SV: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Søren Brier]

Dear Clark

I do not know if there is  a connection from Timaeus to Aristotle who ‘s hyle 
has inspired Peirce synechism. It is true that Hyle contains the possibilities 
for making a limited amount of forms (inspired from Plato’s ideas). Pierce – 
inspired by Hegel and Schelling’s objective (German ) idealism- sets the whole 
thing in motion and develops Scotus extreme Scholastic realism. His idea of 
Cosmogony is close to Hegel’s dialectics but in the improved version of the 
three categories interacting much the same way producing signs. But it is not 
clear to me where or how  matter emerges other than as stiffened habits, which 
is pretty close to how we understand elementary particles like bosons and 
fermions. We also see matter as 99,99% emptiness.

Best
Søren


Fra: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sendt: 24. november 2015 17:48
Til: PEIRCE-L
Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

(I broke out your responses to make them a little easier)


On Nov 24, 2015, at 6:46 AM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> 
wrote:

Which order are you speaking of here? Plotinus, among the neoplatonists has two 
classes of absolute otherness. On the one is the One which is pure potency and 
the origin of all the emanations

I THINK THIS IS WHAT PEIRCE HAD IN MINE KELLY PARKER WROTE A PAPER ON THIS AND 
INCLUDED IN HIS BOOK The Continuity of Peirce's Thought.

Yes I think though Parker deals with both. He points out that in the earliest 
Peirce in his more Kantian rather than Hegelian stage that Being and Substance 
were the unthinkable limits - the start and end. (W 2:49-59)

Yet somewhat following Aristotle he has matter as pure privation which is also 
absolutely Other

THIS I DO NOT KNOW AND DO NOT THINK PEIRCE MENTIONES.

Substance are pure habit is this matter. It’s not quite the same as Aristotle 
since he’s moved in a more neoPlatonic form. But then the neoPlatonist were in 
many ways reconciling the arguments of Aristotle, Plato and the Stoics. Parker 
provides a quote relevant to our other discussion on reversibility and habits.

Pairs of states will also begin to take habits, and thus each state having 
different habits with reference to the different other states will give rise to 
bundles of habits, which will be substances. Some of these states will chance 
to take habits of persistency, and will get to be less and less liable to 
disappear; while those that fail to take such habits will fall out of 
existence. Thus substances will get to be permanent. (CP 1.414)

My sense is that “fall out of existence” simply is due to this being a 
continuum. Those without permanence disappear as a practical interaction. So 
the more permanent something is the more it can act and the less permanent the 
less it can act. I suspect that is what Peirce means in the other quote as well 
(CP 8.318)

Within Hebrew mysticism, especially certain forms of Kabbalism, there’s a 
notion of Tzimtzum. (I tend to follow the traditional interpretation that the 
Jewish mystics got this from gnosticism and neoplatonism but there’s a strain 
that argues for the influence going the other way or at least co-evolution. In 
any case the major form is Lurianic Kabbalism which is a 16th century 
phenomena) This is the idea of God withdrawing to create a space within himself 
that creation can take place. In other words a primal nothing creates a 
secondary nothing.

I HAVE SEEN NOTHING LIKE IN PEIRCE

No. I can’t think of it either. Although it’s something to keep in mind. The 
question is the move from a place of pure possibility to actuality. To be 
actual is to have a place. I think there are parallels to the idea in the 
mature Peirce’s conception of the sign. The sign points to its object by a 
guess. But this guess requires a space or a gap. That gap functions in an 
analogous way. (And in the Continental tradition the various aspects of this 
gap become quite significant and are explicitly tied to the Khora of the 
Timaeus)

The connection of matter and form is significant in Aristotle of course even if 
the creation of the elements in the Timaeus is different. However in Aristotle 
hyle is rich and fertile and open to possibilities. Thus it’s pure potency but 
a pure potency *different* from how form is pure potency. One is giving and one 
is receiving. So if we read Peirce and are connecting to these ideas we have to 
be careful not to assume potency is always the same type of potency. With Duns 
Scotus matter is already determined in a sense in that it’s a material cause of 
individuation. That’s different from Aristotle or most of the neoPlatonist. I 
think Peirce usually is following Duns Scotus in terms of haecceity, quantity 
and individuation. (Although not exactly the same

All that said though people have written on pre-firstness (Being in Peirce’s 
early categories) as being Khora. (Inna Semetsky has according

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Nov 26, 2015, at 8:14 AM, Søren Brier  wrote:
> 
> I do not know if there is  a connection from Timaeus to Aristotle who ‘s hyle 
> has inspired Peirce synechism. It is true that Hyle contains the 
> possibilities for making a limited amount of forms (inspired from Plato’s 
> ideas). Pierce – inspired by Hegel and Schelling’s objective (German ) 
> idealism- sets the whole thing in motion and develops Scotus extreme 
> Scholastic realism. His idea of Cosmogony is close to Hegel’s dialectics but 
> in the improved version of the three categories interacting much the same way 
> producing signs. But it is not clear to me where or how  matter emerges other 
> than as stiffened habits, which is pretty close to how we understand 
> elementary particles like bosons and fermions. We also see matter as 99,99% 
> emptiness.

I think the argument ends up being it’s Aristotle by way of the neoPlatonic 
readings of Aristotle. 

I’m not sure I’d call matter as empty in a field theory view of it.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

(I broke out your responses to make them a little easier)


> On Nov 24, 2015, at 6:46 AM, Søren Brier  wrote:
> 
>> Which order are you speaking of here? Plotinus, among the neoplatonists has 
>> two classes of absolute otherness. On the one is the One which is pure 
>> potency and the origin of all the emanations
> 
> I THINK THIS IS WHAT PEIRCE HAD IN MINE KELLY PARKER WROTE A PAPER ON THIS 
> AND INCLUDED IN HIS BOOK The Continuity of Peirce's Thought.

Yes I think though Parker deals with both. He points out that in the earliest 
Peirce in his more Kantian rather than Hegelian stage that Being and Substance 
were the unthinkable limits - the start and end. (W 2:49-59)

>> Yet somewhat following Aristotle he has matter as pure privation which is 
>> also absolutely Other 
> 
> 
> THIS I DO NOT KNOW AND DO NOT THINK PEIRCE MENTIONES.

Substance are pure habit is this matter. It’s not quite the same as Aristotle 
since he’s moved in a more neoPlatonic form. But then the neoPlatonist were in 
many ways reconciling the arguments of Aristotle, Plato and the Stoics. Parker 
provides a quote relevant to our other discussion on reversibility and habits.

Pairs of states will also begin to take habits, and thus each state having 
different habits with reference to the different other states will give rise to 
bundles of habits, which will be substances. Some of these states will chance 
to take habits of persistency, and will get to be less and less liable to 
disappear; while those that fail to take such habits will fall out of 
existence. Thus substances will get to be permanent. (CP 1.414)

My sense is that “fall out of existence” simply is due to this being a 
continuum. Those without permanence disappear as a practical interaction. So 
the more permanent something is the more it can act and the less permanent the 
less it can act. I suspect that is what Peirce means in the other quote as well 
(CP 8.318)

>> Within Hebrew mysticism, especially certain forms of Kabbalism, there’s a 
>> notion of Tzimtzum. (I tend to follow the traditional interpretation that 
>> the Jewish mystics got this from gnosticism and neoplatonism but there’s a 
>> strain that argues for the influence going the other way or at least 
>> co-evolution. In any case the major form is Lurianic Kabbalism which is a 
>> 16th century phenomena) This is the idea of God withdrawing to create a 
>> space within himself that creation can take place. In other words a primal 
>> nothing creates a secondary nothing. 
> 
> I HAVE SEEN NOTHING LIKE IN PEIRCE 

No. I can’t think of it either. Although it’s something to keep in mind. The 
question is the move from a place of pure possibility to actuality. To be 
actual is to have a place. I think there are parallels to the idea in the 
mature Peirce’s conception of the sign. The sign points to its object by a 
guess. But this guess requires a space or a gap. That gap functions in an 
analogous way. (And in the Continental tradition the various aspects of this 
gap become quite significant and are explicitly tied to the Khora of the 
Timaeus)

The connection of matter and form is significant in Aristotle of course even if 
the creation of the elements in the Timaeus is different. However in Aristotle 
hyle is rich and fertile and open to possibilities. Thus it’s pure potency but 
a pure potency *different* from how form is pure potency. One is giving and one 
is receiving. So if we read Peirce and are connecting to these ideas we have to 
be careful not to assume potency is always the same type of potency. With Duns 
Scotus matter is already determined in a sense in that it’s a material cause of 
individuation. That’s different from Aristotle or most of the neoPlatonist. I 
think Peirce usually is following Duns Scotus in terms of haecceity, quantity 
and individuation. (Although not exactly the same 

All that said though people have written on pre-firstness (Being in Peirce’s 
early categories) as being Khora. (Inna Semetsky has according to my notes 
written on this although I don’t have a reference I could find - just comments 
in Peirce-L more than a decade ago) To me the type of possibility in this 
pre-firstness is more the One than Matter in the neoPlatonic conception. 
However this issue of moving from pure possibility to actuality seems to 
require two aspects - a place for the actuality to become actual and then 
potency of putting in the possibility.

>From what I can see (and admittedly I’ve not studied a ton on Peirce’s 
>cosmology here) Peirce just doesn’t deal with this. Typically when dealing 
>with potency he’s talking firstness not this nothing. So even in Peirce we 
>have to distinguish between potencies. 








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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

Peirce has never read Newton??If you, Sung, had read Peirce, you would know 
that this is incorrect. His texts include many references -  sometimes 
complementary and sometimes  not complementary - for he calls it the 
'Corpuscular Philosophy' (CP 5.65) and writes: 

"The three laws of motion draw no dynamical distinction between right-handed 
and left-handed screws, and a mechanical explanation is an explanation founded 
on the three laws of motion". (5.65) and considers an example which 'is 
absolutely incapable of mechanical explanation"...The example, which you can 
read for yourself in the text cited, is about the 'right-handed and left-handed 
screw structures of the molecules of those bodies which are said to be 
optically active". 

That is, Peirce was quite aware of the difference between mechanical and 
non-mechanical processes. Newton's focus was on the mechanical, and as noted, 
such processes are not thermodynamic and do not include the 2nd law of 
thermodynamics and are indifferent to causality. [To  say that a 'force' exists 
is not a definition of the cause of that force]. 

Certainly, if a box is moved from site A to site B, and then, back to site A, 
there is no violation of any of Newton's three laws. But, when the 
non-mechanical insertion of, as Peirce points out,  'habit' is introduced, 
then, the capacity of the bird to fly, due to the evolution of wings (habit), 
then, one cannot reverse this capacity and 'un-evolve' the wings.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 12:15 PM
  Subject: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, 
Arguments


  Hi,


  According to Ed Dellian, even Newton's Second Law of motion is not 
time-reversible (contrary to what I thought), thus invalidating the first 
sentence of Peirce's statement, (112315-1), that I cited in my previous post.


  If these considerations are true, they may warn us against accepting Peirce's 
 statements without critical examinations in light of the many advances that 
have been made in natural and human sciences since his death almost exactly a 
century ago.


  All the best.



  Sung



  -- Forwarded message --
  From: Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de>
  Date: Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 10:56 AM
  Subject: AW: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments
  To: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>, CLARK GOBLE <cl...@lextek.com>
  Cc: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>



  Sung,



  your Peirce quote shows that this great man as so many others has never read 
Newton’s Principia. Had he done so, he would have found Newton’s second law 
“Mutationem motus proportionalem esse vi motrici impressae”, and he would have 
immediately seen that this law is evidently  n o t  time-reversible! Therefore, 
Peirce, and whoever follows him here, is telling his readers nonsense.

  It is a fact that natural experience disproves the concept of reversibility. 
It is also a fact that the idea that “every physical process can be reverse 
without violation of the laws of mechanics” results only from ignorance and/or 
misinterpretation of Newton’s second law which was conceived not as an 
unrealistic absurdity but on the basis of natural experience and experiment! 

  It is one thing to study the philosophy of Peirce, but it is a different 
thing to study the truth of nature.  



  Ed.  


--

  Von: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] Im Auftrag von 
Sungchul Ji
  Gesendet: Montag, 23. November 2015 13:05
  An: CLARK GOBLE
  Cc: PEIRCE-L
  Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments



  Clark, Søren, lists,



  Peirce said: 



  " . . . While every physical process can be reverse without violation of the 
law of mechanics,(112315-1)
  the law of habit forbids such reversal. '  (CP 8.318)



  I am glad you quoted this statement because I wanted to make a comment on it 
when I first read it about a year ago somewhere in CP but could not find it 
again.



  It seems to me that the first sentence of this this statement is false even 
based on our common experience: Evaporated perfume cannot be put back into a 
bottle.  As we all now know the physical law forbidding the reversal of 
evaporated perfume is called the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and there 
developed a whole field of scientific studies during the 20th Century on such 
processes called IRREVERSIBLE thermodynamics, for the contribution to the 
establishment of which I. Prigogine (1917-2003) was awarded a Nobel Prize in 
1977.   



  If this interpretation is correct, the validity of the second sentence in 
(112315-1) seems weakened considerably, although not totally removed, since it 
can stand on its own as an assertion with or without any supporting sci

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

Sung, Peirce was not talking about a situation functioning within Newton's 
laws. If you read what he wrote:

"While every physical process can be reversed without violation of the law of 
mechanics, the law of habits forbids such reversal" [Peirce 1890-92; 8.318) 

As I said, he was talking about the mechanical situation, and the example I 
gave, of a box being moved from site A to site B and back again to site A - IS 
a reversal of a physical process, and does not violate the law of mechanics.  
You can put a Lego form together, and reverse it taking it all apart in the 
same but reverse order, 'without violation of the law of mechanics' - but, you 
cannot do such a thing to the fish in your aquarium. Why not? Because that fish 
is organized 'within the law of habits'. 

The law of habits, which is not a mechanical process, but an organization of 
the morphology, the form of matter, is non-reversible. And it includes 
thermodynamics, while the mechanical laws do not.

Peirce goes on to write: "Accordingly, time may be have been evolved by the law 
of habit" (8.318).  That is, Newton's laws, to my understanding, are time 
symmetric, i.e. indifferent to time...since  they do not include the 2nd law of 
thermodynamics, but only refer to the relation between inertia and motion. In 
that sense, as time-symmetric, the strictly mechanical actions within Newtonian 
mechanics ARE time reversible. 

Edwina






  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 2:19 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments


  Edwina, and lists,


  You wrote:


  "That is, Peirce was quite aware of the difference between mechanical and 
non-mechanical processes.  (112315-1)
  Newton's focus was on the mechanical, and as noted, . . . "


  But the point is, according to Ed Dellian, Newton's law(s)  is(are) not 
time-reversible.  So, if Ed is right, perhaps Peirce 'mis-read' Newton 
(understanding it to bar the time-irreversibilty), not realizing that it is ?


  All the best.


  Sung






  On Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 1:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Peirce has never read Newton??If you, Sung, had read Peirce, you would know 
that this is incorrect. His texts include many references -  sometimes 
complementary and sometimes  not complementary - for he calls it the 
'Corpuscular Philosophy' (CP 5.65) and writes: 

"The three laws of motion draw no dynamical distinction between 
right-handed and left-handed screws, and a mechanical explanation is an 
explanation founded on the three laws of motion". (5.65) and considers an 
example which 'is absolutely incapable of mechanical explanation"...The 
example, which you can read for yourself in the text cited, is about the 
'right-handed and left-handed screw structures of the molecules of those bodies 
which are said to be optically active". 

That is, Peirce was quite aware of the difference between mechanical and 
non-mechanical processes. Newton's focus was on the mechanical, and as noted, 
such processes are not thermodynamic and do not include the 2nd law of 
thermodynamics and are indifferent to causality. [To  say that a 'force' exists 
is not a definition of the cause of that force]. 

Certainly, if a box is moved from site A to site B, and then, back to site 
A, there is no violation of any of Newton's three laws. But, when the 
non-mechanical insertion of, as Peirce points out,  'habit' is introduced, 
then, the capacity of the bird to fly, due to the evolution of wings (habit), 
then, one cannot reverse this capacity and 'un-evolve' the wings.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 12:15 PM
  Subject: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, 
Arguments


  Hi, 


  According to Ed Dellian, even Newton's Second Law of motion is not 
time-reversible (contrary to what I thought), thus invalidating the first 
sentence of Peirce's statement, (112315-1), that I cited in my previous post.


  If these considerations are true, they may warn us against accepting 
Peirce's  statements without critical examinations in light of the many 
advances that have been made in natural and human sciences since his death 
almost exactly a century ago.


  All the best.



  Sung



  -- Forwarded message --
  From: Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de>
  Date: Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 10:56 AM
  Subject: AW: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, 
Arguments
  To: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>, CLARK GOBLE <cl...@lextek.com>
  Cc: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>



  Sung,



  your Peirce quote shows that this great man as so many others has never 
r

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

Ed, you write: 

To write a text that includes references to Newton is not proof that the author 
has read what he refers to".

I agree. However, it also does not provide proof that the author has NOT read 
the specific text.
Your earlier comment to Sung declared:
your Peirce quote shows that this great man as so many others has never read 
Newton's Principia

That's a very different assertion and that is what I was replying to.

My point, as I've outlined in other posts, is that Peirce was not discussing 
Newtonian mechanics, but was discussing the time irreversibility that emerges 
within the formation of 'habits'. 

Newton's focus, as I understand it, was on the mechanics of motion. And, there 
is no indication of efficient cause, only of 'formal' cause, i.e., the actual 
force applied to the mass. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Ed Dellian 
  To: 'Sungchul Ji' ; 'Edwina Taborsky' 
  Cc: 'PEIRCE-L' 
  Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 2:58 PM
  Subject: AW: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments


  Edwina, Sung -

   

  To write a text that includes references to Newton is not proof that the 
author has read what he refers to. This is very often the case with authors. 
Even Albert Einstein, in an interview with I. B. Cohen two weeks before he 
died, admitted that he had never read Newton "because it's all in the 
textbooks". Mhm. - "Newton's focus was on the mechanical"? Well, his focus was 
on "motion" (Principia, Books 1 and 2 entitled "On the motion of bodies"). 
Motion is 

  omnipresent, in "mechanical" and in other instances. - Yes, "To say that a 
force exists is not a definition of the cause of that force". But, if you read 
Newton, you will see that a force is not an effect that requires a cause, 
rather it is a cause itself that acts and produces certain effects in the 
motion of bodies. Newton's authentic second law that states the geometrical 
proportionality of force and change in motion (and therefore the 
time-irreversibility of a generated change in motion) is a true causal "law of 
cause and effect".

   

  Ed.

   

   

   

  Von: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] Im Auftrag von 
Sungchul Ji
  Gesendet: Montag, 23. November 2015 20:19
  An: Edwina Taborsky
  Cc: PEIRCE-L
  Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

   

  Edwina, and lists,

   

  You wrote:

   

  "That is, Peirce was quite aware of the difference between mechanical and 
non-mechanical processes.  (112315-1)
  Newton's focus was on the mechanical, and as noted, . . . "

   

  But the point is, according to Ed Dellian, Newton's law(s)  is(are) not 
time-reversible.  So, if Ed is right, perhaps Peirce 'mis-read' Newton 
(understanding it to bar the time-irreversibilty), not realizing that it is ?

   

  All the best.

   

  Sung

   

   

   

  On Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 1:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

  Peirce has never read Newton??If you, Sung, had read Peirce, you would know 
that this is incorrect. His texts include many references -  sometimes 
complementary and sometimes  not complementary - for he calls it the 
'Corpuscular Philosophy' (CP 5.65) and writes: 

   

  "The three laws of motion draw no dynamical distinction between right-handed 
and left-handed screws, and a mechanical explanation is an explanation founded 
on the three laws of motion". (5.65) and considers an example which 'is 
absolutely incapable of mechanical explanation"...The example, which you can 
read for yourself in the text cited, is about the 'right-handed and left-handed 
screw structures of the molecules of those bodies which are said to be 
optically active". 

   

  That is, Peirce was quite aware of the difference between mechanical and 
non-mechanical processes. Newton's focus was on the mechanical, and as noted, 
such processes are not thermodynamic and do not include the 2nd law of 
thermodynamics and are indifferent to causality. [To  say that a 'force' exists 
is not a definition of the cause of that force]. 

   

  Certainly, if a box is moved from site A to site B, and then, back to site A, 
there is no violation of any of Newton's three laws. But, when the 
non-mechanical insertion of, as Peirce points out,  'habit' is introduced, 
then, the capacity of the bird to fly, due to the evolution of wings (habit), 
then, one cannot reverse this capacity and 'un-evolve' the wings.

   

  Edwina

- Original Message - 

    From: Sungchul Ji 

    To: PEIRCE-L 

Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 12:15 PM

Subject: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, 
Arguments

 

Hi, 

 

According to Ed Dellian, even Newton's Second Law of motion is not 
time-reversible (contrary to what I thought), thus invalidating the first 
se

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Sungchul Ji]

Clark, Søren, lists,

Peirce said:

" . . . While every physical process can be reverse without violation of
the law of mechanics,(112315-1)
the law of habit forbids such reversal. '  (CP 8.318)

I am glad you quoted this statement because I wanted to make a comment on
it when I first read it about a year ago somewhere in CP but could not find
it again.

It seems to me that the first sentence of this this statement is false even
based on our common experience: Evaporated perfume cannot be put back into
a bottle.  As we all now know the physical law forbidding the reversal of
evaporated perfume is called the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and there
developed a whole field of scientific studies during the 20th Century on
such processes called IRREVERSIBLE thermodynamics, for the contribution to
the establishment of which I. Prigogine (1917-2003) was awarded a Nobel
Prize in 1977.

If this interpretation is correct, the validity of the second sentence in
(112315-1) seems weakened considerably, although not totally removed, since
it can stand on its own as an assertion with or without any supporting
scientific evidence.

All the best.

Sung


On Sun, Nov 22, 2015 at 11:18 PM, CLARK GOBLE  wrote:

>
> On Nov 20, 2015, at 1:01 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:
>
> I agree but Peirce is integrating it with an emptiness ontology inspired
> by Buddhism. Hartshorne describes it as his  Buddhisto-Christianism. Bishop
> writes a paper on Peirce and Eastern Thought. See my
> Pure  Zero paper attached.
>
>
> I just finished it. Very interesting. I hadn’t known that Peirce was
> connected with Suzuki before. (Again as I said I know just enough Buddhism
> to be dangerous but not enough to really be able to say much)
>
> One tangental comment that came to mind in one of your quotes. You have
> Peirce commenting on his famous relationship of mind and matter.
>
> I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I suppose
> matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit. While every
> physical process can be reverse without violation of the law of mechanics,
> the law of habit forbids such reversal. (CP 8.318)
>
> I assume here meaning we can’t lose a habit once developed. Does Peirce
> ever defend this position? I confess it seems a dubious position to hold
> although I understand why his ontology requires it.
>
> On much else I’ve taken Peirce, contra say the scientific realists, to
> reject any kind of convergence. That is there can be periods of rapid
> development and then because of fallibilism falling away or change. To use
> the metaphors James Burke famously did in the 70’s and 80’s about science,
> it is less convergence than pinball process.
>
> That’s always seemed more persuasive as a view of habit-forming too. Yet
> the reversibility is something that in at least a few places Peirce denies.
>
> Of course Peirce is inconsistent on this in certain ways. After all he
> conceives of belief as habit yet the ability to change belief entails the
> ability to reverse habit. So I’m never quite sure how to take this. In
> practice it seems sufficient to merely accept that some habits are more
> ingrained than others. Habits as laws are much less reversible. With
> Peirce’s conception of substance (at least in his early period) as
> extremely congealed habit.
>
> At the end of your paper you say,
>
> Like the Buddhists, Peirce sees this order as no-thing. Niemoczynsk (2011)
> shows that both Eckhart and Böhme posited a pre-personal ground within
> God’s own being, where this ground was called “the godhead” or “the abyss”.
> It contains infinite potential, the absolute freedom to be, and even the
> will or desire to be.
>
>
> Which order are you speaking of here? Plotinus, among the neoplatonists
> has two classes of absolute otherness. On the one is the One which is pure
> potency and the origin of all the emanations. Yet somewhat following
> Aristotle he has matter as pure privation which is also absolutely Other.
> Peirce makes a similar move in his early works with pure Being to pure
> Substance and his three categories in between. In the quote you have in
> your paper what he compares to the Hebrew *tohu bohu* is the infinite
> past with pure chaotic emptiness.
>
> Within Hebrew mysticism, especially certain forms of Kabbalism, there’s a
> notion of Tzimtzum. (I tend to follow the traditional interpretation that
> the Jewish mystics got this from gnosticism and neoplatonism but there’s a
> strain that argues for the influence going the other way or at least
> co-evolution. In any case the major form is Lurianic Kabbalism which is a
> 16th century phenomena) This is the idea of God withdrawing to create a
> space within himself that creation can take place. In other words a primal
> nothing creates a secondary nothing. This enables finitude to take place.
> The reason to see connection to platonism is the parallel to the creation
> of the elements 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Edwina Taborsky]

Ed - I'm not getting into 'conspiracy theories' about the 'suppression' of 
Newton's ideas. My point was solely referring to Peirce's comment on the 
irreversibility of habit formation. 

Newton's eight definitions [see J Bruce Brackenridge] - which refer to quantity 
of matter, of force, absolute, accelerative, motive quantity, of centripetal 
force, etc,etc  have nothing to do with Peirce's comment.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Ed Dellian 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Sungchul Ji' 
  Cc: 'PEIRCE-L' 
  Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 4:24 PM
  Subject: AW: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments


  Edwina, 

   

  I'm ready to discuss what "Newton's focus" was, or is. It is not true that 
"there is no indication of efficient cause". Just read the second law, and 
Newton's own explanation thereof (which explanation is mostly suppressed in 
textbooks, together with Newton's eight "definitions" unknown to all who read 
in their textbooks that he just formulated but "three laws of motion").

   

  Ed.  

   


--

  Von: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
  Gesendet: Montag, 23. November 2015 21:37
  An: Ed Dellian; 'Sungchul Ji'
  Cc: 'PEIRCE-L'
  Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

   

  Ed, you write: 

   

  To write a text that includes references to Newton is not proof that the 
author has read what he refers to".

  I agree. However, it also does not provide proof that the author has NOT read 
the specific text.

  Your earlier comment to Sung declared:

  your Peirce quote shows that this great man as so many others has never read 
Newton's Principia

   

  That's a very different assertion and that is what I was replying to.

   

  My point, as I've outlined in other posts, is that Peirce was not discussing 
Newtonian mechanics, but was discussing the time irreversibility that emerges 
within the formation of 'habits'. 

   

  Newton's focus, as I understand it, was on the mechanics of motion. And, 
there is no indication of efficient cause, only of 'formal' cause, i.e., the 
actual force applied to the mass. 


  Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Ed Dellian 

To: 'Sungchul Ji' ; 'Edwina Taborsky' 

Cc: 'PEIRCE-L' 

Sent: Monday, November 23, 2015 2:58 PM

    Subject: AW: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, 
Arguments

 

Edwina, Sung -

 

To write a text that includes references to Newton is not proof that the 
author has read what he refers to. This is very often the case with authors. 
Even Albert Einstein, in an interview with I. B. Cohen two weeks before he 
died, admitted that he had never read Newton "because it's all in the 
textbooks". Mhm. - "Newton's focus was on the mechanical"? Well, his focus was 
on "motion" (Principia, Books 1 and 2 entitled "On the motion of bodies"). 
Motion is 

omnipresent, in "mechanical" and in other instances. - Yes, "To say that a 
force exists is not a definition of the cause of that force". But, if you read 
Newton, you will see that a force is not an effect that requires a cause, 
rather it is a cause itself that acts and produces certain effects in the 
motion of bodies. Newton's authentic second law that states the geometrical 
proportionality of force and change in motion (and therefore the 
time-irreversibility of a generated change in motion) is a true causal "law of 
cause and effect".

 

Ed.

 

 

 

Von: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] Im Auftrag 
von Sungchul Ji
    Gesendet: Montag, 23. November 2015 20:19
An: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: PEIRCE-L
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, 
Arguments

 

Edwina, and lists,

 

You wrote:

 

"That is, Peirce was quite aware of the difference between mechanical and 
non-mechanical processes.  (112315-1)
Newton's focus was on the mechanical, and as noted, . . . "

 

But the point is, according to Ed Dellian, Newton's law(s)  is(are) not 
time-reversible.  So, if Ed is right, perhaps Peirce 'mis-read' Newton 
(understanding it to bar the time-irreversibilty), not realizing that it is ?

 

All the best.

 

Sung

 

 

 

On Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 1:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

Peirce has never read Newton??If you, Sung, had read Peirce, you would know 
that this is incorrect. His texts include many references -  sometimes 
complementary and sometimes  not complementary - for he calls it the 
'Corpuscular Philosophy' (CP 5.65) and writes: 

 

"The three laws of motion draw no dynamical distinction between 
right-handed and le

Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi,

According to Ed Dellian, even Newton's Second Law of motion is not
time-reversible (contrary to what I thought), thus invalidating the first
sentence of Peirce's statement, (112315-1), that I cited in my previous
post.

If these considerations are true, they may warn us against accepting
Peirce's  statements without critical examinations in light of the many
advances that have been made in natural and human sciences since his death
almost exactly a century ago.

All the best.

Sung

-- Forwarded message --
From: Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de>
Date: Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 10:56 AM
Subject: AW: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions,
Arguments
To: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>, CLARK GOBLE <cl...@lextek.com>
Cc: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>


Sung,



your Peirce quote shows that this great man as so many others has never
read Newton’s Principia. Had he done so, he would have found Newton’s
second law “Mutationem motus proportionalem esse vi motrici impressae”, and
he would have immediately seen that this law is evidently  n o t
time-reversible! Therefore, Peirce, and whoever follows him here, is
telling his readers nonsense.

It is a fact that natural experience disproves the concept of
reversibility. It is also a fact that the idea that “every physical process
can be reverse without violation of the laws of mechanics” results only
from ignorance and/or misinterpretation of Newton’s second law which was
conceived not as an unrealistic absurdity but on the basis of natural
experience and experiment!

It is one thing to study the philosophy of Peirce, but it is a different
thing to study the truth of nature.



Ed.
--

*Von:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *Im Auftrag
von *Sungchul Ji
*Gesendet:* Montag, 23. November 2015 13:05
*An:* CLARK GOBLE
*Cc:* PEIRCE-L
*Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions,
Arguments



Clark, Søren, lists,



Peirce said:



" . . . While every physical process can be reverse without violation of
the law of mechanics,(112315-1)
the law of habit forbids such reversal. '  (CP 8.318)



I am glad you quoted this statement because I wanted to make a comment on
it when I first read it about a year ago somewhere in CP but could not find
it again.



It seems to me that the first sentence of this this statement is false even
based on our common experience: Evaporated perfume cannot be put back into
a bottle.  As we all now know the physical law forbidding the reversal of
evaporated perfume is called the Second Law of Thermodynamics, and there
developed a whole field of scientific studies during the 20th Century on
such processes called IRREVERSIBLE thermodynamics, for the contribution to
the establishment of which I. Prigogine (1917-2003) was awarded a Nobel
Prize in 1977.



If this interpretation is correct, the validity of the second sentence in
(112315-1) seems weakened considerably, although not totally removed, since
it can stand on its own as an assertion with or without any supporting
scientific evidence.



All the best.



Sung





On Sun, Nov 22, 2015 at 11:18 PM, CLARK GOBLE <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:



On Nov 20, 2015, at 1:01 PM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk> wrote:



I agree but Peirce is integrating it with an emptiness ontology inspired by
Buddhism. Hartshorne describes it as his  Buddhisto-Christianism. Bishop
writes a paper on Peirce and Eastern Thought. See my

Pure  Zero paper attached.



I just finished it. Very interesting. I hadn’t known that Peirce was
connected with Suzuki before. (Again as I said I know just enough Buddhism
to be dangerous but not enough to really be able to say much)



One tangental comment that came to mind in one of your quotes. You have
Peirce commenting on his famous relationship of mind and matter.



I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I suppose
matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit. While every
physical process can be reverse without violation of the law of mechanics,
the law of habit forbids such reversal. (CP 8.318)



I assume here meaning we can’t lose a habit once developed. Does Peirce
ever defend this position? I confess it seems a dubious position to hold
although I understand why his ontology requires it.



On much else I’ve taken Peirce, contra say the scientific realists, to
reject any kind of convergence. That is there can be periods of rapid
development and then because of fallibilism falling away or change. To use
the metaphors James Burke famously did in the 70’s and 80’s about science,
it is less convergence than pinball process.



That’s always seemed more persuasive as a view of habit-forming too. Yet
the reversibility is something that in at least a few places Peirce denies.



Of course Peirce is inconsistent on this in certain ways. After all he
conceives of belief 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Sungchul Ji]

 **Cell Life and Death, *S. Ji (ed.), Rutgers
University Press, New Brunswick,  pp. 90-119.



On Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 2:58 PM, Ed Dellian <ed.dell...@t-online.de> wrote:

> Edwina, Sung –
>
>
>
> To write a text that includes references to Newton is not proof that the
> author has read what he refers to. This is very often the case with
> authors. Even Albert Einstein, in an interview with I. B. Cohen two weeks
> before he died, admitted that he had never read Newton “because it’s all
> in the textbooks”. Mhm. – “Newton’s focus was on the mechanical”? Well,
> his focus was on “motion” (Principia, Books 1 and 2 entitled “On the motion
> of bodies”). Motion is
>
> omnipresent, in “mechanical” and in other instances. – Yes, “To say that a
> force exists is not a definition of the cause of that force”. But, if you
> read Newton, you will see that a force is not an effect that requires a
> cause, rather it is a cause itself that acts and produces certain effects
> in the motion of bodies. Newton’s authentic second law that states the
> geometrical proportionality of force and change in motion (and therefore
> the time-irreversibility of a generated change in motion) is a true causal
> “law of cause and effect”.
>
>
>
> Ed.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Von:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *Im
> Auftrag von *Sungchul Ji
> *Gesendet:* Montag, 23. November 2015 20:19
> *An:* Edwina Taborsky
> *Cc:* PEIRCE-L
> *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions,
> Arguments
>
>
>
> Edwina, and lists,
>
>
>
> You wrote:
>
>
>
> "That is, Peirce was quite aware of the difference between mechanical and
> non-mechanical processes.  (112315-1)
> Newton's focus was on the mechanical, and as noted, . . . "
>
>
>
> But the point is, according to Ed Dellian, Newton's law(s)  is(are) not
> time-reversible.  So, if Ed is right, perhaps Peirce 'mis-read' Newton
> (understanding it to bar the time-irreversibilty), not realizing that it is
> ?
>
>
>
> All the best.
>
>
>
> Sung
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Nov 23, 2015 at 1:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
> Peirce has never read Newton??If you, Sung, had read Peirce, you would
> know that this is incorrect. His texts include many references -  sometimes
> complementary and sometimes  not complementary - for he calls it the
> 'Corpuscular Philosophy' (CP 5.65) and writes:
>
>
>
> "The three laws of motion draw no dynamical distinction between
> right-handed and left-handed screws, and a mechanical explanation is an
> explanation founded on the three laws of motion". (5.65) and considers an
> example which 'is absolutely incapable of mechanical explanation"...The
> example, which you can read for yourself in the text cited, is about the
> 'right-handed and left-handed screw structures of the molecules of those
> bodies which are said to be optically active".
>
>
>
> That is, Peirce was quite aware of the difference between mechanical and
> non-mechanical processes. Newton's focus was on the mechanical, and as
> noted, such processes are not thermodynamic and do not include the 2nd law
> of thermodynamics and are indifferent to causality. [To  say that a 'force'
> exists is not a definition of the cause of that force].
>
>
>
> Certainly, if a box is moved from site A to site B, and then, back to site
> A, there is no violation of any of Newton's three laws. But, when
> the non-mechanical insertion of, as Peirce points out,  'habit' is
> introduced, then, the capacity of the bird to fly, due to the evolution of
> wings (habit), then, one cannot reverse this capacity and 'un-evolve' the
> wings.
>
>
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
>
> *From:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu>
>
> *To:* PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>
> *Sent:* Monday, November 23, 2015 12:15 PM
>
> *Subject:* Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions,
> Arguments
>
>
>
> Hi,
>
>
>
> According to Ed Dellian, even Newton's Second Law of motion is not
> time-reversible (contrary to what I thought), thus invalidating the first
> sentence of Peirce's statement, (112315-1), that I cited in my previous
> post.
>
>
>
> If these considerations are true, they may warn us against accepting
> Peirce's  statements without critical examinations in light of the many
> advances that have been made in natural and human sciences since his death
> almost exactly a century ago.
>
>
>
> All the best.
>
>
>
> Sung
>
>
>
> -- Forward

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Nov 20, 2015, at 1:01 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:
> 
> I agree but Peirce is integrating it with an emptiness ontology inspired by 
> Buddhism. Hartshorne describes it as his  Buddhisto-Christianism. Bishop 
> writes a paper on Peirce and Eastern Thought. See my  
> Pure  Zero paper attached.

I just finished it. Very interesting. I hadn’t known that Peirce was connected 
with Suzuki before. (Again as I said I know just enough Buddhism to be 
dangerous but not enough to really be able to say much) 

One tangental comment that came to mind in one of your quotes. You have Peirce 
commenting on his famous relationship of mind and matter.

I believe the law of habit to be purely psychical. But then I suppose matter is 
merely mind deadened by the development of habit. While every physical process 
can be reverse without violation of the law of mechanics, the law of habit 
forbids such reversal. (CP 8.318)

I assume here meaning we can’t lose a habit once developed. Does Peirce ever 
defend this position? I confess it seems a dubious position to hold although I 
understand why his ontology requires it. 

On much else I’ve taken Peirce, contra say the scientific realists, to reject 
any kind of convergence. That is there can be periods of rapid development and 
then because of fallibilism falling away or change. To use the metaphors James 
Burke famously did in the 70’s and 80’s about science, it is less convergence 
than pinball process.

That’s always seemed more persuasive as a view of habit-forming too. Yet the 
reversibility is something that in at least a few places Peirce denies.

Of course Peirce is inconsistent on this in certain ways. After all he 
conceives of belief as habit yet the ability to change belief entails the 
ability to reverse habit. So I’m never quite sure how to take this. In practice 
it seems sufficient to merely accept that some habits are more ingrained than 
others. Habits as laws are much less reversible. With Peirce’s conception of 
substance (at least in his early period) as extremely congealed habit.

At the end of your paper you say,

Like the Buddhists, Peirce sees this order as no-thing. Niemoczynsk (2011) 
shows that both Eckhart and Böhme posited a pre-personal ground within God’s 
own being, where this ground was called “the godhead” or “the abyss”. It 
contains infinite potential, the absolute freedom to be, and even the will or 
desire to be.

Which order are you speaking of here? Plotinus, among the neoplatonists has two 
classes of absolute otherness. On the one is the One which is pure potency and 
the origin of all the emanations. Yet somewhat following Aristotle he has 
matter as pure privation which is also absolutely Other. Peirce makes a similar 
move in his early works with pure Being to pure Substance and his three 
categories in between. In the quote you have in your paper what he compares to 
the Hebrew tohu bohu is the infinite past with pure chaotic emptiness. 

Within Hebrew mysticism, especially certain forms of Kabbalism, there’s a 
notion of Tzimtzum. (I tend to follow the traditional interpretation that the 
Jewish mystics got this from gnosticism and neoplatonism but there’s a strain 
that argues for the influence going the other way or at least co-evolution. In 
any case the major form is Lurianic Kabbalism which is a 16th century 
phenomena) This is the idea of God withdrawing to create a space within himself 
that creation can take place. In other words a primal nothing creates a 
secondary nothing. This enables finitude to take place. The reason to see 
connection to platonism is the parallel to the creation of the elements from 
the forms and place or khora in the Timaeus. The khora is receptical or empty 
space and the origin of the forms would be the One of Plotinus.

Getting back to Peirce and your paper you say that Eckhart and Bohme have a 
pre-personal ground within God’s being called the godhead or abyss. This seems 
similar. And of course Duns Scotus who also was a big influence on Peirce has 
some writings on the ground of the Godhead that makes a similar move. I’ve 
studied this more in connection to Heidegger but it seems like there are some 
similar moves with Peirce.

Within Peirce how do you see this notion of the Nothing as source and Nothing 
as end as well as the distinction between God’s being and this space within 
God’s being (or even its ground)?  I confess it’s not something I’ve studied in 
the least.










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SV: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Søren Brier]

Dear Clark

I have developed these thought and their relation to Perennial Philosophy more 
in 
http://www.transpersonalstudies.org/ImagesRepository/ijts/Downloads/A%20Peircean%20Panentheist%20Scientific%20Mysticism.pdf
  and in a couple of other articles to the Concordia transcendentalists.

Best
Søren

Fra: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sendt: 20. november 2015 21:27
Til: PEIRCE-L
Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments


On Nov 20, 2015, at 1:01 PM, Søren Brier <sb@cbs.dk<mailto:sb@cbs.dk>> 
wrote:

I agree but Peirce is integrating it with an emptiness ontology inspired by 
Buddhism. Hartshorne describes it as his  Buddhisto-Christianism. Bishop writes 
a paper on Peirce and Eastern Thought. See my
Pure  Zero paper attached.


Thank you Soren. I’ll try and read that this evening if I have time.

I should note that emptiness ontology can be found in the neoPlatonic 
tradition. I don’t know enough about the speculations of influence on the 
various neoPlatonists to say how much if at all it originated with them.

My knowledge of Buddhism is far more fragmentary than I’d like. So I’m very 
interested in your insights here. My understanding is that sunya in Buddhism is 
actually fairly close to the neoPlatonic notion of emptiness as pure potency 
(which pops up in Peirce in many places as well as other figures like Heidegger 
who had an odd debate about nothing with Carnap tied to all this)

I hope you don’t mind some questions over the weekend after I’ve read your 
paper.

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SV: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Søren Brier]

Dear Clark

As I understand it Peirce’s God develops according to Agapism or the growth of 
love and reasonability. Here he has some similarity to  Neoplatonism, but it is 
a universal philosophy of a religion of love combining mystical Buddhism and 
Christianity.

Best
Søren

Fra: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sendt: 19. november 2015 21:26
Til: PEIRCE-L
Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments


On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:04 PM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

Yes, this agrees with my understanding, which has not changed, but has matured 
and become more clear over time.


After I posted that I thought about it some more and there is a way in which 
Peirce is like Leibniz or Spinoza and that is with the place of God.

Admittedly Peirce’s God is a bit odd - real but not actual. But the 
relationship between God and the universe in Peirce is a bit trickier since he 
rejects the kind of determinate metaphysical necessity that is in Leibniz and 
Spinoza. The whole “working it out” aspect in Peirce which is just alien to the 
universe of Spinoza or Leibniz remains a big difference. Again, this is due to 
what Peirce sees as reason versus how the Rationalists conceived of it. That is 
the place of thirdness and most importantly the gap between object and 
interpretant is what makes him so unique.

While I’ve not studied Peirce’s God enough to say much there, it does seem like 
it’s a God that simply isn’t developing according to necessity in the sense of 
Spinoza. For Spinoza ethics are necessary in the way that Euclid’s geometry is. 
For Peirce (if I have him right given the paucity of his writings on ethics) 
ethics arises evolutionarily. Admittedly Peirce changed his views on ethics 
around the turn of the century. But it seems to me even in the later texts 
there’s a weird tension with ethics between evolution and possible worlds. 
(Many have noted this around the turn of the century but to my eyes this pops 
up even in his relatively early texts)

Of course if ethics is primarily about possibilities then we’re in a more 
platonic setting. Still though, even if in a possible worlds ethics I’m not 
sure this world is the best of all possible worlds. Quite the contrary. But 
I’ll admit that I’m not quite sure how to take God in Peirce. If it’s real then 
it’s much like a platonic idea yet it seems tied to ends that the universe is 
developing towards rather than ends determining the universe at any point. God 
acts upon the world but must be seen as separate from the world in a certain 
way. The universe is coming to its summum bonum but simply isn’t lawful or 
reasonable yet.

Again Peirce seems much more neoplatonic here than rationalist. The flawed soul 
seeks union with Mind. Still it is a parallel I’d not really considered. If you 
take the Rationalists and inject fallibilism and incompleteness you probably do 
end up with something rather like Peirce.



-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 20, 2015, at 12:03 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:
> 
> As I understand it Peirce’s God develops according to Agapism or the growth 
> of love and reasonability. Here he has some similarity to  Neoplatonism, but 
> it is a universal philosophy of a religion of love combining mystical 
> Buddhism and Christianity.

That’s my understanding as well although it’s more in the metaphysical details 
I confess some confusion. 

If I understand it correctly this focus on love and growth rather than 
necessity just ends up with a very different type of universe from Spinoza or 
Leibniz. Perhaps a bit closer to Hegel although my familiarity with the nuances 
of Hegel’s thought is worse than with Leibniz.

I do like this view of growth of love and it is quite similar to my own views. 
I’m not sure one need tend towards mysticism to embrace it as a working view. I 
should also note that most Christian mysticism seems pretty dominated by 
neoPlatonism. It’s precisely because of those neoPlatonic tendencies that they 
often ran into problem with the theologians. (If only because of effacing the 
distinction between creature and creator that was key to the creeds)



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 20, 2015, at 1:01 PM, Søren Brier  wrote:
> 
> I agree but Peirce is integrating it with an emptiness ontology inspired by 
> Buddhism. Hartshorne describes it as his  Buddhisto-Christianism. Bishop 
> writes a paper on Peirce and Eastern Thought. See my  
> Pure  Zero paper attached.
>  

Thank you Soren. I’ll try and read that this evening if I have time.

I should note that emptiness ontology can be found in the neoPlatonic 
tradition. I don’t know enough about the speculations of influence on the 
various neoPlatonists to say how much if at all it originated with them.

My knowledge of Buddhism is far more fragmentary than I’d like. So I’m very 
interested in your insights here. My understanding is that sunya in Buddhism is 
actually fairly close to the neoPlatonic notion of emptiness as pure potency 
(which pops up in Peirce in many places as well as other figures like Heidegger 
who had an odd debate about nothing with Carnap tied to all this)

I hope you don’t mind some questions over the weekend after I’ve read your 
paper.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 19, 2015, at 12:23 AM, John Collier  wrote:
> 
> An idealist like Peirce takes a very broad view of propositions (shared by 
> Platonists like Russell, and many rationalists in general) to the effect that 
> thoughts are out there in the world as well as in our heads. This view 
> requires further argument from the arguments against psychologism. A weaker 
> position is that propositions but not thoughts are out there in the world 
> (early Wittgenstein is an example – a view I share, though I don’t share his 
> view that true propositions = facts).

> Personally I find that putting thoughts in the world independently of humans 
> requires a degree of rationalism that I cannot accept: that forms are 
> meaningful independent of their existence (this is where I disagree with 
> Jerry, I think). In this case logic can apply independently of thought, just 
> as can mathematics, to the world. In other words, the world can be both 
> logical and mathematical. 

I think it’s probably better to think of Peirce here in terms of his scholastic 
realism instead of in terms of the rationalists like Descartes or Leibniz. I 
say that as I always took the key aspect of the rationalists to be an 
epistemological question rather than a metaphysical one. It seems to me Peirce 
isn’t arguing against more empirical ways of learning mathematics or logic. 
(Maybe I’m forgetting something where he attacks those) It’s just that he 
thinks their structure is independent of any finite number of minds.

The reason I think it unwise to call Peirce a rationalist is that he seems to 
ridicule the idea we are ever acting from pure reason.

Reason is of its very essence egotistical. In many matters it acts the
fly on the wheel. Do not doubt that the bee thinks it has a good
reason for making the end of its cell as it does. But I should be very
much surprised to learn that its reason had solved that problem of
isoperimetry that its instinct has solved. Men many times fancy that
they act from reason when, in point of fact, the reasons they attribute
to themselves are nothing but excuses which unconscious instinct invents
to satisfy the teasing “why’s” of the ego. The extent of this
self-delusion is such as to render philosophical rationalism a farce.
(EP 2.32)

I assume this is tied up with evolutionary conceptions of the development of 
reasoning. His scholastic realism would allow that these structures act on 
creatures such that they develop a mind to recognize them (much as with the 
bee) but that it’s just not reason the way a Rationalist would conceive of it.

This isn’t psychologism of course since the issue (if I’m right) is the 
reasonableness of these structures independent of the creatures learning about 
it. It’s not really normal empiricism either since the empiricists were 
typically nominalists. It’s a third way due to this particularly narrow type of 
idealism.




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RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[John Collier]

Yes, this agrees with my understanding, which has not changed, but has matured 
and become more clear over time.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Thursday, 19 November 2015 9:46 PM
To: PEIRCE-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments


On Nov 19, 2015, at 12:23 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

An idealist like Peirce takes a very broad view of propositions (shared by 
Platonists like Russell, and many rationalists in general) to the effect that 
thoughts are out there in the world as well as in our heads. This view requires 
further argument from the arguments against psychologism. A weaker position is 
that propositions but not thoughts are out there in the world (early 
Wittgenstein is an example – a view I share, though I don’t share his view that 
true propositions = facts).


Personally I find that putting thoughts in the world independently of humans 
requires a degree of rationalism that I cannot accept: that forms are 
meaningful independent of their existence (this is where I disagree with Jerry, 
I think). In this case logic can apply independently of thought, just as can 
mathematics, to the world. In other words, the world can be both logical and 
mathematical.

I think it’s probably better to think of Peirce here in terms of his scholastic 
realism instead of in terms of the rationalists like Descartes or Leibniz. I 
say that as I always took the key aspect of the rationalists to be an 
epistemological question rather than a metaphysical one. It seems to me Peirce 
isn’t arguing against more empirical ways of learning mathematics or logic. 
(Maybe I’m forgetting something where he attacks those) It’s just that he 
thinks their structure is independent of any finite number of minds.

The reason I think it unwise to call Peirce a rationalist is that he seems to 
ridicule the idea we are ever acting from pure reason.

Reason is of its very essence egotistical. In many matters it acts the
fly on the wheel. Do not doubt that the bee thinks it has a good
reason for making the end of its cell as it does. But I should be very
much surprised to learn that its reason had solved that problem of
isoperimetry that its instinct has solved. Men many times fancy that
they act from reason when, in point of fact, the reasons they attribute
to themselves are nothing but excuses which unconscious instinct invents
to satisfy the teasing “why’s” of the ego. The extent of this
self-delusion is such as to render philosophical rationalism a farce.
(EP 2.32)

I assume this is tied up with evolutionary conceptions of the development of 
reasoning. His scholastic realism would allow that these structures act on 
creatures such that they develop a mind to recognize them (much as with the 
bee) but that it’s just not reason the way a Rationalist would conceive of it.

This isn’t psychologism of course since the issue (if I’m right) is the 
reasonableness of these structures independent of the creatures learning about 
it. It’s not really normal empiricism either since the empiricists were 
typically nominalists. It’s a third way due to this particularly narrow type of 
idealism.




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:46 PM, Clark Goble wrote:

> Men many times fancy that
> they act from reason when, in point of fact, the reasons they attribute
> to themselves are nothing but excuses which unconscious instinct invents
> to satisfy the teasing “why’s” of the ego. The extent of this
> self-delusion is such as to render philosophical rationalism a farce.
> (EP 2.32)
> 

CSP's training as a chemist provided him a rich vocabulary of emergent terms 
and emergent relationships that are simply not available in the ordinary 
language of philosophy. 
An example of what is meant is amply illustrated by the trichotomy and the role 
of chemical radicals as the essential and logically necessary linkage between 
symbols of indexes of mathematics and mathematical icons and logical arguments 
founded on the rhema. (3.420)

Thus, while CSP's usage of the term "farce" may not be a complete description 
of philosophy, it make a definitive categorical statement. 

I have often amused myself, when reading this list, by pondering the question, 
"What would CSP have thought about this egotistical narrative?"

The result has been many hearty chuckles!   ;-)

The natural sciences are vastly more perplex than we can yet imagine. The game 
is just beginning.

Cheers

jerry





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[Clark Goble]

> On Nov 19, 2015, at 1:04 PM, John Collier  wrote:
> 
> Yes, this agrees with my understanding, which has not changed, but has 
> matured and become more clear over time. <>
>  

After I posted that I thought about it some more and there is a way in which 
Peirce is like Leibniz or Spinoza and that is with the place of God. 

Admittedly Peirce’s God is a bit odd - real but not actual. But the 
relationship between God and the universe in Peirce is a bit trickier since he 
rejects the kind of determinate metaphysical necessity that is in Leibniz and 
Spinoza. The whole “working it out” aspect in Peirce which is just alien to the 
universe of Spinoza or Leibniz remains a big difference. Again, this is due to 
what Peirce sees as reason versus how the Rationalists conceived of it. That is 
the place of thirdness and most importantly the gap between object and 
interpretant is what makes him so unique.

While I’ve not studied Peirce’s God enough to say much there, it does seem like 
it’s a God that simply isn’t developing according to necessity in the sense of 
Spinoza. For Spinoza ethics are necessary in the way that Euclid’s geometry is. 
For Peirce (if I have him right given the paucity of his writings on ethics) 
ethics arises evolutionarily. Admittedly Peirce changed his views on ethics 
around the turn of the century. But it seems to me even in the later texts 
there’s a weird tension with ethics between evolution and possible worlds. 
(Many have noted this around the turn of the century but to my eyes this pops 
up even in his relatively early texts) 

Of course if ethics is primarily about possibilities then we’re in a more 
platonic setting. Still though, even if in a possible worlds ethics I’m not 
sure this world is the best of all possible worlds. Quite the contrary. But 
I’ll admit that I’m not quite sure how to take God in Peirce. If it’s real then 
it’s much like a platonic idea yet it seems tied to ends that the universe is 
developing towards rather than ends determining the universe at any point. God 
acts upon the world but must be seen as separate from the world in a certain 
way. The universe is coming to its summum bonum but simply isn’t lawful or 
reasonable yet.

Again Peirce seems much more neoplatonic here than rationalist. The flawed soul 
seeks union with Mind. Still it is a parallel I’d not really considered. If you 
take the Rationalists and inject fallibilism and incompleteness you probably do 
end up with something rather like Peirce.



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