. "Diagrammatic reasoning is the only really fertile reasoning."
 8. According to de Waal, Peirce argues that it is the mathematician
who
 is best equipped to translate the more loosely constructed theories
 about groups of positive facts generated by empirical research into
 tight mathematical models.
 9. Finally, "The three mental qualities that in Peirce's view, come
into
 play are imagination, concentration, and generalization."
 I agree with these nine points.  And I emphasize that they are not
 just my opinions.  The first eight are by Peirce himself.  The ninth
is
 de Waal's summary of quotations by Peirce.
 And by the way, I mentioned language as the third item in the
subject
 line above.  I plan to send another note to P-list to show the role
of
 diagrams in representing the semantics of language.  The roots of
 language are found in phaneroscopy, but they develop into diagrams
that
 can represent the semantics of everything that people think or say.
 John
 --
 1. "Phaneroscopy... is the science of the different elementary
 constituents of all ideas.  Its material is, of course, universal
 experience, -- experience I mean of the fanciful and the abstract,
as
 well as of the concrete and real.  Yet to suppose that in such
 experience the elements were to be found already separate would be
to
 suppose the unimaginable and self-contradictory.  They must be
separated
 by a process of thought that cannot be summoned up Hegel-wise on
demand.
 They must be picked out of the fragments that necessary reasonings
 scatter, and therefore it is that phaneroscopic research requires a
 previous study of mathematics.  (R602, after 1903 but before 1908")
 2. The results of experience have to be simplified, generalized, and
 severed from fact so as to be perfect ideas before they are suited
to
 mathematical use.  They have, in short, to be adapted to the powers
of
 mathematics and of the mathematician.  It is only the mathematician
who
 knows what these powers are; and consequently the framing of the
 mathematical hypotheses must be performed by the mathematician.'
 (R 17:06)
 3. there are three kinds of signs which are all indispensable in all
 reasoning; the first is the diagrammatic sign or icon, which
exhibits a
 similarity or analogy to the subject of discourse.  [second is
index;
 third is symbol] (CP 1.369)
 4. All necessary reasoning without exception is diagrammatic.  That
is,
 we construct an icon of our hypothetical state of things and proceed
to
 observe it.  This observation