Re: [PEIRCE-L] The "generative potency" of the number three.

[Gary Richmond]

John, Gary F, List,

The quotations and lead-in comments I made in response to Gary F's post all
concerned the *Simplest mathematics* 4.227-323 positioned by Peirce within
the first branch of Peirce's *Classification of Sciences*, viz., *Pure
mathematics* (his discussion commencing at CP 4.245, 2. The Divisions of
Pure Mathematics) with reference to 3. *The Simplest Branch of Mathematics*
(commencing at CP 4.250), with all the quotations I posted  coming
from 4. *Trichotomic
Mathematics* (commencing at CP 4.307).

This is how they're indexed in the CP:

THE SIMPLEST MATHEMATICS  CP 4.227-323 (1902)
1. The Essence of Mathematics 4.227
2. Division of Pure Mathematics 4.245
3. The Simplest Branch of Mathematics 4.250
4. Trichotomic Mathematics 4.307


I was solely interested in that post in suggesting how the trichotomic
branch of the simplest formal mathematics might have some direct bearing on
*Phaneroscopy*, the first science following Mathematics (i.e., Pure
Mathematics) in Peirce's Classification of the Sciences.

To perhaps help refresh the memory for those who might be interested in
reviewing the passages quoted from *Trichotomic Mathematics a*nd as  summary
*, *here is what I put in boldface from the passages I quoted:

*The most fundamental fact about the number three is its generative
potency.*


*Triads. . . will give every possible variety of type. *

 . . .

*It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the whole of mathematics
is enwrapped in these trichotomic graphs*

*So prolific is the triad in forms that one may easily conceive that all
the variety and multiplicity of the universe springs from it.*

The last snippet above has, perhaps, more application to metaphysics than
to either mathematics or logic; yet it is rooted in mathematics. Still I
hope that these excerpts suggest that for Peirce trichotomic is at the
heart of virtually all sciences beginning with pure mathematics (commencing
with the simplest mathematics), through phaneroscopy, reaching a kind of
acme in logic as semeiotic and metaphysics, but influencing all the
sciences (physical and psychic).

*The most fundamental fact about the number three is its generative
potency.*

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 3:17 PM sowa @bestweb.net  wrote:

> Gary F, Gary R, List,
>
> The term formal logic was introduced by DeMorgan to refer to Boolean
> algebra and the extensions to it by himself and others.  Peirce
> consistently used it to refer to every version of mathematical logic.  That
> includes his own logic of relatives (1877), his algebra of logic (1880,
> 1885), and his existential graphs.  He later used it to refer to Russell's
> logic of 1903 and to the 1910 Principia by Whitehead and Russell.  That
> usage is completely consistent with the use of the term 'formal logic' in
> the century after Peirce.
>
> If you search CP for the term 'formal logic', you'll find a very large
> number of instances.  I have not checked every one, but I strongly doubt
> whether you'll find any exceptions to that point.
>
> John
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[PEIRCE-L] Logica utens vs docens (was Slow Read slide 44

[sowa @bestweb.net]

Nobody today makes a distinction between a logica utens (using) vs a
logica docens (teaching).  And nobody today claims that a formal logic
(either Peirce's algebraic notation or his existential graphs) is
inappropriate for calculation.
  
 In fact, Frege made exactly the same mistake.  Neither Peirce nor
Frege had any experience with the long and complicated proofs that
became common in the century that followed their discoveries.  Even
Whitehead and Russell, who adopted Frege's rules of inference, did not
consider their proof methods to be efficient for computation.
  
 But much better proof procedures were discovered in the century after
Peirce, and the search for better algorithms accelerated when digital
computers became available.  Gerhard Gentzen (1936) invented several
important methods that were adapted to computer processing.
  
 But the simplicity of Peirce's EG rules are a major improvement over
Gentzen's methods.  In fact, they are so simple and elegant that they
enabled an unsolved research problem from 1988 to be solved as a
simple corollary in terms of Peirce's rules.
  
 For an overview of these issues, see the slides I presented at an APA
 conference, session on Peirce in April 2015:  
http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf
  
 Slide two of ppe.pdf has a link to a 76-page article in the Journal of
Applied Logic, in which I spell out all the details.
  
 John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Phyllis, List:

I am basically suggesting that formal logic = mathematical logic = *logica
utens*, while normative logic = semeiotic (speculative grammar + critic +
methodeutic) = *logica docens*. I have in mind Peirce's distinction in CP
2.439 (1902) between mathematics as the science which *draws* necessary
conclusions (strictly deductive) and logic as the science of *drawing*
conclusions (abductive/retroductive, deductive, and inductive).

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 5:52 PM Phyllis Chiasson <
phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I don't see that formal logic is logica utens. Are you defining formal and
> normative differently.
>
> On Sat, Sep 11, 2021, 3:28 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary F., List:
>>
>> As far as I can tell, Peirce makes no distinction between "mathematical
>> logic" and "the logic of mathematics"; they are one and the same, namely,
>> formal logic.
>>
>> CSP: Mathematical logic is formal logic. Formal logic, however developed,
>> is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of logic,
>> or even its principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned as a part of logic
>> proper.(CP 4.240, 1902)
>>
>>
>> Formal logic is a *logica utens* because it is strictly deductive and
>> thus requires no carefully developed theory of reasoning, unlike
>> abduction/retroduction and induction. The fact that John Sowa and others
>> teach formal logic does not make it a *logica docens*. Mathematical
>> reasoning in accordance with formal logic can be extremely sophisticated,
>> requiring years of training and practice, but it always remains a *logica
>> utens*.
>>
>> CSP: There are certain parts of your *logica utens* which nobody really
>> doubts. Hegel and his have loyally endeavored to cast a doubt upon it. The
>> effort has been praiseworthy; but it has not succeeded. The truth of it is
>> too evident. Mathematical reasoning holds. Why should it not? It relates
>> only to the creations of the mind, concerning which there is no obstacle to
>> our learning whatever is true of them. The method of this book, therefore,
>> is to accept the reasonings of pure mathematics as beyond all doubt. It is
>> fallible, as everything human is fallible. Twice two may perhaps not be
>> four. But there is no more satisfactory way of assuring ourselves of
>> anything than the mathematical way of assuring ourselves of mathematical
>> theorems. No aid from the science of logic is called for in that field. (CP
>> 2.192, 1902)
>>
>>
>> Nor, for that matter, in the fields of phaneroscopy, esthetics, or ethics.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 4:44 PM  wrote:
>>
>>> John, Phyllis,
>>>
>>> I think it’s clear enough that “formal logic” (in Peirce at least) is
>>> mathematical logic. The still unanswered question is whether formal logic
>>> is a *logica utens* or a *logica docens*. Since you teach the subject
>>> yourself, John, it would seem to be the latter, something that requires
>>> explicit instruction before the student can make use of it. But Peirce’s
>>> “Logic of Mathematics” paper says that “mathematics performs its
>>> reasonings by a *logica utens* which it develops for itself, and has no
>>> need of any appeal to a *logica docens.*” Unless he changed his mind
>>> about this after c. 1896 (which I doubt), the implication is that the *logic
>>> of mathematics* is a *logica utens* while *mathematical logic* is a *logica
>>> docens*.
>>>
>>> If we accept that compound statement as non-paradoxical, then the
>>> question with respect to phaneroscopic analysis is whether the mathematics
>>> it draws upon for principles is the *logic of mathematics* or *mathematical
>>> logic*. Since phaneroscopy is *cenoscopic*, according to Peirce, that
>>> would seem to rule out any special *logica docens* being an essential
>>> part of it.
>>>
>>> Bellucci’s paper does not choose between those two, but says that the
>>> mathematics involved is really the *logic of relatives*, which (being
>>> mathematical in nature) is not part of “logic proper,” i.e. critical
>>> logic.) Is the logic of relatives, or the mathematical basis of it, a 
>>> *logica
>>> utens*? What do you think?
>>>
>>> By the way, I don’t see as much connection between “oenoscopy” and
>>> phaneroscopy as ADT apparently does.
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

[Phyllis Chiasson]

I don't see that formal logic is logica utens. Are you defining formal and
normative differently.

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021, 3:28 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary F., List:
>
> As far as I can tell, Peirce makes no distinction between "mathematical
> logic" and "the logic of mathematics"; they are one and the same, namely,
> formal logic.
>
> CSP: Mathematical logic is formal logic. Formal logic, however developed,
> is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of logic,
> or even its principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned as a part of logic
> proper.(CP 4.240, 1902)
>
>
> Formal logic is a *logica utens* because it is strictly deductive and
> thus requires no carefully developed theory of reasoning, unlike
> abduction/retroduction and induction. The fact that John Sowa and others
> teach formal logic does not make it a *logica docens*. Mathematical
> reasoning in accordance with formal logic can be extremely sophisticated,
> requiring years of training and practice, but it always remains a *logica
> utens*.
>
> CSP: There are certain parts of your *logica utens* which nobody really
> doubts. Hegel and his have loyally endeavored to cast a doubt upon it. The
> effort has been praiseworthy; but it has not succeeded. The truth of it is
> too evident. Mathematical reasoning holds. Why should it not? It relates
> only to the creations of the mind, concerning which there is no obstacle to
> our learning whatever is true of them. The method of this book, therefore,
> is to accept the reasonings of pure mathematics as beyond all doubt. It is
> fallible, as everything human is fallible. Twice two may perhaps not be
> four. But there is no more satisfactory way of assuring ourselves of
> anything than the mathematical way of assuring ourselves of mathematical
> theorems. No aid from the science of logic is called for in that field. (CP
> 2.192, 1902)
>
>
> Nor, for that matter, in the fields of phaneroscopy, esthetics, or ethics.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 4:44 PM  wrote:
>
>> John, Phyllis,
>>
>> I think it’s clear enough that “formal logic” (in Peirce at least) is
>> mathematical logic. The still unanswered question is whether formal logic
>> is a *logica utens* or a *logica docens*. Since you teach the subject
>> yourself, John, it would seem to be the latter, something that requires
>> explicit instruction before the student can make use of it. But Peirce’s
>> “Logic of Mathematics” paper says that “mathematics performs its
>> reasonings by a *logica utens* which it develops for itself, and has no
>> need of any appeal to a *logica docens.*” Unless he changed his mind
>> about this after c. 1896 (which I doubt), the implication is that the *logic
>> of mathematics* is a *logica utens* while *mathematical logic* is a *logica
>> docens*.
>>
>> If we accept that compound statement as non-paradoxical, then the
>> question with respect to phaneroscopic analysis is whether the mathematics
>> it draws upon for principles is the *logic of mathematics* or *mathematical
>> logic*. Since phaneroscopy is *cenoscopic*, according to Peirce, that
>> would seem to rule out any special *logica docens* being an essential
>> part of it.
>>
>> Bellucci’s paper does not choose between those two, but says that the
>> mathematics involved is really the *logic of relatives*, which (being
>> mathematical in nature) is not part of “logic proper,” i.e. critical
>> logic.) Is the logic of relatives, or the mathematical basis of it, a *logica
>> utens*? What do you think?
>>
>> By the way, I don’t see as much connection between “oenoscopy” and
>> phaneroscopy as ADT apparently does.
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

As far as I can tell, Peirce makes no distinction between "mathematical
logic" and "the logic of mathematics"; they are one and the same, namely,
formal logic.

CSP: Mathematical logic is formal logic. Formal logic, however developed,
is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of logic,
or even its principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned as a part of logic
proper.(CP 4.240, 1902)


Formal logic is a *logica utens* because it is strictly deductive and thus
requires no carefully developed theory of reasoning, unlike
abduction/retroduction and induction. The fact that John Sowa and others
teach formal logic does not make it a *logica docens*. Mathematical
reasoning in accordance with formal logic can be extremely sophisticated,
requiring years of training and practice, but it always remains a *logica
utens*.

CSP: There are certain parts of your *logica utens* which nobody really
doubts. Hegel and his have loyally endeavored to cast a doubt upon it. The
effort has been praiseworthy; but it has not succeeded. The truth of it is
too evident. Mathematical reasoning holds. Why should it not? It relates
only to the creations of the mind, concerning which there is no obstacle to
our learning whatever is true of them. The method of this book, therefore,
is to accept the reasonings of pure mathematics as beyond all doubt. It is
fallible, as everything human is fallible. Twice two may perhaps not be
four. But there is no more satisfactory way of assuring ourselves of
anything than the mathematical way of assuring ourselves of mathematical
theorems. No aid from the science of logic is called for in that field. (CP
2.192, 1902)


Nor, for that matter, in the fields of phaneroscopy, esthetics, or ethics.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 4:44 PM  wrote:

> John, Phyllis,
>
> I think it’s clear enough that “formal logic” (in Peirce at least) is
> mathematical logic. The still unanswered question is whether formal logic
> is a *logica utens* or a *logica docens*. Since you teach the subject
> yourself, John, it would seem to be the latter, something that requires
> explicit instruction before the student can make use of it. But Peirce’s
> “Logic of Mathematics” paper says that “mathematics performs its
> reasonings by a *logica utens* which it develops for itself, and has no
> need of any appeal to a *logica docens.*” Unless he changed his mind
> about this after c. 1896 (which I doubt), the implication is that the *logic
> of mathematics* is a *logica utens* while *mathematical logic* is a *logica
> docens*.
>
> If we accept that compound statement as non-paradoxical, then the question
> with respect to phaneroscopic analysis is whether the mathematics it draws
> upon for principles is the *logic of mathematics* or *mathematical logic*.
> Since phaneroscopy is *cenoscopic*, according to Peirce, that would seem
> to rule out any special *logica docens* being an essential part of it.
>
> Bellucci’s paper does not choose between those two, but says that the
> mathematics involved is really the *logic of relatives*, which (being
> mathematical in nature) is not part of “logic proper,” i.e. critical
> logic.) Is the logic of relatives, or the mathematical basis of it, a *logica
> utens*? What do you think?
>
> By the way, I don’t see as much connection between “oenoscopy” and
> phaneroscopy as ADT apparently does.
>
> Gary f.
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The "generative potency" of the number three.

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., Gary R., List:

GF: ... what I had in mind is the usage of “formal” in reference to
something “Done or made with the forms recognized as ensuring validity;
explicit and definite, as opposed to what is matter of tacit understanding”
(OED) — “formal” as opposed to “informal.” This is quite different from
“formal” as opposed to “material,” which is the usage that applies to
“formal elements of the phaneron.”


You went on to quote Peirce's entry for "formal" in the *Century Dictionary*,
but he also wrote this entry for "material logic" in Baldwin's *Dictionary
of Philosophy and Psychology*.

CSP: Formal logic classifies arguments by producing forms in which, the
letters of the alphabet being replaced by any terms whatever, the result
will be a valid, probable, or sophistic argument, as the case may be;
material logic is a logic which does not produce such perfectly general
forms, but considers a logical universe having peculiar properties.
Such, for example, would be a logic in which every class was assumed to
consist of a finite number of individuals; so that the syllogism of
transposed quantity would hold good. In most cases material logic is
practically a synonym of applied logic. But a system like Hegel's may also
properly be termed material logic. The term originated among the English
Occamists of the 14th century, who declared Aristotle's logic to be
material, in that it did not hold good of the doctrine of the Trinity. (CP
2.549, 1902)


As John Sowa rightly noted, formal logic is simply mathematical logic,
which is diagrammatic and strictly deductive. Hence, it corresponds to
the *logica
utens* that is employed in mathematics, phaneroscopy, esthetics, and
ethics, rather than the *logica docens* that is developed by the normative
science of logic as semeiotic. That being the case, I am inclined to agree
with Gary R. that the formal elements of the phaneron are formal in the
same sense that mathematical logic is formal.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 6:45 AM  wrote:

> Gary R, list,
>
> GR: However, I have trouble with your next comment, that "it seems highly
> unlikely that “formal logic” can be considered a *logica utens* rather
> than a *logica docens*." Why is it unlikely, at least, and perhaps
> especially in consideration of "the simplest mathematics"? I can't say that
> I follow here. What supports your contention, hardly Peirce's, that a *logica
> docens* is a requirement of formal logic, mathematical logic?
>
> GF: I wouldn’t call it a “contention,” more like a suggestion, but anyway,
> what I had in mind is the usage of “formal” in reference to something “Done
> or made with the forms recognized as ensuring validity; explicit and
> definite, as opposed to what is matter of tacit understanding” (OED) —
> “formal” as opposed to “informal.” This is quite different from “formal” as
> opposed to “material,” which is the usage that applies to “formal elements
> of the phaneron.”
>
> Peirce’s entry on the word in the *Century Dictionary* includes these two
> applications to *logic*: 1) “— Formal law, in *logic*, an explicit law;
> also, one which has no exceptions.” 2) “— *Formal logic*, the theory of
> the relations of different forms of propositions and syllogisms; also (by
> loose writers) applied to the opinion of those who hold that such logic is
> adequate to representing human thought.” But you may be right that what
> Peirce had in mind when he wrote of “formal logic” was the formal/material
> distinction (i.e. the logic of external relations rather than internal
> composition), and not the formal/informal or explicit/implicit distinction,
> which certainly informs the difference between *logica docens* and *logica
> utens*. I think this is questionable, but I’m not prepared to argue the
> question one way or the other. We would have to look at each case in
> context.
>
> I certainly don’t deny the generative potency of the number three, just
> wondering about the generative potency of “formal logic.”
>
> Gary f.
>
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

[gnox]

John, Phyllis,

I think it’s clear enough that “formal logic” (in Peirce at least) is
mathematical logic. The still unanswered question is whether formal logic is
a logica utens or a logica docens. Since you teach the subject yourself,
John, it would seem to be the latter, something that requires explicit
instruction before the student can make use of it. But Peirce’s “Logic of
Mathematics” paper says that “mathematics performs its reasonings by a
logica utens which it develops for itself, and has no need of any appeal to
a logica docens.” Unless he changed his mind about this after c. 1896 (which
I doubt), the implication is that the logic of mathematics is a logica utens
while mathematical logic is a logica docens.

If we accept that compound statement as non-paradoxical, then the question
with respect to phaneroscopic analysis is whether the mathematics it draws
upon for principles is the logic of mathematics or mathematical logic. Since
phaneroscopy is cenoscopic, according to Peirce, that would seem to rule out
any special logica docens being an essential part of it.

Bellucci’s paper does not choose between those two, but says that the
mathematics involved is really the logic of relatives, which (being
mathematical in nature) is not part of “logic proper,” i.e. critical logic.)
Is the logic of relatives, or the mathematical basis of it, a logica utens?
What do you think?

By the way, I don’t see as much connection between “oenoscopy” and
phaneroscopy as ADT apparently does.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of sowa @bestweb.net
Sent: 11-Sep-21 15:39
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

 

Gary F,

 

That diagram shows six different aspects of experiences with wine.  There
are many other possible experiences:  worrying about the cost, spitting out
the vinegar, spilling it on the tablecloth or your pants..  But phaneroscopy
is more than just having an experience.  The primary focus is on analyzing
the experience, determining elements, classifying the elements, and mapping
them to a diagram (or other hypoicon) that shows their connections and
interrelationships. 

 

In that regard, Albert Upton's exercises are better examples of phaneroscopy
than ADT's. But Upton goes farther into semeiotic by mapping the experience
to words and sentences and evaluating the results by something similar to
Peirce's methodeutic.

 

John

 

 

 

  _  

From: g...@gnusystems.ca  
Sent: Saturday, September 11, 2021 7:51 AM

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
  site. 

Gary f.

 



 

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re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

[sowa @bestweb.net]

Gary F,

 That diagram shows six different aspects of experiences with wine.  There are 
many other possible experiences:  worrying about the cost, spitting out the 
vinegar, spilling it on the tablecloth or your pants..  But phaneroscopy is 
more than just having an experience.  The primary focus is on analyzing the 
experience, determining elements, classifying the elements, and mapping them to 
a diagram (or other hypoicon) that shows their connections and 
interrelationships.

 In that regard, Albert Upton's exercises are better examples of phaneroscopy 
than ADT's. But Upton goes farther into semeiotic by mapping the experience to 
words and sentences and evaluating the results by something similar to Peirce's 
methodeutic.

 John





 From: g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: Saturday, September 11, 2021 7:51 AM

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne's slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site.

Gary f.






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RE: [PEIRCE-L] The "generative potency" of the number three.

[sowa @bestweb.net]

Gary F, Gary R, List,
  
 The term formal logic was introduced by DeMorgan to refer to Boolean 
algebra and the extensions to it by himself and others.  Peirce 
consistently used it to refer to every version of mathematical logic.  That 
includes his own logic of relatives (1877), his algebra of logic (1880, 
1885), and his existential graphs.  He later used it to refer to Russell's 
logic of 1903 and to the 1910 Principia by Whitehead and Russell.  That 
usage is completely consistent with the use of the term 'formal logic' in 
the century after Peirce.
  
 If you search CP for the term 'formal logic', you'll find a very large 
number of instances.  I have not checked every one, but I strongly doubt 
whether you'll find any exceptions to that point.
  
 John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A comment

[sowa @bestweb.net]

Jon AS, Edwina, List,
  
 As Edwina correctly states, Peirce's hypothesis is a religious opinion.  
The only debatable point is whether there is any scientific methodology 
that could prove or disprove that hypothesis.  Since Peirce did not propose 
any methodology for resolving that debate, and nobody else has discovered 
any such methodology in the past century, the hypothesis is still an open 
question.
  
 Conclusions:  (1) Peirce had a strong belief in that hypothesis; 
therefore, he was a theist of some sort.  (2) Edwina is correct in saying 
that NA and other arguments for  or against that hypothesis are motivated 
by psychology (broadly defined to include instinct).  (3) Agnostics can 
correctly state that the hypothesis remains unproven and unrefuted.
  
 John
  
  


 From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Sent: Saturday, September 11, 2021 12:18 PM   
   ET: I consider that Peirce's outline in the NA article is a religious 
opinion ... not scientific.

   
 Peirce plainly says otherwise (bold added).
  

   CSP: [A]ny normal man who considers the three Universes in the light of 
the hypothesis of God's Reality, and pursues that line of reflection in 
scientific singleness of heart, will come to be stirred to the depths of 
his nature by the beauty of the idea and by its august practicality, even 
to the point of earnestly loving and adoring his strictly hypothetical God, 
and to that of desiring above all things to shape the whole conduct of life 
and all the springs of action into conformity with that hypothesis. (CP 
6.467, EP 2:440)
  

CSP: [T]he N.A. is the First Stage of a scientific inquiry, resulting 
in a hypothesis of the very highest Plausibility, whose ultimate test must 
lie in its value in the self-controlled growth of man's conduct of life. 
(CP 6.480, EP 2:446)
  

CSP: The third argument, enclosing and defending the other two, 
consists in the development of those principles of logic according to which 
the humble argument is the first stage of a scientific inquiry into the 
origin of the three Universes, but of an inquiry which produces, not merely 
scientific belief, which is always provisional, but also a living, 
practical belief, logically justified in crossing the Rubicon with all the 
freightage of eternity. (CP 6.485, EP 2:449)


 According to Peirce, his "Neglected Argument" is part of "a scientific 
inquiry," and its "normal" result when pursued "in scientific singleness of 
heart" is both a "scientific belief" and "a living, practical belief" that 
he himself professes in the article's very first sentence--namely, that God 
as Ens necessarium is "Really creator of all three Universes of Experience" 
(CP 6.453, EP 2:434). He also states in a manuscript draft, "By the proper 
name God, I shall refer to that Being who possesses those Attributes which 
I take to be most essential to the traditional notion" (R 843:25[3]), and 
he proceeds to list several of them.
  
 Hence, my summary is accurate--Peirce believed, at least toward the end of 
his life, that God as traditionally defined is the real and transcendent 
creator of the universe. Anyone is free to disagree with him about this, 
but not to ascribe a different view to him.
  


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inquiry Into Inquiry

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jon A., List:

Understood, I just thought that you might want to share my direct answer to
your specific question with those other audiences.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 11:25 AM Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Dear Jon,
>
> I don't have the time I used to have for writing and here I'm just
> reviewing and reflecting on thoughts from August. The resurrection of the
> Neglected Argument is what formed the main attraction for me, as it took me
> back to fondest days of first encountering Peirce.  Searching the List as
> best I could it appeared to be Phyllis who referred to it this time around,
> so I started with the remarks I made in that context.
>
> Please understand I have zero interest in converting anyone either to or
> fro any particular system of belief in matters of “ultimate concern”, as it
> was phrased in some old course of comparative religion I took many years
> ago.  My interest here is exactly what is was back in the day I first read
> NA, which is the nature and conduct of inquiry, most especially of the
> scientific kind.  Hence the inclusion under this new subject line.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 9/11/2021 11:23 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > Jon A., List:
> >
> > I replied to this post already, but I do not subscribe to the five other
> > forums to which you sent it this time. Perhaps you could forward my
> > response to them, or at least provide a link to it in the Peirce-L
> archive (
> > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00112.html).
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> >
> > On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 10:15 AM Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> >
> >> Cf: Inquiry Into Inquiry • Discussion 2
> >>
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/09/11/inquiry-into-inquiry-discussion-2/
> >>
> >> Re: Peirce List
> >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/thrd14.html#00407
> >> ::: Phyllis Chiasson
> >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00427.html
> >> Re: Peirce List
> >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/thrd4.html#00106
> >> ::: Edwina Taborsky
> >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00106.html
> >>
> >> 
> >> Phenomenology is (with math) the underpinning of both scientific inquiry
> >> and everyday reasoning.  Improve one's capability for observation and
> >> classification and you improve his/her ability to think and reason.
> >> “Neglected Argument” has interesting things to say about the categories
> and
> >> this process as does “What Pragmatism Is”.
> >> 
> >>
> >> Cf: A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God
> >>
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A_Neglected_Argument_for_the_Reality_of_God
> >>
> >> Cf: What Pragmatism Is
> >> https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/whatis/whatpragis.htm
> >>
> >> Although the Neglected Argument was one of the first Peirce essays my
> >> undergraduate philosophy advisor (who happened to be a Unitarian
> minister)
> >> gave me for contemplation — I remember coming to an unconventional,
> >> indirect argument, ontological proof sort of epiphany near the end — I
> >> can't say I've paid all that much attention to Peirce's theodicy since
> >> those days, but I can't recall reading anything he wrote to distinguish
> his
> >> perspective from what is ordinarily called “deism”.  Does he ever
> declare
> >> for the (male personified) anthropomorphic God, so capitalized, of
> Abraham,
> >> Luther, Calvin, or any other, literal, non‑metaphorical theism of that
> kind?
> >>
> >> Resources
> >> =
> >>
> >> • Survey of Inquiry Driven Systems
> >>
> >>
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/12/27/survey-of-inquiry-driven-systems-3/
> >>
> >> Regards,
> >>
> >> Jon
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A comment

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Again, I spell out my interpretation of Peirce's mature cosmology in my
paper, "A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality
of God" (https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187), including how I
understand the earlier passages in light of the later ones. Thanks again
for "repeatedly challenging me to sharpen my thinking and argumentation"
back when I was writing it, as I acknowledge in the last endnote.

Only one claim of mine is really at issue here--Peirce believed, at least
toward the end of his life, that God as traditionally defined is the real
and transcendent creator of the universe. Far from relying on only one
excerpt or only one article, I have provided *numerous *exact quotations
from various writings over the last couple of days where he *explicitly
affirms *this. Unless someone can provide an exact quotation where he
*explicitly
denies* it, I rest my case.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 11:43 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS, list
>
> 1] Then - how do you reconcile Peirce's extensive non-theistic writings,
> about cosmology, about Mind and Matter, which are to be found throughout
> his entire life - including after 1900 - with your insistence that one
> should only consider this one article as definitive of his thought? How do
> you reconcile the two - which are conceptual opposites?
>
> 2] How do you reconcile the notion of a ' strictly hypothetical God'' with
> objective 'Reality' which doesn't operate only within the vagueness of the
> human hypothetical.
>
> 3] And how do you define the NA Argument - which as Jon Awbrey points out,
> is an abductive hypothesis, with science? The scientific method requires
> empirical evidence. As differentiated from the 'method of tenacity, a
> priori and authority, the scientific method requires evidence - objective
> evidence as well as reasoning. Positing a hypothesis is not a complete
> scientific method - it's merely the first step, and therefore, remains a
> hypothesis and not a conclusion.
>
> And again - how do you reconcile this hypothesis which hasn't reached a
> scientific conclusion - with the rest of his lifetime of writing about
> Mind, Cosmology etc - which rests on an analytic framework that does not
> operate with a transcendental god
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sat 11/09/21 12:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET: My goodness - why challenge the List to 'prove Edwina wrong'?
>
>
> Gary R. did no such thing. He simply asked if anyone else on the List
> agrees with the extraordinary claim, in light of the numerous exact
> quotations from various writings that I have provided over the last
> couple of days, that Peirce did not believe, at least toward the end of
> his life, that God as traditionally defined is the real and transcendent
> creator of the universe. As John Sowa rightly said, "For any claims about
> what Peirce believed, please give exact quotations."
>
> Personally, I would welcome any substantive attempt to prove me wrong,
> about this or anything else. Like Peirce, I "would incomparably rather
> undergo the mortification and substantial loss of credit attaching to
> having been proved a blunderer, rather than that anybody should be deceived
> by any fallacious argument" (R 320:30[28], 1907). It seems to me that this
> is the proper attitude of any sincere inquirer who is genuinely seeking the
> truth.
>
> ET: I consider that Peirce's outline in the NA article is a religious
> opinion ... not scientific.
>
>
> Peirce plainly says otherwise (bold added).
>
> CSP: [A]ny normal man who considers the three Universes in the light of
> the hypothesis of God's Reality, and pursues that line of reflection in 
> scientific
> singleness of heart, will come to be stirred to the depths of his nature
> by the beauty of the idea and by its august practicality, even to the point
> of earnestly loving and adoring his strictly hypothetical God, and to that
> of desiring above all things to shape the whole conduct of life and all the
> springs of action into conformity with that hypothesis. (CP 6.467, EP 2:440)
>
> CSP: [T]he N.A. is the First Stage of a scientific inquiry, resulting in
> a hypothesis of the very highest Plausibility, whose ultimate test must lie
> in its value in the self-controlled growth of man's conduct of life. (CP
> 6.480, EP 2:446)
>
> CSP: The third argument, enclosing and defending the other two, consists
> in the development of those principles of logic according to which the
> humble argument is the first stage of a scientific inquiry into the
> origin of the three Universes, but of an inquiry which produces, not merely 
> scientific
> belief, which is always provisional, but also a living, practical belief,
> logically justified in crossing the Rubicon with all the freightage of
> eternity. (CP 6.485, EP 2:449)
>
>
> According to Peirce, his "Neglected Argument" is part of "a scientific
> inquiry," and its "normal" result when 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A comment

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Phyllis, Edwina, List:

I spell out my interpretation of Peirce's mature cosmology in my paper, "A
Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of God" (
https://tidsskrift.dk/signs/article/view/103187). Here is my summary (pp.
13-14).

God as *Ens necessarium*, eternal pure mind, creative of thought (third
Universe), imagines an inexhaustible continuum of real possibilities and
their combinations (first Universe), and exercises perfect freedom in
choosing which of these to actualize (second Universe). This is the *hierarchy
of Being* in terms of Peirce's three Categories (3ns→1ns→2ns). The *sequence
of events* in each case consists of spontaneity followed by reaction and
then habit-taking (1ns→2ns→3ns). The *evolution of states* within our
existing universe (CP 1.409, EP 1.277; 1887-1888) is from complete chaos in
the infinite past, through this ongoing process at any assignable date, to
complete regularity in the infinite future (1ns→3ns→2ns).


Of course, in accordance with Peirce's synechism and objective idealism,
mind is not confined to any one of the three categories. Moreover, we have
had List discussions in the past about how the three divine persons of the
Trinity in Christian theology might correspond to them, and Andrew Robinson
has written extensively on that topic.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 8:38 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Phyllis, List
>
> My problem with defining 'God as firstness' is that Peirce referred to God
> as Mind, which is more operative as Thirdness.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sat 11/09/21 12:00 AM , Phyllis Chiasson
> phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Yes. Peirce was a theist. I think he was very abstract (God as firstness)
> despite the definitions, which are pretty traditional.
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A comment

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

1] Then - how do you reconcile Peirce's extensive non-theistic
writings, about cosmology, about Mind and Matter, which are to be
found throughout his entire life - including after 1900 - with your
insistence that one should only consider this one article as
definitive of his thought? How do you reconcile the two - which are
conceptual opposites?

2] How do you reconcile the notion of a ' strictly hypothetical
God'' with objective 'Reality' which doesn't operate only within the
vagueness of the human hypothetical.

3] And how do you define the NA Argument - which as Jon Awbrey
points out, is an abductive hypothesis, with science? The scientific
method requires empirical evidence. As differentiated from the
'method of tenacity, a priori and authority, the scientific method
requires evidence - objective evidence as well as reasoning. Positing
a hypothesis is not a complete scientific method - it's merely the
first step, and therefore, remains a hypothesis and not a conclusion.

And again - how do you reconcile this hypothesis which hasn't
reached a scientific conclusion - with the rest of his lifetime of
writing about Mind, Cosmology etc - which rests on an analytic
framework that does not operate with a transcendental god

Edwina
 On Sat 11/09/21 12:17 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: My goodness - why challenge the List to 'prove Edwina wrong'?
 Gary R. did no such thing. He simply asked if anyone else on the
List agrees with the extraordinary claim, in light of the numerous
exact quotations from various writings that I have provided over the
last couple of days, that Peirce  did not believe, at least toward
the end of his life, that God as traditionally defined is the real
and transcendent creator of the universe. As John Sowa rightly said,
"For any claims about what Peirce believed, please give exact
quotations."
 Personally, I would welcome any substantive attempt to prove me
wrong, about this or anything else. Like Peirce, I "would
incomparably rather undergo the mortification and substantial loss of
credit attaching to having been proved a blunderer, rather than that
anybody should be deceived by any fallacious argument" (R 320:30[28],
1907). It seems to me that this is the proper attitude of any sincere
inquirer who is genuinely seeking the truth. 
 ET: I consider that Peirce's outline in the NA article is a
religious opinion ... not scientific.
 Peirce plainly says otherwise (bold added).
 CSP: [A]ny normal man who considers the three Universes in the light
of the hypothesis of God's Reality, and pursues that line of
reflection in  scientific singleness of heart, will come to be
stirred to the depths of his nature by the beauty of the idea and by
its august practicality, even to the point of earnestly loving and
adoring his strictly hypothetical God, and to that of desiring above
all things to shape the whole conduct of life and all the springs of
action into conformity with that hypothesis. (CP 6.467, EP 2:440)
  CSP: [T]he N.A. is the First Stage of a scientific inquiry,
resulting in a hypothesis of the very highest Plausibility, whose
ultimate test must lie in its value in the self-controlled growth of
man's conduct of life. (CP 6.480, EP 2:446)
 CSP: The third argument, enclosing and defending the other two,
consists in the development of those principles of logic according to
which the humble argument is the first stage of a  scientific inquiry
into the origin of the three Universes, but of an inquiry which
produces, not merely scientific belief, which is always provisional,
but also a living, practical belief, logically justified in crossing
the Rubicon with all the freightage of eternity. (CP 6.485, EP 2:449)
 According to Peirce, his "Neglected Argument" is part of "a
scientific inquiry," and its "normal" result when pursued "in
scientific singleness of heart" is  both a "scientific belief" and "a
living, practical belief" that he himself professes in the article's
very first sentence--namely, that God as Ens necessarium is "Really
creator of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.453, EP 2:434).
He also states in a manuscript draft, "By the proper name God, I
shall refer to that Being who possesses those Attributes which I take
to be most essential to the traditional notion" (R 843:25[3]), and he
proceeds to list several of them. 
 Hence, my summary is accurate--Peirce believed, at least toward the
end of his life, that God as traditionally defined is the real and
transcendent creator of the universe. Anyone is free to disagree with
him about this, but not to ascribe a different view to him.
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 8:11 AM Edwina Taborsky  wro

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inquiry Into Inquiry

[Jon Awbrey]

Dear Jon,

I don't have the time I used to have for writing and here
I'm just reviewing and reflecting on thoughts from August.
The resurrection of the Neglected Argument is what formed
the main attraction for me, as it took me back to fondest
days of first encountering Peirce.  Searching the List as
best I could it appeared to be Phyllis who referred to it
this time around, so I started with the remarks I made in
that context.

Please understand I have zero interest in converting anyone
either to or fro any particular system of belief in matters
of “ultimate concern”, as it was phrased in some old course
of comparative religion I took many years ago.  My interest
here is exactly what is was back in the day I first read NA,
which is the nature and conduct of inquiry, most especially
of the scientific kind.  Hence the inclusion under this new
subject line.

Regards,

Jon


On 9/11/2021 11:23 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Jon A., List:

I replied to this post already, but I do not subscribe to the five other
forums to which you sent it this time. Perhaps you could forward my
response to them, or at least provide a link to it in the Peirce-L archive (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00112.html).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 10:15 AM Jon Awbrey  wrote:


Cf: Inquiry Into Inquiry • Discussion 2
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/09/11/inquiry-into-inquiry-discussion-2/

Re: Peirce List
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/thrd14.html#00407
::: Phyllis Chiasson
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00427.html
Re: Peirce List
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/thrd4.html#00106
::: Edwina Taborsky
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00106.html


Phenomenology is (with math) the underpinning of both scientific inquiry
and everyday reasoning.  Improve one's capability for observation and
classification and you improve his/her ability to think and reason.
“Neglected Argument” has interesting things to say about the categories and
this process as does “What Pragmatism Is”.


Cf: A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A_Neglected_Argument_for_the_Reality_of_God

Cf: What Pragmatism Is
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/whatis/whatpragis.htm

Although the Neglected Argument was one of the first Peirce essays my
undergraduate philosophy advisor (who happened to be a Unitarian minister)
gave me for contemplation — I remember coming to an unconventional,
indirect argument, ontological proof sort of epiphany near the end — I
can't say I've paid all that much attention to Peirce's theodicy since
those days, but I can't recall reading anything he wrote to distinguish his
perspective from what is ordinarily called “deism”.  Does he ever declare
for the (male personified) anthropomorphic God, so capitalized, of Abraham,
Luther, Calvin, or any other, literal, non‑metaphorical theism of that kind?

Resources
=

• Survey of Inquiry Driven Systems

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/12/27/survey-of-inquiry-driven-systems-3/

Regards,

Jon




_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A comment

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET: My goodness - why challenge the List to 'prove Edwina wrong'?


Gary R. did no such thing. He simply asked if anyone else on the List
agrees with the *extraordinary *claim, in light of the *numerous *exact
quotations from *various *writings that I have provided over the last
couple of days, that Peirce *did not* believe, at least toward the end of
his life, that God as traditionally defined is the real and transcendent
creator of the universe. As John Sowa rightly said, "For any claims about
what Peirce believed, please give exact quotations."

Personally, I would welcome any *substantive *attempt to prove me wrong,
about this or anything else. Like Peirce, I "would incomparably rather
undergo the mortification and substantial loss of credit attaching to
having been proved a blunderer, rather than that anybody should be deceived
by any fallacious argument" (R 320:30[28], 1907). It seems to me that this
is the proper attitude of any sincere inquirer who is genuinely seeking the
truth.

ET: I consider that Peirce's outline in the NA article is a religious
opinion ... not scientific.


Peirce plainly says otherwise (bold added).

CSP: [A]ny normal man who considers the three Universes in the light of the
hypothesis of God's Reality, and pursues that line of reflection in *scientific
*singleness of heart, will come to be stirred to the depths of his nature
by the beauty of the idea and by its august practicality, even to the point
of earnestly loving and adoring his strictly hypothetical God, and to that
of desiring above all things to shape the whole conduct of life and all the
springs of action into conformity with that hypothesis. (CP 6.467, EP 2:440)

CSP: [T]he N.A. is the First Stage of a *scientific *inquiry, resulting in
a hypothesis of the very highest Plausibility, whose ultimate test must lie
in its value in the self-controlled growth of man's conduct of life. (CP
6.480, EP 2:446)

CSP: The third argument, enclosing and defending the other two, consists in
the development of those principles of logic according to which the humble
argument is the first stage of a *scientific *inquiry into the origin of
the three Universes, but of an inquiry which produces, not merely *scientific
*belief, which is always provisional, but also a living, practical belief,
logically justified in crossing the Rubicon with all the freightage of
eternity. (CP 6.485, EP 2:449)


According to Peirce, his "Neglected Argument" is part of "a scientific
inquiry," and its "normal" result when pursued "in scientific singleness of
heart" is *both *a "scientific belief" *and *"a living, practical belief"
that he himself professes in the article's very first sentence--namely,
that God as *Ens necessarium* is "Really creator of all three Universes of
Experience" (CP 6.453, EP 2:434). He also states in a manuscript draft, "By
the proper name God, I shall refer to that Being who possesses those
Attributes which I take to be most essential to the traditional notion" (R
843:25[3]), and he proceeds to list several of them.

Hence, my summary is accurate--Peirce believed, at least toward the end of
his life, that God as traditionally defined is the real and transcendent
creator of the universe. Anyone is free to disagree with him about this,
but not to ascribe a different view to him.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 8:11 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list
>
> My goodness - why challenge the List to 'prove Edwina wrong'?
>
> I claim that Peirce's whole work is not theistic - I don't use just one
> article - and I included quotations from his later years, to show that
> scientifically and logically - Peirce was not a theist 'in the traditional
> sense'  [a 'real and transcendent creator of the universe]. and was
> instead, outlining a self-organized logical, rational, networked,
> agapastically interactive Universe. All of those analyses,
> in extensive outlines,  can be found throughout his work. Hardly something
> that he would abandon in one article.
>
> I have also pointed out the difference between science and religion - and
> I consider that the two have little in common. Religion functions within
> the emotions and the community.  I consider that Peirce's outline in the NA
> article is a religious opinion - though I do like Jon Awbrey's suggestion
> of it as an abductive argument, a 'Holy Guess'..i.e, an opinion and not
> scientific.
>
> I also question why the Appeal-to-Majority' by you should be considered
> definitive?
>
> Edwina
>
> On Fri 10/09/21 11:17 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Jon, List,
>
> Addressing Edwina, you wrote: "So I ask one more time--why not simply
> admit disagreement with his explicitly stated belief, at least toward the
> end of his life, that God as traditionally defined is the real and
> trans

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inquiry Into Inquiry

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jon A., List:

I replied to this post already, but I do not subscribe to the five other
forums to which you sent it this time. Perhaps you could forward my
response to them, or at least provide a link to it in the Peirce-L archive (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00112.html).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 10:15 AM Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Cf: Inquiry Into Inquiry • Discussion 2
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/09/11/inquiry-into-inquiry-discussion-2/
>
> Re: Peirce List
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/thrd14.html#00407
> ::: Phyllis Chiasson
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00427.html
> Re: Peirce List
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/thrd4.html#00106
> ::: Edwina Taborsky
> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00106.html
>
> 
> Phenomenology is (with math) the underpinning of both scientific inquiry
> and everyday reasoning.  Improve one's capability for observation and
> classification and you improve his/her ability to think and reason.
> “Neglected Argument” has interesting things to say about the categories and
> this process as does “What Pragmatism Is”.
> 
>
> Cf: A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God
> https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A_Neglected_Argument_for_the_Reality_of_God
>
> Cf: What Pragmatism Is
> https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/whatis/whatpragis.htm
>
> Although the Neglected Argument was one of the first Peirce essays my
> undergraduate philosophy advisor (who happened to be a Unitarian minister)
> gave me for contemplation — I remember coming to an unconventional,
> indirect argument, ontological proof sort of epiphany near the end — I
> can't say I've paid all that much attention to Peirce's theodicy since
> those days, but I can't recall reading anything he wrote to distinguish his
> perspective from what is ordinarily called “deism”.  Does he ever declare
> for the (male personified) anthropomorphic God, so capitalized, of Abraham,
> Luther, Calvin, or any other, literal, non‑metaphorical theism of that kind?
>
> Resources
> =
>
> • Survey of Inquiry Driven Systems
>
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/12/27/survey-of-inquiry-driven-systems-3/
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Inquiry Into Inquiry

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: Inquiry Into Inquiry • Discussion 2
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2021/09/11/inquiry-into-inquiry-discussion-2/

Re: Peirce List
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/thrd14.html#00407
::: Phyllis Chiasson
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00427.html
Re: Peirce List
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/thrd4.html#00106
::: Edwina Taborsky
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00106.html


Phenomenology is (with math) the underpinning of both scientific inquiry
and everyday reasoning.  Improve one's capability for observation and
classification and you improve his/her ability to think and reason.
“Neglected Argument” has interesting things to say about the
categories and this process as does “What Pragmatism Is”.


Cf: A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A_Neglected_Argument_for_the_Reality_of_God

Cf: What Pragmatism Is
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/bycsp/whatis/whatpragis.htm

Although the Neglected Argument was one of the first Peirce essays my
undergraduate philosophy advisor (who happened to be a Unitarian minister)
gave me for contemplation — I remember coming to an unconventional, indirect
argument, ontological proof sort of epiphany near the end — I can't say I've
paid all that much attention to Peirce's theodicy since those days, but I can't
recall reading anything he wrote to distinguish his perspective from what is
ordinarily called “deism”.  Does he ever declare for the (male personified)
anthropomorphic God, so capitalized, of Abraham, Luther, Calvin, or any other,
literal, non‑metaphorical theism of that kind?

Resources
=

• Survey of Inquiry Driven Systems
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/12/27/survey-of-inquiry-driven-systems-3/

Regards,

Jon
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A comment

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS: For any claims about what Peirce believed, please give exact
quotations.


What an excellent methodological suggestion! If only it had occurred to me
to do that all along! Surely no one would dispute claims about what Peirce
believed that are explicitly confirmed by his own words in multiple exact
quotations. From now on, I will provide relevant excerpts from his writings
to support my interpretations of his thought. Surely no one would complain
about the consistent implementation of such an approach.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Sep 10, 2021 at 11:53 PM sowa @bestweb.net  wrote:

> Jon AS,List,
>
> The "musings" in the NA are so vague that they don't imply anything more
> than the existence of something that affects the ways of thinking of all or
> nearly all populations around the world.  Whatever they call it, it's a
> very important Ens necessarium,.  Beyond that, the NA doesn't say anything
> specific.  Whatever commonalities may occur among the beliefs of the
> nations along the Silk Road can be attributed to wandering gurus.
>
> JFS: In the beginning (en arche) was the Logos, and the Logos was with
> God, and God was the Logos. That is the only definition of God in the New
> Testament.
>
> JAS: On the contrary, it is by no means the only definition of God in the
> New Testament, or even in the writings of John the Evangelist. For example,
> "God is a Spirit" (John 4:24); "God is light" (1 John 1:5); "God is love"
> (1 John 4:8&16).I
>
> Since the words 'spirit', 'light', and 'love' have very different
> definitions in Greek and other languages, the word 'is' cannot be
> interpreted as equality.  It' s unclear how John intended those sentences
> to be interpreted.  The fact that Peirce happened to mention his fondness
> for John's gospel does not provide any evidence for how he interpreted any
> parts of it.
>
> For any claims about what Peirce believed, please give exact quotations.
>
> John
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A comment

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Phyllis, List

My problem with defining 'God as firstness' is that Peirce referred
to God as Mind, which is more operative as Thirdness. 

Edwina
 On Sat 11/09/21 12:00 AM , Phyllis Chiasson
phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com sent:
 Yes. Peirce was a theist. I think he was very abstract (God as
firstness) despite the definitions, which are pretty traditional. 
 On Fri, Sep 10, 2021, 8:18 PM Gary Richmond  wrote:
  Jon, List,
 Addressing Edwina, you wrote: "So I ask one more time--why not
simply admit disagreement with his explicitly stated belief, at least
toward the end of his life, that God as traditionally defined is the
real and transcendent creator of the universe?" 
 Who would deny (except, obviously, Edwina) not so much that you have
argued your position admirably well (which I believe you have), but
that it has been through an abundance of textual support that there
can be no serious substantive argument refuting that "at least toward
the end of his life, that God as traditionally defined is the real and
transcendent creator of the universe"? I think that your "at least"
here is actually quite intellectually generous.  
 So I am genuinely interested and do ask the List: are there other
members of this forum who would deny that Peirce meant what he wrote
when, for but one famous example from 1908 now oft repeated here,
that this was his belief: "THE word "God," so "capitalised" (as we
Americans say), is the definable proper name, signifying Ens
necessarium; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of
Experience"? That is, who else here would deny that Peirce believed
in a creator God? 
 So far -- but I'm willing to be proved wrong -- it seems to me that
Edwina simply refuses to account for or accept anything (notably,
Peirce's own words) that conflicts with her apparently settled view
of the matter, arguing that Peirce was not a theist? 
  No doubt one could argue, as I suppose an atheist must, contra a
creator God, on the basis of "self-organization," etc., etc. But I
thought we were discussing here what Peirce's views were, not even
whether they are correct, held by all theists, etc.
  As you've remarked, the views you're offered in quotation after
quotation aren't even necessarily yours (nor mine, for that matter --
and some of them aren't mine) but, rather, Peirce's if we take him at
his word in the myriad passages you've quoted. I'm actually surprised
that you've hung in there as long as you have, Jon, against Edwina's
obstinate refusal to admit what at this point in the discussion can't
-- or so it seems to me -- reasonably be denied, namely, Peirce's
theism.  
 Parenthetically, I tend to interpret (or, perhaps, misinterpret)
Peirce as a peculiar kind of theist, a kind of 'scientific theist',
this idea based on, for prime example, the concluding lectures in the
1898 series published as Reasoning and the Logic of Things, where the
blackboard example represents for me a kind of ur-continuity before
the Big Bang, one which in my thinking, at least, suggests those
conditions (of? in? the Mind of God) which have the capability to
create not only  this Universe but every possible one. But that could
be an entirely different discussion altogether.
 If no one else but Edwina refutes the principal conclusion that
you've argued for and texually supported, I would like to suggest, as
Edwina already has, that there is hardly a reason to continue this
discussion any further. I'm sure Edwina might want to take me to task
for suggesting that she actually can be as obdurate as she once agreed
with me on List that she can be (as I recall, we employed the word
'stubborn'). But her 'reasoning' in this matter is beyond at least my
ken. 
 Still, if anyone here can support her position as regards Peirce's
beliefs, I for one would like to have them sound in on this. And, i'd
add: if Peirce were not a theist, then what was he?
  Best,
 Gary R
“LET EVERYTHING HAPPEN TO YOU
 BEAUTY AND TERROR
 JUST KEEP GOING
 NO FEELING IS FINAL”
 ― RAINER MARIA RILKE
 Gary Richmond
 Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
 On Fri, Sep 10, 2021 at 4:07 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <
jonalanschm...@gmail.com [2]> wrote:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: The reason that I do not agree with your request ... is because
I read OTHER passages from Peirce that argue against this
'traditional definition'. 
 There is no passage whatsoever in Peirce's writings where he
explicitly denies that God as traditionally defined is the real and
transcendent creator of the universe. On the other hand, I have
quoted several passages where he explicitly affirms that God as
traditionally defined is the real and transcendent creator of the
universe. Interpreting passages where he discusses his cosmology
without explicitly mentioning God at all as somehow rejecting God's
reality and transcendence as creator of the un

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A comment

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

My goodness - why challenge the List to 'prove Edwina wrong'?

I claim that Peirce's whole work is not theistic - I don't use just
one article - and I included quotations from his later years, to show
that scientifically and logically - Peirce was not a theist 'in the
traditional sense'  [a 'real and transcendent creator of the
universe]. and was instead, outlining a self-organized logical,
rational, networked, agapastically interactive Universe. All of those
analyses, in extensive outlines,  can be found throughout his work.
Hardly something that he would abandon in one article.

I have also pointed out the difference between science and religion
- and I consider that the two have little in common. Religion
functions within the emotions and the community.  I consider that
Peirce's outline in the NA article is a religious opinion - though I
do like Jon Awbrey's suggestion of it as an abductive argument, a
'Holy Guess'..i.e, an opinion and not scientific. 

I also question why the Appeal-to-Majority' by you should be
considered definitive? 

Edwina
 On Fri 10/09/21 11:17 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Jon, List,
 Addressing Edwina, you wrote: "So I ask one more time--why not
simply admit disagreement with his explicitly stated belief, at least
toward the end of his life, that God as traditionally defined is the
real and transcendent creator of the universe?" 
 Who would deny (except, obviously, Edwina) not so much that you have
argued your position admirably well (which I believe you have), but
that it has been through an abundance of textual support that there
can be no serious substantive argument refuting that "at least toward
the end of his life, that God as traditionally defined is the real and
transcendent creator of the universe"? I think that your "at least"
here is actually quite intellectually generous.  
 So I am genuinely interested and do ask the List: are there other
members of this forum who would deny that Peirce meant what he wrote
when, for but one famous example from 1908 now oft repeated here,
that this was his belief: "THE word "God," so "capitalised" (as we
Americans say), is the definable proper name, signifying Ens
necessarium; in my belief Really creator of all three Universes of
Experience"? That is, who else here would deny that Peirce believed
in a creator God? 
 So far -- but I'm willing to be proved wrong -- it seems to me that
Edwina simply refuses to account for or accept anything (notably,
Peirce's own words) that conflicts with her apparently settled view
of the matter, arguing that Peirce was not a theist? 
  No doubt one could argue, as I suppose an atheist must, contra a
creator God, on the basis of "self-organization," etc., etc. But I
thought we were discussing here what Peirce's views were, not even
whether they are correct, held by all theists, etc.
  As you've remarked, the views you're offered in quotation after
quotation aren't even necessarily yours (nor mine, for that matter --
and some of them aren't mine) but, rather, Peirce's if we take him at
his word in the myriad passages you've quoted. I'm actually surprised
that you've hung in there as long as you have, Jon, against Edwina's
obstinate refusal to admit what at this point in the discussion can't
-- or so it seems to me -- reasonably be denied, namely, Peirce's
theism.  
 Parenthetically, I tend to interpret (or, perhaps, misinterpret)
Peirce as a peculiar kind of theist, a kind of 'scientific theist',
this idea based on, for prime example, the concluding lectures in the
1898 series published as Reasoning and the Logic of Things, where the
blackboard example represents for me a kind of ur-continuity before
the Big Bang, one which in my thinking, at least, suggests those
conditions (of? in? the Mind of God) which have the capability to
create not only  this Universe but every possible one. But that could
be an entirely different discussion altogether.
 If no one else but Edwina refutes the principal conclusion that
you've argued for and texually supported, I would like to suggest, as
Edwina already has, that there is hardly a reason to continue this
discussion any further. I'm sure Edwina might want to take me to task
for suggesting that she actually can be as obdurate as she once agreed
with me on List that she can be (as I recall, we employed the word
'stubborn'). But her 'reasoning' in this matter is beyond at least my
ken. 
 Still, if anyone here can support her position as regards Peirce's
beliefs, I for one would like to have them sound in on this. And, i'd
add: if Peirce were not a theist, then what was he?
  Best,
 Gary R
“LET EVERYTHING HAPPEN TO YOU
 BEAUTY AND TERROR
 JUST KEEP GOING
 NO FEELING IS FINAL”
 ― RAINER MARIA RILKE
 Gary Richmond
 Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
 O

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Revisiting the N A

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

Are you seriously attempting to set up an argument that IF X-person
does not 'profess belief in the reality of God' - that there is
something 'psychologically problematic' about them??? 

That's quite the unscientific and authoritarian statement! I'm aware
that insistence on this claim as a 'necessary truth' is found in two
of the three monotheistic religions - and is/was the articulated
basis for many wars - but it's not a logical argument.

Equally - to say, for example, that X-person behaves in a certain
way, means that they Believe such and such, is also illogical. You
cannot assert such a necessary and singular linear connection. 

Edwina
 On Fri 10/09/21 10:10 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Phyllis, List:
 After further contemplation and a second reading, I see how there
are likely psychological barriers preventing some inquirers from
professing belief in the reality of God, and how your proposed
approach to interpreting Peirce's Neglected Argument might be helpful
to them. However, from a pragmatistic standpoint, the best evidence
for what someone really believes is not what they say, but how they
behave. 
 CSP: [A]ny normal man who considers the three Universes in the light
of the hypothesis of God's Reality, and pursues that line of
reflection in scientific singleness of heart, will come to be stirred
to the depths of his nature by the beauty of the idea and by its
august practicality, even to the point of earnestly loving and
adoring his strictly hypothetical God, and to that of desiring above
all things to shape the whole conduct of life and all the springs of
action into conformity with that hypothesis. Now to be deliberately
and thoroughly prepared to shape one's conduct into conformity with a
proposition is neither more nor less than the state of mind called
Believing that proposition, however long the conscious classification
of it under that head be postponed. (CP 6.467, EP 2:440, 1908) 
 Some people permanently postpone the conscious classification of
their state of mind as believing in the reality of God, but this does
not entail that they have no such belief. On the contrary, according
to Peirce ...
 CSP: It may, therefore, truly be said that each of us believes in
God, and that the only quest is how to believe less crudely,--a
commonplace yet worth reminding ourselves of. It always seemed to me
that, about 1875, when many men of science used to call themselves
"agnostics," they were, in truth, among those whose Faith in God was
firmest, and that it was precisely because it was so firm that they
did not recognize it. (R 641:22, 1909) 
 Perhaps this is another example of how "facts that stand before our
face and eyes and stare us in the face are far from being, in all
cases, the ones most easily discerned" (CP 6.162, EP 1:333, 1892).
 Regards,
 Jon S.
 On Fri, Sep 10, 2021 at 5:24 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <
jonalanschm...@gmail.com [1]> wrote:
 Phyllis, List:
 Thank you very much for bringing your essay
(https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/chiasson/revisit.htm
[2]) to our attention. On a first reading, I find it to be both
thoughtful and thought-provoking. Nevertheless, as should be clear
from my recent posts, I see no evidence in "A Neglected Argument"
itself--especially when taken in conjunction with the manuscript
drafts and other relevant writings--that Peirce meant anything by
"God" in that context other that the traditional conception,
"religiously (and even politically) loaded" though it may be. 
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
  On Fri, Sep 10, 2021 at 4:52 PM Phyllis Chiasson  wrote:
 Many years ago, I wrote on this topic. It's posted on Arisbe:
Revisiting A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God. It might be
relevant here.   


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/chiasson/revisit.htm
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[5]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Neglected Argument ☯ Abduction ☸ Etc.

[Jon Awbrey]

Peircers,

The fact most neglected about the Neglected Argument (NA)
is its character as an abductive argument, a “Holy Guess”
if you will to believe, and as such the most fallible and
and mutable of hypotheses a happily fallible creature can
create.  Its object is a hypostatic abstraction (HA) from
human experience and the hypostasis has reality in virtue
of whatever properties may be consistently assigned to it.
Does the object of the guess take an active part in human
evolution or does human evolution play its part in making
and reshaping its best guess?

O time, thou must untangle this, not I.
It is too hard a knot for me t'untie.
— “Twelfth Night” • Viola, 2.3.39–40

https://oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_%E2%80%A2_Part_11#A_Projective_Point_of_View

Regards,

Jon

On 9/10/2021 2:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

Jon A., List:

Peirce actually prepared the entries for both "deism" and "deist" in
the *Century
Dictionary* (
http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=02&page=631
).

*deism*, *n*. 1. The doctrine that God is distinct and separated from the world.
2. Belief in the existence of a personal God, accompanied with the denial
of revelation and of the authority of the Christian church. Deism is
opposed to atheism, or the denial of any God; to pantheism, which denies or
ignores the personality of God; to theism, which believes not only in a
God, but in his living relations with his creatures; and to Christianity,
which adds a belief in a historical manifestation of God, as recorded in
the Bible.

*deist*, *n*. 1. One who believes in the existence of a personal God, but
in few or none of the more special doctrines of the Christian religion; one
who holds to some of the more general propositions of the Christian faith
concerning the Deity, but denies revelation and the authority of the
church. The name in this sense is particularly appropriated to a group of
English writers, mostly of the first half of the eighteenth century.
2. One who holds the opinion that there is a God, but no divine providence
governing the affairs of men; one who holds that God is not only distinct
from the world, but also separated from it.


At first glance, Peirce's second definition for "deism" and first
definition for "deist" might seem fairly consistent with his own position.
However, the secondary information that he includes, originally printed in
smaller type, suggests otherwise--"deism" is opposed to "theism," which is
exactly what he calls his own view (as well as "anthropomorphism") in CP
8.262; and "deist" is primarily applicable to certain English writers of
the early 1700s. (Incidentally, "pantheism" is here opposed to both "deism"
and "theism" because it "denies or ignores the personality of God," which
Peirce explicitly affirms in CP 6.162. Hence, the claim by some scholars
that he was a pantheist is untenable.)

Moreover, Peirce's first definition for "deism" and second definition for
"deist" correspond much more closely to how those terms are ordinarily used
today--namely, "belief in the existence of a supreme being, specifically of
a creator who does not intervene in the universe" (
https://www.google.com/search?q=deism). By contrast, Peirce himself
maintains that God is still actively involved in the universe, continuously
creating it on an ongoing basis.

CSP: "Do you believe this Supreme Being to have been the creator of the
universe?" Not so much *to have been* as to be now creating the universe,
concerning which see my articles in the first three volumes of *The Monist*
.. . I think that, vain as it is to attempt to bring to light any definite
meaning from the idea, it is nevertheless true that *all reality* is due to
the creative power of God.

I am inclined to think (though I admit that there is no necessity of taking
that view) that the process of creation has been going on for an infinite
time in the past, and further, during *all *past time, and, further, that
past time had no definite beginning, yet came about by a process which in a
generalized sense, of which we cannot easily get much idea, was a
development. I believe Time to be a reality, and not the figment which
Kant's nominalism proposes to explain it as being. As reality, it is due to
creative power. ...
I think we must regard Creative Activity as an inseparable attribute of
God. (CP 6.505-506, c. 1906)


Finally, as John Sowa noted this morning, "Peirce's favorite gospel is the
one by John the Evangelist." That text obviously declares for the God of
Abraham, even identifying Jesus with Him, and is considered authoritative
Scripture by Christians including Luther and Calvin.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Sep 10, 2021 at 12:05 PM Jon Awbrey  wrote:


List,

Although the Neglected Argument was one of the first Peirce essays my
undergrad phil advisor (who

[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. 

Gary f.

 



 

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] The "generative potency" of the number three.

[gnox]

Gary R, list,

GR: However, I have trouble with your next comment, that "it seems highly 
unlikely that “formal logic” can be considered a logica utens rather than a 
logica docens." Why is it unlikely, at least, and perhaps especially in 
consideration of "the simplest mathematics"? I can't say that I follow here. 
What supports your contention, hardly Peirce's, that a logica docens is a 
requirement of formal logic, mathematical logic?

GF: I wouldn’t call it a “contention,” more like a suggestion, but anyway, what 
I had in mind is the usage of “formal” in reference to something “Done or made 
with the forms recognized as ensuring validity; explicit and definite, as 
opposed to what is matter of tacit understanding” (OED) — “formal” as opposed 
to “informal.” This is quite different from “formal” as opposed to “material,” 
which is the usage that applies to “formal elements of the phaneron.” 

Peirce’s entry on the word in the Century Dictionary includes these two 
applications to logic: 1) “— Formal law, in logic, an explicit law; also, one 
which has no exceptions.” 2) “— Formal logic, the theory of the relations of 
different forms of propositions and syllogisms; also (by loose writers) applied 
to the opinion of those who hold that such logic is adequate to representing 
human thought.” But you may be right that what Peirce had in mind when he wrote 
of “formal logic” was the formal/material distinction (i.e. the logic of 
external relations rather than internal composition), and not the 
formal/informal or explicit/implicit distinction, which certainly informs the 
difference between logica docens and logica utens. I think this is 
questionable, but I’m not prepared to argue the question one way or the other. 
We would have to look at each case in context.

I certainly don’t deny the generative potency of the number three, just 
wondering about the generative potency of “formal logic.”

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Gary Richmond
Sent: 10-Sep-21 23:09



 

Gary F, List

GF: Gary, thank you for reminding us of “The Simplest Mathematics”, i.e. “of 
these very simple branches of mathematics which lie at the root of formal 
logic.” When we juxtapose ["The Simplest Mathematics"] with some of Peirce’s 
other writings on mathematics, logic and phaneroscopy. . .  it raises some 
questions which are not simple at all. 

GR: I agree, and I believe you pointed to one of the most important of the 
"other writings" in this context, viz., “The Logic of Mathematics: An Attempt 
to Develop My Categories From Within.”

GF: I admire Bellucci’s attempt to untangle some of the paradoxes involved in 
phaneroscopic analysis, but I don’t regard it as definitive.  I think some of 
these questions simply have to remain open, as long as we are determined to 
find answers fully consistent with Peirce’s writings and diagrams.

GR: I agree that not only Bellucci's but virtually every "attempt to untangle 
some of the paradoxes involved in phaneroscopic analysis," at least, those I 
know of, cannot be seen as definitive, that many questions remain open, and 
that in a strong sense that the work of explicating and developing 
"phaneroscopic analysis" is still in its infancy, the the science-egg has a 
long way to go before it's hatched and the (potentially) beautiful bird emerges.

GF: To give just one example: is “formal logic” formal in the same sense that 
the “formal elements of the phaneron” are formal?

GR: I have tended to think of it rather in the reverse order that you frame the 
question; so that the question as I see it is: are the formal elements of the 
phaneron formal in the same sense as “formal logic”is formal? That is, since 
phaneroscopy derives at least some of its principles from formal logic, it 
seems sensible to me to answer your question (albeit reversed), yes! The formal 
elements are deeply related in so far as valency theory and the reduction 
thesis in mathematics leads to the Three Universal Categories of phaneroscopy.

As you wrote, Peire, in “The Logic of Mathematics” holds that “mathematics 
performs its reasonings by a logica utens which it develops for itself, and has 
no need of any appeal to a logica docens; for no disputes about reasoning arise 
in mathematics which need to be submitted to the principles of the philosophy 
of thought for decision” (CP 1.417). 

And as you added: "This explains the priority of mathematics over [normative] 
logic as “the philosophy of thought” — and over phenomenology, which comes 
between mathematics and (normative) logic in Peirce’s later classification of 
sciences. . ."

GR: So far we are, I think, in agreement.

However, I have trouble with your next comment, that "it seems highly unlikely 
that “formal logic” can be considered a logica utens rather than a logica 
docens." Why is it unlikely, at least, and perhaps especially in consideration 
of "the simplest mathematics"? I can't say that I follow here. What supports 
y