Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Sungchul Ji]

t;> philosophy -- was in a similar disgraceful state. About that time -- say
>> the date of Mansel's Prolegomena Logica†2 -- Logic touched bottom. There
>> was no room for it to become more degraded. It had been sinking steadily,
>> and relatively to the advance of physical science, by no means slowly from
>> the time of the revival of learning -- say from the date of the last fall
>> of Constantinople.†3 One important addition to the subject had been made
>> early in the eighteenth century, the Doctrine of Chances. But this had not
>> come from the professed logicians, who knew nothing about it. Whewell, it
>> is true, had been doing some fine work; but it was not of a fundamental
>> character. De Morgan and Boole had laid the foundations for modern exact
>> logic, but they can hardly be said to have begun the erection of the
>> edifice itself. Under these circumstances, I naturally opened the dusty
>> folios of the scholastic doctors. Thought generally was, of course, in a
>> somewhat low condition under the Plantagenets. You can appraise it very
>> well by the impression that Dante, Chaucer, Marco Polo, Froissart, and the
>> great cathedrals make upon us. But [their] logic, relatively to the general
>> condition of thought, was marvellously exact and critical. They can tell us
>> nothing concerning methods of reasoning since their own reasoning was
>> puerile; but their analyses of thought and their discussions of all those
>> questions of logic that almost trench upon metaphysics are very instructive
>> as well as very good discipline in that subtle kind of thinking that is
>> required in logic.
>>
>> Peirce: CP 1.16 Cross-Ref:††
>>
>> 16. In the days of which I am speaking, the age of Robert of
>> Lincoln, Roger Bacon, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus, the question of
>> nominalism and realism was regarded as definitively and conclusively
>> settled in favor of realism. You know what the question was. It was whether
>> laws and general types are figments of the mind or are real. If this be
>> understood to mean whether there really are any laws and types, it is
>> strictly speaking a question of metaphysics and not of logic. But as a
>> first step toward its solution, it is proper to ask whether, granting that
>> our common-sense beliefs are true, the analysis of the meaning of those
>> beliefs shows that, according to those beliefs, laws and types are
>> objective or subjective. This is a question of logic rather than of
>> metaphysics -- and as soon as this is answered the reply to the other
>> question immediately follows after.
>>
>> Peirce: CP 1.17 Cross-Ref:††
>>
>> Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
>> Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 10:49 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
>> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>>
>>> Stephen, List,
>>>
>>> You draw the conclusions:  Nothing is innate. Experience/knowing can
>>> only ever be subjective.
>>>
>>> My suggestion was that, until we have understood how Peirce is using the
>>> conception of the innate (or how Plato, or Descartes are using the
>>> conception, for that matter), then we are just talking past each other.
>>> The temptation I would like to resist is that of re-conceiving the meaning
>>> of well established concepts unless there is some compelling reason to do
>>> so.  Doing so causes too much confusion.  As such, my aim is to clarify the
>>> conceptions--and the pragmatic maxim supplies us with a nice method for
>>> doing so.
>>>
>>> So, I think Peirce can accept many of the claims you are making about
>>> the plasticity of the brain and the variation between one kind of organism
>>> and another--and still conclude that the conceptions of space and time are
>>> innate for us.  More importantly, he has good reasons to reject your
>>> reasons for drawing the conclusion that "Experience/knowing can only ever
>>> be subjective."  The study of the validity of the inferences that are
>>> fundamental for scientific inquiry is part of a normative science.  None of
>>> the conclusions that you are drawing from the special science of biology
>>> are dispositive for the questions we face about the validity of abduction,
>>> deduction or induction.
>>>
>>> This ground is all well worn, so I'll leave it at that.
>>>
>>> --Jeff
>>>
>>> Jeff Downard
>>> Associate Professor
>>> Department of Philosophy
>>> NAU
>>

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Stephen Jarosek]

Edwina, I can only concur with the conclusion that you made in your previous
email, namely, "I guess we'll have to continue to disagree!"

What can be said to be innate (insofar as we can agree on what 'innate'
precisely means), or even, to approach objectivity, relate to
semiotic/biosemiotics principles, bodily predispositions, pragmatism, and
maybe even the physics of nonlocality. From this perspective, we might
describe our predispositions as innate... however, that can be undone with
experience. Predispositions aside, the stuff that is contingent on
experience is not innate. I play the violin by ear, and I obtained that
skill from my father... not through inheritance of innate skill, but by
"knowing how to be", in large part, with him as a role model (possibilities
attributable to nonlocality notwithstanding). Same with my
mathematical/analytical skills, and everything else. If I were removed from
my family, in infancy, and raised among wolves, there would be no part of me
that would remain predisposed to playing music by ear or performing
mathematical calculations and inferences.

Now to have a compelling science of life, we need to be able to frame our
thoughts within the context of an axiomatic framework. Might I suggest that
I have trouble framing your interpretation within the context of such a
framework.

sj

-Original Message-
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Wednesday, 14 October 2015 2:33 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Jeffrey Brian Downard'
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

Stephen J - I disagree. The reality of space and time are innate to matter;
the fact that a cell has a wall defines its existence in space; the fact
that a cell has a birth and death defines it existence in time. Now, the
effect of the weight of that matter depends on mass (the amount of matter)
and gravity, so of course, the effect of a fall would be different from that
of a cat's fall.

An animal will both innately know whether it can make a giant leap across a
gap and will learn how to deal with its spatial horizons and its weight. 
There is no way that it would require experience to make these judgments for
the possibility of error is too great.

As for the lifespan of a tortoise vs a human - I'm not sure of your point. 
What about the lifespan of a cell?

Plants, being spatiotemporal matter, do exist 'in space' within interactions
with other matter. So, a plant will move its roots towards water and
nutrients and its leaves towards sun or shade, and also, in the case of a
climbing plant, towards a wall or other matter to which it can attach
itself.

Edwina
- Original Message -
From: "Stephen Jarosek" <sjaro...@iinet.net.au>
To: "'Stephen Jarosek'" <sjaro...@iinet.net.au>; "'Jeffrey Brian Downard'" 
<jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
Cc: "'Peirce-L'" <peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 6:14 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality


... and just to confuse things, maybe some creatures don't even attribute
meaning to space. Plants grow into space, but, from what we can ascertain,
they never make choices from it. So what does this imply about the "meaning"
that a plant might attribute to the empty space that it grows into?
http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/eco.2015.0023
Sj

-Original Message-
From: Stephen Jarosek [mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au]
Sent: Wednesday, 14 October 2015 9:58 AM
To: 'Jeffrey Brian Downard'
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

Jeff, one of the surprises that I have come to in my own thinking in recent
years, within the context of neuroplastic "wiring" commencing early in the
embryo's development, is the realization that not even space or time are
"innate."

Infants begin learning about space by reaching into it and crawling through
it... the reaching begins in the womb.

Space has different meanings for different creatures. The empty space below
an elephant raised one meter in a sling will have a very different meaning
to the empty space below a cat raised one meter. For the former, that one
metre drop could be fatal, while for the latter, it will barely shake the
dust off its back. A tumble for a horse has very different consequences to a
tumble for a cat, by virtue of how mass and size interact with space and
gravity, and so they learn to attribute different limitations to this empty
space that they must negotiate. Pairs of animals in combat suffer different
consequences, depending on size and biology, and so attribute different
meanings to their experiences as constrained by space and mass.

As an adult, I went to look at the house that I first grew up in. I was
struck by my memory of the house, and the houses around it, from that young
age, as being very much larger than they now appear. Clearly, none of the
houses have changed in actual 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Stephen Jarosek]

Jeff, as I have stated before on this forum, I am not a Peirce scholar. So I
concur that it is not for me to take issue with the finer narrative where
the ground is well established. However, there are important issues being
raised that go beyond the finer detail, and these should be considered
without getting bogged down in semantics. If someone wants to quibble about
the precise meaning of "innate", fine, but that is not justification for
dismissing the broader implications, such as the need for an axiomatic
framework, or a review of important principles. Interdisciplinary thinking
requires such openness to ideas, as none of us can be experts on everything.
Otherwise we risk careering down academic cul-de-sacs that are of little
practical utility in the real world. sj

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: Wednesday, 14 October 2015 4:49 PM
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

Stephen, List,

You draw the conclusions:  Nothing is innate. Experience/knowing can only
ever be subjective.

My suggestion was that, until we have understood how Peirce is using the
conception of the innate (or how Plato, or Descartes are using the
conception, for that matter), then we are just talking past each other.  The
temptation I would like to resist is that of re-conceiving the meaning of
well established concepts unless there is some compelling reason to do so.
Doing so causes too much confusion.  As such, my aim is to clarify the
conceptions--and the pragmatic maxim supplies us with a nice method for
doing so.

So, I think Peirce can accept many of the claims you are making about the
plasticity of the brain and the variation between one kind of organism and
another--and still conclude that the conceptions of space and time are
innate for us.  More importantly, he has good reasons to reject your reasons
for drawing the conclusion that "Experience/knowing can only ever be
subjective."  The study of the validity of the inferences that are
fundamental for scientific inquiry is part of a normative science.  None of
the conclusions that you are drawing from the special science of biology are
dispositive for the questions we face about the validity of abduction,
deduction or induction.

This ground is all well worn, so I'll leave it at that.

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: Stephen Jarosek [sjaro...@iinet.net.au]
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 12:57 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

Jeff, one of the surprises that I have come to in my own thinking in recent
years, within the context of neuroplastic "wiring" commencing early in the
embryo's development, is the realization that not even space or time are
"innate."

Infants begin learning about space by reaching into it and crawling through
it... the reaching begins in the womb.

Space has different meanings for different creatures. The empty space below
an elephant raised one meter in a sling will have a very different meaning
to the empty space below a cat raised one meter. For the former, that one
metre drop could be fatal, while for the latter, it will barely shake the
dust off its back. A tumble for a horse has very different consequences to a
tumble for a cat, by virtue of how mass and size interact with space and
gravity, and so they learn to attribute different limitations to this empty
space that they must negotiate. Pairs of animals in combat suffer different
consequences, depending on size and biology, and so attribute different
meanings to their experiences as constrained by space and mass.

As an adult, I went to look at the house that I first grew up in. I was
struck by my memory of the house, and the houses around it, from that young
age, as being very much larger than they now appear. Clearly, none of the
houses have changed in actual size, but the meaning that I attribute to size
had changed.

Same with time. The passage of time for a fly resting on a table is very
different to the passage of time for someone looking at it... 5 seconds to
me will be felt as far longer than that for an insect (insofar as it can be
suggested that time "matters" for an insect). Notice how giant tortoises
move so slowly. We infer a metabolic rate to match, with equipment (the
shell) that protects it from the much nimbler creatures that might annoy or
threaten it. Our life spans are no match for the 255 years of giant tortoise
Adwaitya, that died recently at the Calcutta Zoo. Though, given its
metabolic rate, its 255 years might be experienced as closer to our 70
years. An angry tortoise hasn't much hope of catching the much nimbler
creatures that might annoy it:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjtCS0EEoCY

Conclusion? Nothing is innate. Experience/knowing can only ever be
subjective.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Stephen C. Rose]

aro...@iinet.net.au]
> Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 12:57 AM
> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
> Cc: 'Peirce-L'
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>
> Jeff, one of the surprises that I have come to in my own thinking in recent
> years, within the context of neuroplastic "wiring" commencing early in the
> embryo's development, is the realization that not even space or time are
> "innate."
>
> Infants begin learning about space by reaching into it and crawling through
> it... the reaching begins in the womb.
>
> Space has different meanings for different creatures. The empty space below
> an elephant raised one meter in a sling will have a very different meaning
> to the empty space below a cat raised one meter. For the former, that one
> metre drop could be fatal, while for the latter, it will barely shake the
> dust off its back. A tumble for a horse has very different consequences to
> a
> tumble for a cat, by virtue of how mass and size interact with space and
> gravity, and so they learn to attribute different limitations to this empty
> space that they must negotiate. Pairs of animals in combat suffer different
> consequences, depending on size and biology, and so attribute different
> meanings to their experiences as constrained by space and mass.
>
> As an adult, I went to look at the house that I first grew up in. I was
> struck by my memory of the house, and the houses around it, from that young
> age, as being very much larger than they now appear. Clearly, none of the
> houses have changed in actual size, but the meaning that I attribute to
> size
> had changed.
>
> Same with time. The passage of time for a fly resting on a table is very
> different to the passage of time for someone looking at it... 5 seconds to
> me will be felt as far longer than that for an insect (insofar as it can be
> suggested that time "matters" for an insect). Notice how giant tortoises
> move so slowly. We infer a metabolic rate to match, with equipment (the
> shell) that protects it from the much nimbler creatures that might annoy or
> threaten it. Our life spans are no match for the 255 years of giant
> tortoise
> Adwaitya, that died recently at the Calcutta Zoo. Though, given its
> metabolic rate, its 255 years might be experienced as closer to our 70
> years. An angry tortoise hasn't much hope of catching the much nimbler
> creatures that might annoy it:
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjtCS0EEoCY
>
> Conclusion? Nothing is innate. Experience/knowing can only ever be
> subjective.
>
> sj
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
> Sent: Tuesday, 13 October 2015 12:16 AM
> Cc: 'Peirce-L'
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>
> List,
>
> Stephen's characterization of the conception of what is innate seems to
> differ, in a number of important respects, from the way Peirce is using the
> term.  The notion that" innate ideas" are those that are biologically
> inherited appears to fit with the explanations given, for instance, in the
> Stanford Encyclopedia entry on the subject.  As such, it appears to be a
> prevalent 20th century way of conceiving the matter.
>
> Here are a couple of things Peirce says about innate ideas:
>
> CP 4.92 The very word a priori involves the mistaken notion that the
> operations of demonstrative reasoning are nothing but applications of plain
> rules to plain cases. The really unobjectionable word is innate; for that
> may be innate which is very abstruse, and which we can only find out with
> extreme difficulty. All those Cartesians who advocated innate ideas took
> this ground; and only Locke failed to see that learning something from
> experience, and having been fully aware of it since birth, did not exhaust
> all possibilities.
>
> So, on his account, calling an idea innate does not mean that a creature
> has
> been aware of the idea since birth.  Two examples he gives of innate ideas
> are the conceptions of time and space:
>
> 6.416  That time is not directly perceived is evident, since no lapse of
> time is present, and we only perceive what is present. That, not having the
> idea of time, we should never be able to perceive the flow in our
> sensations
> without some particular aptitude for it, will probably also be admitted.
> The
> idea of force -- at least, in its rudiments -- is another conception so
> early arrived at, and found in animals so low in the scale of intelligence,
> that it must be supposed innate. But the innateness of an idea admits of
> degree, for it consists in the tendency of that idea to present itself to
> the mind. Some ideas, like that of space, do s

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Stephen, List,

You draw the conclusions:  Nothing is innate. Experience/knowing can only ever 
be subjective.

My suggestion was that, until we have understood how Peirce is using the 
conception of the innate (or how Plato, or Descartes are using the conception, 
for that matter), then we are just talking past each other.  The temptation I 
would like to resist is that of re-conceiving the meaning of well established 
concepts unless there is some compelling reason to do so.  Doing so causes too 
much confusion.  As such, my aim is to clarify the conceptions--and the 
pragmatic maxim supplies us with a nice method for doing so.

So, I think Peirce can accept many of the claims you are making about the 
plasticity of the brain and the variation between one kind of organism and 
another--and still conclude that the conceptions of space and time are innate 
for us.  More importantly, he has good reasons to reject your reasons for 
drawing the conclusion that "Experience/knowing can only ever be subjective."  
The study of the validity of the inferences that are fundamental for scientific 
inquiry is part of a normative science.  None of the conclusions that you are 
drawing from the special science of biology are dispositive for the questions 
we face about the validity of abduction, deduction or induction.

This ground is all well worn, so I'll leave it at that.

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: Stephen Jarosek [sjaro...@iinet.net.au]
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 12:57 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

Jeff, one of the surprises that I have come to in my own thinking in recent
years, within the context of neuroplastic "wiring" commencing early in the
embryo's development, is the realization that not even space or time are
"innate."

Infants begin learning about space by reaching into it and crawling through
it... the reaching begins in the womb.

Space has different meanings for different creatures. The empty space below
an elephant raised one meter in a sling will have a very different meaning
to the empty space below a cat raised one meter. For the former, that one
metre drop could be fatal, while for the latter, it will barely shake the
dust off its back. A tumble for a horse has very different consequences to a
tumble for a cat, by virtue of how mass and size interact with space and
gravity, and so they learn to attribute different limitations to this empty
space that they must negotiate. Pairs of animals in combat suffer different
consequences, depending on size and biology, and so attribute different
meanings to their experiences as constrained by space and mass.

As an adult, I went to look at the house that I first grew up in. I was
struck by my memory of the house, and the houses around it, from that young
age, as being very much larger than they now appear. Clearly, none of the
houses have changed in actual size, but the meaning that I attribute to size
had changed.

Same with time. The passage of time for a fly resting on a table is very
different to the passage of time for someone looking at it... 5 seconds to
me will be felt as far longer than that for an insect (insofar as it can be
suggested that time "matters" for an insect). Notice how giant tortoises
move so slowly. We infer a metabolic rate to match, with equipment (the
shell) that protects it from the much nimbler creatures that might annoy or
threaten it. Our life spans are no match for the 255 years of giant tortoise
Adwaitya, that died recently at the Calcutta Zoo. Though, given its
metabolic rate, its 255 years might be experienced as closer to our 70
years. An angry tortoise hasn't much hope of catching the much nimbler
creatures that might annoy it:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjtCS0EEoCY

Conclusion? Nothing is innate. Experience/knowing can only ever be
subjective.

sj

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, 13 October 2015 12:16 AM
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

List,

Stephen's characterization of the conception of what is innate seems to
differ, in a number of important respects, from the way Peirce is using the
term.  The notion that" innate ideas" are those that are biologically
inherited appears to fit with the explanations given, for instance, in the
Stanford Encyclopedia entry on the subject.  As such, it appears to be a
prevalent 20th century way of conceiving the matter.

Here are a couple of things Peirce says about innate ideas:

CP 4.92 The very word a priori involves the mistaken notion that the
operations of demonstrative reasoning are nothing but applications of plain
rules to plain cases. The really unobjectionable word is innate; for that
may be innate which is very abstruse, and which we ca

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Stephen Jarosek]

Jeff, one of the surprises that I have come to in my own thinking in recent
years, within the context of neuroplastic "wiring" commencing early in the
embryo's development, is the realization that not even space or time are
"innate."

Infants begin learning about space by reaching into it and crawling through
it... the reaching begins in the womb. 

Space has different meanings for different creatures. The empty space below
an elephant raised one meter in a sling will have a very different meaning
to the empty space below a cat raised one meter. For the former, that one
metre drop could be fatal, while for the latter, it will barely shake the
dust off its back. A tumble for a horse has very different consequences to a
tumble for a cat, by virtue of how mass and size interact with space and
gravity, and so they learn to attribute different limitations to this empty
space that they must negotiate. Pairs of animals in combat suffer different
consequences, depending on size and biology, and so attribute different
meanings to their experiences as constrained by space and mass.

As an adult, I went to look at the house that I first grew up in. I was
struck by my memory of the house, and the houses around it, from that young
age, as being very much larger than they now appear. Clearly, none of the
houses have changed in actual size, but the meaning that I attribute to size
had changed.

Same with time. The passage of time for a fly resting on a table is very
different to the passage of time for someone looking at it... 5 seconds to
me will be felt as far longer than that for an insect (insofar as it can be
suggested that time "matters" for an insect). Notice how giant tortoises
move so slowly. We infer a metabolic rate to match, with equipment (the
shell) that protects it from the much nimbler creatures that might annoy or
threaten it. Our life spans are no match for the 255 years of giant tortoise
Adwaitya, that died recently at the Calcutta Zoo. Though, given its
metabolic rate, its 255 years might be experienced as closer to our 70
years. An angry tortoise hasn't much hope of catching the much nimbler
creatures that might annoy it:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjtCS0EEoCY

Conclusion? Nothing is innate. Experience/knowing can only ever be
subjective.

sj

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: Tuesday, 13 October 2015 12:16 AM
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

List,

Stephen's characterization of the conception of what is innate seems to
differ, in a number of important respects, from the way Peirce is using the
term.  The notion that" innate ideas" are those that are biologically
inherited appears to fit with the explanations given, for instance, in the
Stanford Encyclopedia entry on the subject.  As such, it appears to be a
prevalent 20th century way of conceiving the matter.  

Here are a couple of things Peirce says about innate ideas:

CP 4.92 The very word a priori involves the mistaken notion that the
operations of demonstrative reasoning are nothing but applications of plain
rules to plain cases. The really unobjectionable word is innate; for that
may be innate which is very abstruse, and which we can only find out with
extreme difficulty. All those Cartesians who advocated innate ideas took
this ground; and only Locke failed to see that learning something from
experience, and having been fully aware of it since birth, did not exhaust
all possibilities.

So, on his account, calling an idea innate does not mean that a creature has
been aware of the idea since birth.  Two examples he gives of innate ideas
are the conceptions of time and space:  

6.416  That time is not directly perceived is evident, since no lapse of
time is present, and we only perceive what is present. That, not having the
idea of time, we should never be able to perceive the flow in our sensations
without some particular aptitude for it, will probably also be admitted. The
idea of force -- at least, in its rudiments -- is another conception so
early arrived at, and found in animals so low in the scale of intelligence,
that it must be supposed innate. But the innateness of an idea admits of
degree, for it consists in the tendency of that idea to present itself to
the mind. Some ideas, like that of space, do so present themselves
irresistibly at the very dawn of intelligence, and take possession of the
mind on small provocation, while of other conceptions we are prepossessed,
indeed, but not so strongly, down a scale which is greatly extended.

So, it appears the Peirce thinks of innate ideas as those that consist in a
natural tendency for the idea to present itself to the mind and to grow.
The idea need not be present at the birth of the organism in order for the
idea to be innate.  The larger question is one of where the natural tendency
finds its source or perhaps its authority for us.  Those idea

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Stephen Jarosek]

... and just to confuse things, maybe some creatures don't even attribute
meaning to space. Plants grow into space, but, from what we can ascertain,
they never make choices from it. So what does this imply about the "meaning"
that a plant might attribute to the empty space that it grows into?
http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/eco.2015.0023
Sj

-Original Message-
From: Stephen Jarosek [mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au] 
Sent: Wednesday, 14 October 2015 9:58 AM
To: 'Jeffrey Brian Downard'
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

Jeff, one of the surprises that I have come to in my own thinking in recent
years, within the context of neuroplastic "wiring" commencing early in the
embryo's development, is the realization that not even space or time are
"innate."

Infants begin learning about space by reaching into it and crawling through
it... the reaching begins in the womb. 

Space has different meanings for different creatures. The empty space below
an elephant raised one meter in a sling will have a very different meaning
to the empty space below a cat raised one meter. For the former, that one
metre drop could be fatal, while for the latter, it will barely shake the
dust off its back. A tumble for a horse has very different consequences to a
tumble for a cat, by virtue of how mass and size interact with space and
gravity, and so they learn to attribute different limitations to this empty
space that they must negotiate. Pairs of animals in combat suffer different
consequences, depending on size and biology, and so attribute different
meanings to their experiences as constrained by space and mass.

As an adult, I went to look at the house that I first grew up in. I was
struck by my memory of the house, and the houses around it, from that young
age, as being very much larger than they now appear. Clearly, none of the
houses have changed in actual size, but the meaning that I attribute to size
had changed.

Same with time. The passage of time for a fly resting on a table is very
different to the passage of time for someone looking at it... 5 seconds to
me will be felt as far longer than that for an insect (insofar as it can be
suggested that time "matters" for an insect). Notice how giant tortoises
move so slowly. We infer a metabolic rate to match, with equipment (the
shell) that protects it from the much nimbler creatures that might annoy or
threaten it. Our life spans are no match for the 255 years of giant tortoise
Adwaitya, that died recently at the Calcutta Zoo. Though, given its
metabolic rate, its 255 years might be experienced as closer to our 70
years. An angry tortoise hasn't much hope of catching the much nimbler
creatures that might annoy it:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjtCS0EEoCY

Conclusion? Nothing is innate. Experience/knowing can only ever be
subjective.

sj

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, 13 October 2015 12:16 AM
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

List,

Stephen's characterization of the conception of what is innate seems to
differ, in a number of important respects, from the way Peirce is using the
term.  The notion that" innate ideas" are those that are biologically
inherited appears to fit with the explanations given, for instance, in the
Stanford Encyclopedia entry on the subject.  As such, it appears to be a
prevalent 20th century way of conceiving the matter.  

Here are a couple of things Peirce says about innate ideas:

CP 4.92 The very word a priori involves the mistaken notion that the
operations of demonstrative reasoning are nothing but applications of plain
rules to plain cases. The really unobjectionable word is innate; for that
may be innate which is very abstruse, and which we can only find out with
extreme difficulty. All those Cartesians who advocated innate ideas took
this ground; and only Locke failed to see that learning something from
experience, and having been fully aware of it since birth, did not exhaust
all possibilities.

So, on his account, calling an idea innate does not mean that a creature has
been aware of the idea since birth.  Two examples he gives of innate ideas
are the conceptions of time and space:  

6.416  That time is not directly perceived is evident, since no lapse of
time is present, and we only perceive what is present. That, not having the
idea of time, we should never be able to perceive the flow in our sensations
without some particular aptitude for it, will probably also be admitted. The
idea of force -- at least, in its rudiments -- is another conception so
early arrived at, and found in animals so low in the scale of intelligence,
that it must be supposed innate. But the innateness of an idea admits of
degree, for it consists in the tendency of that idea to present itself to
the mind. Some ideas, like that of space, do so present themse

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Sungchul Ji]

ng past each other.
>> The temptation I would like to resist is that of re-conceiving the meaning
>> of well established concepts unless there is some compelling reason to do
>> so.  Doing so causes too much confusion.  As such, my aim is to clarify the
>> conceptions--and the pragmatic maxim supplies us with a nice method for
>> doing so.
>>
>> So, I think Peirce can accept many of the claims you are making about the
>> plasticity of the brain and the variation between one kind of organism and
>> another--and still conclude that the conceptions of space and time are
>> innate for us.  More importantly, he has good reasons to reject your
>> reasons for drawing the conclusion that "Experience/knowing can only ever
>> be subjective."  The study of the validity of the inferences that are
>> fundamental for scientific inquiry is part of a normative science.  None of
>> the conclusions that you are drawing from the special science of biology
>> are dispositive for the questions we face about the validity of abduction,
>> deduction or induction.
>>
>> This ground is all well worn, so I'll leave it at that.
>>
>> --Jeff
>>
>> Jeff Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> NAU
>> (o) 523-8354
>> 
>> From: Stephen Jarosek [sjaro...@iinet.net.au]
>> Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 12:57 AM
>> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
>> Cc: 'Peirce-L'
>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>>
>> Jeff, one of the surprises that I have come to in my own thinking in
>> recent
>> years, within the context of neuroplastic "wiring" commencing early in the
>> embryo's development, is the realization that not even space or time are
>> "innate."
>>
>> Infants begin learning about space by reaching into it and crawling
>> through
>> it... the reaching begins in the womb.
>>
>> Space has different meanings for different creatures. The empty space
>> below
>> an elephant raised one meter in a sling will have a very different meaning
>> to the empty space below a cat raised one meter. For the former, that one
>> metre drop could be fatal, while for the latter, it will barely shake the
>> dust off its back. A tumble for a horse has very different consequences
>> to a
>> tumble for a cat, by virtue of how mass and size interact with space and
>> gravity, and so they learn to attribute different limitations to this
>> empty
>> space that they must negotiate. Pairs of animals in combat suffer
>> different
>> consequences, depending on size and biology, and so attribute different
>> meanings to their experiences as constrained by space and mass.
>>
>> As an adult, I went to look at the house that I first grew up in. I was
>> struck by my memory of the house, and the houses around it, from that
>> young
>> age, as being very much larger than they now appear. Clearly, none of the
>> houses have changed in actual size, but the meaning that I attribute to
>> size
>> had changed.
>>
>> Same with time. The passage of time for a fly resting on a table is very
>> different to the passage of time for someone looking at it... 5 seconds to
>> me will be felt as far longer than that for an insect (insofar as it can
>> be
>> suggested that time "matters" for an insect). Notice how giant tortoises
>> move so slowly. We infer a metabolic rate to match, with equipment (the
>> shell) that protects it from the much nimbler creatures that might annoy
>> or
>> threaten it. Our life spans are no match for the 255 years of giant
>> tortoise
>> Adwaitya, that died recently at the Calcutta Zoo. Though, given its
>> metabolic rate, its 255 years might be experienced as closer to our 70
>> years. An angry tortoise hasn't much hope of catching the much nimbler
>> creatures that might annoy it:
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjtCS0EEoCY
>>
>> Conclusion? Nothing is innate. Experience/knowing can only ever be
>> subjective.
>>
>> sj
>>
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
>> Sent: Tuesday, 13 October 2015 12:16 AM
>> Cc: 'Peirce-L'
>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>>
>> List,
>>
>> Stephen's characterization of the conception of what is innate seems to
>> differ, in a number of important respects, from the way Peirce is using
>> the
>> term.  The notion that" innate ideas" are those that are biolog

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

Stephen J - I disagree. The reality of space and time are innate to matter; 
the fact that a cell has a wall defines its existence in space; the fact 
that a cell has a birth and death defines it existence in time. Now, the 
effect of the weight of that matter depends on mass (the amount of matter) 
and gravity, so of course, the effect of a fall would be different from that 
of a cat's fall.


An animal will both innately know whether it can make a giant leap across a 
gap and will learn how to deal with its spatial horizons and its weight. 
There is no way that it would require experience to make these judgments for 
the possibility of error is too great.


As for the lifespan of a tortoise vs a human - I'm not sure of your point. 
What about the lifespan of a cell?


Plants, being spatiotemporal matter, do exist 'in space' within interactions 
with other matter. So, a plant will move its roots towards water and 
nutrients and its leaves towards sun or shade, and also, in the case of a 
climbing plant, towards a wall or other matter to which it can attach 
itself.


Edwina
- Original Message - 
From: "Stephen Jarosek" <sjaro...@iinet.net.au>
To: "'Stephen Jarosek'" <sjaro...@iinet.net.au>; "'Jeffrey Brian Downard'" 
<jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>

Cc: "'Peirce-L'" <peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 6:14 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality


... and just to confuse things, maybe some creatures don't even attribute
meaning to space. Plants grow into space, but, from what we can ascertain,
they never make choices from it. So what does this imply about the "meaning"
that a plant might attribute to the empty space that it grows into?
http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/eco.2015.0023
Sj

-Original Message-
From: Stephen Jarosek [mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au]
Sent: Wednesday, 14 October 2015 9:58 AM
To: 'Jeffrey Brian Downard'
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

Jeff, one of the surprises that I have come to in my own thinking in recent
years, within the context of neuroplastic "wiring" commencing early in the
embryo's development, is the realization that not even space or time are
"innate."

Infants begin learning about space by reaching into it and crawling through
it... the reaching begins in the womb.

Space has different meanings for different creatures. The empty space below
an elephant raised one meter in a sling will have a very different meaning
to the empty space below a cat raised one meter. For the former, that one
metre drop could be fatal, while for the latter, it will barely shake the
dust off its back. A tumble for a horse has very different consequences to a
tumble for a cat, by virtue of how mass and size interact with space and
gravity, and so they learn to attribute different limitations to this empty
space that they must negotiate. Pairs of animals in combat suffer different
consequences, depending on size and biology, and so attribute different
meanings to their experiences as constrained by space and mass.

As an adult, I went to look at the house that I first grew up in. I was
struck by my memory of the house, and the houses around it, from that young
age, as being very much larger than they now appear. Clearly, none of the
houses have changed in actual size, but the meaning that I attribute to size
had changed.

Same with time. The passage of time for a fly resting on a table is very
different to the passage of time for someone looking at it... 5 seconds to
me will be felt as far longer than that for an insect (insofar as it can be
suggested that time "matters" for an insect). Notice how giant tortoises
move so slowly. We infer a metabolic rate to match, with equipment (the
shell) that protects it from the much nimbler creatures that might annoy or
threaten it. Our life spans are no match for the 255 years of giant tortoise
Adwaitya, that died recently at the Calcutta Zoo. Though, given its
metabolic rate, its 255 years might be experienced as closer to our 70
years. An angry tortoise hasn't much hope of catching the much nimbler
creatures that might annoy it:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjtCS0EEoCY

Conclusion? Nothing is innate. Experience/knowing can only ever be
subjective.

sj

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, 13 October 2015 12:16 AM
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

List,

Stephen's characterization of the conception of what is innate seems to
differ, in a number of important respects, from the way Peirce is using the
term.  The notion that" innate ideas" are those that are biologically
inherited appears to fit with the explanations given, for instance, in the
Stanford Encyclopedia entry on the subject.  As such, it appears to be a
prevalent 20th century way of c

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Ozzie]

Stephen -
I did not raise the wildebeest example to discuss "knowing how to be" -- you 
did on Oct. 9 at 4:28 AM.  You can find it by scrolling down in this string.  
You used it as evidence for your theory.  ("Regarding the passing of the 
elderly wildebeest, Darwinian natural selection is SECONDARY to its demise... 
PRIMARY is its failure to keep up with the 'knowing how to be' of the herd.") 

Now you only stand behind the most vague of propositions: sometimes they live, 
sometimes they die.  Why bring it up, if it means nothing for your theory?  I 
didn't have any interests in wildebeests beyond saying what you claimed about 
them is vague and uninformed. 

Regards,
Tom Wyrick 



> On Oct 12, 2015, at 2:45 PM, Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au> wrote:
> 
> Thomas, no passages were ignored. What wildebeest video? I did not see any 
> link to any other video apart from that of the expert and the seed beetle. So 
> I presumed that your colourful references (eg, “bulging eyes”) was just 
> creative license on your part. Either way, it did not matter because your 
> passages did not revolve around any big-picture paradigm. Sometimes buffalos 
> die. Sometimes they cross rivers. Sometimes they survive. Sometimes they have 
> bulging eyes. Sometimes they get eaten by crocs. Sometimes their “knowing how 
> to be” pays off... sometimes it doesn’t. Sometimes the older or sicker ones 
> can no longer keep up with their “knowing how to be” and their position in 
> the pecking order gets usurped by younger, healthier, more virile buffalos 
> with a more competitive “knowing how to be”. I love watching wildlife videos, 
> but do I really need to watch yet another wildlife video just to be persuaded 
> by your point? What are you getting at? What axiomatic framework are you 
> working with? sj
>  
> From: Thomas [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com] 
> Sent: Monday, 12 October 2015 6:47 PM
> To: Stephen Jarosek
> Cc: Matt Faunce; Peirce-L
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>  
> Stephen, List ~
> I can easily admit the suggestion that my "semiotic scaffolding" is 
> imperfect.  
>  
> However, that discussion seems to be a substitute for answers to my direct 
> challenge. It has been claimed that the wildebeest video provided empirical 
> evidence in support of the "knowing how to be" theory. 
>  
> When I inquired about the wildebeest  evidence, however, the subject abruptly 
> changed to my shortcomings and to a completely different series of examples 
> to illustrate the how to be theory.  That approach seems evasive and contrary 
> to the search for truth.  Let's get to the bottom of the original claims 
> before spinning out new ones.  
>  
> Here are the passages that were ignored: 
>  
> "In your account, the old buffalo no longer knows 'how to be' while the young 
> ones do -- but I don't recall whether (in the story) the old buffalo was 
> eaten by crocs or made it safely across the river.  
>  
> "If he survived the swim, then not knowing how to be evidently didn't 
> endanger his survival.  Then, the old buffalo's bulging eyes before being 
> pushed into the water does not reveal a lot about the evolutionary story of 
> his species.  Are buffalo who are acting like real buffalo supposed to 
> volunteer for hazardous duty, disregard their own past experiences, and not 
> let their eyes bulge?  
>  
> "If we don't actually know whether the old buffalo made it across the river, 
> drawing any conclusion about evolution from a few frames of video is 
> premature.
>  
> "What about the same old buffalo when he was only half that age.  Did he know 
> how to be a buffalo when he was younger?  What caused the transformation?  
> Did he have buffalo offspring who did or did not know how to be buffalo?"
> 
> 
> Regards,
> Tom Wyrick 
>  
>  
>  
> 
> On Oct 12, 2015, at 4:09 AM, Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au> wrote:
> 
> Hi Tom, list,
> 
> >”Can we use it [knowing how to be] to animate our logic and make predictions 
> >about behavior? “
> 
> Absolutely. There are several ways that an entity “learns how to be” and none 
> of that has anything to do with instinct or programming within a DNA 
> blueprint. Central to this concept is pragmatism... or is that 
> pragmaticism... establishing how said entity defines the things that matter. 
> The simplest and most obvious example I can think of here is imitation. 
> Richard Dawkins based his memetic theory on imitation. But there are other 
> ways of defining the things that matter, not just imitation. Imitation is a 
> subset of “knowing how to be.”
> 
> Animals have to “know how to be.” In the absence of human contact, we

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Stephen Jarosek]

es to inform the rest of your thinking.

The full impact of “knowing how to be” came to me only in 2013, as I was 
starting a new life in the northern hemisphere. I am reminded of that cliché, 
“like a child seeing the world for the first time.” It’s ALL about “knowing how 
to be.” The concept is not vague at all. It is precise, laser sharp. It is the 
core with all the layers removed. You don’t see it because you continue to 
interpret the world with the narratives of the mainstream and the scaffolding 
that has established your “knowing how to be.” You need to address your 
scaffolding, along the lines of the following Buddhist koan:

A Cup of Tea 
Nan-in, a Japanese master during the Meiji era (1868-1912), 
received a university professor who came to inquire about Zen. 
Nan-in served tea. He poured his visitor’s cup full, and then kept 
on pouring. 
The professor watched the overflow until he no longer could 
restrain himself. 
“It is overfull. No more will go in!” 
“Like this cup,” Nan-in said, “you are full of your own opinions 
and speculations. How can I show you Zen unless you first empty your cup?”

*I only recently stumbled across the fairly new term “scaffolding” (the 
structure of narratives) within a semiotic context, without having access to 
the full journal (Biosemiotics, Springer) documents... hope I’m using the word 
in the right context.

sj

 

From: Ozzie [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Friday, 9 October 2015 11:03 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek
Cc: Matt Faunce; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

 

Stephen, List ~

In your account, the old buffalo no longer knows "how to be" while the young 
ones do -- but I don't recall whether (in the story) the old buffalo was eaten 
by crocs or made it safely across the river.  

 

If he survived the swim, then not knowing how to be evidently didn't endanger 
his survival.  Then, the old buffalo's bulging eyes before being pushed into 
the water does not reveal a lot about the evolutionary story of his species.  
Are buffalo who are acting like real buffalo supposed to volunteer for 
hazardous duty, disregard their own past experiences, and not let their eyes 
bulge?  

 

If we don't actually know whether the old buffalo made it across the river, 
drawing any conclusion about evolution from a few frames of video is premature.

 

What about the same old buffalo when he was only half that age.  Did he know 
how to be a buffalo when he was younger?  What caused the transformation?  Did 
he have buffalo offspring who did or did not know how to be buffalo?  

 

I have trouble with "knowing how to be" because it is vague and doesn't mean 
anything specific to me.  (Yet, perhaps it does to others.)  Can we use it to 
animate our logic and make predictions about behavior?

 

Finally - I don't personally believe that Pragmatic logic requires DNA (you 
suggest that I probably do) -- but I don't perceive the two are in conflict, 
either.  For example, social institutions do not have DNA.  Neither do water 
molecules.  

 

Regards,

Tom Wyrick 

 

 


On Oct 9, 2015, at 2:16 PM, Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au> wrote:

>” Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more complicated 
>than self-interest.  I don't believe that any species can survive (long term) 
>without individual members having a self-interest motive.“

But Tom, self-interest relates to pragmatism, and how an entity defines the 
things that matter. And defining the things that matter relates to “knowing how 
to be.” “Knowing how to be” comes first, and the self-interest, as motivation 
(firstness?), is established within the context of that knowing. This vaguely 
defined notion “self-interest” infers a deterministic narrative... it seems to 
imply an “instinct” “programmed” into the DNA blueprint, which I for one do not 
buy into.

sj

 

From: Ozzie [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Friday, 9 October 2015 8:42 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek
Cc: Matt Faunce; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

 

Stephen, Matt ~ 

Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more complicated 
than self-interest.  I don't believe that any species can survive (long term) 
without individual members having a self-interest motive.  Perhaps the old 
buffalo knows "how to be," and doesn't want to swim with crocs.  Maybe that's 
how he got to be old.  And perhaps the young bulls behind him are impatient and 
less afraid.  Both may be self-interested, though not endowed with equal 
wisdom.  (Don't we observe the same behavior in human wars?  The young soldier 
charges into a machine gun nest, while the more experienced soldier keeps his 
head down.  It's a matter of knowing how to be alive tomorrow.)

 

I enjoy the video (and others like it), but I see the discussion as one that 
describes mechanisms in nature i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Thomas]

ires itself to incorporate experience into its narratives 
and its identity. Genes and DNA are important, of course, but nothing as 
described in the spirit of the genocentric narrative.

>”Finally - I don't personally believe that Pragmatic logic requires DNA (you 
>suggest that I probably do) “

Might I suggest that, while you have an appreciation for the semiotic theory of 
Peirce, your narratives continue to be influenced by the established 
genocentric narrative. The scaffolding* for your semiotic theory is not 
complete, it is a work in progress. And therefore you do not have an intuitive 
feel for the reach of semiotic theory. This is why you have trouble with 
“knowing how to be” and still see it is vague.

As an engineering/business graduate ignorant of Peirce, I first formulated my 
own theoretical outline, independently of Peirce, a couple of decades ago. And 
prior to that, I devoted much effort to trying to understand what motivates 
people in a cultural context... why are they so trapped in their cultural bs? 
So my scaffolding has been a work in progress for a very long time... and yet 
to this day, I continue to be surprised that I am still learning new things... 
the adventure continues. Putting the scaffolding in place takes a long time and 
requires considerable effort. And each stage yields more insights, more layers 
to work on. When I talk about the domestication of animals, for example, some 
less experienced Peirceans might think to themselves “how nice, I buy that” and 
then fail to grasp the reach of what I am trying to say because, continuing to 
whisper into their ears, is the genocentric narrative, along the lines of “yes, 
what sj is saying sounds pretty cool, but instinct because genes.” You can 
entertain a theory on the surface, but remain mired in a scaffolding that 
continues to inform the rest of your thinking.

The full impact of “knowing how to be” came to me only in 2013, as I was 
starting a new life in the northern hemisphere. I am reminded of that cliché, 
“like a child seeing the world for the first time.” It’s ALL about “knowing how 
to be.” The concept is not vague at all. It is precise, laser sharp. It is the 
core with all the layers removed. You don’t see it because you continue to 
interpret the world with the narratives of the mainstream and the scaffolding 
that has established your “knowing how to be.” You need to address your 
scaffolding, along the lines of the following Buddhist koan:

A Cup of Tea 
Nan-in, a Japanese master during the Meiji era (1868-1912), 
received a university professor who came to inquire about Zen. 
Nan-in served tea. He poured his visitor’s cup full, and then kept 
on pouring. 
The professor watched the overflow until he no longer could 
restrain himself. 
“It is overfull. No more will go in!” 
“Like this cup,” Nan-in said, “you are full of your own opinions 
and speculations. How can I show you Zen unless you first empty your cup?”

*I only recently stumbled across the fairly new term “scaffolding” (the 
structure of narratives) within a semiotic context, without having access to 
the full journal (Biosemiotics, Springer) documents... hope I’m using the word 
in the right context.

sj
 
From: Ozzie [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Friday, 9 October 2015 11:03 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek
Cc: Matt Faunce; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
 
Stephen, List ~
In your account, the old buffalo no longer knows "how to be" while the young 
ones do -- but I don't recall whether (in the story) the old buffalo was eaten 
by crocs or made it safely across the river.  
 
If he survived the swim, then not knowing how to be evidently didn't endanger 
his survival.  Then, the old buffalo's bulging eyes before being pushed into 
the water does not reveal a lot about the evolutionary story of his species.  
Are buffalo who are acting like real buffalo supposed to volunteer for 
hazardous duty, disregard their own past experiences, and not let their eyes 
bulge?  
 
If we don't actually know whether the old buffalo made it across the river, 
drawing any conclusion about evolution from a few frames of video is premature.
 
What about the same old buffalo when he was only half that age.  Did he know 
how to be a buffalo when he was younger?  What caused the transformation?  Did 
he have buffalo offspring who did or did not know how to be buffalo?  
 
I have trouble with "knowing how to be" because it is vague and doesn't mean 
anything specific to me.  (Yet, perhaps it does to others.)  Can we use it to 
animate our logic and make predictions about behavior?
 
Finally - I don't personally believe that Pragmatic logic requires DNA (you 
suggest that I probably do) -- but I don't perceive the two are in conflict, 
either.  For example, social institutions do not have DNA.  Neither do water 
molecules.  
 
Regards,
Tom Wyrick 
 
 

On 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

To my understanding, Stephen J.,  you subscribe to what is known as the 'Empty 
Bucket' or tabula rasa theory of the mind (Locke's theory) where the human 
species is born with an empty brain and 'learns how to be' from almost passive 
experience. A subjectivist theory - i.e., there is only one kind of knowledge - 
that possessed by a knowing subject. This of course leads to nominalism and 
relativism and of course precludes Truth, which can't exist in such an 
epistemology. 

See Karl Popper's strong criticism of this approach in his 'Objective 
Knowledge'. He opts instead, as did Peirce, for the existence of 'the real', 
the objective reality which exists outside of human cultural beliefs;  and 
human knowledge can examine this reality and arrive at its truth, as a Peircean 
'community of scholars' - within our innate dispositions to be rational, to 
imagine, to be analytical and to communicate - such as the disposition to learn 
a language. 

Now, you also seem to define the acquisition of knowledge as based on and only 
on individual subjective experience; that is, you reject any common will to 
knowledge or any innate capacity for examination of the objective world. I 
don't subscribe to the extreme reductionism of Dawkins, who places all 
causality in 'the genes' - and I totally reject his memes theory of culture - 
BUT, I think that all species have both innate knowledge of 'how to be' and the 
human species has the least amount of innate knowledge - and this is  genetic. 
What the human species has, genetically, is the capacity for logic, order, 
organization and symbolic communication. These permit its knowledge base of 
'how to be' to evolve, adapt, change, while the knowledge base of, let's say a 
frog, is limited, and it must change its physiology to adapt, while the human 
species changes its technology - a far easier and faster method of adaptation. 
Language - and the rational analysis of the world - which are both genetic 
within our species - enables man to critique, describe, the objective reality 
and change his methods of interaction with it.

Your references to the Buddhist and Zen 'emptying the bucket' so to speak, are 
merely desires to empty oneself of one's beliefs - the subjectivist beliefs 
that one has learned - but this action doesn't include obtaining another set of 
beliefs to 'fill the bucket' but to open the mind to the objective world such 
that one's innate capacity for reason and analysis can view it objectively.

Edwina





 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen Jarosek 
  To: 'Ozzie' 
  Cc: 'Matt Faunce' ; 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 5:09 AM
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality


  Hi Tom, list,

  >”Can we use it [knowing how to be] to animate our logic and make predictions 
about behavior? “

  Absolutely. There are several ways that an entity “learns how to be” and none 
of that has anything to do with instinct or programming within a DNA blueprint. 
Central to this concept is pragmatism... or is that pragmaticism... 
establishing how said entity defines the things that matter. The simplest and 
most obvious example I can think of here is imitation. Richard Dawkins based 
his memetic theory on imitation. But there are other ways of defining the 
things that matter, not just imitation. Imitation is a subset of “knowing how 
to be.”

  Animals have to “know how to be.” In the absence of human contact, we 
recognize their untamed feral natures in the wild. But subject to being raised 
among humans, they learn from humans civil behaviour, incorporating it within 
the terms of their bodily predispositions. By the same token, there are records 
(of varying credibility) of children raised by wild animals (e.g., the “Wild 
Boy of Aveyron or the Dog Girl from the Ukraine, variously affirmed or debunked 
by “experts” who know nothing of neural plasticity, pragmatism, or semiotic 
principles). There is nothing necessarily “wrong” or “broken” with the brains 
of feral children... their brains do what brains are meant to do, when learning 
how to be. Thomas Szasz has it mostly right... mental illness is a fiction... 
it’s about experience, choices and wiring.

  Then there is culture and “knowing how to be” within culture. Most people, 
when they travel, force-fit their observations into the pigeon-holes of their 
home culture. It does not occur to them that the new narratives that they must 
contend with are entirely different to the narratives back home. Often, 
radically different. In this there is utility in the theory of “knowing how to 
be” by realizing the extent to which one’s personal narratives are alien to 
those of the new culture. You make the same transactions as everyone else does, 
in your new culture, so you assume that they are connecting with the same 
narratives... nothing could be farther from the truth.

  So what sort of prediction would you like to make? I can predict that an 
animal in the wild, bey

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Stephen Jarosek]

Edwina, on the face of the points you raise, I won't disagree with you. 
However, for clarification, let us draw a clear distinction between naive 
idealism versus realistic (semiotic) idealism. In the spirit of naive idealism 
(naive cultural relativism), we cannot just wake up one morning and announce 
"today is the first day of the rest of my life" and then proceed to become a 
different person from that point forwards, simply by the force of will.

As you would realize, one must contend with mind-body predispositions and how 
they relate to pragmatism and semiotic principles, within the context of a 
compelling axiomatic framework. Thus there is an objective Truth in the sense 
of a Truth about semiotic principles, but experience (knowing) can only ever be 
subjective.

Naive idealism is the flip-side of the genocentric paradigm. One says "it's all 
in the genes." The other says "no it's not, don't oppress me... I can be 
whatever I want to be." Both are embodiments of the same kind of simplistic 
linear thinking.

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Monday, 12 October 2015 3:03 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Ozzie'
Cc: 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

 

To my understanding, Stephen J.,  you subscribe to what is known as the 'Empty 
Bucket' or tabula rasa theory of the mind (Locke's theory) where the human 
species is born with an empty brain and 'learns how to be' from almost passive 
experience. A subjectivist theory - i.e., there is only one kind of knowledge - 
that possessed by a knowing subject. This of course leads to nominalism and 
relativism and of course precludes Truth, which can't exist in such an 
epistemology. 

 

See Karl Popper's strong criticism of this approach in his 'Objective 
Knowledge'. He opts instead, as did Peirce, for the existence of 'the real', 
the objective reality which exists outside of human cultural beliefs;  and 
human knowledge can examine this reality and arrive at its truth, as a Peircean 
'community of scholars' - within our innate dispositions to be rational, to 
imagine, to be analytical and to communicate - such as the disposition to learn 
a language. 

 

Now, you also seem to define the acquisition of knowledge as based on and only 
on individual subjective experience; that is, you reject any common will to 
knowledge or any innate capacity for examination of the objective world. I 
don't subscribe to the extreme reductionism of Dawkins, who places all 
causality in 'the genes' - and I totally reject his memes theory of culture - 
BUT, I think that all species have both innate knowledge of 'how to be' and the 
human species has the least amount of innate knowledge - and this is  genetic. 
What the human species has, genetically, is the capacity for logic, order, 
organization and symbolic communication. These permit its knowledge base of 
'how to be' to evolve, adapt, change, while the knowledge base of, let's say a 
frog, is limited, and it must change its physiology to adapt, while the human 
species changes its technology - a far easier and faster method of adaptation. 
Language - and the rational analysis of the world - which are both genetic 
within our species - enables man to critique, describe, the objective reality 
and change his methods of interaction with it.

 

Your references to the Buddhist and Zen 'emptying the bucket' so to speak, are 
merely desires to empty oneself of one's beliefs - the subjectivist beliefs 
that one has learned - but this action doesn't include obtaining another set of 
beliefs to 'fill the bucket' but to open the mind to the objective world such 
that one's innate capacity for reason and analysis can view it objectively.

 

Edwina

 

 

 

 

 

 

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek <mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>  

To: 'Ozzie' <mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com>  

Cc: 'Matt Faunce' <mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com>  ; 'Peirce-L' 
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>  

Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 5:09 AM

Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

 

Hi Tom, list,

>”Can we use it [knowing how to be] to animate our logic and make predictions 
>about behavior? “

Absolutely. There are several ways that an entity “learns how to be” and none 
of that has anything to do with instinct or programming within a DNA blueprint. 
Central to this concept is pragmatism... or is that pragmaticism... 
establishing how said entity defines the things that matter. The simplest and 
most obvious example I can think of here is imitation. Richard Dawkins based 
his memetic theory on imitation. But there are other ways of defining the 
things that matter, not just imitation. Imitation is a subset of “knowing how 
to be.”

Animals have to “know how to be.” In the absence of human contact, we recognize 
their untamed feral natures in the wild. But subject to being raised among 
humans, the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

Stephen J. - I'm not sure that your response deals with the point of my 
comment, which was that 'knowledge' is not all gained by experience - that was 
the 'Empty Bucket' theory to which I was referring. Instead, my point was that 
a certain amount of knowledge is innate, more so in plants, insects, animals 
and less so in the human species - but - nevertheless, our species has an 
innate capacity for symbolic language, for reasoning, for imagination which 
enables hypothetical or anticipatory decision-making, etc. 

Therefore, knowledge is not confined to experience.  This has nothing to do 
with total genocentric determinism (is there such a thing?) nor with 'naive 
cultural relativism'. Instead, the question focuses around two issues:

1) How much of the knowledge base is innate, i.e., genetic. As I suggested, I 
think the ability to use symbolic language, to think rationally etc..is 
genetic. And how does this affect the community as well as the individual 
(i.e., mathematical ability, musical ability which can be shown in many cases 
to be genetic rather than learned)..
vs
2) And how much is social; i.e., collective knowledge - which is NOT subjective 
but communal, (and not necessarily truthful to objective reality) and how does 
the collective knowledge base adapt and change?

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen Jarosek 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Ozzie' 
  Cc: 'Matt Faunce' ; 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 3:29 PM
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality


  Edwina, on the face of the points you raise, I won't disagree with you. 
However, for clarification, let us draw a clear distinction between naive 
idealism versus realistic (semiotic) idealism. In the spirit of naive idealism 
(naive cultural relativism), we cannot just wake up one morning and announce 
"today is the first day of the rest of my life" and then proceed to become a 
different person from that point forwards, simply by the force of will.

  As you would realize, one must contend with mind-body predispositions and how 
they relate to pragmatism and semiotic principles, within the context of a 
compelling axiomatic framework. Thus there is an objective Truth in the sense 
of a Truth about semiotic principles, but experience (knowing) can only ever be 
subjective.

  Naive idealism is the flip-side of the genocentric paradigm. One says "it's 
all in the genes." The other says "no it's not, don't oppress me... I can be 
whatever I want to be." Both are embodiments of the same kind of simplistic 
linear thinking.

  sj

   

  From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
  Sent: Monday, 12 October 2015 3:03 PM
  To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Ozzie'
  Cc: 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L'
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

   

  To my understanding, Stephen J.,  you subscribe to what is known as the 
'Empty Bucket' or tabula rasa theory of the mind (Locke's theory) where the 
human species is born with an empty brain and 'learns how to be' from almost 
passive experience. A subjectivist theory - i.e., there is only one kind of 
knowledge - that possessed by a knowing subject. This of course leads to 
nominalism and relativism and of course precludes Truth, which can't exist in 
such an epistemology. 

   

  See Karl Popper's strong criticism of this approach in his 'Objective 
Knowledge'. He opts instead, as did Peirce, for the existence of 'the real', 
the objective reality which exists outside of human cultural beliefs;  and 
human knowledge can examine this reality and arrive at its truth, as a Peircean 
'community of scholars' - within our innate dispositions to be rational, to 
imagine, to be analytical and to communicate - such as the disposition to learn 
a language. 

   

  Now, you also seem to define the acquisition of knowledge as based on and 
only on individual subjective experience; that is, you reject any common will 
to knowledge or any innate capacity for examination of the objective world. I 
don't subscribe to the extreme reductionism of Dawkins, who places all 
causality in 'the genes' - and I totally reject his memes theory of culture - 
BUT, I think that all species have both innate knowledge of 'how to be' and the 
human species has the least amount of innate knowledge - and this is  genetic. 
What the human species has, genetically, is the capacity for logic, order, 
organization and symbolic communication. These permit its knowledge base of 
'how to be' to evolve, adapt, change, while the knowledge base of, let's say a 
frog, is limited, and it must change its physiology to adapt, while the human 
species changes its technology - a far easier and faster method of adaptation. 
Language - and the rational analysis of the world - which are both genetic 
within our species - enables man to critique, describe, the objective reality 
and change his methods of interaction with it.

   

  Your references to the Buddhist and Zen 'em

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Stephen Jarosek]

Thomas, no passages were ignored. What wildebeest video? I did not see any link 
to any other video apart from that of the expert and the seed beetle. So I 
presumed that your colourful references (eg, “bulging eyes”) was just creative 
license on your part. Either way, it did not matter because your passages did 
not revolve around any big-picture paradigm. Sometimes buffalos die. Sometimes 
they cross rivers. Sometimes they survive. Sometimes they have bulging eyes. 
Sometimes they get eaten by crocs. Sometimes their “knowing how to be” pays 
off... sometimes it doesn’t. Sometimes the older or sicker ones can no longer 
keep up with their “knowing how to be” and their position in the pecking order 
gets usurped by younger, healthier, more virile buffalos with a more 
competitive “knowing how to be”. I love watching wildlife videos, but do I 
really need to watch yet another wildlife video just to be persuaded by your 
point? What are you getting at? What axiomatic framework are you working with? 
sj

 

From: Thomas [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Monday, 12 October 2015 6:47 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek
Cc: Matt Faunce; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

 

Stephen, List ~

I can easily admit the suggestion that my "semiotic scaffolding" is imperfect.  

 

However, that discussion seems to be a substitute for answers to my direct 
challenge. It has been claimed that the wildebeest video provided empirical 
evidence in support of the "knowing how to be" theory. 

 

When I inquired about the wildebeest  evidence, however, the subject abruptly 
changed to my shortcomings and to a completely different series of examples to 
illustrate the how to be theory.  That approach seems evasive and contrary to 
the search for truth.  Let's get to the bottom of the original claims before 
spinning out new ones.  

 

Here are the passages that were ignored: 

 

"In your account, the old buffalo no longer knows 'how to be' while the young 
ones do -- but I don't recall whether (in the story) the old buffalo was eaten 
by crocs or made it safely across the river.  

 

"If he survived the swim, then not knowing how to be evidently didn't endanger 
his survival.  Then, the old buffalo's bulging eyes before being pushed into 
the water does not reveal a lot about the evolutionary story of his species.  
Are buffalo who are acting like real buffalo supposed to volunteer for 
hazardous duty, disregard their own past experiences, and not let their eyes 
bulge?  

 

"If we don't actually know whether the old buffalo made it across the river, 
drawing any conclusion about evolution from a few frames of video is premature.

 

"What about the same old buffalo when he was only half that age.  Did he know 
how to be a buffalo when he was younger?  What caused the transformation?  Did 
he have buffalo offspring who did or did not know how to be buffalo?"





Regards,

Tom Wyrick 

 

 

 


On Oct 12, 2015, at 4:09 AM, Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au> wrote:

Hi Tom, list,

>”Can we use it [knowing how to be] to animate our logic and make predictions 
>about behavior? “

Absolutely. There are several ways that an entity “learns how to be” and none 
of that has anything to do with instinct or programming within a DNA blueprint. 
Central to this concept is pragmatism... or is that pragmaticism... 
establishing how said entity defines the things that matter. The simplest and 
most obvious example I can think of here is imitation. Richard Dawkins based 
his memetic theory on imitation. But there are other ways of defining the 
things that matter, not just imitation. Imitation is a subset of “knowing how 
to be.”

Animals have to “know how to be.” In the absence of human contact, we recognize 
their untamed feral natures in the wild. But subject to being raised among 
humans, they learn from humans civil behaviour, incorporating it within the 
terms of their bodily predispositions. By the same token, there are records (of 
varying credibility) of children raised by wild animals (e.g., the “Wild Boy of 
Aveyron or the Dog Girl from the Ukraine, variously affirmed or debunked by 
“experts” who know nothing of neural plasticity, pragmatism, or semiotic 
principles). There is nothing necessarily “wrong” or “broken” with the brains 
of feral children... their brains do what brains are meant to do, when learning 
how to be. Thomas Szasz has it mostly right... mental illness is a fiction... 
it’s about experience, choices and wiring.

Then there is culture and “knowing how to be” within culture. Most people, when 
they travel, force-fit their observations into the pigeon-holes of their home 
culture. It does not occur to them that the new narratives that they must 
contend with are entirely different to the narratives back home. Often, 
radically different. In this there is utility in the theory of “knowing how to 
be” by realizing the extent to which

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Stephen Jarosek]

Edwina, perhaps my long-winded reply was another way of saying that I do not 
believe that there is any such thing as innate knowledge. So on this specific 
point, it turns out that we do not agree. My problem with innate knowledge is 
that it cannot be incorporated into an axiomatic framework as readily as can 
the empty bucket theory.

Basically, it is not at all unreasonable to suggest that maybe all inheritance 
of behaviour across the generations and across families CAN take place without 
the need for innate (genetically inherited) knowledge. You can do away entirely 
with any reference to genes/DNA, and still have a reasonable explanation for 
inheritance of behaviour across the generations (I posted on this a couple of 
times to this forum, most recently on Thu 30/04/2015 on "DNA nonlocality for a 
scientific Buddhism").

And many of the claims of evidence supporting the genetic inheritance of 
behaviour, such as the Minnesota twins studies, are controversial, and debunked 
as often as they are affirmed. With all the recent news of corruption in the 
peer-review process, colour me sceptic:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/science/rise-in-scientific-journal-retractions-prompts-calls-for-reform.html?pagewanted=all
 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/science/rise-in-scientific-journal-retractions-prompts-calls-for-reform.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1>
 &_r=1
http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(15)60696-1.pdf

So to summarize, this is my biggest problem with the notion of innate 
knowledge... it is not possible to establish for it, an axiomatic framework 
that hangs together. By contrast, an axiomatic framework for the empty bucket 
interpretation is much more workable, á la Peircean biosemiotics. Without an 
axiomatic framework for the life sciences (analogous to what Isaac Newton 
provided for the physical sciences), we have no life science... hence my 
rejection of the innate knowledge interpretation.

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Monday, 12 October 2015 10:21 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Ozzie'
Cc: 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

 

Stephen J. - I'm not sure that your response deals with the point of my 
comment, which was that 'knowledge' is not all gained by experience - that was 
the 'Empty Bucket' theory to which I was referring. Instead, my point was that 
a certain amount of knowledge is innate, more so in plants, insects, animals 
and less so in the human species - but - nevertheless, our species has an 
innate capacity for symbolic language, for reasoning, for imagination which 
enables hypothetical or anticipatory decision-making, etc. 

 

Therefore, knowledge is not confined to experience.  This has nothing to do 
with total genocentric determinism (is there such a thing?) nor with 'naive 
cultural relativism'. Instead, the question focuses around two issues:

 

1) How much of the knowledge base is innate, i.e., genetic. As I suggested, I 
think the ability to use symbolic language, to think rationally etc..is 
genetic. And how does this affect the community as well as the individual 
(i.e., mathematical ability, musical ability which can be shown in many cases 
to be genetic rather than learned)..

vs

2) And how much is social; i.e., collective knowledge - which is NOT subjective 
but communal, (and not necessarily truthful to objective reality) and how does 
the collective knowledge base adapt and change?

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek <mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>  

To: 'Edwina Taborsky' <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>  ; 'Ozzie' 
<mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com>  

Cc: 'Matt Faunce' <mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com>  ; 'Peirce-L' 
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>  

Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 3:29 PM

Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

 

Edwina, on the face of the points you raise, I won't disagree with you. 
However, for clarification, let us draw a clear distinction between naive 
idealism versus realistic (semiotic) idealism. In the spirit of naive idealism 
(naive cultural relativism), we cannot just wake up one morning and announce 
"today is the first day of the rest of my life" and then proceed to become a 
different person from that point forwards, simply by the force of will.

As you would realize, one must contend with mind-body predispositions and how 
they relate to pragmatism and semiotic principles, within the context of a 
compelling axiomatic framework. Thus there is an objective Truth in the sense 
of a Truth about semiotic principles, but experience (knowing) can only ever be 
subjective.

Naive idealism is the flip-side of the genocentric paradigm. One says "it's all 
in the genes." The other says "no it's not, don't oppress me... I can be 
whatever I want to be." Both are embodiments of the same kind of simplistic 
linear thinking.

sj

 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Stephen Jarosek]

Stephen R, refer to my unsubstantiated, speculative (but compelling?) post of 
Thu 30/04/2015 on "DNA nonlocality for a scientific Buddhism". I accept that 
hunches masquerading as thought experiments do not a proper science make, but 
there ya go.

 

From: Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, 13 October 2015 12:15 AM
To: Stephen Jarosek; Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

 

Would "such thing" exclude capacities in a newborn that would suggest that 
apart from what she absorbs she is able to perform mental actions that do 
suggest inherent awareness that could not be said to exist externally?  




Books  <http://buff.ly/15GfdqU> http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art:  
<http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl> http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl 

Gifts:  <http://buff.ly/1wXADj3> http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

 

On Mon, Oct 12, 2015 at 5:52 PM, Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au> wrote:

Edwina, perhaps my long-winded reply was another way of saying that I do not 
believe that there is any such thing as innate knowledge. So on this specific 
point, it turns out that we do not agree. My problem with innate knowledge is 
that it cannot be incorporated into an axiomatic framework as readily as can 
the empty bucket theory.

Basically, it is not at all unreasonable to suggest that maybe all inheritance 
of behaviour across the generations and across families CAN take place without 
the need for innate (genetically inherited) knowledge. You can do away entirely 
with any reference to genes/DNA, and still have a reasonable explanation for 
inheritance of behaviour across the generations (I posted on this a couple of 
times to this forum, most recently on Thu 30/04/2015 on "DNA nonlocality for a 
scientific Buddhism").

And many of the claims of evidence supporting the genetic inheritance of 
behaviour, such as the Minnesota twins studies, are controversial, and debunked 
as often as they are affirmed. With all the recent news of corruption in the 
peer-review process, colour me sceptic:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/science/rise-in-scientific-journal-retractions-prompts-calls-for-reform.html?pagewanted=all
 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/science/rise-in-scientific-journal-retractions-prompts-calls-for-reform.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1>
 &_r=1
http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(15)60696-1.pdf

So to summarize, this is my biggest problem with the notion of innate 
knowledge... it is not possible to establish for it, an axiomatic framework 
that hangs together. By contrast, an axiomatic framework for the empty bucket 
interpretation is much more workable, á la Peircean biosemiotics. Without an 
axiomatic framework for the life sciences (analogous to what Isaac Newton 
provided for the physical sciences), we have no life science... hence my 
rejection of the innate knowledge interpretation.

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Monday, 12 October 2015 10:21 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Ozzie'
Cc: 'Matt Faunce'; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

 

Stephen J. - I'm not sure that your response deals with the point of my 
comment, which was that 'knowledge' is not all gained by experience - that was 
the 'Empty Bucket' theory to which I was referring. Instead, my point was that 
a certain amount of knowledge is innate, more so in plants, insects, animals 
and less so in the human species - but - nevertheless, our species has an 
innate capacity for symbolic language, for reasoning, for imagination which 
enables hypothetical or anticipatory decision-making, etc. 

 

Therefore, knowledge is not confined to experience.  This has nothing to do 
with total genocentric determinism (is there such a thing?) nor with 'naive 
cultural relativism'. Instead, the question focuses around two issues:

 

1) How much of the knowledge base is innate, i.e., genetic. As I suggested, I 
think the ability to use symbolic language, to think rationally etc..is 
genetic. And how does this affect the community as well as the individual 
(i.e., mathematical ability, musical ability which can be shown in many cases 
to be genetic rather than learned)..

vs

2) And how much is social; i.e., collective knowledge - which is NOT subjective 
but communal, (and not necessarily truthful to objective reality) and how does 
the collective knowledge base adapt and change?

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek <mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>  

To: 'Edwina Taborsky' <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>  ; 'Ozzie' 
<mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com>  

Cc: 'Matt Faunce' <mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com>  ; 'Peirce-L' 
<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>  

Sent: Monday, October 12, 2015 3:29 PM

Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

 

Edwina, on the face of the points you raise, I won't disagree with you. 
However, for clarification, let us dr

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Stephen Jarosek]

Matt,

Good points. The point where you cue the talk, where your ‘expert’ disses 
cooperation... we can understand how organisms work for the good of the group 
only from a semiotic perspective and the realization that every organism has to 
“learn how to be.” As soon as you factor in “knowing how to be”, you factor in 
the motivation for an organism to work for the good of the group... not 
directly, of course, but by default... natural selection meets semiotics. Easy 
peazy, there is nothing illogical in that crucial insight. His reference to an 
elderly wildebeest being pushed into the river by the herd can also be 
understood within the context of “knowing how to be.” Regarding the passing of 
the elderly wildebeest, Darwinian natural selection is SECONDARY to its 
demise... PRIMARY is its failure to keep up with the “knowing how to be” of the 
herd. When it loses its ability to keep up with the herd and its behaviour, 
that is when natural selection kicks in. Natural selection is better understood 
in the context of failing to keep up with the group, whereas “knowing how to 
be” is of greater importance, first cause, and the source of complexity.  
Indeed, factoring in “knowing how to be” and its role in cooperation is, imho, 
much more compelling than reductionism and Dawkins’ idea of selfish genes. 
“Knowing how to be”... humans do it, bees do it, neurons do it, stem cells do 
it, men and women do it. “Knowing how to be” is the first source of variety. 
Natural selection is the filter of variety, the penalty/reward for 
improper/successful conduct. “Knowing how to be” is semiotics.

sj

 

 

From: Matt Faunce [mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Thursday, 8 October 2015 10:48 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

 

On 10/7/15 8:47 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt - I have some logical questions:

 

1) "instincts are no longer considered to work toward the probable perpetuation 
of the species, but they work only toward the probable perpetuation of their 
specific gene type, sometimes at the expense of the species."

 

I always dislike the passive tense "no longer considered to work'...because it 
leaves out the important AGENT. Who says that instincts no longer work toward 
the continuity of the species"? Proof? Or just some 'expert' 
(Appeal-to-Authority Fallacy).


Here's my 'expert' cued up to where he explicitly states it:
https://youtu.be/Y0Oa4Lp5fLE?t=16m21s




Instincts work only toward the perpetuation of their gene type? Ah, a 
reductionist view - and how does the gene harm the species? Examples of both 
privileging the gene and harming the species? 


Reductionism would be the case for a theory that genes determine behavior, but 
I said the opposite, that behavior (instincts) works toward preserving a gene 
type.

He later mentions fish who choose mates who are bright and colorful despite 
this trait making them more likely to be preyed on.

A seed beetle's aggressive mating behavior favors its gene type over its 
competitor's but harms the species:
http://www.mediadesk.uzh.ch/articles/2011/paarungsverhalten_en.html

Matt


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Ozzie]

Stephen, List ~
In your account, the old buffalo no longer knows "how to be" while the young 
ones do -- but I don't recall whether (in the story) the old buffalo was eaten 
by crocs or made it safely across the river.  

If he survived the swim, then not knowing how to be evidently didn't endanger 
his survival.  Then, the old buffalo's bulging eyes before being pushed into 
the water does not reveal a lot about the evolutionary story of his species.  
Are buffalo who are acting like real buffalo supposed to volunteer for 
hazardous duty, disregard their own past experiences, and not let their eyes 
bulge?  

If we don't actually know whether the old buffalo made it across the river, 
drawing any conclusion about evolution from a few frames of video is premature.

What about the same old buffalo when he was only half that age.  Did he know 
how to be a buffalo when he was younger?  What caused the transformation?  Did 
he have buffalo offspring who did or did not know how to be buffalo?  

I have trouble with "knowing how to be" because it is vague and doesn't mean 
anything specific to me.  (Yet, perhaps it does to others.)  Can we use it to 
animate our logic and make predictions about behavior?

Finally - I don't personally believe that Pragmatic logic requires DNA (you 
suggest that I probably do) -- but I don't perceive the two are in conflict, 
either.  For example, social institutions do not have DNA.  Neither do water 
molecules.  

Regards,
Tom Wyrick 



> On Oct 9, 2015, at 2:16 PM, Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au> wrote:
> 
> >” Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more 
> >complicated than self-interest.  I don't believe that any species can 
> >survive (long term) without individual members having a self-interest 
> >motive.“
> 
> But Tom, self-interest relates to pragmatism, and how an entity defines the 
> things that matter. And defining the things that matter relates to “knowing 
> how to be.” “Knowing how to be” comes first, and the self-interest, as 
> motivation (firstness?), is established within the context of that knowing. 
> This vaguely defined notion “self-interest” infers a deterministic 
> narrative... it seems to imply an “instinct” “programmed” into the DNA 
> blueprint, which I for one do not buy into.
> 
> sj
>  
> From: Ozzie [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com] 
> Sent: Friday, 9 October 2015 8:42 PM
> To: Stephen Jarosek
> Cc: Matt Faunce; Peirce-L
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>  
> Stephen, Matt ~ 
> Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more complicated 
> than self-interest.  I don't believe that any species can survive (long term) 
> without individual members having a self-interest motive.  Perhaps the old 
> buffalo knows "how to be," and doesn't want to swim with crocs.  Maybe that's 
> how he got to be old.  And perhaps the young bulls behind him are impatient 
> and less afraid.  Both may be self-interested, though not endowed with equal 
> wisdom.  (Don't we observe the same behavior in human wars?  The young 
> soldier charges into a machine gun nest, while the more experienced soldier 
> keeps his head down.  It's a matter of knowing how to be alive tomorrow.)
>  
> I enjoy the video (and others like it), but I see the discussion as one that 
> describes mechanisms in nature in general terms instead of offering a 
> definitive account of nature's logic.  For example, consider the example of 
> beautiful fish that attract more mates and also attract more predators.  I'm 
> not persuaded that after a female fish lays her eggs in the weeds she can be 
> said to be "selecting" handsome suitors for her offspring.  Maybe she can do 
> so despite having left the area, but her method is not obvious.  ("Internal 
> fertilization is not the norm for fish, and the majority of species use 
> external fertilization. In this mating system, eggs and sperm are released 
> separately and are fertilized outside of the body.")
>  
> In some species, sex is pleasurable.  In those cases an "ugly" male or female 
> may attract short-term suitors who are looking for a good time.  That allows 
> the ugly gene to survive, and removes the genetic bias toward nonfunctional 
> adaptations (that don't promote survival). 
>  
> Continuing this example, a lot of sex in nature appears to be what modern 
> humans would describe as rape.  Then, selection is more a case of the 
> relative strength of one partner and opportunity -- not choice geared toward 
> individual survival or that of the species.  That institution (rape) mixes up 
> the gene pool, selects for size and signals to targets of unwilling sex to 
> stay close to home for protection.  (This process may des

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Ozzie]

Stephen, Matt ~ 
Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more complicated 
than self-interest.  I don't believe that any species can survive (long term) 
without individual members having a self-interest motive.  Perhaps the old 
buffalo knows "how to be," and doesn't want to swim with crocs.  Maybe that's 
how he got to be old.  And perhaps the young bulls behind him are impatient and 
less afraid.  Both may be self-interested, though not endowed with equal 
wisdom.  (Don't we observe the same behavior in human wars?  The young soldier 
charges into a machine gun nest, while the more experienced soldier keeps his 
head down.  It's a matter of knowing how to be alive tomorrow.)

I enjoy the video (and others like it), but I see the discussion as one that 
describes mechanisms in nature in general terms instead of offering a 
definitive account of nature's logic.  For example, consider the example of 
beautiful fish that attract more mates and also attract more predators.  I'm 
not persuaded that after a female fish lays her eggs in the weeds she can be 
said to be "selecting" handsome suitors for her offspring.  Maybe she can do so 
despite having left the area, but her method is not obvious.  ("Internal 
fertilization is not the norm for fish, and the majority of species use 
external fertilization. In this mating system, eggs and sperm are released 
separately and are fertilized outside of the body.")

In some species, sex is pleasurable.  In those cases an "ugly" male or female 
may attract short-term suitors who are looking for a good time.  That allows 
the ugly gene to survive, and removes the genetic bias toward nonfunctional 
adaptations (that don't promote survival). 

Continuing this example, a lot of sex in nature appears to be what modern 
humans would describe as rape.  Then, selection is more a case of the relative 
strength of one partner and opportunity -- not choice geared toward individual 
survival or that of the species.  That institution (rape) mixes up the gene 
pool, selects for size and signals to targets of unwilling sex to stay close to 
home for protection.  (This process may describe early human evolution.)

Other species may have emotional lives (experiences) we are not aware of, and 
those emotions may influence behavior in ways that are presently attributed to 
kinship genes. 

Regards, 
Tom Wyrick



> On Oct 9, 2015, at 4:28 AM, Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au> wrote:
> 
> Matt,
> 
> Good points. The point where you cue the talk, where your ‘expert’ disses 
> cooperation... we can understand how organisms work for the good of the group 
> only from a semiotic perspective and the realization that every organism has 
> to “learn how to be.” As soon as you factor in “knowing how to be”, you 
> factor in the motivation for an organism to work for the good of the group... 
> not directly, of course, but by default... natural selection meets semiotics. 
> Easy peazy, there is nothing illogical in that crucial insight. His reference 
> to an elderly wildebeest being pushed into the river by the herd can also be 
> understood within the context of “knowing how to be.” Regarding the passing 
> of the elderly wildebeest, Darwinian natural selection is SECONDARY to its 
> demise... PRIMARY is its failure to keep up with the “knowing how to be” of 
> the herd. When it loses its ability to keep up with the herd and its 
> behaviour, that is when natural selection kicks in. Natural selection is 
> better understood in the context of failing to keep up with the group, 
> whereas “knowing how to be” is of greater importance, first cause, and the 
> source of complexity.  Indeed, factoring in “knowing how to be” and its role 
> in cooperation is, imho, much more compelling than reductionism and Dawkins’ 
> idea of selfish genes. “Knowing how to be”... humans do it, bees do it, 
> neurons do it, stem cells do it, men and women do it. “Knowing how to be” is 
> the first source of variety. Natural selection is the filter of variety, the 
> penalty/reward for improper/successful conduct. “Knowing how to be” is 
> semiotics.
> 
> sj
>  
>  
> From: Matt Faunce [mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com] 
> Sent: Thursday, 8 October 2015 10:48 PM
> To: Peirce-L
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality
>  
> On 10/7/15 8:47 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> Matt - I have some logical questions:
>  
> 1) "instincts are no longer considered to work toward the probable 
> perpetuation of the species, but they work only toward the probable 
> perpetuation of their specific gene type, sometimes at the expense of the 
> species."
>  
> I always dislike the passive tense "no longer considered to work'...because 
> it leaves out the important AGENT. Who says that instincts no longe

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Stephen Jarosek]

>” Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more complicated 
>than self-interest.  I don't believe that any species can survive (long term) 
>without individual members having a self-interest motive.“

But Tom, self-interest relates to pragmatism, and how an entity defines the 
things that matter. And defining the things that matter relates to “knowing how 
to be.” “Knowing how to be” comes first, and the self-interest, as motivation 
(firstness?), is established within the context of that knowing. This vaguely 
defined notion “self-interest” infers a deterministic narrative... it seems to 
imply an “instinct” “programmed” into the DNA blueprint, which I for one do not 
buy into.

sj

 

From: Ozzie [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Friday, 9 October 2015 8:42 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek
Cc: Matt Faunce; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

 

Stephen, Matt ~ 

Pushing that old buffalo to the crocs may represent nothing more complicated 
than self-interest.  I don't believe that any species can survive (long term) 
without individual members having a self-interest motive.  Perhaps the old 
buffalo knows "how to be," and doesn't want to swim with crocs.  Maybe that's 
how he got to be old.  And perhaps the young bulls behind him are impatient and 
less afraid.  Both may be self-interested, though not endowed with equal 
wisdom.  (Don't we observe the same behavior in human wars?  The young soldier 
charges into a machine gun nest, while the more experienced soldier keeps his 
head down.  It's a matter of knowing how to be alive tomorrow.)

 

I enjoy the video (and others like it), but I see the discussion as one that 
describes mechanisms in nature in general terms instead of offering a 
definitive account of nature's logic.  For example, consider the example of 
beautiful fish that attract more mates and also attract more predators.  I'm 
not persuaded that after a female fish lays her eggs in the weeds she can be 
said to be "selecting" handsome suitors for her offspring.  Maybe she can do so 
despite having left the area, but her method is not obvious.  ("Internal 
fertilization is not the norm for fish, and the majority of species use 
external fertilization. In this mating system, eggs and sperm are released 
separately and are fertilized outside of the body.")

 

In some species, sex is pleasurable.  In those cases an "ugly" male or female 
may attract short-term suitors who are looking for a good time.  That allows 
the ugly gene to survive, and removes the genetic bias toward nonfunctional 
adaptations (that don't promote survival). 

 

Continuing this example, a lot of sex in nature appears to be what modern 
humans would describe as rape.  Then, selection is more a case of the relative 
strength of one partner and opportunity -- not choice geared toward individual 
survival or that of the species.  That institution (rape) mixes up the gene 
pool, selects for size and signals to targets of unwilling sex to stay close to 
home for protection.  (This process may describe early human evolution.)

 

Other species may have emotional lives (experiences) we are not aware of, and 
those emotions may influence behavior in ways that are presently attributed to 
kinship genes. 

 

Regards, 

Tom Wyrick

 

 


On Oct 9, 2015, at 4:28 AM, Stephen Jarosek <sjaro...@iinet.net.au> wrote:

Matt,

Good points. The point where you cue the talk, where your ‘expert’ disses 
cooperation... we can understand how organisms work for the good of the group 
only from a semiotic perspective and the realization that every organism has to 
“learn how to be.” As soon as you factor in “knowing how to be”, you factor in 
the motivation for an organism to work for the good of the group... not 
directly, of course, but by default... natural selection meets semiotics. Easy 
peazy, there is nothing illogical in that crucial insight. His reference to an 
elderly wildebeest being pushed into the river by the herd can also be 
understood within the context of “knowing how to be.” Regarding the passing of 
the elderly wildebeest, Darwinian natural selection is SECONDARY to its 
demise... PRIMARY is its failure to keep up with the “knowing how to be” of the 
herd. When it loses its ability to keep up with the herd and its behaviour, 
that is when natural selection kicks in. Natural selection is better understood 
in the context of failing to keep up with the group, whereas “knowing how to 
be” is of greater importance, first cause, and the source of complexity.  
Indeed, factoring in “knowing how to be” and its role in cooperation is, imho, 
much more compelling than reductionism and Dawkins’ idea of selfish genes. 
“Knowing how to be”... humans do it, bees do it, neurons do it, stem cells do 
it, men and women do it. “Knowing how to be” is the first source of variety. 
Natural selection is the filter of variety, the penalt

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Thomas]

Matt, List ~

"Reductionism would be the case for a theory that genes determine behavior, but 
I said the opposite, that behavior (instincts) works toward preserving a gene 
type."

Here is how I believe a strict Pragmatist would re-state that relationship:   
Genes are memorialized behavior, so there is no conflict between genes and 
behavior.   Genes reduce the energy-time cost for the creature of performing 
the same tasks.  That assumes the environment is unchanging long enough for 
evolutionary forces to dominate -- i.e., long run equilibrium. 

The exception is the case of cognition, which has the ability to anticipate the 
future.  As a consequence the cognitive creature does not (necessarily) adapt 
to (live in) a stable environment, even if one exists. 

I won't argue with your fish and beetle examples, beyond pointing out that 
humans are seldom well-versed enough in the environmental-evolutionary forces 
pressing on other creatures to assess efficient vs. inefficient adaptations.  
We have seen new discoveries time and again that reverse previous beliefs -- 
plants that communicate with each other, etc.  It is also possible that the 
species in question are headed toward extinction, so observing them does not 
reveal the gene-behavior interplay of a successful species. 

Without any more to go on, I would always put my money in #1 -- human 
ignorance.   I note that the gene-behavior relationship you described for the 
fish reminds me of that for humans: "Fish who choose mates who are bright and 
colorful despite this trait making them more likely to be preyed on."

Regards,
Tom Wyrick 



On Oct 8, 2015, at 3:47 PM, Matt Faunce  wrote:

On 10/7/15 8:47 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> Matt - I have some logical questions:
>  
> 1) "instincts are no longer considered to work toward the probable 
> perpetuation of the species, but they work only toward the probable 
> perpetuation of their specific gene type, sometimes at the expense of the 
> species."
>  
> I always dislike the passive tense "no longer considered to work'...because 
> it leaves out the important AGENT. Who says that instincts no longer work 
> toward the continuity of the species"? Proof? Or just some 'expert' 
> (Appeal-to-Authority Fallacy).

Here's my 'expert' cued up to where he explicitly states it:
https://youtu.be/Y0Oa4Lp5fLE?t=16m21s

> Instincts work only toward the perpetuation of their gene type? Ah, a 
> reductionist view - and how does the gene harm the species? Examples of both 
> privileging the gene and harming the species?

Reductionism would be the case for a theory that genes determine behavior, but 
I said the opposite, that behavior (instincts) works toward preserving a gene 
type.

He later mentions fish who choose mates who are bright and colorful despite 
this trait making them more likely to be preyed on.

A seed beetle's aggressive mating behavior favors its gene type over its 
competitor's but harms the species:
http://www.mediadesk.uzh.ch/articles/2011/paarungsverhalten_en.html

Matt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

Matt - in reply:
  1) Edwina:Instincts work only toward the perpetuation of their gene type? Ah, 
a reductionist view - and how does the gene harm the species? Examples of both 
privileging the gene and harming the species? 

  MATT: Reductionism would be the case for a theory that genes determine 
behavior, but I said the opposite, that behavior (instincts) works toward 
preserving a gene type.

  EDWINA: But instinctual behaviour is genetically determined - and if that 
behaviour 'preserves a gene type', then, this privileges the gene.

  2) MATT: He later mentions fish who choose mates who are bright and colorful 
despite this trait making them more likely to be preyed on.

  EDWINA: I'll quibble with a bright/colourful fish that attracts mates AND 
ALSO attracts predators. . unless the species cannot function with too many 
males and thus, disables them after mating (by a predator!) - this is a common 
mode among insects etc. and therefore, your second example of the beetle - is 
one such - and there is no evidence that it harms the species. 

  MATT: A seed beetle's aggressive mating behavior favors its gene type over 
its competitor's but harms the species:
  http://www.mediadesk.uzh.ch/articles/2011/paarungsverhalten_en.html

  Matt



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

On 10/7/15 8:47 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt - I have some logical questions:
1) "instincts are no longer considered to work toward the probable 
perpetuation of the species, but they work only toward the probable 
perpetuation of their specific gene type, sometimes at the expense of 
the species."
I always dislike the passive tense "no longer considered to 
work'...because it leaves out the important AGENT. Who says that 
instincts no longer work toward the continuity of the species"? Proof? 
Or just some 'expert' (Appeal-to-Authority Fallacy).


Here's my 'expert' cued up to where he explicitly states it:
https://youtu.be/Y0Oa4Lp5fLE?t=16m21s

Instincts work only toward the perpetuation of their gene type? Ah, a 
reductionist view - and how does the gene harm the species? Examples 
of both privileging the gene and harming the species?


Reductionism would be the case for a theory that genes determine 
behavior, but I said the opposite, that behavior (instincts) works 
toward preserving a gene type.


He later mentions fish who choose mates who are bright and colorful 
despite this trait making them more likely to be preyed on.


A seed beetle's aggressive mating behavior favors its gene type over its 
competitor's but harms the species:

http://www.mediadesk.uzh.ch/articles/2011/paarungsverhalten_en.html

Matt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

On 10/6/15 11:20 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

On 10/6/15 10:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Science, on the other hand depends on objective reality as its 
reference base - and therefore, cannot depend on encultured opinion. 
Galileo was quite clear on that. That is, you can have a _belief_ 
that witches cause the plague but this is not science since there is 
no objective empirical evidence.
I think you're example here shows that you're conflating surface 
beliefs of individuals with deep-seated believes, i.e., beliefs that 
are so deep seated that the all people of many contiguous eras don't 
question them.


That was a hack answer by me. Deep seatedness and shallowness of belief 
often accompany their truth and falseness, in relativist theory, but 
that relation is besides the point. Sorry for the noise. This is to the 
point:


In Margolis's relativism, if your belief is supportable with available 
evidence and fares better than available alternatives, then you are 
right, if not you're wrong. The belief that witches caused the plague 
was not supportable at that time, so in historicism-relativism that 
belief is wrong. But remember, morals belong on a multi-valent scale 
with degrees of rightness and wrongness. I'm not sure what other classes 
of beliefs he puts on that scale. He did put some religious beliefs on 
the multi-valent scale in his article Religion and Reason.


Matt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Thomas]

Matt, List ~ 
I haven't read the Margolis article and don't mean to offer a critique of it. 
However, I wanted to offer a general observation. 

The view that humans have no ultimate objective and can give meaning to social 
institutions by adopting a few second-best objectives strikes me as similar to 
the "Construction Theory" of physics discussed here a few weeks ago. (My 
apologies if I have mis-remembered the name of that theory.)  Both give the 
impression of powerful analytical skills searching for deeper meaning by 
surveying past accomplishments. 

I get that impression in other sciences too.  Faintly. Attempting to extract 
truth from countless inductive experiments (that sometimes amount to tinkering 
and at other times yield irreproducible results) creates the impression that 
scientists do not understand the Pragmatic, or purposeful, behavior of the 
subjects they study. 

To some extent that is because the natural scientists can't (often) survey 
their subjects as social scientists can, but are given freer rein to conduct 
invasive experiments.  But even then it must be admitted that "the purpose of 
log




On Oct 7, 2015, at 2:15 PM, Matt Faunce  wrote:

On 10/7/15 8:38 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> In reply to Matt's comment :
>  
> "In Margolis's relativism, if your belief is supportable with available 
> evidence and fares better than available alternatives, then you are right, if 
> not you're wrong. The belief that witches caused the plague was not 
> supportable at that time, so in historicism-relativism that belief is wrong. 
> But remember, morals belong on a multi-valent scale with degrees of rightness 
> and wrongness. I'm not sure what other classes of beliefs he puts on that 
> scale. He did put some religious beliefs on the multi-valent scale in his 
> article Religion and Reason."
>  
> Hmm. I think that's a weak defense  - to declare that a belief that is 
> supported by 'available evidence' is right and 'fares better'...The belief 
> that witches caused the plague could very well be supported at the time. 
> After all, one could readily come up with 'evidence' that when she danced and 
> sang (and no-one needed to see/hear her) then, the plague broke out, and 
> after murdering her, the plague stopped. The FACT that correlation is not 
> causationwell...

It's a second-best defense. Given that reality changes it becomes necessary to 
put the word evidence in scare quotes.

>  
>  I don't understand the belief that 'Morals belong on a multi-valent 
> scale with degrees of rightness and wrongness". Is he saying that IF one is 
> starving, then it is OK to steal? And if one has no such physical need, then, 
> it is not OK to steal? I'm not sure what a scale of morality includes.
>  
> Edwina

How exactly certain classes of judgments belong on multi-valent scale is 
something I'm looking into. Just last week I received Susan Haaack's book 
Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic in the mail. In the book she claims "truth does not 
come in degrees" and that fuzzy logic isn't even logic. In 2012 she gave a 
lecture in Bonn where she repeated that phrase, but she later said (in a 
lecture available on YouTube) that on the airline home she changed her mind: 
lies and mistakes come in degrees, so truth must also. I haven't read from her 
book yet, although I took a cursory look at what I can expect. I feel I'd need 
to understand her arguments to best answer your question. But, I do have 
reasons for believing what I already believe.

Hopefully these analogies will serve to explain. Saying that an act of charity 
is morally good is like saying a Beethoven symphony is musically good. I judge 
his third symphony as better than his eighth; and some charitable acts are 
better than others. Jesus said, about the poor lady who gave two small coins, 
"I tell you the truth, this poor widow has put in more than all the others." 
Also, the legendary charitable act by Fatima exemplifies 'very very good' on 
that scale, which is better than 'pretty good'. When a poor woman begged her 
for some clothing, Fatima only had two dresses, an old worn one and her new 
wedding dress for her upcoming wedding. Fatima gave the poor lady her wedding 
dress. It would have been good to give her old dress but it was better to give 
her new one. That represents something of how people thought in her culture, 
and still think in ours.

Matt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

In reply to Matt's comment :

"In Margolis's relativism, if your belief is supportable with available 
evidence and fares better than available alternatives, then you are right, if 
not you're wrong. The belief that witches caused the plague was not supportable 
at that time, so in historicism-relativism that belief is wrong. But remember, 
morals belong on a multi-valent scale with degrees of rightness and wrongness. 
I'm not sure what other classes of beliefs he puts on that scale. He did put 
some religious beliefs on the multi-valent scale in his article Religion and 
Reason."

Hmm. I think that's a weak defense  - to declare that a belief that is 
supported by 'available evidence' is right and 'fares better'...The belief that 
witches caused the plague could very well be supported at the time. After all, 
one could readily come up with 'evidence' that when she danced and sang (and 
no-one needed to see/hear her) then, the plague broke out, and after murdering 
her, the plague stopped. The FACT that correlation is not causationwell...

 I don't understand the belief that 'Morals belong on a multi-valent scale 
with degrees of rightness and wrongness". Is he saying that IF one is starving, 
then it is OK to steal? And if one has no such physical need, then, it is not 
OK to steal? I'm not sure what a scale of morality includes.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 07, 2015 2:56 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality


  On 10/6/15 11:20 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

On 10/6/15 10:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

  Science, on the other hand depends on objective reality as its reference 
base - and therefore, cannot depend on encultured opinion. Galileo was quite 
clear on that. That is, you can have a belief that witches cause the plague but 
this is not science since there is no objective empirical evidence. 

I think you're example here shows that you're conflating surface beliefs of 
individuals with deep-seated believes, i.e., beliefs that are so deep seated 
that the all people of many contiguous eras don't question them.


  That was a hack answer by me. Deep seatedness and shallowness of belief often 
accompany their truth and falseness, in relativist theory, but that relation is 
besides the point. Sorry for the noise. This is to the point:

  In Margolis's relativism, if your belief is supportable with available 
evidence and fares better than available alternatives, then you are right, if 
not you're wrong. The belief that witches caused the plague was not supportable 
at that time, so in historicism-relativism that belief is wrong. But remember, 
morals belong on a multi-valent scale with degrees of rightness and wrongness. 
I'm not sure what other classes of beliefs he puts on that scale. He did put 
some religious beliefs on the multi-valent scale in his article Religion and 
Reason.

  Matt



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

Matt - I have some logical questions:

1) "instincts are no longer considered to work toward the probable perpetuation 
of the species, but they work only toward the probable perpetuation of their 
specific gene type, sometimes at the expense of the species."

I always dislike the passive tense "no longer considered to work'...because it 
leaves out the important AGENT. Who says that instincts no longer work toward 
the continuity of the species"? Proof? Or just some 'expert' 
(Appeal-to-Authority Fallacy).

Instincts work only toward the perpetuation of their gene type? Ah, a 
reductionist view - and how does the gene harm the species? Examples of both 
privileging the gene and harming the species? 

And

2) "Perhaps you're right. If so, and if the scientists who say we've already 
embarked on the sixth mass extinction, which is caused by man and threatens 
man's existence, and if Sapolsky is also right, it's because man's instincts 
outweighed his logic."

Which scientists? Do they 'know' the truth? Do any disagree with them? And 
isn't instinct in itself, embedded Reason? That is, the embedded (instinctual) 
normative habits of organization of a species, from the lizard to the human, 
are in themselves, expressions of Mind, of 'universal Reason'. Therefore, they 
are logical - eg, the capacity for language, the capacity for abductive or 
hypothetical reasoning vs inductive/deductive. 

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 07, 2015 12:27 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality


  Tom, 

  Somewhere the Essential Peirce he says something to the extent that an act in 
violation of love is illogical. You might find some support for your idea if 
you can find it.

  On the other hand, I know instinct isn't logic, but this might be relevant: I 
learned from listening to a lecture by Robert Sapolsky that instincts are no 
longer considered to work toward the probable perpetuation of the species, but 
they work only toward the probable perpetuation of their specific gene type, 
sometimes at the expense of the species.

  Right now I can only narrow the source down to the first two or three 
lectures in this series:
  https://youtu.be/NNnIGh9g6fA?list=PL848F2368C90DDC3D

  Perhaps you're right. If so, and if the scientists who say we've already 
embarked on the sixth mass extinction, which is caused by man and threatens 
man's existence, and if Sapolsky is also right, it's because man's instincts 
outweighed his logic.

  https://woods.stanford.edu/news-events/news/mass-extinction-here

  Matt

  On 10/6/15 11:49 PM, Thomas wrote:

Matt, Edwina, List -


I am still persuaded that we (humans) evolved the cognitive ability to 
manipulate logic for the sole purpose of ensuring our survival.  We didn't 
choose that - it evolved, and we are the beneficiaries.  Our brains+logic were 
optimized in nature to ensure our survival, over millions of years.  The 
Pragmatic way we analyze issues and weigh options comes naturally, because it 
defines who we are. 


Likewise, the social institutions created by Pragmatic logic have the 
primary purpose of ensuring the survival of the species.  We will never reach 
perfection, but it survival is the normative objective that we instinctively 
use to judge and change our institutions. 


Pragmatic logic cannot aim for any other long-run result ahead of survival. 
 It wouldn't know how.  Other goals to animate our social institutions will 
either fail to gain (informed, logical) adherents, or those goals must actually 
be intermediate goals that promote survival. 


If I'm wrong about the way evolution works, we should be able to identify 
prominent features of other species that have no survival value, and are simply 
optional. 


Regards,
Tom Wyrick 



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

I don't see how one can be both a realist and constructivist, both a realist 
and a relativist.

I don't think that I'm discussing surface beliefs vs deep-seated beliefs; my 
point is that truth is not dependent on a conceptual paradigm.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 11:20 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality


  On 10/6/15 10:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Science, on the other hand depends on objective reality as its reference 
base - and therefore, cannot depend on encultured opinion. Galileo was quite 
clear on that. That is, you can have a belief that witches cause the plague but 
this is not science since there is no objective empirical evidence. 

  I think you're example here shows that you're conflating surface beliefs of 
individuals with deep-seated believes, i.e., beliefs that are so deep seated 
that the all people of many contiguous eras don't question them.

  I see how you'd come to your conclusion when plugging the ideas I present 
into Peirce's philosophy. I'm not saying that Peirce's philosophy is 
incoherent. Margolis, who proposes an alternative, agrees that Peirce was 
"remarkably coherent." I'm just saying there's an alternative that can be 
backed up with equal strength. So I think certain classes of truths can rightly 
be said to be based on what the potential of inquiry, within its own 'sphere of 
belief' and in its own time, would conclude.

  That Margolis is a pragmatist, a realist, but also a relativist and a 
constructivist, I think offers us an alternative to see realism and pragmatism 
from a new perspective, perhaps yielding a wider understanding of what these 
terms mean, and maybe even deepening our understanding of Peirce's pragmatism 
and realism. That's why I brought this here.

  Matt



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

Stephen - realism,in my view, has nothing to do with ideals or values. Realism 
means that one believes that 'the world' exists outside of any perception of it 
and any belief about it. That is, that objective reality exists in itself 
outside of anything that I may think about it, feel about it, value about it. 
Realism also believes in the reality of universals ..but that's another issue.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen C. Rose 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 07, 2015 8:47 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality


  One can be a realist and a relativist in the following way. Let us say a 
realist believes that reality is all, that is to say cannot be transcended. Let 
us say we agree with Peirce that we are all fallible. Let us say we agree with 
Ken Wilber that we are a spectrum from worst to best. Let us say we make 
decisions along a similar spectrum. There is no way that relativism cannot be 
in play in the realms of ethics and aesthetics. But one is perfectly justified 
in believing that there are indeed the makings of realism in the structure of 
reality -- to wit the ideals to which the values point and those elements of 
reality we might designate as ontological. 


  Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl 
  Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3



  On Wed, Oct 7, 2015 at 8:25 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

I don't see how one can be both a realist and constructivist, both a 
realist and a relativist.

I don't think that I'm discussing surface beliefs vs deep-seated beliefs; 
my point is that truth is not dependent on a conceptual paradigm.

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 11:20 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality


  On 10/6/15 10:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Science, on the other hand depends on objective reality as its 
reference base - and therefore, cannot depend on encultured opinion. Galileo 
was quite clear on that. That is, you can have a belief that witches cause the 
plague but this is not science since there is no objective empirical evidence. 

  I think you're example here shows that you're conflating surface beliefs 
of individuals with deep-seated believes, i.e., beliefs that are so deep seated 
that the all people of many contiguous eras don't question them.

  I see how you'd come to your conclusion when plugging the ideas I present 
into Peirce's philosophy. I'm not saying that Peirce's philosophy is 
incoherent. Margolis, who proposes an alternative, agrees that Peirce was 
"remarkably coherent." I'm just saying there's an alternative that can be 
backed up with equal strength. So I think certain classes of truths can rightly 
be said to be based on what the potential of inquiry, within its own 'sphere of 
belief' and in its own time, would conclude.

  That Margolis is a pragmatist, a realist, but also a relativist and a 
constructivist, I think offers us an alternative to see realism and pragmatism 
from a new perspective, perhaps yielding a wider understanding of what these 
terms mean, and maybe even deepening our understanding of Peirce's pragmatism 
and realism. That's why I brought this here.

  Matt



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

On 10/7/15 8:38 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

In reply to Matt's comment :
"In Margolis's relativism, if your belief is supportable with 
available evidence and fares better than available alternatives, then 
you are right, if not you're wrong. The belief that witches caused the 
plague was not supportable at that time, so in historicism-relativism 
that belief is wrong. But remember, morals belong on a multi-valent 
scale with degrees of rightness and wrongness. I'm not sure what other 
classes of beliefs he puts on that scale. He did put some religious 
beliefs on the multi-valent scale in his article Religion and Reason."
Hmm. I think that's a weak defense  - to declare that a belief that is 
supported by 'available evidence' is right and 'fares better'...The 
belief that witches caused the plague could very well be supported _at 
the time_. After all, one could readily come up with 'evidence' that 
when she danced and sang (and no-one needed to see/hear her) then, the 
plague broke out, and after murdering her, the plague stopped. The 
FACT that correlation is not causationwell...


It's a second-best defense. Given that reality changes it becomes 
necessary to put the word /evidence/ in scare quotes.


 I don't understand the belief that 'Morals belong on a 
multi-valent scale with degrees of rightness and wrongness". Is he 
saying that IF one is starving, then it is OK to steal? And if one has 
no such physical need, then, it is not OK to steal? I'm not sure what 
a scale of morality includes.

Edwina


How exactly certain classes of judgments belong on multi-valent scale is 
something I'm looking into. Just last week I received Susan Haaack's 
book Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic in the mail. In the book she claims 
"truth does not come in degrees" and that fuzzy logic isn't even logic. 
In 2012 she gave a lecture in Bonn where she repeated that phrase, but 
she later said (in a lecture available on YouTube) that on the airline 
home she changed her mind: lies and mistakes come in degrees, so truth 
must also. I haven't read from her book yet, although I took a cursory 
look at what I can expect. I feel I'd need to understand her arguments 
to best answer your question. But, I do have reasons for believing what 
I already believe.


Hopefully these analogies will serve to explain. Saying that an act of 
charity is morally good is like saying a Beethoven symphony is musically 
good. I judge his third symphony as better than his eighth; and some 
charitable acts are better than others. Jesus said, about the poor lady 
who gave two small coins, "I tell you the truth, this poor widow has put 
in more than all the others." Also, the legendary charitable act by 
Fatima exemplifies 'very very good' on that scale, which is better than 
'pretty good'. When a poor woman begged her for some clothing, Fatima 
only had two dresses, an old worn one and her new wedding dress for her 
upcoming wedding. Fatima gave the poor lady her wedding dress. It would 
have been good to give her old dress but it was better to give her new 
one. That represents something of how people thought in her culture, and 
still think in ours.


Matt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

On 10/6/15 10:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Science, on the other hand depends on objective reality as its 
reference base - and therefore, cannot depend on encultured opinion. 
Galileo was quite clear on that. That is, you can have a _belief_ that 
witches cause the plague but this is not science since there is no 
objective empirical evidence.
I think you're example here shows that you're conflating surface beliefs 
of individuals with deep-seated believes, i.e., beliefs that are so deep 
seated that the all people of many contiguous eras don't question them.


I see how you'd come to your conclusion when plugging the ideas I 
present into Peirce's philosophy. I'm not saying that Peirce's 
philosophy is incoherent. Margolis, who proposes an alternative, agrees 
that Peirce was "remarkably coherent." I'm just saying there's an 
alternative that can be backed up with equal strength. So I think 
certain classes of truths can rightly be said to be based on what the 
potential of inquiry, within its own 'sphere of belief' and in its own 
time, would conclude.


That Margolis is a pragmatist, a realist, but also a relativist and a 
constructivist, I think offers us an alternative to see realism and 
pragmatism from a new perspective, perhaps yielding a wider 
understanding of what these terms mean, and maybe even deepening our 
understanding of Peirce's pragmatism and realism. That's why I brought 
this here.


Matt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

Tom,

Somewhere the Essential Peirce he says something to the extent that an 
act in violation of love is illogical. You might find some support for 
your idea if you can find it.


On the other hand, I know instinct isn't logic, but this might be 
relevant: I learned from listening to a lecture by Robert Sapolsky that 
instincts are no longer considered to work toward the probable 
perpetuation of the species, but they work only toward the probable 
perpetuation of their specific gene type, sometimes at the expense of 
the species.


Right now I can only narrow the source down to the first two or three 
lectures in this series:

https://youtu.be/NNnIGh9g6fA?list=PL848F2368C90DDC3D

Perhaps you're right. If so, and if the scientists who say we've already 
embarked on the sixth mass extinction, which is caused by man and 
threatens man's existence, and if Sapolsky is also right, it's because 
man's instincts outweighed his logic.


https://woods.stanford.edu/news-events/news/mass-extinction-here

Matt

On 10/6/15 11:49 PM, Thomas wrote:

Matt, Edwina, List -

I am still persuaded that we (humans) evolved the cognitive ability to 
manipulate logic for the sole purpose of ensuring our survival.  We 
didn't choose that - it evolved, and we are the beneficiaries.  Our 
brains+logic were optimized in nature to ensure our survival, over 
millions of years.  The Pragmatic way we analyze issues and weigh 
options comes naturally, because it defines who we are.


Likewise, the social institutions created by Pragmatic logic have the 
primary purpose of ensuring the survival of the species.  We will 
never reach perfection, but it survival is the normative objective 
that we instinctively use to judge and change our institutions.


Pragmatic logic cannot aim for any other long-run result ahead of 
survival.  It wouldn't know how.  Other goals to animate our social 
institutions will either fail to gain (informed, logical) adherents, 
or those goals must actually be intermediate goals that promote survival.


If I'm wrong about the way evolution works, we should be able to 
identify prominent features of other species that have no survival 
value, and are simply optional.


Regards,
Tom Wyrick

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

Tom,

You misunderstood what "second-best" means. In Plato (to the best of my 
knowledge) it means that in lieu of the ever elusive best, we should 
take the second best. This reading of Plato makes him out to be like 
today's cancer doctors who criticize the fact that way too much money is 
being spent to find the silver bullet cure (the ideal, the best) rather 
than the second best way of funding research for palliative care 
(second-best). Margolis says that what is commonly called "best", in 
regard to a moral ideal, is a fantasy, (or that commonly cited criteria 
for how we can know what is best are pie-in-the-sky ideals, e.g., 
perfect coherence, chasing after pie-in-the-sky moral precepts,) but 
there's still a way, it just requires taking a step or two back in your 
rationale and adjusting your faulty premise to a better one. Here, 
second-best is actually best. It helps to understand this to know that 
Margolis is also a constructivist for matters determined by culture, 
like morality. If morals are actually constructed (by humans), then 
chasing after some non-human given (God given) ideal, that most people 
consider best, is a fools errand.


As for survival of the species being a ground for logic... Were samurais 
who committed seppuku (harakiri) illogical? What about the suicidal Jews 
at Masada? Was Edwina illogical when she said to you, on July 22, "I'm 
not a member of the set of people who weep over extinctions. Something 
else emerges, just as you point out, with that E=MC2. Exactly."? A 
strong case could be made for the rationality of all of these.


Matt


On 10/6/15 12:52 AM, Ozzie wrote:

Matt, List ~
Margolis explains, "We are to construct a state ... in spite of the 
fact that no one knows how to detect the would-be guiding Forms."


If I were in charge of constructing the society of monkeys (or any 
other species), I would pay greatest attention to ensuring the 
survival of the species.  If Plato or Margolis don't take the survival 
principle as a starting point for humans, I can understand their 
search for direction.


There is no such thing as a second-best objective at which our logic 
should aim.  If one does not know what is best, one doesn't have any 
way of judging what is second-best, either.  Also, second-best is not 
so good if we are all dead.   A value judgment is required. 
 Pragmatism requires a purpose, or there is no logic.


The ability to manipulate logic is our (humankind's) evolved 
superpower.  Other species wait for accidents, death and time to adapt 
to challenges in optimum ways, while we can (potentially) do it 
overnight.  The evolved purpose of human logic is to survive and 
thrive.  The interpretants in that logic do not favor the interests of 
one person, one party or one nation over another.  The challenges (and 
opportunities) are human and nonhuman, earthborn and from space.


For the individual (person), the first purpose of logic is to survive 
and thrive within the laws of mankind.  A congruence between logic 
serving humankind as well as serving individual humans occurs when 
"efficient" laws and institutional incentives generate decisions that 
are both personally and socially rewarding.  Free thought, free 
communication, free association and free trade are generally believed 
to contribute to those ends, though with limitations.


... Anyway, that's how I see it.

Regards,
Tom Wyrick



On Oct 5, 2015, at 3:05 PM, Matt Faunce '> wrote:


I'm in the middle of re-reading a lecture by Joseph Margolis titled A 
Second-Best Morality. I've been wanting to introduce some of his 
concepts to Peirce-L because they both challenge and expand Peirce's 
philosophy. Among the several things I've read by Margolis, A 
Second-Best Morality seems to be the easiest introduction to this 
otherwise very difficult-to-read philosopher.


The term /Second-Best/ comes from Plato's "second-best state." Since 
there is no discoverable first principles to guide us in what sort of 
state to form. Margolis explains,


"We are to construct a state, it seems––we must live within one
political order or another––in spite of the fact that no one
knows how to detect the would-be guiding Forms."

I have many thoughts on how concepts from this paper relate to the 
subject we're talking about. Unfortunately I haven't organized them 
in a presentable way yet, nonetheless, at the risk of foregoing 
presenting some important premises that Margolis does present, here's 
a quote that is of paramount importance to pragmatism. Speaking of


"We must bear in mind that we ourselves are surely the creatures
of our own cultural history; what we can and dare judge to be
morally and politically reasonable must fit the living options of
our actual world. Even if we supposed an "ideal" answer might
serve as a guide at least, we need to remember that our visions
cannot be more than projections from local 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

On 10/6/15 4:49 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:
Conceptions of physics do too; and it can be argued, using Thomas Kuhn 
for example, that sometimes our changing conceptions of physics are, 
to some extent, due to changing attitudes regulated by 
history/culture. As far as I can see physics and historical/culture 
affect each other, like when I push against a tree it pushes against me.
Think of the evolution or Reality according to Peirce. In the beginning 
there was all but utter chaos. According to Peirce's article, The Order 
of Nature, in Illustrations of the Logic of Science, we can find order 
in randomness. I imagine that near the beginning of this evolution that 
the order we found and locked onto was pretty much randomly chosen, like 
seeing faces and things in fast moving clouds. The possibilities of what 
we––we being that growing inkling of order––could have chosen and locked 
onto were mind-bogglingly numerous. Peircean cosmology, in this way, 
seems to support constructivist and relativist philosophy: we were 
pretty much constructing the laws of reality. Instead of the analogy of 
me pushing against a tree, imagine me pushing against a rock: early in 
our evolution the rock was small and would move, but now that rock is 
huge, like the Earth, and according to Newton, when I push it it does 
push back but it doesn't seem to budge.


Matt

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

On 10/6/15 3:22 AM, Matt Faunce wrote:
Were samurais who committed seppuku (harakiri) illogical? What about 
the suicidal Jews at Masada?


Those two questions were in response to your statement here: "For the 
individual (person), the first purpose of logic is to survive and thrive 
within the laws of mankind."


Moral rationality is based on values. There is no conceptual necessity 
to subscribe to the idea that there is one standard of moral values that 
applies to all people for all time, or, for that matter, for all people 
at any given time. (I could have taken the word 'moral' out and, I could 
argue, it would still be true.)


Matt



On 10/6/15 12:52 AM, Ozzie wrote:

Matt, List ~
Margolis explains, "We are to construct a state ... in spite of the 
fact that no one knows how to detect the would-be guiding Forms."


If I were in charge of constructing the society of monkeys (or any 
other species), I would pay greatest attention to ensuring the 
survival of the species.  If Plato or Margolis don't take the 
survival principle as a starting point for humans, I can understand 
their search for direction.


There is no such thing as a second-best objective at which our logic 
should aim.  If one does not know what is best, one doesn't have any 
way of judging what is second-best, either.  Also, second-best is not 
so good if we are all dead.   A value judgment is required. 
 Pragmatism requires a purpose, or there is no logic.


The ability to manipulate logic is our (humankind's) evolved 
superpower.  Other species wait for accidents, death and time to 
adapt to challenges in optimum ways, while we can (potentially) do it 
overnight.  The evolved purpose of human logic is to survive and 
thrive.  The interpretants in that logic do not favor the interests 
of one person, one party or one nation over another.  The challenges 
(and opportunities) are human and nonhuman, earthborn and from space.


For the individual (person), the first purpose of logic is to survive 
and thrive within the laws of mankind.  A congruence between logic 
serving humankind as well as serving individual humans occurs when 
"efficient" laws and institutional incentives generate decisions that 
are both personally and socially rewarding.  Free thought, free 
communication, free association and free trade are generally believed 
to contribute to those ends, though with limitations.


... Anyway, that's how I see it.

Regards,
Tom Wyrick



On Oct 5, 2015, at 3:05 PM, Matt Faunce ' wrote:

I'm in the middle of re-reading a lecture by Joseph Margolis titled 
A Second-Best Morality. I've been wanting to introduce some of his 
concepts to Peirce-L because they both challenge and expand Peirce's 
philosophy. Among the several things I've read by Margolis, A 
Second-Best Morality seems to be the easiest introduction to this 
otherwise very difficult-to-read philosopher.


The term /Second-Best/ comes from Plato's "second-best state." Since 
there is no discoverable first principles to guide us in what sort 
of state to form. Margolis explains,


"We are to construct a state, it seems––we must live within one
political order or another––in spite of the fact that no one
knows how to detect the would-be guiding Forms."

I have many thoughts on how concepts from this paper relate to the 
subject we're talking about. Unfortunately I haven't organized them 
in a presentable way yet, nonetheless, at the risk of foregoing 
presenting some important premises that Margolis does present, 
here's a quote that is of paramount importance to pragmatism. 
Speaking of


"We must bear in mind that we ourselves are surely the creatures
of our own cultural history; what we can and dare judge to be
morally and politically reasonable must fit the living options
of our actual world. Even if we supposed an "ideal" answer might
serve as a guide at least, we need to remember that our visions
cannot be more than projections from local habits of thought or
neighboring possibilities."

The question that this lecture poses is 'how much of reality does 
this principle cover?' And it makes the case that it should be much 
more than morals and judgments of art. If abduction of moral 
principles (and the value of art) is not the guessing of what is 
true in a Cartesian-Realist way but true in a 'second-best' way, 
then is this also the case of other truths? Understand that Margolis 
brings to light premises that give this question a lot of force. (By 
Cartesian-Realist, I mean that truth is out there, outside of us, 
waiting to be discovered, and we have the means to discover it. I 
mean to challenge the first clause.)


How far did Peirce move, say, compared with Descartes, or Kant, 
toward this idea of second-best truth? Margolis somewhere, on video, 
say something to the extent that this is where the future of 
pragmatism is.


Here is the link to a page where you can download the PDF of the 
written 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

 Peirce wrote: "The object of the belief exists it is true, only because the 
belief exists; but this is not the same as to say that it begins to exist first 
when the belief begins to exist."

The object exists, regardless of whether or not you KNOW about it or have any 
belief about it. As Peirce wrote in other places - the object exists 
independent of what you or I think of it. BUT, when you start to examine that 
object, and gain knowledge about it - then, the object exists within the 
belief. [But it still exists even if you and I never knew about/had a belief in 
it]. Therefore, that object didn't 'begin' to exist when you started to know 
about it/have a belief in it. The object, again, exists on its own, independent 
of any belief in it. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 10:14 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality


  OK, I'm getting a little overwhelmed here. One question.

  On 10/6/15 10:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:


  4) If you accept Peirce's final-opinion then this akwardness comes with 
it:

"At first it seems no doubt a paradoxical statement that, “the object 
of final belief which exists only in consequence of the belief, should itself 
produce the belief”; but their have been a great many instances in which we 
have adopted a conception of existence similar to this. The object of the 
belief exists it is true, only because the belief exists; but this is not the 
same as to say that it begins to exist first when the belief begins to exist." 
(W.3:57, 1873) (I took this quote from Mayorga pg. 97)

  Perhaps Margolis shows a less maladroit way.
  EDWINA: The way I read the above is that the 'object of the belief' does 
indeed, in a way, 'produce that final belief' because the object, which exists 
independently of me, rests in a truth. Therefore, if the object is water, then, 
the truthful belief that it is made up of a mixture of various chemicals 
(hydrogen and oxygen) is indeed produced by the factual truth of that object. 

  You left out the most perplexing part, viz., "which exists only in 
consequence of the belief".

  Matt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

On 10/6/15 10:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
 Peirce wrote: "The object of the belief exists it is true, only 
because the belief exists; but this is not the same as to say that it 
begins to exist first when the belief begins to exist."
The object exists, regardless of whether or not you KNOW about it or 
have any belief about it. As Peirce wrote in other places - the object 
exists independent of what you or I think of it. BUT, when you start 
to examine that object, and gain knowledge about it - then, the object 
exists _within the belief_.


OK, an object's existence _within the belief_ is the immediate object, 
as opposed to the dynamic object. (After 100+ "I disagrees" I'm going 
for an "I agree".)


Many people speak of a teleological aspect of Peirce's philosophy. I 
assumed that the above quote was an example of it. Do you agree?


Matt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Matt Faunce]

Edwina,

In response to your use of quotes of Peirce on the definition of reality...

According to Peirce, reality is dependent on us, if "us" is the totality 
of thinking over time (including potential thought in the future). When 
I spoke of the inkling of order in the early time of cosmic evolution, 
and called it 'we', I meant all that was generalized. I do suggest a 
break from Peirce, as I state below.


Peirce, in CP 5:408. "But it may be said that this view is directly 
opposed to the abstract definition which we have given of reality, 
inasmuch as *it makes the characters of the real depend on what is 
ultimately thought about them*. But the answer to this is that, on the 
one hand, reality is independent, *not necessarily of thought in 
general*, but only of what you or I or any finite number of men may 
think about it; and that, on the other hand, though the object of the 
final opinion depends on what that opinion is, yet what that opinion is 
does not depend on what you or I or any man thinks."


Where I first break from Peirce is in rejecting the idea that the final 
opinion over time is what defines the real. In giving more credibility 
to each sphere of thought in history, as history and thinking change, it 
seems more reasonable to say that the real is defined by the potential 
for infinite inquiry during that time, or in its own sphere, rather than 
over time. So out with the final opinion and in with the potential for 
current inquiry. Granted, that's a big break. I believe it's fair to tag 
that onto Margolis. (I wish someone more authoritative than me on 
Margolis's philosophy would back me up. So...)


I claim that the validity of a judgment of a moral truth is not 
dependent on this totality of actual and potential thought over time, 
and that judgments about moral acts and values of people 5000 years ago 
by those people compared to acts now by us, are probably 
incommensurable. Then my question is this: If, as I suggest, this is 
because morals are dependent on encultured opinion, then isn't science 
also dependent on encultured opinion albeit more deeply rooted and more 
slowly changing?


I don't think Peirce allowed for incommensurability of any truths, but 
is his argument against it so strong that I shouldn't entertain it?



To my memory- in the beginning, there wasn't chaos. There was Nothing.


I got that phrase "all but chaos" from Peirce. This is similar:

   "If the universe is thus progressing *from a state of all but pure
   chance* to a state of all but complete determination by law, we must
   suppose that there is an original, elemental, tendency of things to
   acquire determinate properties, to take habits. This is the Third or
   mediating element between chance, which brings forth First and
   original events, and law which produces sequences or Seconds."

http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-one-two-three-kantian-categories-1

Chaos by itself is nothingness, but due to that inkling of order having 
the tendency to form habit, laws are formed:


EP2:124

   "Efficient causation without final causation, however, is worse than
   helpless, by far; it is mere chaos; and chaos is not even so much as
   chaos, without final causation; it is blank nothing."

Again, I'm suggesting that we should replace'final causation' and 'final 
opinion' with 'potential for infinite inquiry within one's paradigm'. 
The change is called for, as far as I can tell, in giving more 
credibility to each sphere of thought in history, as history and 
thinking change.


If you accept Peirce's final-opinion then this akwardness comes with it:

   "At first it seems no doubt a paradoxical statement that, “the
   object of final belief which exists only in consequence of the
   belief, should itself produce the belief”; but their have been a
   great many instances in which we have adopted a conception of
   existence similar to this. The object of the belief exists it is
   true, only because the belief exists; but this is not the same as to
   say that it begins to exist first when the belief begins to exist."
   (W.3:57, 1873) (I took this quote from Mayorga pg. 97)

Perhaps Margolis shows a less maladroit way.

Matt

On 10/6/15 6:47 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Matt- see my replies below:

- Original Message -
*From:* Matt Faunce <mailto:mattfau...@gmail.com>
*To:* Peirce-L <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
    *Sent:* Tuesday, October 06, 2015 5:18 PM
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

On 10/6/15 4:49 PM, Matt Faunce wrote:

1) Conceptions of physics do too; and it can be argued, using
Thomas Kuhn for example, that sometimes our changing conceptions
of physics are, to some extent, due to changing attitudes
regulated by history/culture. As far as I can see physics and
historical/culture affect each other, like when I push against a
tree it p

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Edwina Taborsky]

Matt and Tom

First, in my view, 'second best' is an action of pragmatic realism  - 
acknowledging the current situation. But, this doesn't preclude the agenda of 
idealism - which is not mere fantasy/pie in the sky, but acknowledges the 
imagined 'the best situation'. So - it can't be an either-or process but, a 
society exists and operates within both the fallabilities of pragmatic realism 
and the notion of an ideal - and the people work within both agendas. If we 
didn't, we couldn't technologically advance or - survive in the present.

Second, I agree with Tom that 'survival of the species/group/society' is a 
basic axiom. To declare that a few members of the group were suicidal has no 
bearing on the survival of the collective. My comment about extinction of a 
species doesn't negate this, for one species may become extinct but the vacuum, 
so to speak, is filled by one or several new species that develop. It's the 
same with societies - their nature may become extinct (eg, the mode of 
fiefdoms, the mode of hunting/gathering) but the SPECIES of homo sapiens 
survives.

All societies must develop pragmatic (i.e., logical) solutions to the 
environmental and societal realities of their situation - to enable them to 
survive both as a biological species and as a collective (for human survival 
rests within a collective). These beliefs/modes of behaviour/moralities are not 
random and haphazard but function to hold the community together and enable its 
continuity. 

Third, you wrote: " Moral rationality is based on values. There is no 
conceptual necessity to subscribe to the idea that there is one standard of 
moral values that applies to all people for all time, or, for that matter, for 
all people at any given time. (I could have taken the word 'moral' out and, I 
could argue, it would still be true.)"

The above sounds to me to be totally relativist and arbitrary. But the source 
of values has to rest within their pragmatic functionality AND within human 
rationality* not within whim or even habit. If a value (such as stoning a woman 
to death for being raped, burning a woman at the stake because you declare that 
she caused the plague, beheading a man for being of a different 
religion)...ceases to be functional within the society, then rationality must 
step in and examine that belief. That is, within a collective, a set of beliefs 
may keep the population submissive and controllable by a set of authoritative 
Rulers. BUT - if this same collective can no longer remain isolate in the 
world, if innovation and technological change is necessary, if its people meet 
up with other peoples and different values; if disease is not cured by burning 
people at the stake; ..then, those values must change - and the root of the 
change has to be *rationality*. What works for us? Such changes develop in the 
periphery and work their way into an acceptance (disease is caused by germs, 
religion is private rather than state). 

Furthermore, I suggest that there IS a basic value - the so-called 'Golden 
Rule' (do not do to others what I would not want done to me)...for a start. 
And, I think that there are a SET of basic values that apply to a modern 
economic mode [functions in large growth populations in contact with others] - 
which Tom referred to, with his " Free thought, free communication, free 
association and free trade are generally believed to contribute to those ends, 
though with limitations."

Edwina 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Matt Faunce 
  To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
  Sent: Tuesday, October 06, 2015 3:22 AM
  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality


  Tom,

  You misunderstood what "second-best" means. In Plato (to the best of my 
knowledge) it means that in lieu of the ever elusive best, we should take the 
second best. This reading of Plato makes him out to be like today's cancer 
doctors who criticize the fact that way too much money is being spent to find 
the silver bullet cure (the ideal, the best) rather than the second best way of 
funding research for palliative care (second-best). Margolis says that what is 
commonly called "best", in regard to a moral ideal, is a fantasy, (or that 
commonly cited criteria for how we can know what is best are pie-in-the-sky 
ideals, e.g., perfect coherence, chasing after pie-in-the-sky moral precepts,) 
but there's still a way, it just requires taking a step or two back in your 
rationale and adjusting your faulty premise to a better one. Here, second-best 
is actually best. It helps to understand this to know that Margolis is also a 
constructivist for matters determined by culture, like morality. If morals are 
actually constructed (by humans), then chasing after some non-human given (God 
given) ideal, that most people consider best, is a fools errand.

  As for survival of the species being a ground for logic... Were samurais who 
committed seppuku (harakiri) illogical? What about 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: A Second-Best Morality

[Ozzie]

Matt, List ~

No, I don't think I did misunderstand what second-best means.  In fact, 
economists (which I am) have a theory of second-best which I studied in grad 
school about 100 years ago, and it sounds very much like what you are 
describing.  So let's turn the question around: Did Plato know about evolution 
or Pragmatic logic when telling us to pursue second-best objectives? 

I cannot respond specifically to your question about the rationality of suicide 
in the cases you identified, due to my lack of information on the subject. 
Also, you are focused on small (extinct) groups, whereas I discussed humanity.  
 However, if I kill myself 5-minutes before someone else is going to kill me, 
that does not define me as suicidal.  Edwina did not say the extinction of her 
own species would be inconsequential.   So I don't think your examples are 
pertinent to my argument. 

I made three simple points, which were not addressed by your comment: 1- Logic 
(that survives) has a Pragmatic purpose.  2- The human ability to manipulate 
logic evolved for the specific purpose of ensuring the survival of humans.  3- 
Therefore, when humans use logic to construct social institutions, survival of 
the species is the appropriate (first) objective. 

Far more difficult is the task of translating the objective of survival into 
social policy.  Yet, if we forget about survival and begin with some other 
objective (e.g., democracy), then vast numbers of people will take exception to 
it.  That's the current situation in much of the world today: People believe 
their own idiosyncratic (second-best) objectives are paramount, and 
kill/threaten/enslave/disrespect/marginalize others who disagree.  It is 
difficult to believe that represents the pinnacle of human potential. 

Regards,
Tom Wyrick


 



> On Oct 6, 2015, at 2:22 AM, Matt Faunce  wrote:
> 
> Tom,
> 
> You misunderstood what "second-best" means. In Plato (to the best of my 
> knowledge) it means that in lieu of the ever elusive best, we should take the 
> second best. This reading of Plato makes him out to be like today's cancer 
> doctors who criticize the fact that way too much money is being spent to find 
> the silver bullet cure (the ideal, the best) rather than the second best way 
> of funding research for palliative care (second-best). Margolis says that 
> what is commonly called "best", in regard to a moral ideal, is a fantasy, (or 
> that commonly cited criteria for how we can know what is best are 
> pie-in-the-sky ideals, e.g., perfect coherence, chasing after pie-in-the-sky 
> moral precepts,) but there's still a way, it just requires taking a step or 
> two back in your rationale and adjusting your faulty premise to a better one. 
> Here, second-best is actually best. It helps to understand this to know that 
> Margolis is also a constructivist for matters determined by culture, like 
> morality. If morals are actually constructed (by humans), then chasing after 
> some non-human given (God given) ideal, that most people consider best, is a 
> fools errand.
> 
> As for survival of the species being a ground for logic... Were samurais who 
> committed seppuku (harakiri) illogical? What about   the suicidal Jews at 
> Masada? Was Edwina illogical when she said to you, on July 22, "I'm not a 
> member of the set of people who weep over extinctions. Something else 
> emerges, just as you point out, with that E=MC2. Exactly."? A strong case 
> could be made for the rationality of all of these.
> 
> Matt 
> 
> 
>> On 10/6/15 12:52 AM, Ozzie wrote:
>> Matt, List ~
>>> Margolis explains, "We are to construct a state ... in spite of the fact 
>>> that no one knows how to detect the would-be guiding Forms."
>> 
>> 
>> If I were in charge of constructing the society of monkeys (or any other 
>> species), I would pay greatest attention to ensuring the survival of the 
>> species.  If Plato or Margolis don't take the survival principle as a 
>> starting point for humans, I can understand their search for direction. 
>> 
>> There is no such thing as a second-best objective at which our logic should 
>> aim.  If one does not know what is best, one doesn't have any way of judging 
>> what is second-best, either.  Also, second-best is not so good if we are all 
>> dead.   A value judgment is required.  Pragmatism requires a purpose, or 
>> there is no logic. 
>> 
>> The ability to manipulate logic is our (humankind's) evolved superpower.  
>> Other species wait for accidents, death and time to adapt to 
>> challenges in optimum ways, while we can (potentially) do it overnight.  The 
>> evolved purpose of human logic is to survive and thrive.  The interpretants 
>> in that logic do not favor the interests of one person, one party or one 
>> nation over another.  The challenges (and opportunities) are human and 
>> nonhuman, earthborn and from space. 
>> 
>> For the individual (person), the first purpose of logic is to survive and