Re: [PEIRCE-L] On esoteric and exoteric Peirce

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Kirsti, list:



You said:

*You picked up a metaphor, used by CSP. In order to understand the meaning
of any metaphor (in pragmaticist sense), one needs relational thinking
connecting an idea with a more developed (a better) idea VIA the
metaphorical expession.*



It is my experience that some users on this list run first to Peirce quotes
to do this, then state their interpretation and hold fast to that meaning,
in spite of Reaction put forth by other interlocutors.  So there is slow
drift of metaphoric meaning, if any at all.



As to what Peirce said and the context, he said this about the statement:

It has been said to be a sceptical and materialistic principle. But it is
only an application of the sole principle of logic which was recommended by
Jesus; “*Ye may know them by their fruits*,” and it is very intimately
allied with the ideas of the gospel…



Their fruit is, therefore, collective; it is the achievement of the whole
people. What is it, then, that the whole people is about, what is this
civilization that is the outcome of history, but is never completed? We
cannot expect to attain a complete conception of it; but we can see that it
is a gradual process, that it involves a realization of ideas in man’s
consciousness and in his works, and that it takes place by virtue of man’s
capacity for learning, and by experience continually pouring upon him ideas
he has not yet acquired.



That is, the web of relations point at a particular meaning here,
(application of the sole principle of logic recommended by Jesus, relates
to the ideas of the gospel, a collective achievement, involves a
realization of man’s ideas, never completed but *gradual process*,
dependent on man’s capacity for learning).



In a different place, he again refers to *fruits…* as a “logical rule”, a
term that he would not use haphazardly since he puts himself forth *as* a
logician:

All pragmatists will further agree that their method of ascertaining the
meanings of words and concepts is no other than that experimental method by
which all the successful sciences…have reached the degrees of certainty
that we severally proper to them today;- this experimental method being
itself nothing but a particular application of an older *logical rule*, “*By
their fruits ye shall know them*.”



Given the two situations in which the *fruits…* are used to indicate
pragmatism, we could ask of ourselves, *what does pragmaticism mean?* and
query whether this symbol is growing or whether complete.



Do you believe your conception of pragmaticism to be different in ten
years?  I admit that I think of myself as having a strong grasp of what
pragmaticism means and I don’t genuinely think the meaning will be
different in ten years.  It does not grow.  It is complete.  Adding new
information does not change its essence.


That is, I know of this principle of logic recommended by Jesus that is
synonymous with an experimental method by which all the sciences have been
successful that I can state clearly.  But perhaps my belief is merely
hubris, which is to say that I prefer to think of my belief as fallibilist
but that is not only for me to judge.  We could look at the clear statement
together and determine if there is a stronger argument.  Upon consideration
of that strongest statement and not finding any better, the meaning for me
is nearly indubitable and does not grow.



In a different place, he doesn’t mention pragmatism specifically, but to an
idea involved in pragmatism, which does not disrupt my fallibilist
understanding:

I can hardly be supposed to have selected the unusual word “uberty” instead
of “fruitfulness” merely because it is spelled with half as many letters.
Observations may be *fruitful as you will, but they cannot be said to be
gravid with young truth* in the sense in which reasoning may be, not
because of the nature of the subject it considers, but because of the
manner in which it is supported by the ratiocinative instinct.



I believe there is room for growth in the meaning of this statement but
again, it does not alter my view of pragmaticism but only reaffirms it.



You said:

You seem to assume that it is possible to offer, to explicate a complete
meaning of an expression. - But it is just as impossible as it is to
express the ultimate truth, once and for all times.



This is one way to understand the meaning of “completeness”, but it
neglects the finiteness of human life.  That is, I assume a different type
of complete meaning because while meanings may change, they don’t change so
fast that meanings can’t be argued about.  Change can be both gradual and
abrupt, but they must be fixed enough so that interlocutors can state a
position and adhere to it.  So words and meanings have lifetimes and
symbols don’t grow any faster/slower than users use them.



But the completeness concept is more complicated than at first glance.  For
instance, I asked Gary previously what he meant by completeness and he
responded with 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] On esoteric and exoteric Peirce

[kirstima]

Jerry,

Instead of jumping into conclusions (iterpretations) on what CSP meant, 
let's (as a first step) take closer look on what you did in the act of 
writing your response.


You picked up a metaphor, used by CSP. In order to understand the 
meaning of any metaphor (in pragmaticist sense), one needs relational 
thinking connecting an idea with a more developed (a better) idea VIA 
the metaphorical expession.


You seem to assume that it is possible to offer, to explicate a complete 
meaning of an expression. - But it is just as impossible as it is to 
express the ultimate truth, once and for all times.


Symbols grow, meanings change. Both are contextual, thus also have a 
history and a future.


It is easy to see why (in a teleological sense) CSP re-used a quote from 
the Testaments. He was addressing the audience of his times. It was 
sensible to assume his readers were quite well familiar with the 
Testaments and the Bible.


In our globalized world, this may not be the case. Some familiarity with 
fruits, sheep and wolves may be assumed more common. Although 
city-people may know sheep and wolves mostly via television & childhood 
fairy-tales.


Just as I earlier tried to point out, the question of a "complete 
meaning" of any single verbal expression, or a collection of expressions 
singled out. - A lot of math is needed to understand this. - To just 
take one example: What were the key points in Peirce's critique of 
Cantor and his theory.


Best,

Kirsti Määttänen







In this particular case

Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 14.11.2016 23:32:

Dear Kirsti, list:

Thank you for your comment.

With regard to seminary philosophy, Peirce cites a familiar passage:

“YE MAY KNOW THEM BY THEIR FRUITS”, and alternatively,

"By their fruits ye shall know them.”

Which is reminiscent of Matthew 7:15-17

“Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep's clothing,
but inwardly they are ferocious wolves.  YE SHALL KNOW THEM BY THEIR
FRUITS…

Likewise, every good tree bears good fruit, but a bad tree bears bad
fruit.”

What do you suppose is the complete meaning of this line and why does
he choose it when referring to pragmaticism, in particular?

Best,
 Jerry R

On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 7:53 AM,  wrote:


Jerry,

If you take "to people who want to find out" to mean: "people who
want to find out by themselves" thus not only to be told so, it
makes perfect sense. - In order to find grounds for this
interpretation, you will have to look elsewhere in the works of CSP.
- It is not uncommon that in order to find the right interpretation
for a piece of writing of any philosopher (or other writer( you'll
have to look outsiden the quote or piece in question. - It is more
like a rule. You usually have to.

As to the other quote, the main message I see, is that actually
doing philosophy. philosphizing, is nos just a matter of words. -
Even though propositional logic, even as now, takes it to be.

It is for seminary philosophers to do so. CSP never took such
endeavours seriously. To him they were simply second-class
philosophers.

He did not deal with quotes. He dealt with ideas, thoughts,
arguments.

Also, the second quote shows his contempt of taking language as
consisting of WORDS, even chains of words.

Catching a sense of irony always needs the contexts. Without a
sense fot that anyone gets lost in the web of quotes.

Best,

Kirsti Määttänen

Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 13.11.2016 02:47:


Dear list,

How are we to interpret Peirce based strictly on the printed word
if
the philosopher says such things as:

“My book is meant for people who _want to find out; _and people
who
want philosophy ladled out to them can go elsewhere.”

I mean, it’s not as though Peirce didn’t understand nuances
of
recovering an author’s intention. For example:

“Now words, taken just as they stand, if in the form of an
argument,
thereby do imply whatever fact may be necessary to make the
argument
conclusive; so that to the formal logician, who has to do only
with
the meaning of the words according to the proper principles of
interpretation, and not with the intention of the speaker as
GUESSED
at from other indications, the only fallacies should be such as
are
simply absurd and contradictory, either because their conclusions
are
absolutely inconsistent with their premisses, or because they
CONNECT
PROPOSITIONS BY A SPECIES OF ILLATIVE CONJUNCTION, by which they
cannot under any circumstances be validly connected. “

~_Some Consequences of Four Incapacities_



If to understand irony is to understand that the philosopher may
not
to speak at all (which would then make it _up to us_ to do so),

then what does _this_ perfect philosopher mean?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=azd0dLu-Muo [1] [1]

For example, consider contradictions in the following:

one; _Some Consequences_, 1883

If _A,_ then _B;_
But _A:_
[Ergo,] _B._

two; CP 2.718 (per JAS) 1886

_Rule. _If _A _is true, _C _is true,

_Case. _In a certain case _A 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] On esoteric and exoteric Peirce

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Kirsti, list:



Thank you for your comment.



With regard to seminary philosophy, Peirce cites a familiar passage:



“*Ye may know them by their fruits*”, and alternatively,

"By their fruits ye shall know them.”



Which is reminiscent of Matthew 7:15-17

“Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep's clothing, but
inwardly they are ferocious wolves.  *Ye shall know them by their fruits*…

Likewise, every good tree bears good fruit, but a bad tree bears bad fruit.”



What do you suppose is the complete meaning of this line and why does he
choose it when referring to pragmaticism, in particular?



Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 7:53 AM,  wrote:

> Jerry,
>
> If you take "to people who want to find out" to mean: "people who want to
> find out by themselves" thus not only to be told so, it makes perfect
> sense. - In order to find grounds for this interpretation, you will have to
> look elsewhere in the works of CSP. - It is not uncommon that in order to
> find the right interpretation for a piece of writing of any philosopher (or
> other writer( you'll have to look outsiden the quote or piece in question.
> - It is more like a rule. You usually have to.
>
> As to the other quote, the main message I see, is that actually doing
> philosophy. philosphizing, is nos just a matter of words. - Even though
> propositional logic, even as now, takes it to be.
>
> It is for seminary philosophers to do so. CSP never took such endeavours
> seriously. To him they were simply second-class philosophers.
>
> He did not deal with quotes. He dealt with ideas, thoughts, arguments.
>
> Also, the second quote shows his contempt of taking language as consisting
> of WORDS, even chains of words.
>
> Catching a sense of irony always needs the contexts. Without a sense fot
> that anyone gets lost in the web of quotes.
>
> Best,
>
> Kirsti Määttänen
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Jerry Rhee kirjoitti 13.11.2016 02:47:
>
>> Dear list,
>>
>> How are we to interpret Peirce based strictly on the printed word if
>> the philosopher says such things as:
>>
>> “My book is meant for people who _want to find out; _and people who
>> want philosophy ladled out to them can go elsewhere.”
>>
>> I mean, it’s not as though Peirce didn’t understand nuances of
>> recovering an author’s intention.  For example:
>>
>> “Now words, taken just as they stand, if in the form of an argument,
>> thereby do imply whatever fact may be necessary to make the argument
>> conclusive; so that to the formal logician, who has to do only with
>> the meaning of the words according to the proper principles of
>> interpretation, and not with the intention of the speaker as GUESSED
>> at from other indications, the only fallacies should be such as are
>> simply absurd and contradictory, either because their conclusions are
>> absolutely inconsistent with their premisses, or because they CONNECT
>> PROPOSITIONS BY A SPECIES OF ILLATIVE CONJUNCTION, by which they
>> cannot under any circumstances be validly connected. “
>>
>> ~_Some Consequences of Four Incapacities_
>>
>> 
>>
>> If to understand irony is to understand that the philosopher may not
>> to speak at all (which would then make it _up to us_ to do so),
>>
>> then what does _this_ perfect philosopher mean?
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=azd0dLu-Muo [1]
>>
>> For example, consider contradictions in the following:
>>
>> one; _Some Consequences_, 1883
>>
>> If _A,_ then _B;_
>>  But _A:_
>>  [Ergo,] _B._
>>
>> two; CP 2.718 (per JAS) 1886
>>
>> _Rule. _If _A _is true, _C _is true,
>>
>> _Case. _In a certain case _A _is true;
>>
>> _Result. _.·. In that case _C _is true.
>>
>> three, CP 5.189, 1903
>>
>> The surprising fact, C, is observed;
>>  But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
>>  Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
>>
>> _Ergo_ and _Hence_ are illative conjunctions.
>>
>> But there is also contradiction.
>>
>> For example, what of the following sequence?
>>
>> For “This much Peirce had learnt from the medieval doctors, who
>> “always called the minor premise the antecedent and the conclusion
>> the consequent” (NEM 4, p. 178, 1898). ~ Bellucci and Pietarinen
>>
>> That is, if “A presents B with a gift C, is a triple relation”, or
>> alternatively, “Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings
>> something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into
>> the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that
>> in which itself stands to C”,
>>
>> then which is the consequent and where the predicate?
>>
>> In consequence of the identification in question, in S ^ P, I speak of
>> S indifferently as _subject_, _antecedent_, or _premise_, and of P as
>> _predicate_, _consequent_, or _conclusion_. (Peirce 1880; W4, p. 170,
>>
>> 170n5)
>>
>> In other words, when you examine one and two, the consequent is B and
>> C.
>>
>> So, which is the consequent when taken whole?
>>
>> For what reasons B or C, when 

[PEIRCE-L] On esoteric and exoteric Peirce

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



How are we to interpret Peirce based strictly on the printed word if the
philosopher says such things as:



“My book is meant for people who *want to find out; *and people who want
philosophy ladled out to them can go elsewhere.”



I mean, it’s not as though Peirce didn’t understand nuances of recovering
an author’s intention.  For example:



“Now words, taken just as they stand, if in the form of an argument,
thereby do imply whatever fact may be necessary to make the argument
conclusive; so that to the formal logician, who has to do only with the
meaning of the words according to the proper principles of interpretation,
and not with the intention of the speaker as *guessed* at from other
indications, the only fallacies should be such as are simply absurd and
contradictory, either because their conclusions are absolutely inconsistent
with their premisses, or because they *connect propositions by a species of
illative conjunction*, by which they cannot under any circumstances be
validly connected. “

~*Some Consequences of Four Incapacities*





If to understand irony is to understand that the philosopher may not to
speak at all (which would then make it *up to us* to do so),

then what does *this* perfect philosopher mean?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=azd0dLu-Muo



For example, consider contradictions in the following:



*one; Some Consequences, 1883*

If *A,* then *B;*
But *A:*
[Ergo,] *B.*



*two; CP 2.718 (per JAS) 1886*

*Rule. *If *A *is true, *C *is true,

*Case. *In a certain case *A *is true;

*Result. *.·. In that case *C *is true.



*three, CP 5.189, 1903*

The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.



*Ergo* and *Hence* are illative conjunctions.

But there is also contradiction.



For example, what of the following sequence?

For “This much Peirce had learnt from the medieval doctors, who “always
called the minor premise the antecedent and the conclusion the consequent”
(NEM 4, p. 178, 1898). ~ Bellucci and Pietarinen



That is, if “A presents B with a gift C, is a triple relation”, or
alternatively, “Namely, a sign is something, A, which brings
something, B, its interpretant sign determined or created by it, into
the same sort of correspondence with something, C, its object, as that in
which itself stands to C”,

then which is the consequent and where the predicate?

In consequence of the identification in question, in S ^ P, I speak of S
indifferently as *subject*, *antecedent*, or *premise*, and of P as
*predicate*, *consequent*, or *conclusion*. (Peirce 1880; W4, p. 170, 170n5)



In other words, when you examine one and two, the consequent is B and C.

So, which is the consequent when taken whole?

For what reasons B or C, when even conclusion of a suspicious A?



That is, “Given the separate probabilities of the two consequences,

“If A, then B,” and “If both A and B, then C (1878),”

then perhaps multiple consequences sharing labels for different reasons?



“But, first, if ‘being’ has many senses (for it means sometimes substance,
sometimes that it is of a certain quality, sometimes that it is of a
certain quantity, and at other times the other categories),”

then what of the next situation in which there are many labels?

In which direction is movement; one two or three?

_



To determine consensus opinion on what Peirce said reflects the problem of
speaking as a single, unified voice on something as difficult as man’s
glassy essence.  But what is our social principle for determination here?  If
we’re not allowed to apply the method of that philosopher who gave us his
method for scientific guessing to his own philosophical writings, then
where else should we test abduction?



That is, why is it we are doing what we’re doing?  What is the good in it?



With best wishes,
Jerry Rhee



PS.  If we were to bring into this conversation an old one, then

CP 5.189 over CP 5.402 because illation and *consequentia, *

which is surprising, for *“*a *consequentia* is an argument (A, therefore
B), not a conditional proposition (if A, then B).” ~Francesco Bellucci

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