date:20240111

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-11 Thread John F Sowa

Jon, Jerry, List,

We had discussed this issue many times before.   R 669 was an attempt by Peirce 
to relate all the versions of EGs he had written, published, and toyed with.  
The result (R 669) was a hodge-podge that had many ad hoc constructions that 
Peirce was unable to justify by any convincing proof.  He knew that it was bad.

In R 670, he began to sketch out a new version, and a few weeks later he 
produced his clearest, most precise, and most elegant foundation for EGs.  And 
he confirmed that version as his final choice in his last major letter in 2013.

Peirce's three primitives are conjunction (AND), negation (NOT), and the 
existential quantifier (line of identity).  These three primitives with 
Peirce's 1911 rules of inference are so general and powerful, that they unify 
and simplify Gerhard Gentzen's two systems -- clause form and natural deduction.

As a result an unsolved research problem about the relationship between the two 
systems (stated in the 1970s) was finally solved by a simple proof when 
translated to Peirce's 1911 notation and rules of inference.   That is 
conclusive evidence beyond any shadow of a doubt that Peirce's 1911 system is 
one of his most brilliant achievements.

I'll send another note with all the references.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Sent: 1/11/24 6:13 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: 
Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Jerry, List:

JLRC: The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - 
negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional.

Actually, Peirce points out that only two signs are needed as primitives, with 
the others being derived from them.

CSP: Out of the conceptions of non-relative deductive logic, such as 
consequence, coexistence or composition, aggregation, incompossibility, 
negation, etc., it is only necessary to select two, and almost any two at that, 
to have the material needed for defining the others. What ones are to be 
selected is a question the decision of which transcends the function of this 
branch of logic. (CP 2.379, 1902)

For example, in the Alpha part of Existential Graphs for propositional logic, 
the simplest approach is to select the two primitives as juxtaposition for 
conjunction (coexistence) and shading for negation* such that disjunction is 
then defined as multiple unshaded areas within a shaded area, material 
conditional (consequence) as one unshaded area within a shaded area (scroll), 
and bi-conditional as juxtaposed scrolls with the antecedent and consequent 
reversed. The Beta part for first-order predicate logic adds one more 
primitive, the line of identity for existential quantification such that 
universal quantification is then defined as a line of identity whose outermost 
part is within a shaded area.

*As I have discussed on the List many times before, although this choice is 
practically more efficient and easier to explain, Peirce suggests on several 
occasions that it is philosophically more accurate to select the scroll for 
material implication as the second primitive such that negation is then defined 
as a scroll with a blackened inner close shrunk to infinitesimal size, 
signifying that every proposition is true if the antecedent is true (CP 
4.454-456, 1903; CP 4.564n, c. 1906; R 300:[47-51], 1908; R 669:[16-18], 1911).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 12:52 PM Jerry LR Chandler 
 wrote:
On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

But  you already know this

Edwinia:

If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste my 
time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the 
grammatical structures of your and other responses.

Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between ordered 
pairs.

The classical  logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - 
negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional.

These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian syllogisms.  
Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence grammars.  For a 
discussion of Peircian “tokens and types” from a categorical perspective, see 
the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - Language - Ontology. 2022.

Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation constrained 
to multi-valued logics?

My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that the 
classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of molecular 
sentences.  (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert Rosen’s 
writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy or dogmas 
or….  Just seeking a scientifically use

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-11 Thread John F Sowa

Jerry, Jon, List,

There is no single theory by Peirce that can explain everything.  For any 
particular quotation, it's important to study the context to determine which 
theory (or theories) Peirce was using when he wrote that paragraph.

JLRC> We seem to be on different wavelengths...  It seems to me that there is a 
profound distinction between a categorical decision to express a feeling / 
emotion and experiencing a relation with the exterior world...  Further the 
design and conduct of chemical experiments necessary to compose two nouns into 
a single “sin-sign”, such as planning to combine Sodium and Chlorine to create 
Sodium Chloride (NaCl) is another example.   Perhaps the modern usage of 
symbols differs at a foundational level of logical meanings than during the CSP 
era.

Peirce's background in philosophy, science, formal logic, and semeiotic is very 
much at the same level as modern developments in the cognitive sciences 
(Philosopy, Psychology, Linguistics, Artificial Intelligence, Neuroscience, and 
Anthropology).  At Peirce conferences (Sesquicentennial in 1989 and Centennial 
in 2019), there were many specialists from all those fields who showed how 
modern and up-to-date his contributions have been.

In the quotations cited by Jon (copy below), the context shows that Peirce was 
addressing different issues from different areas of his vast range of thought.  
 In some cases, the issues are about logic, in other cases phaneroscopy or some 
other field may be more relevant.

I agree with Jon that "We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other 
common noun for "camel" in this passage."

But it's essential to ask in what context Peirce might happen to mention those 
three words.  If it's merely to use those words as signs, he might talk about 
them in the same way.  But if he is talking about feelings, such as a headache, 
he  is more likely to be talking about phaneroscopy.  If he is talking about an 
orange, he might be talking about the chemistry and methods for analyzing the 
constituents of orange juice.  And he might mention a camel for many other 
reasons.

Issues about signs are relevant to chemical experiments in many ways.  But when 
Peirce talks about any science, he does so with a focus on applications of 
logic to propositions stated in the terminology of that science.  Issues about 
interpretants of signs are, of course, relevant at the lowest levels of 
interpretinf anything.  But those issues are so detailed that a discussion at 
that level might obscure, rather than clarify the more relevant issues.

Summary:  when citing any quotation by Peirce, we need to consider the context 
of the quotation and how it is related to the context we are discussing  --  
and consider how Peirce himself would relate those two different contexts.   
'when we consider multiple contexts that happen to mention the same words, we 
may have to interpret those words in different senses.

With his deep experience in lexicography for the Century Dictionary, Peirce 
knew very well how words senses shift from one context to another.   We must 
always consider how and whether words from different contexts might be used in 
different senses.

John


From: "Jerry LR Chandler" 
Sent: 1/11/24 4:09 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Cc: Peirce List 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: 
Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Thanks for your answer.

We seem to be on different wavelengths.

On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for "camel" in 
this passage.

It seems to me that there is a profound distinction between a categorical 
decision to express a feeling / emotion and experiencing a relation with the 
exterior world.

One example is that combines both an internal feeling and an external 
experience is sexual copulation.

Further the design and conduct of chemical experiments necessary to compose two 
nouns into a single “sin-sign”, such as planning to combine Sodium and Chlorine 
to create Sodium Chloride (NaCl) is another example.

Perhaps the modern usage of symbols differs at a foundational level of logical 
meanings than during the CSP era.

I appreciate your responses.

Cheers

Jerry

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
To: Peirce-L

Every word is a token of a type--in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a replica of a 
rhematic symbol or symbolic rheme, and therefore a peculiar kind of rhematic 
indexical sinsign.

CSP: Eighth, a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme, is a sign connected with its 
Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica calls 
up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or dispositions of 
that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the Replica is interpreted 
as a sign of an Object that is an instance of that concept. Thus, the Rhematic 
Symbol eithe

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-11 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Jerry, List:

JLRC: The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five
signs - negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and
bi-conditional.

Actually, Peirce points out that only two signs are needed as primitives,
with the others being derived from them.

CSP: Out of the conceptions of non-relative deductive logic, such as
consequence, coexistence or composition, aggregation, incompossibility,
negation, etc., it is only necessary to select two, and almost any two at
that, to have the material needed for defining the others. What ones are to
be selected is a question the decision of which transcends the function of
this branch of logic. (CP 2.379, 1902)

For example, in the Alpha part of Existential Graphs for propositional
logic, the simplest approach is to select the two primitives as
juxtaposition for conjunction (coexistence) and shading for negation* such
that disjunction is then defined as multiple unshaded areas within a shaded
area, material conditional (consequence) as one unshaded area within a
shaded area (scroll), and bi-conditional as juxtaposed scrolls with the
antecedent and consequent reversed. The Beta part for first-order predicate
logic adds one more primitive, the line of identity for existential
quantification such that universal quantification is then defined as a line
of identity whose outermost part is within a shaded area.

*As I have discussed on the List many times before, although this choice is
practically more efficient and easier to explain, Peirce suggests on
several occasions that it is philosophically more accurate to select the
scroll for material implication as the second primitive such that negation
is then defined as a scroll with a blackened inner close shrunk to
infinitesimal size, signifying that *every *proposition is true if the
antecedent is true (CP 4.454-456, 1903; CP 4.564n, c. 1906; R 300:[47-51],
1908; R 669:[16-18], 1911).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 12:52 PM Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
> But  you already know this
>
> Edwinia:
>
> If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste
> my time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the
> grammatical structures of your and other responses.
>
> Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between 
> *ordered
> pair*s.
>
> The classical  logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs -
> negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and
> bi-conditional.
>
> These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian
> syllogisms.  Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence
> grammars.  For a discussion of Peircian *“tokens and types” *from a
> categorical perspective, see the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic -
> Language - Ontology. 2022.
>
> Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation
> constrained to multi-valued logics?
>
> My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that
> the classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of
> molecular sentences.  (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert
> Rosen’s writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy
> or dogmas or….  Just seeking a scientifically useful meaning for my
> research.
>
> Cheers
> Jerry
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-11 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Helmut, list

I’m not sure of your point. 

Peirce is here writing about consciousness - and I think that not all, indeed, 
a great portion of the universe’s semiosic triads have little to do with 
‘consciousness.  That is, in the physics-chemical and biological realms, the 
semiosic process is a vibrant reality in the formation and functioning of 
matter. And, as noted, “thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It 
appears in the work of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world” 4.551

This doesn’t mean that the three categories are not fully operational in the 
non-brain/mind world [ ie, Firstness or feeling, Secondness or reaction; 
Thirdness or the formation of habits]. Indeed, I think that it is clear that 
all categorical modes are found in these realms.These enable anticipation - ie, 
Thirdness or habits is a key mode enabling the material entities to, without 
consciousness, anticipate. Surely a plant anticipates the warmer weather and 
begins to develop leaves?  But consciousness?

Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, Altersense 
and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just as in his 
outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to speak, for 
‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes [Sensagion and Will]; 
and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, Suggestion, Association’. 7.551.

Again - I’m not sure of your point.

Edwina

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:40 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Edwina, list,
>  
> what about primisense, altersense, medisense? Three entities in one person. 
> E.g. I have a headache (feeling, primisense), then I remember, that coffee 
> can help (memory from altersense), then I think, I should drink one 
> (thinking, medisense).
>  
> Best, Helmut
>  
> Gesendet: Donnerstag, 11. Januar 2024 um 18:28 Uhr
> Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
> An: "Jerry LR Chandler" 
> Cc: "Peirce List" 
> Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: 
> Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
> jerry
>  
> Yes- you can feel a headache without going through the rather complicated 
> analysis that it’s a triadic experience.
>  
> No- I don’t think the triad requires ‘exterior objects’ in the sense of being 
> external to the person. You can mutter through your own thoughts all alone! 
> But I think the notion of external does apply to the semiotic process. Take a 
> cell- it necessarily interacts with its surroundings- otherwise it would be 
> dead - and these interactions function within the triadic process. In that 
> sense - yes , semiosis functions by an entity interacting with its exterior.
>  
> And no - the triadic relation is basic within the physical and chemical and 
> biological realms. Ie the non symbolic realms. 
> But  you already know this 
>  
> Edwina
>  
> Sent from my iPhone
>  
> On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>  wrote:
>  
> 
> Edwina, List.
>  
> Very interesting response.
>  
> The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.
>  
> In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of 
> triadicity!u
>  
> The question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of 
> experiences.
> Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?
>  
> Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that 
> can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?
>  
> Cheers.
> Jerry.
>  
> Sent from my iPad 
>  
> On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
>  
> Jerry - list
>  
> Ii think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = 
> or any sound
>  
> 1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that 
> recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:
>  
> Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word
>  
> 2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the 
> triadic interaction is:
>  
> Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the 
> sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. 
>  
> I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or 
> to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. 
>  
> By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative 
> Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of 
> Secondness. 
>  
> So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, 
> that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything 
> is networking with other triads.
>  
> Edwina
>  
>  
>  
> On Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>  wrote:
>  
> List: 
>  
> Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic expression for my 
> feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. 
> Perhaps it would be hel

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-11 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Thanks for your answer.

We seem to be on different wavelengths. 

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for "camel" 
> in this passage.

It seems to me that there is a profound distinction between a categorical 
decision to express a feeling / emotion and experiencing a relation with the 
exterior world.

One example is that combines both an internal feeling and an external 
experience is sexual copulation.  

Further the design and conduct of chemical experiments necessary to compose two 
nouns into a single “sin-sign”, such as planning to combine Sodium and Chlorine 
to create Sodium Chloride (NaCl) is another example. 

Perhaps the modern usage of symbols differs at a foundational level of logical 
meanings than during the CSP era.

I appreciate your responses.

Cheers

Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-11 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Jerry - frankly - I’ve never been a fan of Robert Rosen ; my reference to 
entropy was more along the lines of Prigogine.

And yes- I consider that signs can be understood within the outline of the 
Aristotlean syllogism. ..but I don’t see this triad as confined to the symbolic 
realm of language. 

Edwina

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 1:55 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> But  you already know this 
> 
> Edwinia:  
> 
> If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste my 
> time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the 
> grammatical structures of your and other responses.
> 
> Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between 
> ordered pairs.  
> 
> The classical  logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - 
> negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional.
> 
> These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian syllogisms.  
> Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence grammars.  For a 
> discussion of Peircian “tokens and types” from a categorical perspective, see 
> the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - Language - Ontology. 2022.
> 
> Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation 
> constrained to multi-valued logics?  
> 
> My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that the 
> classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of 
> molecular sentences.  (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert 
> Rosen’s writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy or 
> dogmas or….  Just seeking a scientifically useful meaning for my research.
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry
> 

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-11 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> But  you already know this 

Edwinia:  

If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste my 
time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the 
grammatical structures of your and other responses.

Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between ordered 
pairs.  

The classical  logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - 
negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional.

These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian syllogisms.  
Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence grammars.  For a 
discussion of Peircian “tokens and types” from a categorical perspective, see 
the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - Language - Ontology. 2022.

Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation constrained 
to multi-valued logics?  

My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that the 
classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of molecular 
sentences.  (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert Rosen’s 
writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy or dogmas 
or….  Just seeking a scientifically useful meaning for my research.

Cheers
Jerry

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-11 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Jerry, List:

Every word is a token of a type--in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a replica of a
rhematic symbol or symbolic rheme, and therefore a peculiar kind of
rhematic indexical sinsign.

CSP: Eighth, a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme, is a sign connected with
its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its
Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits
or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the
Replica is interpreted as a sign of an Object that is an instance of that
concept. Thus, the Rhematic Symbol either is, or is very like, what the
logicians call a general term. The Rhematic Symbol, like any Symbol, is
necessarily itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign.
Its Replica, however, is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind,
in that the image it suggests to the mind acts upon a Symbol already in
that mind to give rise to a general concept. ... A Replica of the word
"camel" is likewise a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, being really affected,
through the knowledge of camels, common to the speaker and auditor, by the
real camel it denotes, even if this one is not individually known to the
auditor; and it is through such real connection that the word "camel" calls
up the idea of a camel. The same thing is true of the word "phoenix." For
although no phoenix really exists, real descriptions of the phoenix are
well known to the speaker and his auditor; and thus the word is really
affected by the Object denoted. (CP 2.261, EP 2:295, 1903)


We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for
"camel" in this passage. The word by itself is a name, its dynamical object
is the general concept that it denotes, its immediate object is the idea
that can be associated with it by virtue of previous collateral experience,
its immediate interpretant is its verbal definition describing the range of
meanings that it *possibly could* have, its dynamical interpretant is any
effect that it *actually does *have, and its final interpretant is the
effect that it *necessarily would *have under ideal circumstances, after
infinite inquiry by an infinite community. However, "there can be no
isolated sign" (CP 4.551, 1906)--each dynamical interpretant is affected by
the context of the word's utterance and the interpreter's established
habits of interpretation. Moreover ...

CSP: The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined
with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an
interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as
such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. (EP
2:304, c. 1901)

CSP: A *state of things* is an abstract constituent part of reality, of
such a nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but
one *individual*, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the
all of reality. A. *fact *is so highly a prescissively abstract state of
things, that it can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the
term "simple," here, has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative
expression. (CP 5.549, EP 2:378, 1906)


CSP: {A]n Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is
built up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of
it. ... [P]ropositions are either roughly described states of
Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the
description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second
order serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (R
295, 1906)


CSP: [N]o sign of a thing or kind of thing--the ideas of signs to which
concepts belong--can arise except in a proposition; and no logical
operation upon a proposition can result in anything but a proposition; so
that non-propositional signs can only exist as constituents of
propositions. But it is not true, as ordinarily represented, that a
proposition can be built up of non-propositional signs. The truth is that
concepts are nothing but indefinite problematic judgments. The concept of *man
*[or headache or orange] necessarily involves the thought of the possible
being of a man [or headache or orange]; and thus it is precisely the
judgment, "There may be a man."(CP 4.583, 1906)


In short, words as names of concepts are artifacts used to formulate
propositions describing facts prescinded from the real and continuous
inferential process of semiosis. That is why Existential Graphs, as
individual frames in "a moving-picture of Thought" (CP 4.11, 1906), always
represent propositions. In the Beta part, a name typically cannot be
scribed by itself, it must be attached to at least one line of identity. As
I said before, this attribution of a general (indeterminate) concept to an
indefinite individual makes the former more determinate and the latter more
definite. The logical meaning of a concept (second grade of clearness) is
the continuum of all

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-11 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, list,

what about primisense, altersense, medisense? Three entities in one person. E.g. I have a headache (feeling, primisense), then I remember, that coffee can help (memory from altersense), then I think, I should drink one (thinking, medisense).

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Donnerstag, 11. Januar 2024 um 18:28 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
An: "Jerry LR Chandler"
Cc: "Peirce List"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

jerry

Yes- you can feel a headache without going through the rather complicated analysis that it’s a triadic experience.

No- I don’t think the triad requires ‘exterior objects’ in the sense of being external to the person. You can mutter through your own thoughts all alone!

But I think the notion of external does apply to the semiotic process. Take a cell- it necessarily interacts with its surroundings- otherwise it would be dead - and these interactions function within the triadic process. In that sense - yes , semiosis functions by an entity interacting with its exterior.

And no - the triadic relation is basic within the physical and chemical and biological realms. Ie the non symbolic realms.

But you already know this

Edwina
Sent from my iPhone

On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

Edwina, List.

Very interesting response.

The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.

In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!u

The question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences.

Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?

Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?

Cheers.

Jerry.

Sent from my iPad

On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Jerry - list

Ii think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = or any sound

1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:

Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word

2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the triadic interaction is:

Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the sound entropically dissipates, so to speak.

I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well.

By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of Secondness.

So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is networking with other triads.

Edwina

On Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

List:

Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic _expression_ for my feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation.

Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or controversial (outside the CSP community.)

The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of mathematics.

The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates”

(See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense. That is, in the genetic sense. In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations.

From these perspectives, I now give an examples.

When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning interpreted as a “triadic relation”.

“HEADACHE”.

“ORANGE”

How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ? (Or any other sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)

In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?)

(Or, what locates the three subjects?) Or are the three terms of the triadic relations merely adjectives?

Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s phrases are welcome.

(Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered pairs” in set theory.)

(Ben: In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is correctly remembered.)

Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?

Cheers

Jerry

Participle

rel

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

2024-01-11 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Helmut, List:

HR: A sign (1) cannot determine an interpretant (3).

On the contrary, the sign not only *can*, but *always does* determine the
interpretant. One more time ...

CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which
mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined
by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and *determines the
interpretant* *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the
interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this
"sign." (EP 2:410, 1907; bold added)

This is an analysis of what happens in an individual *event of semiosis* as
prescinded from the real and continuous process. What I call Peirce's "rule
of determination"--"It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but
a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by
nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908)--applies specifically within
the logical order of the various trichotomies for *sign classification*.
His 1903 taxonomy has three of them--for the nature of the sign itself
(qualisign/sinsign/legisign), its relation with its object
(iconic/indexical/symbolic), and its relation with its interpretant
(rheme/dicisign/argument). A qualisign can determine nothing but an icon,
which can determine nothing but a rheme; and an argument can be determined
by nothing but a symbol, which can be determined by nothing but a legisign.
The upshot is that there are only ten classes of signs, not 27 as would be
the case if all combinations were possible.

That said, Peirce's three universal categories (1ns/2ns/3ns) have much
broader application than these "categorical modes," including phaneroscopic
analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating that
yields one sign with two objects and three interpretants.

HR: Therefore I suggested, that the interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the
determining entity.

This is also true in the sense that the interpreter's mind is *another *sign,
which co-determines the dynamical interpretant--its actual effect on that
individual interpreter--along with the sign being analyzed. Hence, the *same
*sign can have *different *dynamical interpretants for different
interpreters who have different collateral experience and different habits
of interpretation.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 10:42 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>  Suppsupplement: And I am not the only one: Vincent Colapietro in a paper
> in the internet wrote:
> "So, Peirce in his investigation of signs considered signs in themselves,
> in their secondness (i.e., in relationship to their object or other), and
> in their thirdness (i.e., in relationship to their interpretant or as a
> factor in a complex, ongoing process of mediation)"
>
> So, where i still may be completely wrong, is, that I didn´t call the
> relations (sign itself, sign-object, sign-interpretant) categorial, but
> sign, object, interpretant. But why not prescind e.g. an interpretant from
> its relation with the sign, and then say, that it is thirdness? To say,
> that that is forbidden, is a bit too strict, I think.
>
> Later Colapietro writes, that in this case it is not modes of being, but
> modes of knowledge. I find the term "mode" or "modality" too unexact, and,
> as I said, have for me replaced it with classification versus composition.
> Supplement: And, I did not insist, that "a first, a second, a third"
> belong to modal categories, but to categories. Of course I know the
> difference between modality and the composition of a sign triad.
> Edwina, what you wrote, is exactly what I wrote: That determination, or,
> as you wrote, production, cannot go upward in category number: A sign (1)
> cannot determin an interpretant (3). Therefore I suggested, that the
> interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. Now I must add,
> that all "entities" of course are prescinded, as they donot really exist
> alone, before somebody feels the need of telling me so.
> Best, Helmut
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-11 Thread Edwina Taborsky

jerryYes- you can feel a headache without going through the rather complicated analysis that it’s a triadic experience.No- I don’t think the triad requires ‘exterior objects’ in the sense of being external to the person. You can mutter through your own thoughts all alone! But I think the notion of external does apply to the semiotic process. Take a cell- it necessarily interacts with its surroundings- otherwise it would be dead - and these interactions function within the triadic process. In that sense - yes , semiosis functions by an entity interacting with its exterior.And no - the triadic relation is basic within the physical and chemical and biological realms. Ie the non symbolic realms. But  you already know this EdwinaSent from my iPhoneOn Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:Edwina, List.Very interesting response.The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!uThe question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences.Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?Cheers.Jerry.Sent from my iPad On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:Jerry - listIi think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = or any sound1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of Secondness. So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is networking with other triads.EdwinaOn Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:List: Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic _expression_ for my feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or controversial (outside the CSP community.)The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of mathematics. The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense.  That is, in the genetic sense.  In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations.From these perspectives, I now give an examples.When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning interpreted as a “triadic relation”.“HEADACHE”.Or“ORANGE”How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ?  (Or any other sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) (Or, what locates the three subjects?)  Or are the three terms of the triadic relations merely adjectives?Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s phrases are welcome.  (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered pairs” in set theory.)  (Ben:  In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is correctly remembered.)Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?CheersJerry Participlerelātus (feminine relāta, neuter relātum); first/second-declension participlePerfect passive participle of referō(having been) driven or carried back(having been) returned, restored, repaid(having been) reported(having been) reconsideredOn Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:ListI think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness has a genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third degree.These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in meaning from the q

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-11 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Helmet- the triadic process - ie the sign meditation is taking place within the persons mind. EdwinaSent from my iPhoneOn Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:Edwina, List.Very interesting response.The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!uThe question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences.Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?Cheers.Jerry.Sent from my iPad On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:Jerry - listIi think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = or any sound1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of Secondness. So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is networking with other triads.EdwinaOn Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:List: Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic _expression_ for my feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or controversial (outside the CSP community.)The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of mathematics. The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense.  That is, in the genetic sense.  In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations.From these perspectives, I now give an examples.When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning interpreted as a “triadic relation”.“HEADACHE”.Or“ORANGE”How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ?  (Or any other sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) (Or, what locates the three subjects?)  Or are the three terms of the triadic relations merely adjectives?Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s phrases are welcome.  (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered pairs” in set theory.)  (Ben:  In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is correctly remembered.)Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?CheersJerry Participlerelātus (feminine relāta, neuter relātum); first/second-declension participlePerfect passive participle of referō(having been) driven or carried back(having been) returned, restored, repaid(having been) reported(having been) reconsideredOn Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:ListI think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness has a genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third degree.These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in meaning from the quotation provided by JAS CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7)The above terms , with, eg, reference to the two objects, means only that the Immediate Object has a ‘degenerate’ or less intact’ form of informational conte

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-11 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

Edwina, List.Very interesting response.The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!uThe question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences.Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?Cheers.Jerry.Sent from my iPad On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:Jerry - listIi think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = or any sound1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of Secondness. So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is networking with other triads.EdwinaOn Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:List: Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic _expression_ for my feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or controversial (outside the CSP community.)The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of mathematics. The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense.  That is, in the genetic sense.  In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations.From these perspectives, I now give an examples.When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning interpreted as a “triadic relation”.“HEADACHE”.Or“ORANGE”How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ?  (Or any other sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) (Or, what locates the three subjects?)  Or are the three terms of the triadic relations merely adjectives?Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s phrases are welcome.  (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered pairs” in set theory.)  (Ben:  In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is correctly remembered.)Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?CheersJerry Participlerelātus (feminine relāta, neuter relātum); first/second-declension participlePerfect passive participle of referō(having been) driven or carried back(having been) returned, restored, repaid(having been) reported(having been) reconsideredOn Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:ListI think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness has a genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third degree.These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in meaning from the quotation provided by JAS CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7)The above terms , with, eg, reference to the two objects, means only that the Immediate Object has a ‘degenerate’ or less intact’ form of informational content than the Dynamic Object. These terms, I suggest, refer to the determination of the semiosic process - and have nothing to do with the categories.  That is, although JAS dec

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

2024-01-11 Thread Helmut Raulien

Suppsupplement: And I am not the only one: Vincent Colapietro in a paper in the internet wrote:

"So, Peirce in his investigation of signs considered signs in themselves, in their secondness (i.e., in relationship to their object or other), and in their thirdness (i.e., in relationship to their interpretant or as a factor in a complex, ongoing process of mediation)"

So, where i still may be completely wrong, is, that I didn´t call the relations (sign itself, sign-object, sign-interpretant) categorial, but sign, object, interpretant. But why not prescind e.g. an interpretant from its relation with the sign, and then say, that it is thirdness? To say, that that is forbidden, is a bit too strict, I think.

Later Colapietro writes, that in this case it is not modes of being, but modes of knowledge. I find the term "mode" or "modality" too unexact, and, as I said, have for me replaced it with classification versus composition.

Supplement: And, I did not insist, that "a first, a second, a third" belong to modal categories, but to categories. Of course I know the difference between modality and the composition of a sign triad.

Edwina, what you wrote, is exactly what I wrote: That determination, or, as you wrote, production, cannot go upward in category number: A sign (1) cannot determin an interpretant (3). Therefore I suggested, that the interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. Now I must add, that all "entities" of course are prescinded, as they donot really exist alone, before somebody feels the need of telling me so.

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Dienstag, 09. Januar 2024 um 17:42 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
An: "Helmut Raulien"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce.

And think: How can an entity organized within Firstness [ pure vague feeling] produce an entity organized within the much more restrictive mode of Secondness [an actual single form]? Think of this situation in terms of ‘information -content. Can an entity with a low information content [ ie, just a feeling]..produce an entity with a higher information content [ a singular thing]? How? Where does it get that increased information to form something that is so much more organized? How does pure indeterminacy [Firstness] produce something determined [ Secondness]. You are moving into magical assumptions!

Tha’s why the outline by Peirce in “EP:272 “A Sign , or Representamen, is a First which stands iin such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant”….

….Has to be understood as referring to ordinal numbers rather than the modal categories. Peirce warned of this error [p 271 note] “The conception of a First, improperly called an ‘object’ and of aSecond, should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness’.

I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc

Again - if you read what he wrote - Peirce was referring to the RELATIONS between the ’nodes’ [Representamen, Object, Interpretant] and to these relations as determinants. He was not referring to their mode-of-being, or the categories.

And - just a wee bit of thought - would lead you to realize that something in a. Mode of Firstness [pure indeterminacy] doesn’t have the informational capacity to produce something in a mode of either Secondness or Thirdness with their much more restrictive natures!

Edwina

On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of "Gestalt" (overall figure)?

Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, composition, or determination. Anyway, from this point of view on, an upward determination (from 1ns to 3ns) is odd. So I guess, that what determines

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

2024-01-11 Thread Helmut Raulien

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Dienstag, 09. Januar 2024 um 17:42 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
An: "Helmut Raulien"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce.

I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc

Edwina

On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien"
An: "Edwina Taborsky"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky"
Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Edwina, list,

ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of the DO). And the knowledge, that snow may be handled by using a shovel, is not part of the sign, but comes from the memory. N

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

2024-01-11 Thread Helmut Raulien

Best, Helmut

Gesendet: Dienstag, 09. Januar 2024 um 17:42 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
An: "Helmut Raulien"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky"
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce.

I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc

Edwina

On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr
Von: "Helmut Raulien"
An: "Edwina Taborsky"
Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky"
Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Edwina, list,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

2024-01-11 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Jerry - list

Ii think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = 
or any sound

1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that 
recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:

Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word

2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the 
triadic interaction is:

Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the 
sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. 

I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or 
to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. 

By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative 
Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of 
Secondness. 

So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that 
means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is 
networking with other triads.

Edwina



> On Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>  wrote:
> 
> List: 
> 
> Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic expression for my 
> feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. 
> Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a 
> critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or 
> controversial (outside the CSP community.)
> The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of 
> mathematics. 
> The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” 
> (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to 
> carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense.  
> That is, in the genetic sense.  In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that 
> is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the 
> implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set 
> of triadic relations.
> 
> From these perspectives, I now give an examples.
> When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning 
> interpreted as a “triadic relation”.
> 
> “HEADACHE”.
> 
> Or
> 
> “ORANGE”
> 
> How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of 
> interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ?  (Or any other sense 
> or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)
> 
> In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) 
> (Or, what locates the three subjects?)  Or are the three terms of the triadic 
> relations merely adjectives?
> 
> Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s 
> phrases are welcome. 
> 
>  (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered 
> pairs” in set theory.)  
> (Ben:  In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is 
> correctly remembered.)
> 
> Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry 
> 
> Participle
> relātus (feminine relāta , 
> neuter relātum ); first 
> /second-declension
>   participle
> Perfect passive participle of referō 
> (having been) driven  or carried 
>  back
> (having been) returned , restored 
> , repaid 
> 
> (having been) reported 
> (having been) reconsidered 
> 
>> On Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>> 
>> List
>> 
>> I think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the 
>> quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as 
>> having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of 
>> Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness 
>> has a genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third 
>> degree.
>> 
>> These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in 
>> meaning from the quotation provided by JAS 
>> 
>>> CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in 
>>> determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two 
>>> Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, 
>>> to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the 
>>> immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is 
>>> secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 
>>> 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7)
>> 
>> The above terms , with, eg, reference

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

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