Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

I sincerely appreciate the more characteristic tone of your latest post,
and hope that we can both maintain it going forward.

JFS:  Before going further, note that my explanation is consistent with the
three footnotes by Hartshorne and Weiss to CP 4.538.


Yes, but as I have indicated before, I believe those footnotes to be
*incorrect*.  The CP editors were not infallible, and their interpretive
comments are not authoritative.  Peirce stated explicitly that "Delome" is
synonymous with "Argument," but made no such remarks about "Seme" or
"Pheme" with respect to "Rheme" or "Dicisign," respectively.  As you said
yourself, "Peirce was very precise in what he wrote"--if he had considered
those sets of terms to be equivalent, he surely would have simply continued
using the latter pair; in fact, his ethics of terminology would have *required
*this.

CSP:  Having thus given some idea of the nature of the reasons which weigh
with me, I proceed to state the rules which I find to be binding upon me in
this field ...
Sixth, for philosophical conceptions which vary by a hair's breadth from
those for which suitable terms exist, to invent terms with a due regard for
the usages of philosophical terminology and those of the English language,
but yet with a distinctly technical appearance ... Having once introduced a
symbol, to consider myself almost as much bound by it as if it had been
introduced by somebody else; and after others have accepted it, to consider
myself more bound to it than anybody else.
Seventh, to regard it as needful to introduce new systems of expression
when new connections of importance between conceptions come to be made out,
or when such systems can, in any way, positively subserve the purposes of
philosophical study. (CP 2.225-226, EP 2:266; 1903)


Peirce considered himself "bound to" his own neologisms as long as the
corresponding conceptions remained the same, but he also considered new
terminology *necessary *once those conceptions varied, even if only "by a
hair's breadth"; all the more so when it would bring out "new connections
of importance between conceptions" or otherwise "subserve the purposes of
philosophical study."  Hence we can infer that he must have had *very
specific reasons* for introducing "Seme" and "Pheme," rather than sticking
with "Rheme" and "Dicisign."  I am by no means breaking new ground here;
for example, Francesco Bellucci takes the same position in *Peirce's
Speculative Grammar:  Logic as Semiotics*.

FB:  New concepts require new names, and Peirce was the last of men to be
indifferent to this.  Indeed, it is during the spring of 1906 that he must
have come to the conclusion that his new findings in speech act theory
necessitated a new grammatical terminology ... A "pheme" is not simply a
dicisign.  A dicisign is something that has the structure of a proposition,
and that can be used to make an assertion.  A pheme is, *more generally*,
something that has the structure of a proposition and that can be used to
perform several speech acts ... the grammatical notion of dicisign is
further enlarged to that of pheme by including non-assertoric dicisigns.
Given the taxonomic investigations I have documented above, this should
come as no surprise.  To signalize the further extension, Peirce re-names
the locutionary trichotomy  into . (pp. 315-316)


As I have explained previously, I think that using "Proposition," rather
than "Dicisign" or "Pheme," is warranted by Peirce's statement elsewhere
that "One and the same proposition may be affirmed, denied, judged,
doubted, inwardly inquired into, put as a question, wished, asked for,
effectively commanded, taught, or merely expressed, and does not thereby
become a different proposition" (EP 2:312; 1904).  Bellucci does not
comment directly on "Seme" vs. "Rheme," but while reviewing our recent List
exchanges (as you requested), I came across this observation in your post
 from a
few weeks ago with the subject line, "A seme is a predicate or a
quasi-predicate."

JFS:  In 1903, Peirce defined the word 'seme' in a way that is inconsistent
with what he wrote in 1906:

CSP:  An *Index*, or *Seme* (*σημα*), is a Representamen whose
Representative character consists in its being an individual Second. (EP
2:274)


Compare this with the 1906 definition.


CSP:  By a *Seme*, I shall mean anything which serves for any purpose as a
substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or
Sign. (CP 4.538)


While the later notion of "Seme" is certainly not *synonymous* with
"Index," it is not *incompatible* with it, either--a Seme *can* be Index,
and it can also be an Icon or a Symbol.  As I have pointed out before, that
is the primary sense in which "Seme" is "much widened" relative to the more
familiar "Term," which only applies to Symbols.  After all, for Peirce the
Logical *Breadth* of a Sign corresponds to the *Objects* that it denotes,
and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[John F Sowa]

On 2/27/2019 12:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

I focused on representing Propositions, rather than the process
of reasoning; and then I decided accordingly to call the resulting
diagrams Propositional Graphs, rather than Modified Existential Graphs.


The notation for every version of logic from Aristotle to the present
has been designed to facilitate the process of reasoning.


Even so, I still might ultimately adopt your recommendation to stick
with EGs


That's a good step in the right direction.  Peirce devoted many years
to developing a precise notation with the most general and powerful
rules of inference ever invented.  The best way to preserve that power
and precision is to define any proposed notation by a formal mapping
to and from his EGs.


You went on to assert that "Seme" cannot possibly apply to a subject,
even though Peirce explicitly stated otherwise in an alternate draft
of the very same paragraph.

CSP:  The first member of the triplet, the 'Seme,' embraces the logical
Term, the Subject or Object of a sentence, everything of any kind, be it
a man or a scribed character, such as h or Pb, which will serve, or is
supposed to serve, for some purpose, as a substitute for its Object.
It is a Sign which pretends, at least, to intend to be virtually its
Object. (R 295:11-12[28-29]; 1906)


No.  Before going further, note that my explanation is consistent
with the three footnotes by Hartshorne and Weiss to CP 4.538.
The first cites CP 2.250f for the triad Rheme, Dicisign, Argument
as equivalent to the "triplet... Term, Proposition, Argument."
The second says that 'Rmeme' as a synonym for 'Seme'.  And the
third says that 'Ddicisign' is a synonym for 'Pheme'.

I copied CP 2.250-251 at the end of this note.  Note that Peirce
wrote that a Dicisign is "a proposition or quasi-proposition".
He also wrote "A Rheme is a Sign which, for its Interpretant,
is a Sign of qualitative Possibility, that is, is understood
as representing such and such a kind of possible Object."

This point distinguishes logical subject and logical predicate:
A subject (which has an attached line of identity) is a sign of
some definite object, but a predicate (with its unattached peg)
is a sign of some unspecified possible object.

In Latin, the word 'quasi', in hypothetical statements, means "as if";
in comparisons, 'quasi' means "as", "like as", "as it were", "almost",
"a sort of".  CP has 78 occurrences of 'quasi-'.  Therefore, the word
'quasi-predicate', which Peirce used at least once, would be suitable
for something that played a role similar to a predicate.  An alternate
word could be 'quasi-rheme'.  But if 'Rheme' is a synonym for 'Seme',
then Rheme would also include both predicates and quasi-predicates.

These points are consistent with the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition
for the terms of syllogisms.  Peirce was the author of the article on
Syllogism in Baldwin's Dictionary, vol 2, pp. 628-639.  It begins

Syllogism consists in stating in one proposition the truth involved
in two non-relative propositions after the elimination of a common
term as -- All a is b; All c is a; ∴ All c is b.


Note that the common term c occurs in both subject position and object
position.  As an object, it is just a rheme or monad -- a predicate
with one peg that is not attached to a line of identity.  But in
subject position, it is part of the noun phrase "All c".  In an EG,
the word 'All' includes a line of identity, which is attached to
the unattached peg in the term c.

Peirce learned syllogisms in 1852 (age 13), wrote a definitive article
about them 50 years later, and continued that interest all his life.
For what he wrote in 1911, see http://jfsowa.com/peirce/eg1911.pdf :

But this letter will be long enough without discussing Aristotle and
his Greek commentators, a subject on which I should soon tire you,
interesting as it is to me.  (NEM 3:167-168)


Then he continues on pp. 168-169 with a proof in EGs:

Fig. 11 shows the two premisses "Any M is P" and "Any S is M"
... giving Fig. 17 [Any S is P]


Note that every EG from Fig. 11 to Fig. 17 of eg1911.pdf has two
or more terms (S, M, or P).  Each subject term is attached to a
line of identity that links it to a peg of an object term.

This evidence shows that (1) Peirce, Hartshorne, and Weiss agree that
a Seme is a Rheme; (2) a term is a monad that may occur in a logical
subject or a logical predicate; and (3) as a logical subject, the
monad refers to something definite; but as a logical predicate,
it refers to some qualitative possibility.

Finally, these points enable us to interpret R 295:11-12[28-29]:
Since every term is a predicate, a Seme or a Rheme would "embrace"
all logical terms, including those which occur in subject position
or object position in any sentence.

But I admit that the word 'or' in the following list may be puzzling:
"the Subject or Object of a sentence, everything of any kind, be it
a man or a scribed character, such as h or Pb, which will serve, or is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  I showed that your interpretation of Peirce was inconsistent with
what he wrote.


You showed that my interpretation of Peirce is inconsistent with your
interpretation of what he wrote.

JFS:  Determine exactly where you made your mistakes and correct them.


My approach to the List is such that I am not afraid to make and correct
mistakes, and I tend to learn a lot when I do so; as the saying goes, "I
write to find out what I think."  Disagreement forces me to sharpen that
thinking, as it has done repeatedly in this case.  I admit that I had some
initial misconceptions about Existential Graphs, which led me to propose
adjustments that were more radical than I realized at the time.  Once I
gained a better understanding, I focused on representing Propositions,
rather than the process of reasoning; and then I decided accordingly to
call the resulting diagrams Propositional Graphs, rather than Modified
Existential Graphs.  Even so, I still might ultimately adopt your
recommendation to stick with EGs and use a multi-Peg Spot for the
Continuous Predicate, consistent with Peirce's own brief experiments in his
Logic Notebook.

JFS:  If by chance you find any point where I or the CP editors made a
mistake, I would be happy to correct my error, and you would have an
article that is worth publishing in Semiotica,


As a relatively trivial case, you attributed the one and only passage where
Peirce used the term "quasi-predicate" to the Minute Logic of 1902, when in
fact it was in the Syllabus of 1903--which the CP editors incorrectly dated
"c. 1902" in the footnote for 2.309, the source reference that encompasses
2.320.  More substantively, at first you argued strenuously against
employing the word "Seme" at all, and later insisted repeatedly that it is
strictly equivalent to "predicate" or "quasi-predicate," citing the CP
editors for suggesting in a footnote to 4.538 that "Seme" and "Rheme" are
synonymous--which is at least misleading, and arguably false; "vase" is a
Seme, while "_ is a vase" is a Rheme.  You went on to assert that
"Seme" cannot possibly apply to a subject, even though Peirce explicitly
stated otherwise in an alternate draft of the very same paragraph.

CSP:  The first member of the triplet, the 'Seme,' embraces the logical
Term, the Subject or Object of a sentence, everything of any kind, be it a
man or a scribed character, such as h or Pb, which will serve, or is
supposed to serve, for some purpose, as a substitute for its Object.  It is
a Sign which pretends, at least, to intend to be virtually its Object. (R
295:11-12[28-29]; 1906)


This definition is extremely broad, and there is no viable way to parse it
as somehow encompassing only predicates and thus excluding subjects,
especially since "the Subject or Object of a sentence" is *right there in
the text*.  Moreover, it is clearly consistent with Peirce's late 1908
analysis of a Proposition--the topic of our sharpest interpretive
disagreement--in which *every *constituent Sign that serves "as a
substitute for its Object" is a Subject, while the one Continuous Predicate
is embodied primarily in the Syntax; sometimes exclusively, as with "Cain
killed Abel."  Again, I believe that there is further fruit to be harvested
from the notion that "the proper way in logic is to take as the subject
whatever there is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the
proposition itself, but collateral experience on the part of its
interpreter is requisite" (NEM 3:885; 1908).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 4:40 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 2/26/2019 12:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > Why should anyone /presuppose /that your analysis is somehow
> > /intrinsically /more accurate than mine?
>
> They shouldn't presuppose anything.  They can just look at the proof.
> I showed that your interpretation of Peirce was inconsistent with
> what he wrote.
>
> > disagree with my analysis does not entail that it lacks such depth.
>
> Disagreement doesn't entail anything.  Proof does.
>
> If you don't want to feel insulted, you should do your homework.
> Study my previous notes.  Determine exactly where you made your
> mistakes and correct them.
>
> If by chance you find any point where I or the CP editors made
> a mistake, I would be happy to correct my error, and you would
> have an article that is worth publishing in Semiotica,
>
> If not, please apologize.
>
> John
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[John F Sowa]

On 2/26/2019 12:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Why should anyone /presuppose /that your analysis is somehow 
/intrinsically /more accurate than mine?


They shouldn't presuppose anything.  They can just look at the proof.
I showed that your interpretation of Peirce was inconsistent with
what he wrote.


disagree with my analysis does not entail that it lacks such depth.


Disagreement doesn't entail anything.  Proof does.

If you don't want to feel insulted, you should do your homework.
Study my previous notes.  Determine exactly where you made your
mistakes and correct them.

If by chance you find any point where I or the CP editors made
a mistake, I would be happy to correct my error, and you would
have an article that is worth publishing in Semiotica,

If not, please apologize.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



The subject heading is ‘Analyzing Propositions’.



What are the propositions here?



‘you are a student’

‘you are a loose thinker’

‘you are condescending’

‘you are insulting’



Any Peircean would recognize these appellations as such.

Hence, the conclusion would be that we understand the points Peirce was
making.

Again, people can read Peirce's words and what we both say about them for
themselves, then draw their own conclusions.



This is man… proud man.

If *A,* then *B;*
But *A:*
[Ergo,] *B.*



This analysis is somehow intrinsically more accurate.

I have carefully made my case and am sticking to substance rather than
sidetracking into personal disparagement.



Perception, you say, is knowledge?

And, indeed, if I may venture to say so, it is not a bad description of
knowledge that you have given, but one which Protagoras also used to give.
Only, he has said the same thing in a different way. For he says somewhere
that man is “the measure of all things, of the existence of the things that
are and the non-existence of the things that are not.”



You have read that, I suppose?



With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 11:46 AM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John, List:
>
> JFS:   If you prefer, I won't call you a student.  I'll call you a "loose
> thinker".
>
>
> So much for not being condescending; and now insulting, as well.  Any
> Peircean would recognize that particular appellation as such.
>
> JFS:  An analysis of the passages you quoted confirms the fact that you
> did not understand the points that Peirce was making.
>
>
> Why should anyone *presuppose *that your analysis is somehow *intrinsically
> *more accurate than mine?  Again, people can read Peirce's words and what
> we both say about them for themselves, then draw their own conclusions.
>
> JFS:  Peirce's writings deserve that depth of analysis.
>
>
> The fact that you happen to disagree with my analysis does not entail that
> it lacks such depth.  I have carefully made my case and responded to your
> objections, sticking to substance rather than sidetracking into personal
> disparagement.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 10:21 AM John F Sowa  wrote:
>
>> On 2/26/2019 9:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>> > I am not /your /student, and we are /both /students of Peirce.
>>
>> Yes.  But you have a lot to learn about recognizing the precision
>> in Peirce's writings.  If you prefer, I won't call you a student.
>> I'll call you a "loose thinker".
>>
>> > I am not willing to accept someone else's dogmatic pronouncements
>> > as if they were beyond questioning.
>>
>> I never make dogmatic statements.  I recognize that everything,
>> including my own writing is fallible.  And I always appreciate
>> corrections or additional points I may have missed.
>>
>> But before you reject what I've written or what Hartshorne and
>> Weiss have written, you must address the issues at the same or
>> deeper level of precision.
>>
>> > I consistently quote Peirce's own writings to back it up--as much
>> > as or more than anyone else on the List these days,
>>
>> A quotation is not a proof.  Until you do the analysis at the level
>> that Peirce was writing, all you did was cut and paste a bunch of
>> words.  An analysis of the passages you quoted confirms the fact
>> that you did not understand the points that Peirce was making.
>>
>> > sometimes that process produces surprises, forcing us to reconsider
>> > views that we previously considered to be settled.
>>
>> Yes indeed.  But the issues aren't settled by juxtaposing passages.
>> All of us must do the much harder work of (1) analyzing those passages
>> at the level that Peirce was writing, (2) considering the unstated
>> background knowledge (i.e., collateral experience) that Peirce assumed
>> his readers would have, and (3) using relevant knowledge developed
>> during the past century.
>>
>> In conclusion, I'll repeat what I wrote in my reply to Stephen:
>>
>> > Many people, including me, have found that in most publications,
>> > even by prominent Peirce scholars, the quotations by Peirce are
>> > more precise than the discussions about them.
>> >
>> > The explanations by Peirce scholars are certainly helpful, because
>> > they highlight points that we may have missed on first reading.
>> > But when we reread Peirce's originals, we marvel at how clearly,
>> > succinctly, and precisely they make their point.
>>
>> Peirce's writings deserve that depth of analysis.
>>
>> John
>>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:   If you prefer, I won't call you a student.  I'll call you a "loose
thinker".


So much for not being condescending; and now insulting, as well.  Any
Peircean would recognize that particular appellation as such.

JFS:  An analysis of the passages you quoted confirms the fact that you did
not understand the points that Peirce was making.


Why should anyone *presuppose *that your analysis is somehow *intrinsically
*more accurate than mine?  Again, people can read Peirce's words and what
we both say about them for themselves, then draw their own conclusions.

JFS:  Peirce's writings deserve that depth of analysis.


The fact that you happen to disagree with my analysis does not entail that
it lacks such depth.  I have carefully made my case and responded to your
objections, sticking to substance rather than sidetracking into personal
disparagement.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Feb 26, 2019 at 10:21 AM John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 2/26/2019 9:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > I am not /your /student, and we are /both /students of Peirce.
>
> Yes.  But you have a lot to learn about recognizing the precision
> in Peirce's writings.  If you prefer, I won't call you a student.
> I'll call you a "loose thinker".
>
> > I am not willing to accept someone else's dogmatic pronouncements
> > as if they were beyond questioning.
>
> I never make dogmatic statements.  I recognize that everything,
> including my own writing is fallible.  And I always appreciate
> corrections or additional points I may have missed.
>
> But before you reject what I've written or what Hartshorne and
> Weiss have written, you must address the issues at the same or
> deeper level of precision.
>
> > I consistently quote Peirce's own writings to back it up--as much
> > as or more than anyone else on the List these days,
>
> A quotation is not a proof.  Until you do the analysis at the level
> that Peirce was writing, all you did was cut and paste a bunch of
> words.  An analysis of the passages you quoted confirms the fact
> that you did not understand the points that Peirce was making.
>
> > sometimes that process produces surprises, forcing us to reconsider
> > views that we previously considered to be settled.
>
> Yes indeed.  But the issues aren't settled by juxtaposing passages.
> All of us must do the much harder work of (1) analyzing those passages
> at the level that Peirce was writing, (2) considering the unstated
> background knowledge (i.e., collateral experience) that Peirce assumed
> his readers would have, and (3) using relevant knowledge developed
> during the past century.
>
> In conclusion, I'll repeat what I wrote in my reply to Stephen:
>
> > Many people, including me, have found that in most publications,
> > even by prominent Peirce scholars, the quotations by Peirce are
> > more precise than the discussions about them.
> >
> > The explanations by Peirce scholars are certainly helpful, because
> > they highlight points that we may have missed on first reading.
> > But when we reread Peirce's originals, we marvel at how clearly,
> > succinctly, and precisely they make their point.
>
> Peirce's writings deserve that depth of analysis.
>
> John
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[John F Sowa]

On 2/26/2019 9:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

I am not /your /student, and we are /both /students of Peirce.


Yes.  But you have a lot to learn about recognizing the precision
in Peirce's writings.  If you prefer, I won't call you a student.
I'll call you a "loose thinker".


I am not willing to accept someone else's dogmatic pronouncements
as if they were beyond questioning. 


I never make dogmatic statements.  I recognize that everything,
including my own writing is fallible.  And I always appreciate
corrections or additional points I may have missed.

But before you reject what I've written or what Hartshorne and
Weiss have written, you must address the issues at the same or
deeper level of precision.


I consistently quote Peirce's own writings to back it up--as much
as or more than anyone else on the List these days,


A quotation is not a proof.  Until you do the analysis at the level
that Peirce was writing, all you did was cut and paste a bunch of
words.  An analysis of the passages you quoted confirms the fact
that you did not understand the points that Peirce was making.


sometimes that process produces surprises, forcing us to reconsider
views that we previously considered to be settled.


Yes indeed.  But the issues aren't settled by juxtaposing passages.
All of us must do the much harder work of (1) analyzing those passages
at the level that Peirce was writing, (2) considering the unstated
background knowledge (i.e., collateral experience) that Peirce assumed
his readers would have, and (3) using relevant knowledge developed
during the past century.

In conclusion, I'll repeat what I wrote in my reply to Stephen:


Many people, including me, have found that in most publications,
even by prominent Peirce scholars, the quotations by Peirce are
more precise than the discussions about them.

The explanations by Peirce scholars are certainly helpful, because
they highlight points that we may have missed on first reading.
But when we reread Peirce's originals, we marvel at how clearly,
succinctly, and precisely they make their point.


Peirce's writings deserve that depth of analysis.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  I am not condescending.  I'm treating you as a bright student who has
a lot to learn about logic, linguistics, lexicography, and the kind of
detailed textual analysis that Peirce did all his life.  I'm willing to
help, but you must do your homework.


Apparently you are unaware of the condescension that pervades these very
statements.  I am not *your *student, and we are *both *students of
Peirce.  I welcome sincere disagreement and spirited discussion--I learn a
tremendous amount from it, and sometimes change my mind as a result of
it--but I am not willing to accept someone else's dogmatic pronouncements
as if they were beyond questioning.  That would be blocking the way of (my
own) inquiry, embracing the method of authority rather than the method of
science.

JFS:  But don't claim that what you write is consistent with what Peirce
said.


I have every right to make that claim, and I consistently quote Peirce's
own writings to back it up--as much as or more than anyone else on the List
these days, including excerpts from unpublished manuscripts that I have
transcribed myself from his own hand.  That way, those reading along can
decide for themselves whether and how well my comments match up with his
original text, rather than taking my (or your) word for it.  Since he did
not provide us with a single unified work that systematically presents all
of his insights, we instead have to piece them together from scattered
fragments--and sometimes that process produces surprises, forcing us to
reconsider views that we previously considered to be settled.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 10:30 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 2/25/2019 9:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > Why not just accept the fact (as I have) that we are pursuing different
> > purposes, and therefore adopting different approaches accordingly?  Why
> > insist that I /must /adhere to /your /analysis of propositions and /your
> > /preference for unmodified EGs?
>
> Because Peirce was very precise in what he wrote, and he had
> no sympathy with people who misrepresented what he was saying.
>
> If you just want to develop your own ideas, I have no objection.
> But I do object to claims like the following:
>
> > It is perfectly consistent with what Peirce wrote
> > in NEM 3:885-886--as well as ...
>
> Just quoting a bunch of words and saying X is consistent with Y
> is the loosest of loose thinking.  It's even worse when you add
> the word 'perfectly'.
>
> No linguist, lexicographer, or logician would ever say that.
> Peirce had a solid foundation in all those areas, and he used
> those skills in everything he wrote.  He would never say
> "This cloud of words is consistent with that cloud."
>
> I am not condescending.  I'm treating you as a bright student
> who has a lot to learn about logic, linguistics, lexicography,
> and the kind of detailed textual analysis that Peirce did all
> his life.  I'm willing to help, but you must do your homework.
>
> If you don't want to do the really hard work of learning how
> to analyze every last detail, just go your own way.  But don't
> claim that what you write is consistent with what Peirce said.
>
> John
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[John F Sowa]

On 2/26/2019 7:34 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote:

"Because Peirce was very precise in what he wrote, and he had
no sympathy with people who misrepresented what he was saying."

That seems a mite broad.


Many people, including me, have found that in most publications,
even by prominent Peirce scholars, the quotations by Peirce are
more precise than the discussions about them.

The explanations by Peirce scholars are certainly helpful, because
they highlight points that we may have missed on first reading.
But when we reread Peirce's originals, we marvel at how clearly,
succinctly, and precisely they make their point.

SCR

Peirce seems to have gained in sympathy over time.


He wrote the following passage in 1911:

The more I studied [logic] the more and more deeply I felt the
shocking levity and looseness of thought with which these basic
questions had been treated. (NEM 3:159)


SCR

He did after all reject the term pragmatism. That suggests
that he regarded words themselves as weak vessels.


He was angry about the loose thinking of people who "hijacked"
the word he coined.  Therefore, he switched to another word
that was less likely to be hijacked and therefore more precise.

Note that one of the people who misused that term was his best
friend William James.  He even added the name Santiago to his own
because of his high regard for James.  But that did not stop him
from criticizing the way WJ used the word.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Stephen Curtiss Rose]

" Because Peirce was very precise in what he wrote, and he had
no sympathy with people who misrepresented what he was saying. "

That seems a mite broad. Were he precise the likes of Walker Percy wou;ld
have complimented him rather that repeatedly complaining about Peirce the
writer and explainer.

Peirce seems to have gained in sympathy over time.

He did after all reject the term pragmatism. That suggests that he regarded
words themselves as weak vessels.

Please do not reply. I would do me in from surprise.



amazon.com/author/stephenrose


On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 11:30 PM John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 2/25/2019 9:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > Why not just accept the fact (as I have) that we are pursuing different
> > purposes, and therefore adopting different approaches accordingly?  Why
> > insist that I /must /adhere to /your /analysis of propositions and /your
> > /preference for unmodified EGs?
>
> Because Peirce was very precise in what he wrote, and he had
> no sympathy with people who misrepresented what he was saying.
>
> If you just want to develop your own ideas, I have no objection.
> But I do object to claims like the following:
>
> > It is perfectly consistent with what Peirce wrote
> > in NEM 3:885-886--as well as ...
>
> Just quoting a bunch of words and saying X is consistent with Y
> is the loosest of loose thinking.  It's even worse when you add
> the word 'perfectly'.
>
> No linguist, lexicographer, or logician would ever say that.
> Peirce had a solid foundation in all those areas, and he used
> those skills in everything he wrote.  He would never say
> "This cloud of words is consistent with that cloud."
>
> I am not condescending.  I'm treating you as a bright student
> who has a lot to learn about logic, linguistics, lexicography,
> and the kind of detailed textual analysis that Peirce did all
> his life.  I'm willing to help, but you must do your homework.
>
> If you don't want to do the really hard work of learning how
> to analyze every last detail, just go your own way.  But don't
> claim that what you write is consistent with what Peirce said.
>
> John
>
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>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[John F Sowa]

On 2/25/2019 9:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Why not just accept the fact (as I have) that we are pursuing different 
purposes, and therefore adopting different approaches accordingly?  Why 
insist that I /must /adhere to /your /analysis of propositions and /your 
/preference for unmodified EGs?


Because Peirce was very precise in what he wrote, and he had
no sympathy with people who misrepresented what he was saying.

If you just want to develop your own ideas, I have no objection.
But I do object to claims like the following:


It is perfectly consistent with what Peirce wrote
in NEM 3:885-886--as well as ...


Just quoting a bunch of words and saying X is consistent with Y
is the loosest of loose thinking.  It's even worse when you add
the word 'perfectly'.

No linguist, lexicographer, or logician would ever say that.
Peirce had a solid foundation in all those areas, and he used
those skills in everything he wrote.  He would never say
"This cloud of words is consistent with that cloud."

I am not condescending.  I'm treating you as a bright student
who has a lot to learn about logic, linguistics, lexicography,
and the kind of detailed textual analysis that Peirce did all
his life.  I'm willing to help, but you must do your homework.

If you don't want to do the really hard work of learning how
to analyze every last detail, just go your own way.  But don't
claim that what you write is consistent with what Peirce said.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[gnox]

List,

I just noticed that the message below, from Jeff Downard, did not go to the 
list, although he clearly intended it to. I think the question he poses at the 
end is a fascinating one, but hardly know where to start in working toward an 
answer. (Perhaps I should start with Peirce’s writings on topology in NEM?) 
Anyway I hope Jeff or John Sowa or others will take up this topic (perhaps with 
a change of subject line), as it’s something I’ve often wondered about.

One passage that might be relevant is the topological cave-exploration passage 
in Peirce’s 1898 Cambridge lecture on the Logic of Continuity, which I’ll 
append at the bottom of this message. I find it both challenging and 
fascinating to (try to) follow.

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard  
Sent: 20-Feb-19 10:58
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

 

Gary F, Jon S, John S, List,

 

I, too, agree with Gary F's remarks on the points John S has made about the 
EG's. That is, they seem on track to me so long as we constrain our attention 
to Peirce's treatment of lines connecting dots to relations of 
identity--conceived of dyadically and triadically (i.e., as teridentity). 

 

Having said that, I find it difficult to see how Jon S's suggestions with 
respect to the MEG's are supposed to provide an account which treats lines as 
more general relations and not as lines of identity. After all, it is obvious 
that some relations are not well captured by lines connecting spots, including 
the relation of the conditional de inesse and the relation between affirmation 
and negation--which are fundamental to all versions of the EG.

 

Having said that, it would help me better understand what Jon S is trying to 
accomplish with the MEG's if some comparison were made between the way he is 
using and interpreting lines and branches to represent various kinds of 
relations and the way Peirce uses lines and branches when he develops the 
conceptions of the potentials and the selectives.

 

Having read and listened to the presentation John S gave at the APA Pacific 
Division meetings a little while back on the use of EG's in the Alpha and Beta 
forms to represent some of Eulid's reasonings in the Elements, I am curious 
about a diagram in the gamma system that Peirce offers to represent the 5th 
postulate in Book I.  Don Roberts provides some helpful commentary on Peirce's 
graph of that postulate on pages 76-7 of his monograph. I'd be curious to hear 
from John S (and others) how such representations in the gamma system might be 
used to analyze examples of more complex reasoning in geometry. As test cases 
of more complex inferences, consider the reasoning of Riemann to the postulates 
that lie at the basis of elliptical geometry and of Lobachevsky to the 
postulates that lie at the basis of hyperbolic geometries. Furthermore, 
consider the proofs they give of the theorems that follow from those alternate 
systems of hypotheses. In both cases, a key move was a reconsideration of the 
conceptions that are involved in the 5th postulate--and Peirce is clearly 
thinking this through in a number of places, including the last lecture in RLT, 
the EM and NEM, and his later remarks on the relations that hold between 
topology, projective geometry and metrical geometries.

 

Let me try to offer a first response to Gary's comments about the discussion 
that we had on the points that Peirce explores concerning the "EGs and 
Phaneroscopy" in the Lowell Lectures (thanks again to Gary for providing 
transcriptions of those lectures). I think the example above might help to 
supply us with a case to consider. Instead of looking at the postulates that 
lie at the basis of metrical or projective geometries, consider the simpler set 
of postulates, definitions and axioms that lie at the bases of 19th-century 
topology. Peirce's articulates a number of the key postulates in the EM and 
NEM. With a list of those hypotheses in hand, we could try to answer the same 
kinds of question that Peirce tried to answer in "The Logic of Mathematics, an 
attempt to develop my categories from within" for the case of number theory. 
I've tried to reconstruct the main moves in Peirce's phenomenological analysis 
of the formal categories and the role that each plays in the hypotheses that 
lie at the basis of discrete and finite systems of number in an essay that 
appeared in the Cuadernos. 

 

The same kind of analysis could be given, I think, for the key conceptions in 
the conventions that lie at the bases of the EG--including the generation of a 
surface as a sheet of assertion, and the generation of the scroll as a line 
that creates a boundary between areas on that surface. Interpreting the 
diagrammatic representation of these logical conceptions will, I believe, 
require us to consider the topological postulates and conceptions (i.e., the 
generation of surfaces and boundaries) that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

JFS:  I suggest that you convert MEGs to conventional EGs by using the
triad Rel.


Your suggestion is duly noted, and I sincerely appreciate you now
recognizing that they are equivalent, rather than alleging (incorrectly)
that MEGs are "false."

JFS:  Please *study* my last two notes.  I have refuted all your claims,
and there is nothing more to discuss until you do your homework.


Why assume that I did not *already *study them carefully, *before *responding?
Which specific "claims" of mine do you believe that you have somehow
"refuted"?

In any case, such condescension is rather unbecoming.  I have expressed my
respect for you on multiple occasions during our recent exchanges, despite
our sharp disagreements.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 11:49 AM John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 2/20/2019 12:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > As Gary F. already pointed out, only when someone insists on
> > interpreting them as if they were /ordinary /EGs
>
> Yes.  I acknowledged that.  I suggest that you convert MEGs
> to conventional EGs by using the triad Rel.
>
> Please *study* my last two notes.  I have refuted all your claims,
> and there is nothing more to discuss until you do your homework.
>
> Then we can begin a more fruitful thread.
>
> John
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[John F Sowa]

On 2/20/2019 12:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
As Gary F. already pointed out, only when someone insists on 
interpreting them as if they were /ordinary /EGs


Yes.  I acknowledged that.  I suggest that you convert MEGs
to conventional EGs by using the triad Rel.

Please *study* my last two notes.  I have refuted all your claims,
and there is nothing more to discuss until you do your homework.

Then we can begin a more fruitful thread.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[John F Sowa]

On 2/20/2019 12:22 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
GF: I can’t find any trace of /phaneroscopic/ observation in that 
presentation, at the conclusion or anywhere else. What I see throughout 
is /observation of diagrams/ as a key element of formal or deductive logic,


Yes.  That was not the focus of the talk.  But the analysis of the
phaneron is a direct corollary.  See the citations in the last
few slides.

In particular, look at the article by the psychologist
Philip Johnson-Laird.  I have been discussing related issues
with him, and I sent him a copy of a recent article which
he liked very much.

See also "The virtual reality of the mind":
http://jfsowa.com/talks/vrmind.pdf

There's much more to say about all these issues.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., List:

JFS:  Every so-called Modified EG (MEG) is false.


As Gary F. already pointed out, only when someone insists on interpreting
them as if they were *ordinary *EGs, rather than incorporating the very
specific *modifications *(hence the M) that I spelled out--in particular,
that *there are no Lines of Identity or Ligatures*, only a single branching
Line of Relation.

JFS:  Peirce explained EGs in several different ways, but the first-order
core, the rules of inference, and the translations from one version to
another never changed.


I have never denied this; on the contrary, I have freely (and repeatedly)
acknowledged it.  I fully agree with you that R 514 as reproduced in NEM
3:162-169 serves as an excellent "tutorial," although it omits a few
helpful clarifications, such as the fact that a Line of Identity can always
be branched at a Spot of Teridentity and then extended inward through a Cut.

JAS:  In Peirce's "proper" or "ultimate" analysis of Propositions, "pure"
predicates are the only predicates.  Anything that refers to content in the
universe of discourse--i.e., anything that can only be understood by an
interpreting Quasi-mind that has had previous Collateral Experience with
it--is a Subject; it belongs to the Object of the Proposition.

JFS:  No.  That claim is false for many reasons.  First of all, The words
'proper' and 'ultimate' are both relative terms that depend on context.
And the contexts for those two words have nothing in common.


To clarify, are you only denying the first statement of mine that you
quoted?  Or are you also contending that discrete predicates (such as
"killing") somehow belong to the *Interpretant *of the proposition, rather
than its *Object*?  I have freely (and repeatedly) acknowledged that
"proper" and "ultimate" are *relative to a purpose*, and that mine is
different from yours.  Right now I am focusing on Peirce's concept of
Experience as reflected in this careful distinction between Subjects as
whatever *requires *Collateral Experience and the Continuous Predicate as
whatever the Proposition *itself *conveys, the form of relation that
"marries" the different Subjects.  *This *sense of "ultimate" is quite
"proper" for my purpose.

JFS:  To illustrate that point, let's turn to the MEGs.  Each one has a
teridentity or a ligature of multiple teridentities, which falsely state
that some wildly different things are identical.


No, again, MEGs cannot be interpreted as if they were EGs.  There is *no
such thing* as "a teridentity" or "a ligature" in MEGs, and in general they *do
not* state that anything is "identical" to anything else.  Discrete Points
correspond to different Subjects, which are "married" by the branching Line
of Relation that corresponds to the sole Continuous Predicate.

JFS:  For example, the MEG for "Brutus kills Caesar" has a teridentity,
which states that there is a single entity in the universe of discourse,
which happens to be identical to Brutus, Caesar, and the act of killing.
That proposition is false.


No, the MEG states nothing more or less than that Brutus stands in the
relation of killing to Caesar, which is *true*.  "Brutus," "killing," and
"Caesar" are all Subjects represented by Points; while the Line of Relation
represents the Continuous Predicate, "_ stands in the relation of _
to _."


JFS:  The second EG in brutus.jpg has one more logical subject, which is
the gerund 'killing' (a nominalization) with a line of identity that is
also attached to a triad named Rel.  I'm using the name Rel for the pure
predicate that Peirce defined in NEM 3:886, 3rd line from the top.  As
Peirce said, Rel is a pure predicate.  With Rel, the second EG states
"Brutus stands in the relation 'killing' to Caesar."


I agree, the second EG represents *exactly the same proposition* as the
MEG, using a three-Peg Spot for the Continuous Predicate and three Lines of
Identity for the Subjects.  My *personal *opinion is that MEGs *better
*represent
the *Indexical *nature of Subjects as *denoting the Object *of the
Proposition, as well as the *Iconic *nature of the Continuous
Predicate as *signifying
the* *Interpretant *of the Proposition.

JFS:  The Modified EGs are false, but most of them could be converted to
correct EGs by using the pure predicate Rel.


One more time--MEGs are *not *false when properly interpreted on *their own*
terms, which are *different *from those of EGs.  I agree that a multi-Peg
Spot can be used to represent a Continuous Predicate in an EG, since that
is essentially what Peirce scribed in his Logic Notebook.

JFS:  The sharp distinction between subjects and predicates implies that a
seme could never refer to a logical subject or a quasi-subject.


No, Peirce explicitly defined a Seme as "anything which serves for any
purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a
representative or Sign" (CP 4.538; 1906).  That is *precisely *the function
of a Subject, especially *within *a Proposition.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[John F Sowa]

On 2/20/2019 9:20 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
What you’ve said about Jon’s MEGs, though, is true only if we read the 
lines in those diagrams as Lines of Identity; and the main modification 
Jon made was to read the lines NOT as Lines of Identity but as Lines of 
Relation.


I agree.  But it violates the principles of EGs, since it doesn't
put an explicit marker at the intersection.   With the label Rel
at the intersection, the MEGs become EGs.  Since Peirce never said
that the result was a new kind of EG, that would be what he had
intended.


It’s not clear to me how sequences of MEGs could be used to analyze
the thought process into the smallest possible steps


Please drop the word MEG.  Every operation that Peirce specified
converted one EG to another EG that expressed exactly the same
proposition with a different choice of relations.  That puts the
Aristotelian transformation into perspective:  it's replaces one
relation with a copula.  Peirce learned that method at age 13,
and he developed the idea over the years.

The word 'thought' is misleading for modern ears, since it sounds
too psychological.  Peirce said that thoughts exist outside the mind.
But most readers don't think in those terms.  It's better to use the
neutral word 'proposition'.


The analysis of propositions is only one aspect of EGs as “moving
pictures of thought,” and the rules for permissible transformations
of graphs are the keys for analyzing the process of thought.


I strongly agree.  In fact, that's the motivation for a talk i
presented at a Peirce session of the Vancouver APA in April 2015:
"Peirce, Polya, and Euclid:  Integrating logic, heuristics, and
geometry"  http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf


I share with Gary R a deep interest in phenomenology/phaneroscopy
— and especially the observational part (as opposed to the analytical
part) of it.


That's my motivation for the ppe.pdf slides.  See the concluding slide
of ppe.pdf, which is attached as ppe.png.

There's much more to say, but I believe that EGs that contain arbitrary
icons (in any number of dimensions) can simulate the phaneron.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[gnox]

John, list,

I think everything you’ve said about EGs here, and how they might represent 
continuous predicates, is exactly right. What you’ve said about Jon’s MEGs, 
though, is true only if we read the lines in those diagrams as Lines of 
Identity; and the main modification Jon made was to read the lines NOT as Lines 
of Identity but as Lines of Relation. It’s not clear to me how sequences of 
MEGs could be used to analyze the thought process into the smallest possible 
steps, which was the purpose for which Peirce invented EGs and made his own 
modifications to them. The analysis of propositions is only one aspect of EGs 
as “moving pictures of thought,” and the rules for permissible transformations 
of graphs are the keys for analyzing the process of thought. I’m doubtful that 
Jon’s MEGs can improve on Peirce’s EGs in that respect; but then this thread 
hasn’t done much to explain how EGs fulfill that purpose either.

I started an “EGs and Phaneroscopy” thread because I wanted to explore how EGs 
might be used to iconize the phenomenological categories (in addition to their 
main use, which is logical analysis of the thought process). I thought I saw a 
few clues in Peirce’s writings from 1906, but haven’t come up with an 
explanation of how they can be used for the analysis of experience into its 
elements. Nor have I seen anyone else come up with such an explanation. This is 
not surprising, since (as Atkins shows in his book) Peirce first arrived at his 
three categories by means of logical analysis, and only began to apply them 
more broadly in the 1880s, and did not see the need for a separate science of 
phenomenology until 1902 — and even then he remained primarily a logician, and 
his phenomenology consisted mostly of applying this three categories 
heuristically to the analysis of experience/phenomena, working on the 
hypothesis that the structure of experience itself must be analogous to the 
mathematical structures revealed by his analysis of the logic of relations.

Since I share with Gary R a deep interest in phenomenology/phaneroscopy — and 
especially the observational part (as opposed to the analytical part) of it — 
I’ll have to take that to another thread, if I come up with anything to say 
about it. Propositions appear, they are certainly phenomena, and I suppose they 
are the essential format of what we call facts (as Peirce said), but there must 
be more to phaneroscopy than the analysis of propositions; so I’ll leave that 
to you folks who have contributed to this thread.

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa  
Sent: 19-Feb-19 23:34



Edwina, Gary R, and Jon AS,

 

Finally, this thread has reached the dénoument, when the pieces fall into place 
and the mysterious knots are untied.

 

Every so-called Modified EG (MEG) is false.  The file brutus.png shows how to 
replace MEGs with ordinary EGs that satisfy all of Peirce's criteria.  That 
method, when explained in Peirce's exact words, resolves the outstanding issues 
about what is proper or ultimate in various contexts.

 

But first, I'll comment on notes by Edwina and Gary R.

 

ET

> I see Peirce's work as evolving so that... I don't see Peirce 

> abandoning much at all. And when he finds himself as having clearly 

> been in error, he tends to explicitly state that along with his 

> corrected view...  Peirce is constantly experimenting; but, in my 

> opinion, one needn't take an experiment late in his life as 

> necessarily "abandoning" those undertaken earlier.

 

I strongly agree.  For logic, Peirce began with the 19th c. version of 
Aristotelian-Scholastic logic when he was 13 and Boolean logic a few years 
later.  During the next 60+ years, major breakthroughs occurred in 1870, 1885, 
and 1897.  After each one, he went through variations and interpretations.  But 
unless he explicitly corrected some error, he didn't reject the earlier 
versions.

 

The rock-solid stability of classical first-order logic from 1885 makes it the 
Rosetta Stone for relating Peirce's writings about logic and semeiotic at every 
period of his life.  It's also essential for relating his writings to every 
version of logic from Aristotle to the present.  Peirce explained EGs in 
several different ways, but the first-order core, the rules of inference, and 
the translations from one version to another never changed.

 

GR

> it seems to me that one remains squarely in the realm of logic as 

> semeiotic when one is working with EGs because, as now repeatedly

> noted: "All that existential graphs can represent is propositions, on 

> a single sheet, and arguments on a succession of sheets, presented in 

> temporal succession." CSP

 

I agree.  But logic as semeiotic is the foundation.  Without it, you get word 
hash with no criteria for evaluation or correction.

 

GR quoting CSP

>> CSP: The system of Existential Graphs (at least, so far as it is at 

>> present developed) does not represent every kind of Sign. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, Gary R, and Jon AS,

Finally, this thread has reached the dénoument, when the pieces
fall into place and the mysterious knots are untied.

Every so-called Modified EG (MEG) is false.  The file brutus.png
shows how to replace MEGs with ordinary EGs that satisfy all of
Peirce's criteria.  That method, when explained in Peirce's exact
words, resolves the outstanding issues about what is proper or
ultimate in various contexts.

But first, I'll comment on notes by Edwina and Gary R.

ET

I see Peirce's work as evolving so that... I don't see Peirce
abandoning much at all. And when he finds himself as having clearly
been in error, he tends to explicitly state that along with his
corrected view...  Peirce is constantly experimenting; but, in
my opinion, one needn't take an experiment late in his life as
necessarily "abandoning" those undertaken earlier.


I strongly agree.  For logic, Peirce began with the 19th c. version
of Aristotelian-Scholastic logic when he was 13 and Boolean logic
a few years later.  During the next 60+ years, major breakthroughs
occurred in 1870, 1885, and 1897.  After each one, he went through
variations and interpretations.  But unless he explicitly corrected
some error, he didn't reject the earlier versions.

The rock-solid stability of classical first-order logic from 1885
makes it the Rosetta Stone for relating Peirce's writings about
logic and semeiotic at every period of his life.  It's also essential
for relating his writings to every version of logic from Aristotle
to the present.  Peirce explained EGs in several different ways, but
the first-order core, the rules of inference, and the translations
from one version to another never changed.

GR

it seems to me that one remains squarely in the realm of logic as
semeiotic when one is working with EGs because, as now repeatedly
noted: "All that existential graphs can represent is propositions,
on a single sheet, and arguments on a succession of sheets, presented
in temporal succession." CSP


I agree.  But logic as semeiotic is the foundation.  Without it, you
get word hash with no criteria for evaluation or correction.

GR quoting CSP

CSP: The system of Existential Graphs (at least, so far as it is
at present developed) does not represent every kind of Sign. For
example, a piece of concerted music is a sign; for it is a medium
for the conveyance of Form. But I know not how to make a graph
equivalent to it.


In CP 2.643, Peirce wrote "the various sounds made by the instruments
of an orchestra strike upon the ear, and the result is a peculiar
musical emotion, quite distinct from the sounds themselves."

As I showed with the graph of a musical score, it's easy to map
the notes from a score to any notation for FOL.  But the emotions
produced by Jascha Heifetz and the kid next door are very different.

The musical score can't explain the emotion, but it can be useful
as a map for analyzing the performance.  Perhaps the note at bar 17,
as the kid played it, was grating, and the transition to the next
note was abrupt, off tempo, and slightly flat.  Yet a professional
violinist, in some context, might deliberately play a note that way.
Context and purpose are critical for interpreting anything.

Music illustrates the distinction between the discrete subjects and
predicates in the logic, and the continuous sound, which you or your
cat may perceive as streams of quasi-subjects and quasi-predicates.
(A cat that likes music:  http://minervaclassics.com/harpcat1.jpg )

JAS

In Peirce's "proper" or "ultimate" analysis of Propositions, "pure"
predicates are the only predicates.  Anything that refers to content
in the universe of discourse--i.e., anything that can only be
understood by an interpreting Quasi-mind that has had previous
Collateral Experience with it--is a Subject; it belongs to the
Object of the Proposition.


No.  That claim is false for many reasons.  First of all, The words
'proper' and 'ultimate' are both relative terms that depend on context.
And the contexts for those two words have nothing in common.

CP has 124 occurrences of 'proper'.  Some of them narrow the meaning
of a word, such as 'proper name' or 'history proper'.  The others
occur with words like 'for' or 'with' that refer to some context.

For example, consider the chair you're sitting on.  Sitting is its
*proper* use.  But you could also use it for many other purposes.
You might stand on it to change a light bulb, or you might use it
to hold some books you're putting on a shelf.

The "ultimate" analysis of the chair depends on whether you're talking
with a carpenter, a chemist, or a nuclear physicist.  The first two
might give you useful advice for some purposes, but not for sitting.
If the physicist starts talking about quarks and leptons, that might
be ultimate, but it's not proper for any use of a chair.

As for the quotation, "when we have carried analysis so far as to
leave only a continuous predicate,  we have carried it to its ultimate
elements" -- 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

In light of Peirce's brief experimentation with explicitly including in EGs
the Continuous Predicate, "is in the relation of/to," such that it would
always be the *only *Spot in a given Graph with more than one Peg, I would
like to propose anew what I described previously as a "more radical
revision."  Mindful of his ethics of terminology, I will call the resulting
diagrams Modified Existential Graphs, or MEGs.  The Sheet of Assertion,
existential quantification, Cuts, and transformation rules are all
unchanged; however ...

   1. Labeled Spots for predicates with multiple Pegs are replaced with
   labeled Points for Subjects, reflecting their role as the *Indexical *part
   of a Proposition that *denotes *its complete collective Object.
   2. Multiple Lines of Identity for individuals are replaced with a single
   branching Line of Relation for the Continuous Predicate, reflecting its
   role as the *Iconic *part of a Proposition that *signifies *its
   Interpretant.
   3. Every branch of the Line of Relation terminates at a Point for a
   Subject, generally read left to right as subject nominative, indirect
   object (if applicable), and direct object, with prepositions labeling
   additional branches as needed.
   4. Points for Subjects that are relations are placed above the
   horizontal Line of Relation, while Points for Subjects that are correlates
   are placed at each end of it and below it.

The goal here is to implement "the proper way in logic" (NEM 3:885; 1908)
by carrying the analysis of each Proposition "to its ultimate limits" (SS
72; 1908).  Attached are a few examples for illustration and comparison.
Please let me know what you think.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., Helmut, List:

GR:  Modality will, I think, continue to be difficult to graph, and not
only via EGs ...


Peirce acknowledged as much.  I apologize for the long quotes, but the full
context seems necessary.

CSP:  In selecting a mode of representing Modality, which I have not done
without much experimentation, I have finally resorted to one which commits
itself as little as possible to any particular theory of the nature of
Modality, although there are undeniable objections to such a course. If any
particular analysis of Modality had appeared to me to be quite evident, I
should have endeavored to exhibit it unequivocally. Meantime, my opinion is
that the Universe is a Subject of every Proposition and that any Modality
shown by its indefiniteness to be Affirmative, such as Possibility and
Intention, is a special determination of the Universe of The Truth.
Something of this sort is seen in Negation. For if we say of a Man that he
is not sinless, we represent the sinless as having a place only in an ideal
universe which, or the part of which that contains the imagined sinless
being, we then positively sever from the identity of the man in question.
(CP 4.552n1; 1906)


CSP:  I may as well, at once, acknowledge that, in Existential Graphs, the
representation of Modality (possibility, necessity, etc.) lacks almost
entirely that pictorial, or Iconic, character which is so striking in the
representation in the same system of every feature of propositions *de
inesse*. Perhaps it is in the nature of things that it should be so in such
wise that for Modality to be iconically represented in that same
"pictorial" way in which the other features are represented would
constitute a falsity in the representation. If so, it is a perfect
vindication of the system, upon whose accusers, I suppose, the burden of
proof lies. Still, I confess I suspect there is in the heraldic
representation of modality as set forth in my paper on the System
["Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism"] ... a defect capable of
being remedied. If it be not so, if the lack of "pictorialness" in the
representation of modality cannot be remedied, it is because modality has,
in truth, the nature which I opined it has (which opinion I expressed
toward the end of the footnote [quoted above] ...); and if that be the
case, Modality is not, properly speaking, conceivable at all, but the
difference, for example, between possibility and actuality is only
recognizable much in the same way as we recognize the difference between a
dream and waking experience, supposing the dream to be ever so detailed,
reasonable, and thoroughly consistent with itself and with all the rest of
the dreamer's experience. Namely, it still would not be so "vivid" as
waking experience. (R 298, CP 4.553n1; 1906)


I might have more to say in the future about "the difference between a
dream and waking experience," perhaps in the other thread on "EGs and
Phaneroscopy."  For now, returning to the topic of *this *thread, note
Peirce's statement that "the Universe is a Subject of every Proposition."
This is consistent with my contention that anything within a Proposition
that refers to the *contents *of the Universe--i.e., any member of any of
the three Universes of Experience, of which an interpreting Quasi-mind can
only have knowledge by means of previous Collateral Experience--is likewise
properly understood as a logical *subject* (i.e., the Proposition's *Object*),
not a logical predicate (i.e., its *Interpretant*).

Speaking of which, in a 2014 paper, "Peirce and the Unity of the Proposition
," Franceso
Bellucci cited yet another passage--the earliest discovered so far--in
which Peirce described the concept of the Continuous Predicate, although he
did not give it that or any other name.  It is on pages 491-493 [331r-332r]
of the Logic Notebook (R 339), which he dated October 17-20, 1908--just a
few days before he wrote R 611, whose pages he dated October 28, 1908,
where he used the term "Continuous Relation."  Again, please forgive the
long quotation.

CSP:  I need not tell you that any assertion is composed of *subject* and
*predicate*; for grammar has taught you that.  Grammar, however, looks upon
these matters in a superficial way; and the traditional logic is scarcely
better.  Permit me to suggest your regarding the matter from a different
point of view, from which I am confident that, as soon as you become
familiar with it, you will agree with me that the true composition of an
assertion is revealed much more distinctly than from that of grammar.  In
the first place, then, when I speak of the *subject* I do not mean the
grammatical subject nominative, nor do I necessarily mean that thing which
the subject nominative denotes.  I cannot in a simple brief sentence give
you a perfectly distinct idea of what I mean.  I shall have to be a little
vague at first.  By the subject I mean that about which the 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, list,

I have nothing to add to JS's general comments on the sheet of assertion
which are clear enough.

You wrote:

Speaking of music, one subject likes gangsta rap and Wagner, and the other
subject finds both disgusting. So i was thinking, what if we just reverse
the inner/outer- direction of the graphs, and say, that the inside of the
smallest circle is the subjective universe, and what is outside is excluded
from it?


As I understand them, unlike classical first-order logic, which is read in
a linear manner from left to right, EGs are meant to be read from outside
in and interpreted by what Peirce calls the endopeuretic method. This is
not the time to discuss that, but it seems to me that your example doesn't
lend itself to being expressed in an EG no matter how it is read.

On the other hand, I think that your idea itself is quite interesting such
that you might try experimenting on diagrams and graphs of your own
creation on a sheet of assertion for discourse concerning, for example,
ethical or aesthetic universes with the subject at the center of the graph,
observing experimental changes made to the graph, etc.

Modality will, I think, continue to be difficult to graph, and not only via
EGs, although new technologies (for example, holographic and 3d ones) might
eventually afford breakthroughs in this matter. Peirce considered several
approaches to representing modality via Gamma graphs as I recall:
tinctures, threads through various sheets, etc. But, again, I'm not
sufficiently familiar with EGs to say much more.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*





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On Thu, Feb 14, 2019 at 11:59 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Gary, list,
> I am just beginning to get acquainted to the graphs. So far I think, that
> the sheet of assertion means to symbolize a universe with clear true/false
> rules. But what, if every subject (at least, if the subjects are organisms)
> has its own universe (speaking with Uexküll and the constructivists)?
> Speaking of music, one subject likes gangsta rap and Wagner, and the other
> subject finds both disgusting. So i was thinking, what if we just reverse
> the inner/outer- direction of the graphs, and say, that the inside of the
> smallest circle is the subjective universe, and what is outside is excluded
> from it? The sheet of assertion still is the universe of efficient cause,
> and the inner circles are the subjective universes of needs and volitions.
> I think, this way it is possible to elaborate gamma-graphs with special
> cuts-symbols like interrupted lines and so on (unidirectional,
> semipermeable membranes, things like in cells, like endoplasmatic
> reticulum, tunnels and pumps...), a whole graphic art system. Just dreaming.
> Best, Helmut
>
>
>
>  13. Februar 2019 um 21:23 Uhr
>  "Gary Richmond" 
> *wrote:*
> Jon, John, list,
>
> Jon, this post is quite helpful in clarifying what you've recently been
> arguing, perhaps especially "that "according to Peirce, 'the proper way
> in logic" is to treat *anything *that refers to content as a Subject, not
> a predicate.' " It seems likely that what you've written so far will need
> further support to be convincing to many. After all, you're arguing for an
> interpretation just the opposite of the standard one, an analysis which
> Peirce himself also argued for (as you've admitted). I expect that it will
> be an uphill battle, but one worth undertaking.
>
> In addition, your post seems to me to help prepare the way for a
> discussion of logic and EGs in relation to phenomenology. However, I hope
> that *that* discussion doesn't begin in earnest too soon as both Gary F
> and I (and perhaps others) haven't yet completed Atkins book on
> Phenomenology.
> Personally, while I have a great deal of interest in Phenomenology, I
> haven't as much interest in EGs as some on the list, notably, John, Gary F,
> Jeff, and yourself and some others have, in part, because of what Peirce
> says in the 1908 letter to Lady Welby which Gary F recently shared a link
> to:
>
>
> The system of Existential Graphs (at least, so far as it is at present
> developed) does not represent every kind of Sign. For example, a piece of
> concerted music is a sign; for it is a medium for the conveyance of Form.
> But I know not how to make a graph equivalent to it. So the command of a
> military officer to his men: “Halt!” “Ground arms!” which is interpreted in
> their action, is a sign beyond the competence of existential graphs. All
> that existential graphs can represent is 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[John F Sowa]

On 2/14/2019 11:59 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
So far I think, that the sheet of assertion means to symbolize a 
universe with clear true/false rules. But what, if every subject 
(at least, if the subjects are organisms) has its own universe 
(speaking with Uexküll and the constructivists)?


I'm now writing a longer note that will clarify the various issues.
But the Sheet of Assertion (SA) deserves a few more comments:

 1. De Morgan introduced the term 'Universe of Discourse' (UoD) for
the totality of everything that is being discussed.  He considered
the option of having different UoDs for different discussions.

 2. Peirce adopted and broadened De Morgan's term.  For EGs, he used
the SA for any topic that is under discussion, and he considered
the option of having multiple SAs for different contexts and
even different universes.

 3. For modal logic, he generalized the idea to a pad of sheets, which
could represent different contexts or different possible worlds.
Whatever appears on one sheet is true for that possible world.
Whatever is necessarily true would appear on every sheet.

For Peirce's clearest and simplest tutorial about EGs (1909), see
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm .

In 1911, he sent a clean copy of MS 514 in a letter to Mr. Kehler,
a member of Lady Welby's Significs group.  Since Peirce had a high
regard for Lady Welby and her colleagues, his choice of this version
shows that it was his preferred tutorial introducing EGs.

For more about Peirce's universes and their implications, see
http://jfsowa.com/pubs/5qelogic.pdf

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

I find Peirce's distinction between that which a Proposition *itself *conveys
(Interpretant) vs. that which requires Collateral Experience (Objects)
especially relevant here; as I said before, whatever refers to content in
the *universe of discourse* is a Subject--i.e., a member of one of the
three *Universes of Experience*.

CSP:  The first distinction which I must bring to your attention is one ...
which Salisbury expresses most accurately, as the distinction between that
which is *signified *and that which is *named*. I am not going to deal with
the subject in full: I need only explain what Aristotle means when he says
that we *understand *generals, but only *feel* (or, *experience*) singulars
... The central fact about the distinction in question is the following. If
I wish to make any assertion, it is easy to frame an expression which shall
signify the predicate that I desire to affirm. For I can always make a
simple predicate intelligible by exhibiting two diagrams or other
fabricated instances, the one of its truth, the other of its falsity; and
out of such simple predicates, I can build up any other. But when it comes
to the subject about which I desire to make the assertion, no description
can ever be adequate to distinguishing that which I refer to from all other
possible objects; and the only way to be understood is to insure that the
person whom I am addressing shall have had an actual experience, direct or
indirect, of the object I have in view, and that he shall not, since that
experience, have lost the trace of the object. In short, *collateral
observation* on his part can alone guide his attention to that object. (R
200:38-39[E73-E76]; 1908)


In other words, it is the very same distinction between what a Proposition
*signifies *vs. what it *denotes*, and therefore between its Iconic vs.
Indexical aspects.

CSP:  It will be observed that the icon is very perfect in respect to
signification, bringing its interpreter face to face with the very
character signified ... But in denotation it is wanting. It gives no
assurance that any such object as it represents really exists. The index on
the other hand does this most perfectly, actually bringing to the
interpreter the experience of the very object denoted. But it is quite
wanting in signification unless it involves an iconic part. (EP 2:307; 1904)


Peirce made this clear when describing all three classes of Dicisigns in
his original taxonomy of Signs, and then years later when discussing the
different kinds of thought-signs.

CSP:  Fourth, a Dicent Sinsign  .. must involve an Iconic Sinsign to embody
the information and a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign to indicate the Object to
which the information refers. But the mode of combination, or Syntax, of
these two must also be significant ...
Seventh, a Dicent Indexical Legisign ... must involve an Iconic Legisign to
signify the information and a Rhematic Indexical Legisign to denote the
subject of that information ...
Ninth, a Dicent Symbol, or ordinary Proposition ... is composite inasmuch
as it necessarily involves a Rhematic Symbol (and thus is for its
Interpretant an Iconic Legisign) to express its information and a Rhematic
Indexical Legisign to indicate the subject of that information. But its
Syntax of these is significant. (CP 2.257-262, EP 2:294-296; 1903)

CSP:  The Icons chiefly illustrate the significations of
predicate-thoughts, the Indices the denotations of subject-thoughts. (CP
6.338, R 200:40[E77]; 1908)


Each Subject denotes an Object of the Proposition by Indexically
representing it in a manner similar to a proper name, while the Continuous
Predicate signifies the Interpretant of the Proposition--again, the
information that it conveys--by Iconically representing it in the form of
Syntax.  This suggests that the best diagram of a Proposition should employ
an Index for the former and an Icon for the latter.

That is exactly what we find in EGs, *when we interpret them as I have
suggested*--a labeled spot for each Subject, like a discrete point with a
letter designating it in geometry; and a continuous line with the
appropriate number of branches for the Continuous Predicate.  By contrast,
in the standard interpretation--again, admittedly, Peirce's own--a line for
a subject is Indexical only in denoting the same individual at both ends
(cf. CP 4.448; 1903), and a spot for a predicate is Iconic only in
signifying its valency with the corresponding number of pegs.  Moreover ...

CSP:  Breadth refers to the Object, which occasions the use of the sign,
while Depth refers to the Interpretant, or proper determinate of the sign
... it is the predicates which express depth, and the subjects which
indicate breadth. It should be added that when the sign expresses a
relation, the Breadth is separable into parts, each of which makes up a
relate of that relation ... It must also be recognized that every sign has
a single principal predicate, however complex, if it has any; while 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, John, list,

Jon, this post is quite helpful in clarifying what you've recently been
arguing, perhaps especially "that "according to Peirce, 'the proper way in
logic" is to treat *anything *that refers to content as a Subject, not a
predicate.' " It seems likely that what you've written so far will need
further support to be convincing to many. After all, you're arguing for an
interpretation just the opposite of the standard one, an analysis which
Peirce himself also argued for (as you've admitted). I expect that it will
be an uphill battle, but one worth undertaking.

In addition, your post seems to me to help prepare the way for a discussion
of logic and EGs in relation to phenomenology. However, I hope that
*that* discussion
doesn't begin in earnest too soon as both Gary F and I (and perhaps others)
haven't yet completed Atkins book on Phenomenology.
Personally, while I have a great deal of interest in Phenomenology, I
haven't as much interest in EGs as some on the list, notably, John, Gary F,
Jeff, and yourself and some others have, in part, because of what Peirce
says in the 1908 letter to Lady Welby which Gary F recently shared a link
to:

The system of Existential Graphs (at least, so far as it is at present
developed) does not represent every kind of Sign. For example, a piece of
concerted music is a sign; for it is a medium for the conveyance of Form.
But I know not how to make a graph equivalent to it. So the command of a
military officer to his men: “Halt!” “Ground arms!” which is interpreted in
their action, is a sign beyond the competence of existential graphs. All
that existential graphs can represent is *propositions*, on a single sheet,
and arguments on a succession of sheets, presented in temporal succession.


So, for example, John's recent EG'd musical notation example, besides being
unwieldy and inelegant, was not at all convincing to me because it left so
much out that is essential in music, say, of the Romantic era (e.g.
dynamics, expressive marks, changes in tempo such as *ritardando *and
*accelerando*, phrasing, the 'voicing' of the counterpoint, etc., etc.,
etc.), and this in consideration of the Sign which is a simple musical
composition's notation only. It's possible that *some *of the things just
mentioned could be included in the graph, but most likely that would add to
the awkwardness and inelegance of it.

So, imho, EGs being isomorphic to first-order logic in their beta part,
they ought direct themselves towards what first-order logic *can best *express
in its graphic form. As you know, the gamma part has not been much
developed and may never be. Finally, while I'm eager to read what Atkins
has to say about EGs in relation to Phenomenology, at the moment I have
difficulty imagining that they might be of very much value to that science
except in explicating its discoveries logically, clearly and unequivocally.
But I continue to study EGs time permitting, and hope to benefit from the
upcoming discussion of them in relation to Phenomenology.

Your post today seems to me modest in its claims, but supported strongly by
CSP quotes; also in consideration of their chronology and the frequency of
certain terminology. Yet it also makes clear that you are only making a
'stab' at something which Peirce had not completed, and this is the
"additional step" which you are taking. So far, I find your exposition of
Peirce's mature logic to be clear and increasingly convincing. And I am
finding your dialogue with John especially helpful.

Best,

Gary R

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*





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On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 1:37 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> John S., List:
>
> I changed the subject heading, since we are still not actually discussing
> EGs and Phaneroscopy.
>
> JFS:  But "Bob owns a red car" could be separated in four ways: (1) "Bob /
> owns a red car."  (2) "A red car / is owned by Bob." (3) "A car owned by
> Bob / is red."  (4) "A car / is red and is owned by Bob."
>
>
> You left out a fifth way--"Bob, owning, car, redness / _ is in the
> dyadic relation of _ to a _ that possesses the character of _."
>
> JFS:  Therefore, the set of subjects is disjoint from the set of
> predicates.
>
>
> My point was that non-continuous predicates, such as "owns/owning" and
> "red/redness," can be analyzed *either *as predicates *or *as subjects.
>
> JFS:  The predicate "is a car owned by Bob" can be true or false *of*
> something only when it is linked to a subject, for example, "That Chevy /
> is a car owned by Bob."
>
>
> We can also analyze that "predicate" as four Subjects 

[PEIRCE-L] Analyzing Propositions (was EGs and Phaneroscopy)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., List:

I changed the subject heading, since we are still not actually discussing
EGs and Phaneroscopy.

JFS:  But "Bob owns a red car" could be separated in four ways: (1) "Bob /
owns a red car."  (2) "A red car / is owned by Bob." (3) "A car owned by
Bob / is red."  (4) "A car / is red and is owned by Bob."


You left out a fifth way--"Bob, owning, car, redness / _ is in the
dyadic relation of _ to a _ that possesses the character of _."

JFS:  Therefore, the set of subjects is disjoint from the set of predicates.


My point was that non-continuous predicates, such as "owns/owning" and
"red/redness," can be analyzed *either *as predicates *or *as subjects.

JFS:  The predicate "is a car owned by Bob" can be true or false *of*
something only when it is linked to a subject, for example, "That Chevy /
is a car owned by Bob."


We can also analyze that "predicate" as four Subjects (something, car,
owning, Bob) "married" by two Continuous Predicates--"_ is identical to
a _ that is in the dyadic relation of _ to _."

JFS:  The "proper way" on p. 885 would replace the verb 'breathes' in the
sentence "Every mammal breathes oxygen" with the verb 'is' in "Every mammal
is an oxygen-breathing animal."


No, we have been over this already.  The "proper way" is Peircean, not
Aristotelian, and analyzes that sentence as "Every mammal is in the dyadic
relation of breathing to oxygen."  There is no need to insert the word
"animal."

JFS:  Yes, but that is continuity of *pure* predicates, not of predicates
that refer to content in the universe of discourse.


In Peirce's "proper" or "ultimate" analysis of Propositions, "pure"
predicates are the *only *predicates.  *Anything* that refers to content in
the universe of discourse--i.e., anything that can only be understood by an
interpreting Quasi-mind that has had previous Collateral Experience with
it--is a *Subject*; it belongs to the *Object *of the Proposition.  The
only information that a Proposition can *convey*, which therefore belongs
to its *Interpretant*, is the logical form of the relation that "marries"
all of the referenced Subjects.  In order to understand "Bob owns a red
car," I need Collateral Experience with not only Bob and cars, but also
owning and redness.  In order to understand "Every mammal breathes oxygen,"
I need Collateral Experience with not only mammals and oxygen, but also
breathing.

JFS:  In CP 4.538, Peirce said that the triad rheme/dicisign/argument would
have to be widened to cover those image-like things.  His earlier
definition of quasi-predicate would cover those aspects. Therefore, the
widened term 'seme' includes both 'predicate' and 'quasi-predicate'.  But
no logical subject could ever be a seme.


That is *not *what the text says *at all*.  The trichotomy that had to be
"much widened" was term/proposition/argument; "rheme" and "dicisign" are
not mentioned, and as I have pointed out repeatedly, "quasi-predicate" *never
*appears in *any *of Peirce's writings, other than its one occurrence in
1903.  The definition of "Seme" is "anything which serves for any purpose
as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a
representative or Sign," which clearly encompasses *all *logical subjects.

JAS:  The additional step that I am taking is to recognize...
JFS:  If Peirce did not explicitly take that step, don't put words in his
mouth.


But I *did not* put words in his mouth; I said quite plainly that I was
taking an additional step.

JAS:  Bellucci cites another passage where Peirce clearly endorsed...
JFS:  If he didn't explicitly say something that seems "clear" or
"obvious", he probably had some reason for not doing so.


But he *did* explicitly say something in this case--three times!

CSP:  I regard everything to which the assertion relates and to which
reference can be removed from the predicate, although what is referred to
be a quality, relation, state of things, etc. as a Subject. (R 611)

CSP:  But the proper way in logic is to take as the subject whatever there
is of which sufficient knowledge cannot be conveyed in the proposition
itself, but collateral experience on the part of its interpreter is
requisite ... The result is that everything in a proposition that possibly
can should be thrown into the subjects, leaving the *pure *predicate a mere
form of connection ... (NEM 3:885)

CSP:  When we have analyzed a proposition so as to throw into the subject
everything that can be removed from the predicate, all that it remains for
the predicate to represent is the form of connection between the different
subjects as expressed in the propositional *form* ... when we have carried
analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it
to its ultimate elements. (SS 71-72)


I already acknowledged that the EGs reflect his earlier analysis, and that
maintaining such an approach makes perfect sense when using EGs to teach
first-order predicate logic today.  I have a