Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary F, Jeff, Mike,

Thanks for the reference, Jeff.

I thought that the question of consequentiae might be more complicated than
being able to relate it to the terms of formal symbolic logic, but I wanted
to see what your thoughts were on it, and so I do. The confirmation is much
appreciated.

-- Franklin

On Oct 25, 2017 8:05 PM, "Mike Bergman" <m...@mkbergman.com> wrote:

> Hi Jeff,
>
>
> Thank you. The Bellucci reference is excellent and timely. I found a PDF
> online at http://www.academia.edu/download/41369857/Bellucci_
> CSP_consequences.pdf; some of the Abelard quotes are translated at
> http://johnmacfarlane.net/abelard.pdf.
>
>
> Best, Mike
>
> On 10/25/2017 6:18 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
>
> Franklin, Gary F, List,
>
>
> In *Reading Peirce Reading*, Richard Smyth suggests that many logicians,
> such as Quine, make the error of   making assignments to the truth table
> for the conditional in a rather arbitrary fashion. Peirce, on the other
> hand, is developing a logical theory that seeks to explain why some
> inferences that we take to be good or bad really are valid or invalid. As
> such, he is setting up a semantic assignment of values to the truth table
> that is not arbitrary.
>
>
> Here, in the second lecture, he trying to show us how to set up
> mathematical system of logic that will enable us to analyze examples of
> reasoning more carefully and exactly. As such, he is trying to avoid the
> temptation of developing a logical system that prejudges the questions
> we're trying to answer in the normative theory of logic.
>
>
> For background on the relation between these different accounts of the
> conditional, it might be worth looking atFrancesco Bellucci
> <http://www.tandfonline.com/author/Bellucci%2C+Francesco>'s "Charles S.
> Peirce and the Medieval Doctrine of *consequentiae".*
> See: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01445340.
> 2015.1118338?scroll=top=true&
>
>
> In this article, he provides a historical reconstruction of what Peirce
> was drawing from in the medieval doctrine, and how this account of the
> conditional shape his understanding of the relation of implication.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
> ----------
> *From:* Franklin Ransom <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>
> <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 25, 2017 1:51:13 PM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4
>
> Gary F,
>
> If I try to picture the Philonian and Diodoran interpretations in terms of
> truth value tables, they essentially correspond to material and strict
> implication, respectively. But I'm not sure how the distinction between
> ordinary consequence and simplex de inesse fits in. Would that have more to
> do with modal logic (possible vs...actual?), which the gamma graphs aim to
> treat of, and which you are suggesting is where the Philonian or material
> approach becomes problematic?
>
> -- Franklin
>
>
> On Oct 25, 2017 4:22 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>
> Franklin, list,
>
>
>
> The distinction between the conditional “simplex de inesse” and other
> if-then propositions is that the “simplex” is indeed simpler, and
> absolutely exact from a logical point of view, which removes all possible
> ambiguity from the interpretation of it. It asserts no connection at all
> between the truth of the antecedent and the truth of the consequent
> *except* that when the former is true, the latter is true, “never mind
> the why or wherefore.” This means that there is no way to falsify the
> conditional proposition as a whole *except* to observe that the
> antecedent is true *and* the consequent is false. The proposition as a
> whole — contrary to the “ordinary language” usage and the Diodoran point of
> view — remains perfectly true if *both* antecedent and consequent are in
> themselves false.
>
>
>
> The *significance* of this distinction should become more clear as Peirce
> proceeds to define the “scroll” as the diagram representing the conditional 
> *de
> inesse*. The reading of the scroll follows from the stipulation “that in
> logic we are to understand the form “If A, then B” to mean “Either A is
> impossible or in every possible case in which it is true, B is true
> likewise,” or in other words it means “In each possible case, either A is
> false or B is true.”
>
> From this Peirce will derive the meaning of the cut as *negation of what
> is inside the cut*. It seems to me, in hindsight, that right here on the
> g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Jeff,

  
Thank you. The Bellucci reference is excellent and timely. I
found a PDF online at
http://www.academia.edu/download/41369857/Bellucci_CSP_consequences.pdf;
some of the Abelard quotes are translated at
http://johnmacfarlane.net/abelard.pdf.

  
Best, Mike


On 10/25/2017 6:18 PM, Jeffrey Brian
  Downard wrote:


  
  
  
Franklin, Gary F, List,


In Reading
Peirce Reading, Richard Smyth suggests that many
  logicians, such as Quine, make the error of   making
  assignments to the truth table for the conditional in a rather
  arbitrary fashion. Peirce, on the other hand, is developing a
  logical theory that seeks to explain why some inferences that
  we take to be good or bad really are valid or invalid. As
  such, he is setting up a semantic assignment of values to the
  truth table that is not arbitrary.


Here,
  in the second lecture, he trying to show us how to set up
  mathematical system of logic that will enable us to analyze
  examples of reasoning more carefully and exactly. As such, he is trying
to avoid the temptation of developing a logical system that
prejudges the questions we're trying to answer in the
normative theory of logic. 

  
For background on the relation
between these different accounts of the conditional, it
might be worth looking atFrancesco Bellucci's "Charles S. Peirce and the
  Medieval Doctrine of consequentiae".

  
See: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01445340.2015.1118338?scroll=top=true&


In
  this article, he provides a historical reconstruction of what
  Peirce was drawing from in the medieval doctrine, and how this
  account of the conditional shape his understanding of the
  relation of implication.


--Jeff



  
Jeffrey Downard
  Associate Professor
  Department of Philosophy
  Northern Arizona University
  (o) 928 523-8354
  

  
  
  From:
  Franklin Ransom <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>
  Sent: Wednesday, October 25, 2017 1:51:13 PM
  To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4
 
  
  

  Gary F,


If I try to picture the Philonian and
  Diodoran interpretations in terms of truth value tables,
  they essentially correspond to material and strict
  implication, respectively. But I'm not sure how the
  distinction between ordinary consequence and simplex de
  inesse fits in. Would that have more to do with modal
  logic (possible vs...actual?), which the gamma graphs aim
  to treat of, and which you are suggesting is where the
  Philonian or material approach becomes problematic?


-- Franklin


  On Oct 25, 2017 4:22 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca>
wrote:

  

  Franklin,
  list,
   
  The
  distinction between the conditional “simplex
  de inesse” and other if-then propositions is
  that the “simplex” is indeed simpler, and
  absolutely exact from a logical point of view,
  which removes all possible ambiguity from the
  interpretation of it. It asserts no connection
  at all between the truth of the antecedent and
  the truth of the consequent
  except that when the former is true,
  the latter is true, “never mind the why or
  wherefore.” This means that there is no way to
  falsify the conditional proposition as a whole
  except to observe that the antecedent
  is true and the consequent is false.
  The proposition as a whole — contrary to the
  “ordinary language” usage and the Diodoran
  point of view — remains perfectly true if
  both antecedent and consequent are in

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[gnox]

Franklin,

 

Jeff’s post just now is probably more useful than what I’m about to say, but 
since I wrote it before I saw Jeff’s I might as well post it anyway …

 

Yes, I understand that “material implication” is now the more common term for 
the Philonian view of conditionals; I just don’t use that term because I don’t 
see that it clarifies the issue. Peirce says that Duns Scotus “threw 
considerable light upon” the Philonian/Diodoran controversy (and thus on 
“material implication”) by making the distinction between “simplex” and other 
conditionals. My understanding is that the “simplex” conditional is more 
obviously well suited to the Philonian point of view because it relates only to 
the “hic et nunc” rather than to general conditions. Peirce doesn’t want the 
ordinary or common-sense usage of the conditional form to interfere with 
comprehension of the strictly logical issue, so he avoids that by focusing on 
the conditional “de inesse” instead.

 

Taking a strictly Philonian view of the conditional perspective seems requisite 
for Peirce’s very definition of negation. Since I have never taken a course in 
formal logic, it was not immediately obvious to me why negation has to be 
formally defined at all, but Peirce appears to see the conditional, or “if -> 
then”, as logically simpler or more elementary than negation or “not.” So he 
appears to derive the sign for negation in EGs from the sign for the 
conditional; and just to isolate the concept of the conditional from everyday 
language, which is inexact, he narrows the focus to the more artificial concept 
of the conditional de inesse.

 

There are probably logicians aboard who could explain this better than I, but 
my own interest in this close study is to make it easier to follow for 
non-logicians or “amateur” logicians like myself. For us, EGs are not easy to 
swallow, but I want to make every effort to see their importance for myself, 
before I accept or reject Peirce’s opinion of their importance for pragmatism 
and philosophy generally.

 

Having said that … Jeff, I’ll hunt for that Bellucci article you mentioned.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 25-Oct-17 16:51
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

 

Gary F,

 

If I try to picture the Philonian and Diodoran interpretations in terms of 
truth value tables, they essentially correspond to material and strict 
implication, respectively. But I'm not sure how the distinction between 
ordinary consequence and simplex de inesse fits in. Would that have more to do 
with modal logic (possible vs...actual?), which the gamma graphs aim to treat 
of, and which you are suggesting is where the Philonian or material approach 
becomes problematic?

 

-- Franklin

 

 


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Franklin, Gary F, List,


In Reading Peirce Reading, Richard Smyth suggests that many logicians, such as 
Quine, make the error of   making assignments to the truth table for the 
conditional in a rather arbitrary fashion. Peirce, on the other hand, is 
developing a logical theory that seeks to explain why some inferences that we 
take to be good or bad really are valid or invalid. As such, he is setting up a 
semantic assignment of values to the truth table that is not arbitrary.


Here, in the second lecture, he trying to show us how to set up mathematical 
system of logic that will enable us to analyze examples of reasoning more 
carefully and exactly. As such, he is trying to avoid the temptation of 
developing a logical system that prejudges the questions we're trying to answer 
in the normative theory of logic.


For background on the relation between these different accounts of the 
conditional, it might be worth looking atFrancesco 
Bellucci<http://www.tandfonline.com/author/Bellucci%2C+Francesco>'s "Charles S. 
Peirce and the Medieval Doctrine of consequentiae".

See: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01445340.2015.1118338?scroll=top=true;


In this article, he provides a historical reconstruction of what Peirce was 
drawing from in the medieval doctrine, and how this account of the conditional 
shape his understanding of the relation of implication.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Franklin Ransom <pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, October 25, 2017 1:51:13 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

Gary F,

If I try to picture the Philonian and Diodoran interpretations in terms of 
truth value tables, they essentially correspond to material and strict 
implication, respectively. But I'm not sure how the distinction between 
ordinary consequence and simplex de inesse fits in. Would that have more to do 
with modal logic (possible vs...actual?), which the gamma graphs aim to treat 
of, and which you are suggesting is where the Philonian or material approach 
becomes problematic?

-- Franklin


On Oct 25, 2017 4:22 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:
Franklin, list,

The distinction between the conditional “simplex de inesse” and other if-then 
propositions is that the “simplex” is indeed simpler, and absolutely exact from 
a logical point of view, which removes all possible ambiguity from the 
interpretation of it. It asserts no connection at all between the truth of the 
antecedent and the truth of the consequent except that when the former is true, 
the latter is true, “never mind the why or wherefore.” This means that there is 
no way to falsify the conditional proposition as a whole except to observe that 
the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. The proposition as a whole 
— contrary to the “ordinary language” usage and the Diodoran point of view — 
remains perfectly true if both antecedent and consequent are in themselves 
false.

The significance of this distinction should become more clear as Peirce 
proceeds to define the “scroll” as the diagram representing the conditional de 
inesse. The reading of the scroll follows from the stipulation “that in logic 
we are to understand the form “If A, then B” to mean “Either A is impossible or 
in every possible case in which it is true, B is true likewise,” or in other 
words it means “In each possible case, either A is false or B is true.”
>From this Peirce will derive the meaning of the cut as negation of what is 
>inside the cut. It seems to me, in hindsight, that right here on the ground 
>level of the whole EG system lies a design feature that will later become 
>problematic for the gamma part of EGs, i.e. for modal logic. That’s why I’m 
>trying to understand why Peirce felt compelled to design them in the way he 
>did.

The significance of the distinction becomes amplified, I think, as soon as we 
take a step beyond exact logic into metaphysics. But we’re not ready to talk 
about that yet. Or at least I’m not, I’m still trying to clarify exactly how 
EGs are supposed to work, so that their meanings become more directly visible 
to me.

Gary f.

From: Franklin Ransom 
[mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com<mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>]
Sent: 25-Oct-17 14:32
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 1 
<PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

Gary F,

Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular 
consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate? That 
is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given what 
Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture.

-- Franklin

Here’s the 1898 excerpt t

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary F,

If I try to picture the Philonian and Diodoran interpretations in terms of
truth value tables, they essentially correspond to material and strict
implication, respectively. But I'm not sure how the distinction between
ordinary consequence and simplex de inesse fits in. Would that have more to
do with modal logic (possible vs...actual?), which the gamma graphs aim to
treat of, and which you are suggesting is where the Philonian or material
approach becomes problematic?

-- Franklin


On Oct 25, 2017 4:22 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

Franklin, list,



The distinction between the conditional “simplex de inesse” and other
if-then propositions is that the “simplex” is indeed simpler, and
absolutely exact from a logical point of view, which removes all possible
ambiguity from the interpretation of it. It asserts no connection at all
between the truth of the antecedent and the truth of the consequent *except*
that when the former is true, the latter is true, “never mind the why or
wherefore.” This means that there is no way to falsify the conditional
proposition as a whole *except* to observe that the antecedent is true *and*
the consequent is false. The proposition as a whole — contrary to the
“ordinary language” usage and the Diodoran point of view — remains
perfectly true if *both* antecedent and consequent are in themselves false.



The *significance* of this distinction should become more clear as Peirce
proceeds to define the “scroll” as the diagram representing the conditional *de
inesse*. The reading of the scroll follows from the stipulation “that in
logic we are to understand the form “If A, then B” to mean “Either A is
impossible or in every possible case in which it is true, B is true
likewise,” or in other words it means “In each possible case, either A is
false or B is true.”

>From this Peirce will derive the meaning of the cut as *negation of what is
inside the cut*. It seems to me, in hindsight, that right here on the
ground level of the whole EG system lies a design feature that will later
become problematic for the gamma part of EGs, i.e. for modal logic. That’s
why I’m trying to understand why Peirce felt compelled to design them in
the way he did.



The significance of the distinction becomes amplified, I think, as soon as
we take a step beyond exact logic into metaphysics. But we’re not ready to
talk about that yet. Or at least I’m not, I’m still trying to clarify
exactly how EGs are supposed to work, so that their meanings become more
directly visible to me.



Gary f.



*From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
*Sent:* 25-Oct-17 14:32
*Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4



Gary F,



Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular
consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate?
That is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given
what Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture.



-- Franklin



Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional *de
inesse*” *(R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):*

 Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy between
two logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of conditional
propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is lightening it will
thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will thunder and was
only false if it is lightening but will not thunder. Diodorus objected to
this. Either the ancient reporters or he himself failed to make out
precisely what was in his mind, and though there have been many virtual
Diodorans since, none of them have been able to state their position
clearly without making it too foolish. Most of the strong logicians have
been Philonians, and most of the weak ones have been Diodorans. For my
part, I am a Philonian; but I do not think that justice has ever been done
to the Diodoran side of the question. The Diodoran vaguely feels that there
is something wrong about the statement that the proposition “If it is
lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely by its not lightening.

Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw
considerable light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary
*consequentia*, or conditional proposition, and a *consequentia simplex de
inesse*. A *consequentia simplex de inesse* relates to no range of
possibilities at all, but merely to what happens, or is true, *hic et nunc*.
But the ordinary conditional proposition asserts not merely that here and
now either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, but that in
each possible state of things throughout a certain well-understood range of
possibility either the antecedent is false or the consequent true. So
understood the proposition “If it lightens it will thunder” means that on
each occasion which could arise consistently with the regular c

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[gnox]

Franklin, list,

 

The distinction between the conditional “simplex de inesse” and other if-then 
propositions is that the “simplex” is indeed simpler, and absolutely exact from 
a logical point of view, which removes all possible ambiguity from the 
interpretation of it. It asserts no connection at all between the truth of the 
antecedent and the truth of the consequent except that when the former is true, 
the latter is true, “never mind the why or wherefore.” This means that there is 
no way to falsify the conditional proposition as a whole except to observe that 
the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. The proposition as a whole 
— contrary to the “ordinary language” usage and the Diodoran point of view — 
remains perfectly true if both antecedent and consequent are in themselves 
false.

 

The significance of this distinction should become more clear as Peirce 
proceeds to define the “scroll” as the diagram representing the conditional de 
inesse. The reading of the scroll follows from the stipulation “that in logic 
we are to understand the form “If A, then B” to mean “Either A is impossible or 
in every possible case in which it is true, B is true likewise,” or in other 
words it means “In each possible case, either A is false or B is true.”

>From this Peirce will derive the meaning of the cut as negation of what is 
>inside the cut. It seems to me, in hindsight, that right here on the ground 
>level of the whole EG system lies a design feature that will later become 
>problematic for the gamma part of EGs, i.e. for modal logic. That’s why I’m 
>trying to understand why Peirce felt compelled to design them in the way he 
>did.

 

The significance of the distinction becomes amplified, I think, as soon as we 
take a step beyond exact logic into metaphysics. But we’re not ready to talk 
about that yet. Or at least I’m not, I’m still trying to clarify exactly how 
EGs are supposed to work, so that their meanings become more directly visible 
to me.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 25-Oct-17 14:32
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

 

Gary F,

 

Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular 
consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate? That 
is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given what 
Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture.

 

-- Franklin

 

Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional de 
inesse” (R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):

 Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy between two 
logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of conditional 
propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is lightening it will 
thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will thunder and was only 
false if it is lightening but will not thunder. Diodorus objected to this. 
Either the ancient reporters or he himself failed to make out precisely what 
was in his mind, and though there have been many virtual Diodorans since, none 
of them have been able to state their position clearly without making it too 
foolish. Most of the strong logicians have been Philonians, and most of the 
weak ones have been Diodorans. For my part, I am a Philonian; but I do not 
think that justice has ever been done to the Diodoran side of the question. The 
Diodoran vaguely feels that there is something wrong about the statement that 
the proposition “If it is lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely 
by its not lightening.

Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw considerable 
light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary consequentia, or 
conditional proposition, and a consequentia simplex de inesse. A consequentia 
simplex de inesse relates to no range of possibilities at all, but merely to 
what happens, or is true, hic et nunc. But the ordinary conditional proposition 
asserts not merely that here and now either the antecedent is false or the 
consequent is true, but that in each possible state of things throughout a 
certain well-understood range of possibility either the antecedent is false or 
the consequent true. So understood the proposition “If it lightens it will 
thunder” means that on each occasion which could arise consistently with the 
regular course of nature, either it would not lighten or thunder would shortly 
follow. 

Now this much may be conceded to the Diodoran, in order that we may fit him out 
with a better defence than he has ever been able to construct for himself, 
namely, that in our ordinary use of language we always understand the range of 
possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the antecedent shall be 
true. Consider, for example, the following conditional proposition: If I were 
to take up that lampstand by its 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Jerry Rhee]

Franklin, Gary f, list:



"How do you know that *A* is *A*?"



"Because that is involved in what I mean by 'is'."



"How do you know it is involved?"



"Because, torture my imagination as I will, I cannot think of anything that
I could call *A* and not judge that *A* is *A*."



"Perhaps that is because you have not hit on the right kind of a subject to
substitute for A."



"Possibly. But as long as I cannot help thinking that that is what I mean
by 'is', it is nonsense to question it."





Best,
Jerry R


PS.  Franklin, very cool gmail handle...

On Wed, Oct 25, 2017 at 1:31 PM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Gary F,
>
> Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular
> consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate?
> That is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given
> what Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture.
>
> -- Franklin
>
> On Oct 24, 2017 6:07 PM, "Jerry Rhee"  wrote:
>
>> Gary f:
>>
>> "pet theories"?   :)
>>
>> Best,
>> J
>>
>> On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 3:00 PM,  wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry R, list,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Lowell 2.4 introduces the “conditional *de inesse,*” as Peirce calls
>>> it, as the most simple and basic logical form that needs to be represented
>>> in the system of existential graphs. It was not obvious to me at first
>>> *why* Peirce chose this particular form as the place to start; so in
>>> the presentation of Lowell 2 on my website, I inserted as a sidenote a
>>> section from one of his 1898 Cambridge Lectures that explains in more
>>> detail what the logical issue is and why the “conditional *de inesse*”
>>> is so important for the Peircean approach to formal logic in the Lowells.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> And of course, you have to understand the part formal logic and
>>> existential graphs play in Peirce’s whole philosophy in order to see the
>>> point of what he’s doing in Lowell 2. So if you weren’t following Lowell 1
>>> very closely, you probably won’t follow Lowell 2 very closely either. That
>>> may mean you have to set aside your own pet theories and predilections to
>>> get on board with Peirce’s train of thought.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional *de
>>> inesse*” *(R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy
>>> between two logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of
>>> conditional propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is
>>> lightening it will thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will
>>> thunder and was only false if it is lightening but will not thunder.
>>> Diodorus objected to this. Either the ancient reporters or he himself
>>> failed to make out precisely what was in his mind, and though there have
>>> been many virtual Diodorans since, none of them have been able to state
>>> their position clearly without making it too foolish. Most of the strong
>>> logicians have been Philonians, and most of the weak ones have been
>>> Diodorans. For my part, I am a Philonian; but I do not think that justice
>>> has ever been done to the Diodoran side of the question. The Diodoran
>>> vaguely feels that there is something wrong about the statement that the
>>> proposition “If it is lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely
>>> by its not lightening.
>>>
>>> Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw
>>> considerable light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary
>>> *consequentia*, or conditional proposition, and a *consequentia simplex
>>> de inesse*. A *consequentia simplex de inesse* relates to no range of
>>> possibilities at all, but merely to what happens, or is true, *hic et
>>> nunc*. But the ordinary conditional proposition asserts not merely that
>>> here and now either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, but
>>> that in each possible state of things throughout a certain well-understood
>>> range of possibility either the antecedent is false or the consequent true.
>>> So understood the proposition “If it lightens it will thunder” means that
>>> on each occasion which could arise consistently with the regular course of
>>> nature, either it would not lighten or thunder would shortly follow.
>>>
>>> Now this much may be conceded to the Diodoran, in order that we may fit
>>> him out with a better defence than he has ever been able to construct for
>>> himself, namely, that in our ordinary use of language we always understand
>>> the range of possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the
>>> antecedent shall be true. Consider, for example, the following conditional
>>> proposition: If I were to take up that lampstand by its shaft and go
>>> brandishing the lamp about in the faces of my auditors it would not
>>> occasion the slightest surprise to anybody. Everybody will say that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Franklin Ransom]

Gary F,

Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular
consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate?
That is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given
what Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture.

-- Franklin

On Oct 24, 2017 6:07 PM, "Jerry Rhee"  wrote:

> Gary f:
>
> "pet theories"?   :)
>
> Best,
> J
>
> On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 3:00 PM,  wrote:
>
>> Jerry R, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> Lowell 2.4 introduces the “conditional *de inesse,*” as Peirce calls it,
>> as the most simple and basic logical form that needs to be represented in
>> the system of existential graphs. It was not obvious to me at first *why*
>> Peirce chose this particular form as the place to start; so in the
>> presentation of Lowell 2 on my website, I inserted as a sidenote a section
>> from one of his 1898 Cambridge Lectures that explains in more detail what
>> the logical issue is and why the “conditional *de inesse*” is so
>> important for the Peircean approach to formal logic in the Lowells.
>>
>>
>>
>> And of course, you have to understand the part formal logic and
>> existential graphs play in Peirce’s whole philosophy in order to see the
>> point of what he’s doing in Lowell 2. So if you weren’t following Lowell 1
>> very closely, you probably won’t follow Lowell 2 very closely either. That
>> may mean you have to set aside your own pet theories and predilections to
>> get on board with Peirce’s train of thought.
>>
>>
>>
>> Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional *de
>> inesse*” *(R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):*
>>
>>
>>
>> Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy between
>> two logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of conditional
>> propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is lightening it will
>> thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will thunder and was
>> only false if it is lightening but will not thunder. Diodorus objected to
>> this. Either the ancient reporters or he himself failed to make out
>> precisely what was in his mind, and though there have been many virtual
>> Diodorans since, none of them have been able to state their position
>> clearly without making it too foolish. Most of the strong logicians have
>> been Philonians, and most of the weak ones have been Diodorans. For my
>> part, I am a Philonian; but I do not think that justice has ever been done
>> to the Diodoran side of the question. The Diodoran vaguely feels that there
>> is something wrong about the statement that the proposition “If it is
>> lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely by its not lightening.
>>
>> Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw
>> considerable light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary
>> *consequentia*, or conditional proposition, and a *consequentia simplex
>> de inesse*. A *consequentia simplex de inesse* relates to no range of
>> possibilities at all, but merely to what happens, or is true, *hic et
>> nunc*. But the ordinary conditional proposition asserts not merely that
>> here and now either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, but
>> that in each possible state of things throughout a certain well-understood
>> range of possibility either the antecedent is false or the consequent true.
>> So understood the proposition “If it lightens it will thunder” means that
>> on each occasion which could arise consistently with the regular course of
>> nature, either it would not lighten or thunder would shortly follow.
>>
>> Now this much may be conceded to the Diodoran, in order that we may fit
>> him out with a better defence than he has ever been able to construct for
>> himself, namely, that in our ordinary use of language we always understand
>> the range of possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the
>> antecedent shall be true. Consider, for example, the following conditional
>> proposition: If I were to take up that lampstand by its shaft and go
>> brandishing the lamp about in the faces of my auditors it would not
>> occasion the slightest surprise to anybody. Everybody will say that is
>> false; and were I to reply that it was true because under no possible
>> circumstances should I behave in that outrageous manner, you would feel
>> that I was violating the usages of speech.
>>
>> I would respectfully and kindly suggest to the Diodoran that this way of
>> defending his position is better than his ordinary stammerings. Still,
>> should he accept my suggestion I shall with pain be obliged to add that the
>> argument is the merest *ignoratio elenchi* which ought not to deceive a
>> tyro in logic. For it is quite beside the question what ordinary language
>> means. The very idea of formal logic is, that certain *canonical forms*
>> of expression shall be provided, the meanings of which forms are governed
>> by 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Jerry Rhee]

Gary f:

"pet theories"?   :)

Best,
J

On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 3:00 PM,  wrote:

> Jerry R, list,
>
>
>
> Lowell 2.4 introduces the “conditional *de inesse,*” as Peirce calls it,
> as the most simple and basic logical form that needs to be represented in
> the system of existential graphs. It was not obvious to me at first *why*
> Peirce chose this particular form as the place to start; so in the
> presentation of Lowell 2 on my website, I inserted as a sidenote a section
> from one of his 1898 Cambridge Lectures that explains in more detail what
> the logical issue is and why the “conditional *de inesse*” is so
> important for the Peircean approach to formal logic in the Lowells.
>
>
>
> And of course, you have to understand the part formal logic and
> existential graphs play in Peirce’s whole philosophy in order to see the
> point of what he’s doing in Lowell 2. So if you weren’t following Lowell 1
> very closely, you probably won’t follow Lowell 2 very closely either. That
> may mean you have to set aside your own pet theories and predilections to
> get on board with Peirce’s train of thought.
>
>
>
> Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional *de
> inesse*” *(R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):*
>
>
>
> Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy between
> two logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of conditional
> propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is lightening it will
> thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will thunder and was
> only false if it is lightening but will not thunder. Diodorus objected to
> this. Either the ancient reporters or he himself failed to make out
> precisely what was in his mind, and though there have been many virtual
> Diodorans since, none of them have been able to state their position
> clearly without making it too foolish. Most of the strong logicians have
> been Philonians, and most of the weak ones have been Diodorans. For my
> part, I am a Philonian; but I do not think that justice has ever been done
> to the Diodoran side of the question. The Diodoran vaguely feels that there
> is something wrong about the statement that the proposition “If it is
> lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely by its not lightening.
>
> Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw
> considerable light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary
> *consequentia*, or conditional proposition, and a *consequentia simplex
> de inesse*. A *consequentia simplex de inesse* relates to no range of
> possibilities at all, but merely to what happens, or is true, *hic et
> nunc*. But the ordinary conditional proposition asserts not merely that
> here and now either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, but
> that in each possible state of things throughout a certain well-understood
> range of possibility either the antecedent is false or the consequent true.
> So understood the proposition “If it lightens it will thunder” means that
> on each occasion which could arise consistently with the regular course of
> nature, either it would not lighten or thunder would shortly follow.
>
> Now this much may be conceded to the Diodoran, in order that we may fit
> him out with a better defence than he has ever been able to construct for
> himself, namely, that in our ordinary use of language we always understand
> the range of possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the
> antecedent shall be true. Consider, for example, the following conditional
> proposition: If I were to take up that lampstand by its shaft and go
> brandishing the lamp about in the faces of my auditors it would not
> occasion the slightest surprise to anybody. Everybody will say that is
> false; and were I to reply that it was true because under no possible
> circumstances should I behave in that outrageous manner, you would feel
> that I was violating the usages of speech.
>
> I would respectfully and kindly suggest to the Diodoran that this way of
> defending his position is better than his ordinary stammerings. Still,
> should he accept my suggestion I shall with pain be obliged to add that the
> argument is the merest *ignoratio elenchi* which ought not to deceive a
> tyro in logic. For it is quite beside the question what ordinary language
> means. The very idea of formal logic is, that certain *canonical forms*
> of expression shall be provided, the meanings of which forms are governed
> by inflexible rules; and if the forms of speech are borrowed to be used as 
> *canonical
> forms of logic* it is merely for the mnemonic aid they afford, and they
> are always to be understood in logic in strict technical senses. These
> forms of expression are to be defined, just as zoologists and botanists
> define the terms which they invent, that is to say, without the slightest
> regard for usage but so as to correspond to natural classifications. That
> is why I 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[gnox]

Jerry R, list,

 

Lowell 2.4 introduces the “conditional de inesse,” as Peirce calls it, as the 
most simple and basic logical form that needs to be represented in the system 
of existential graphs. It was not obvious to me at first why Peirce chose this 
particular form as the place to start; so in the presentation of Lowell 2 on my 
website, I inserted as a sidenote a section from one of his 1898 Cambridge 
Lectures that explains in more detail what the logical issue is and why the 
“conditional de inesse” is so important for the Peircean approach to formal 
logic in the Lowells.

 

And of course, you have to understand the part formal logic and existential 
graphs play in Peirce’s whole philosophy in order to see the point of what he’s 
doing in Lowell 2. So if you weren’t following Lowell 1 very closely, you 
probably won’t follow Lowell 2 very closely either. That may mean you have to 
set aside your own pet theories and predilections to get on board with Peirce’s 
train of thought.

 

Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional de 
inesse” (R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):

 

Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy between two 
logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of conditional 
propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is lightening it will 
thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will thunder and was only 
false if it is lightening but will not thunder. Diodorus objected to this. 
Either the ancient reporters or he himself failed to make out precisely what 
was in his mind, and though there have been many virtual Diodorans since, none 
of them have been able to state their position clearly without making it too 
foolish. Most of the strong logicians have been Philonians, and most of the 
weak ones have been Diodorans. For my part, I am a Philonian; but I do not 
think that justice has ever been done to the Diodoran side of the question. The 
Diodoran vaguely feels that there is something wrong about the statement that 
the proposition “If it is lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely 
by its not lightening.

Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw considerable 
light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary consequentia, or 
conditional proposition, and a consequentia simplex de inesse. A consequentia 
simplex de inesse relates to no range of possibilities at all, but merely to 
what happens, or is true, hic et nunc. But the ordinary conditional proposition 
asserts not merely that here and now either the antecedent is false or the 
consequent is true, but that in each possible state of things throughout a 
certain well-understood range of possibility either the antecedent is false or 
the consequent true. So understood the proposition “If it lightens it will 
thunder” means that on each occasion which could arise consistently with the 
regular course of nature, either it would not lighten or thunder would shortly 
follow. 

Now this much may be conceded to the Diodoran, in order that we may fit him out 
with a better defence than he has ever been able to construct for himself, 
namely, that in our ordinary use of language we always understand the range of 
possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the antecedent shall be 
true. Consider, for example, the following conditional proposition: If I were 
to take up that lampstand by its shaft and go brandishing the lamp about in the 
faces of my auditors it would not occasion the slightest surprise to anybody. 
Everybody will say that is false; and were I to reply that it was true because 
under no possible circumstances should I behave in that outrageous manner, you 
would feel that I was violating the usages of speech.

I would respectfully and kindly suggest to the Diodoran that this way of 
defending his position is better than his ordinary stammerings. Still, should 
he accept my suggestion I shall with pain be obliged to add that the argument 
is the merest ignoratio elenchi which ought not to deceive a tyro in logic. For 
it is quite beside the question what ordinary language means. The very idea of 
formal logic is, that certain canonical forms of expression shall be provided, 
the meanings of which forms are governed by inflexible rules; and if the forms 
of speech are borrowed to be used as canonical forms of logic it is merely for 
the mnemonic aid they afford, and they are always to be understood in logic in 
strict technical senses. These forms of expression are to be defined, just as 
zoologists and botanists define the terms which they invent, that is to say, 
without the slightest regard for usage but so as to correspond to natural 
classifications. That is why I entitled one of the first papers I published, 
“On the Natural Classification of Arguments.” And by a natural classification, 
we mean the most pregnant classification, pregnant that is to say with 
implications 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[Jerry Rhee]

Gary f, list:



Thank you for that posting.



I must assert though,



I am surprised that if A is true, B is true,

for I thought: if A were true, C would be a matter of course.



Does B and not C surprise you?



http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-04.htm



Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Mon, Oct 23, 2017 at 9:36 AM,  wrote:

> Continuing from Lowell 2.3,
>
> https://www.fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-
> manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-lowell-lecture-ii/display/13602:
>
>
>
> The most immediately useful information is that which is conveyed in
> conditional propositions, “*If* you find that this is true, *then* you
> may know that that is true.” Now in ordinary language the conditional form
> is employed to express a variety of relations between one possibility and
> another. Very frequently when we say “If A is true, then B is true,” we
> have in mind a whole range of possibilities, and we assert that among all
> possible cases, every one of those in which A is true will turn out to be a
> case in which B is true also. But in order to obtain a way of expressing
> that sort of conditional proposition, we must begin by getting a way of
> expressing a simpler kind, which does not often occur in ordinary speech
> but which has great importance in logic. The sort of conditional
> proposition I mean is one in which no range of possibilities is
> contemplated, which speaks only of the actual state of things. “If A is
> true then B is true,” in this sense is called a conditional proposition *de
> inesse*. In case A is not true, it makes no assertion at all and
> therefore involves no falsity. And since every proposition is either true
> or false, if the antecedent, A, is not true, the conditional *de inesse*
> is true, no matter how it may be with B. In case the consequent, B, is
> true, all that the conditional *de inesse* asserts is true, and therefore
> it is true, no matter how it may be with A. If however the antecedent, A,
> is true, while the consequent, B, is false, then, and then only is the
> conditional proposition *de inesse* false. This sort of conditional says
> nothing at all about any real connection between antecedent and consequent;
> but limits itself to saying “If you should find that A is true, then you
> may know that B is true,” never mind the why or wherefore.
>
>
>
> *http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm * }{
> Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903
>
> https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-
> lowell-lecture-ii
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4

[gnox]

Continuing from Lowell 2.3,

https://www.fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903
-lowell-lecture-ii/display/13602:

 

The most immediately useful information is that which is conveyed in
conditional propositions, "If you find that this is true, then you may know
that that is true." Now in ordinary language the conditional form is
employed to express a variety of relations between one possibility and
another. Very frequently when we say "If A is true, then B is true," we have
in mind a whole range of possibilities, and we assert that among all
possible cases, every one of those in which A is true will turn out to be a
case in which B is true also. But in order to obtain a way of expressing
that sort of conditional proposition, we must begin by getting a way of
expressing a simpler kind, which does not often occur in ordinary speech but
which has great importance in logic. The sort of conditional proposition I
mean is one in which no range of possibilities is contemplated, which speaks
only of the actual state of things. "If A is true then B is true," in this
sense is called a conditional proposition de inesse. In case A is not true,
it makes no assertion at all and therefore involves no falsity. And since
every proposition is either true or false, if the antecedent, A, is not
true, the conditional de inesse is true, no matter how it may be with B. In
case the consequent, B, is true, all that the conditional de inesse asserts
is true, and therefore it is true, no matter how it may be with A. If
however the antecedent, A, is true, while the consequent, B, is false, then,
and then only is the conditional proposition de inesse false. This sort of
conditional says nothing at all about any real connection between antecedent
and consequent; but limits itself to saying "If you should find that A is
true, then you may know that B is true," never mind the why or wherefore. 

 

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm }{ Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1903

https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-low
ell-lecture-ii

 


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