Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[kirstima]

Hi, Jerry,

Where in earth did you take the "moral authority" you (mistakenly) 
assume I was refering to?


Pity you did not understand my points.

But if Hilbert is your leading star in the universe of sciences, then it 
is understandable that you hold on to his mistakes, as well as his 
achievements.


I do not find the concept of identity as easy and simple as eg. Hilbert 
took for granted. - But if you remain happy with your ideas on it, I 
just wish you luck.


Best, Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 15.6.2017 16:37:

Hi Kirsti:

Curious reply!

Other matters have dominated my life in recent months so that I have
not the time to respond to most issues opened here.  Nevertheless, you
post deserves comment.


On Jun 15, 2017, at 12:06 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

Jerry,

When CSP used "ERGO", that was a case of ENTHYMEME (cf. Aristotle). 
The rheme "If - then" remains implied. One is supposed to regocnize 
that.


What is the source of the moral authority that I am supposed to be 
following.

These three sentences are typical of philosophical conjectures.
Science uses more effective means of communication.


Logic is not linguistics, and shluld not be replaced, not even partly, 
by lingquitics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite 
famous ones even, which have made that mistake.


I am concerned with two clearly separate and distinct notions of logic.
1. The logic of nature that generates the consistency, the
completeness, and the decidability of natural phenomenology.
(following Hilbert.)
2. The logics of human communication by whatever means. These logics
are entangled with one another. How are they entangled?   Various
categories of these logics have been used and abused.  The records of
human communication about logic appear to originate several millennia
ago and these forms of communication continue to evolve today.


CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.


I am pleased to learn that philosophers can be, on occasion, 
infallible!  :-)




I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace 
reading CSP. - Even though they may of of help sometimes. To a limited 
degree.


IMHO, every human being is free to use terminology in whatever form of
“units of meaning" that they choose - the forms of the units of
meaning are often related to experience and sometimes even to units of
fact! Of course, one’s usage of terminology allows colleagues to
evaluate the meanings of those units from any perspective the
colleagues may choose.

The central concept behind these comments is the conceptual role of
identity in generating the conceptual dynamics of the perplexity of
individual minds.

Abstractly, as I noted some months ago,
“The union of units unify the unity.”

The graphs (icons) of such perplex unions record the meanings visually.

Cheers

Jerry




Best Kirsti











Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 12.6.2017 17:55:

List:

On Jun 12, 2017, at 6:50 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
ERGO present just the THEN part.

from Wikipedia (sorry!)
Ergo may refer to:
* A Latin [1] word meaning "therefore" as in Cogito ergo sum.
* A Greek word έργο meaning "work", used as a prefix ergo-, for
example, in ergonomics.
Pragmatically, the syntactical force of “ergo” vastly exceeds the
syntactical force of “then”.
Just my opinion.
Cheers
jerry
Links:
--
[1] 
apple-wikipedia-api://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_phrases:_E#ergo



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[John F Sowa]

Kirsti and Jon A.

Kirsti

Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even partly,
by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite
famous ones even, which have made that mistake. 


Jon

ditto amen qed si.


Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic.  They are related
by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic.

The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a
very low opinion of language.  Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder.
He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit
by laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often
almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts."

My "correction" to Frege:  "We must break the domination of analytic
philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions
that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably
arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world."
For more detail, see http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf

Kirsti,

CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.


Yes.  Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework.  He studied
the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail.

Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from
language.  The Stoics and Scholastics continued that development.
Peirce continued to treat logic as an abstraction from language,
not as a replacement for language.

In his first book, Wittgenstein followed Frege and Russell.  But
Frank Ramsey, who had studied Peirce's writings, discussed Peirce
with LW.  Wittgenstein's later theory of language games is more
compatible with Peirce than with his mentors, Frege and Russell.
I discuss those issues in http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf

Kirsti

I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace
reading CSP. - Even though they may be of help sometimes. To a
limited degree.


I certainly agree with that point.  When I said that dictionaries
were useful, I meant as a *starting point* for discussion.  Please
remember that Peirce himself wrote thousands of definitions for
several dictionaries.

But no definition can be definitive for all applications for all time.
Professional lexicographers are the first to admit the limitations.
See the article "I don't believe in word senses" by the lexicographer
Adam Kilgarriff:  https://arxiv.org/pdf/cmp-lg/9712006.pdf

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Hi Kirsti: 

You wrote:

>> Logic is not linguistics, and shluld not be replaced, not even partly, by 
>> lingquitics.

I awoke in the middle of the night, feeling that I may have mis-read your 
meaning.

Did you mean, linguistics as the study of languages…

Or, that logic ITSELF, whatever that may mean, is not language?

What is your definition of the term “logic” , perhaps you would be so kind as 
to give examples?

On a different topic, compelling arguments for the perplex number system 
continue to accumulate.
The operations of the real number system (associative, distributive and 
commutative are now understood.
The creation of (biological , in the sense of Ehresmann) memory, originates in 
the:
atoms —> molecules
The difference between classical mathematics and organic mathematics lies in 
the logic of addition of integers. The entailments differ, even though the same 
consequence, the sum is the same. integers of a partition —> an integer with 
that partition  (“entailment” of parts to generate a whole)
This is necessary for critical dynamics of life, e.g., handedness. 

Atoms with internal parts become the informed source of internal causality of 
life, and of inner life of mind.

…  and much more that remains to be written-up.


Very warmly,

Cheers

Jerry



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[kirstima]

Jerry,

When CSP used "ERGO", that was a case of ENTHYMEME (cf. Aristotle). The 
rheme "If - then" remains implied. One is supposed to regocnize that.


Logic is not linguistics, and shluld not be replaced, not even partly, 
by lingquitics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite 
famous ones even, which have made that mistake.


CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake.

I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace 
reading CSP. - Even though they may of of help sometimes. To a limited 
degree.


Best Kirsti






Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 12.6.2017 17:55:

List:


On Jun 12, 2017, at 6:50 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

ERGO present just the THEN part.


from Wikipedia (sorry!)

Ergo may refer to:

* A Latin [1] word meaning "therefore" as in Cogito ergo sum.
* A Greek word έργο meaning "work", used as a prefix ergo-, for
example, in ergonomics.

Pragmatically, the syntactical force of “ergo” vastly exceeds the
syntactical force of “then”.

Just my opinion.

Cheers

jerry


Links:
--
[1] 
apple-wikipedia-api://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_phrases:_E#ergo



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[John F Sowa]

Jon and Jerry,

To specify a system of formal logic, there are many equivalent
options for choosing the notation, the operators, the definitions,
the axioms, and the rules of inference.

JA

One could hardly dispute the importance of implication relations
like A ⇒ B.  The set-theoretic analogues are subset relations
like A ⊆ B...


Yes.  And many logicians, such as Frege, chose IF and EVERY as the
two primary operators because they correspond to his two primary
rules of inference:  modus ponens and universal instantiation.
When you add NOT, you can define all the other operators.

But other options may be preferable for other purposes.

JA

implication in existential graphs is expressed in a compound form,
as (A (B)), “not A without B”.  For another, there is Peirce's own
discovery of the amphecks, “not both” and “both not”, which appear
to have a primary and and fundamental status all their own.


If you map natural languages to logic, consider the effect of various
options.  When you translate a text from any NL to any version of logic,
the most common logical operators are AND and SOME.  The third most
common is NOT.  EVERY, OR, and IF are less common; NOR and IFF (AKA
if-and-only-if) are rare; and NAND (AKA not-both) is vary rare.

But if you're designing computer hardware, NAND and NOR turn out
to be very useful for reducing the total number of transistors
on a chip.

For his entitative graphs, Peirce started with EVERY, OR, and NOT
as his basic operators.  But when he gave examples of mapping
English to and from the graphs, the readings were rather awkward.

For example, if you want to say "A cat is on a mat" with the
operators of entitative graphs, you need to say the equivalent of

"It's false that for every x, for every y, either (x is not a cat)
or (y is not a mat) or (x is not on y)."

It took less than a year of such examples before Peirce switched to
the operators SOME, AND, and NOT.  That choice enabled him to say
"A cat is on a mat" by a very simple existential graph:

   cat———on———mat, which is equivalent to "Some cat is on some mat."

With Frege's choice of EVERY, IF, and NOT, "A cat is on a mat" becomes

"It's false that for every x, for every y, if x is a cat, then
if y is a mat, then x is not on y."

Exercise for the reader:  You can express everything with just one
Boolean operator (NAND or NOR) plus one quantifier (SOME or EVERY).
Pick one from each option and try to say "A cat is on a mat".

JR

I thought ‘ergo’ was simply identical with ‘hence’,
which is what follows ‘the’ and ‘but’ in the argument CP 5.189.


Natural languages have an abundance of vocabulary for describing
a proof and emphasizing different aspects.

When mathematicians are describing the steps of a proof, they might
use the word 'therefore' when they emphasize the conclusion.  But they
might use the word 'hence' when they emphasize the previous step from
which they derive the next one.  For the final conclusion, they might
say QED (Quod Erat Demonstrandum -- What was to be demonstrated).

In any case, the words used to describe a proof are less important
than the propositions at each step and the rules of inference that
are applied to derive each step from a previous step (or steps).

And by the way, Peirce's verb 'illation' is rarely, if ever, used today.
The common term is 'inference'.  Unfortunately, the Latin verb 'fero'
(bear or carry) is a quirky verb with past participle 'latus'.  In olden
days, when every college graduate knew Latin, they understood that the
English 'illation' was derived from Latin 'illatio' from 'illatus'.
Today, logicians use the word 'inference', which is derived from the
present participle 'inferens'.

When quoting Peirce, it's essential to use his exact words.  But when
talking about illation, I recommend the modern word 'inference'.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:


I thought ‘ergo’ was simply identical with ‘hence’,

which is what follows ‘the’ and ‘but’ in the argument CP 5.189.



I believe *that* thought is simple and complex enough;

for it contains terms, propositions and illation, as well.



I see* even* the recognition that arguments may be drawn from persons.



Best,

Jerry R

On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 2:00 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> On 6/12/2017 11:21 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
>
>> Is computation power relevant to semiotics?  If so, what are the forms of
>> the propositions that transform illations to relations?
>>
>
> As Peirce said, everything is relevant to semiotic.  For starters,
> read his 1887 article on "Logical machines":
> http://history-computer.com/Library/Peirce.pdf
>
> That article is included as a pioneering work in Marvin Minsky's
> bibliography of artificial intelligence.
>
> Ergo may refer to:
>> * A Latin word meaning "therefore" as in Cogito ergo sum.
>> * A Greek word έργο meaning "work", used as a prefix ergo-
>>
>
> Peirce learned both Latin and Greek from his father.  When he wrote
> "ergo" in Latin letters, he meant ergo in Latin.
>
> There is no need for a transformation:  illation *is* a relation
> that relates propositions.  Today, logicians distinguish two terms:
>
>  1. Implication is defined *formally* -- i.e., by the form (syntax) of
> the propositions.  Every rule of inference in Peirce's algebraic
> notations of 1870 and 1885 and in the graph notations from 1896 on,
> is specified *formally* -- i.e., by the syntactic form of the
> propositions.
>
>  2. Entailment is defined *semantically* -- i.e., by the requirement
> that proposition p entails proposition q if and only if q is true
> of every case in which p is true.  This criterion is independent
> of the syntax of the propositions p and q.
>
> A syntactic rule of inference is *sound* if and only if it preserves
> truth -- i.e., implication implies entailment.  Every logician from
> Aristotle to Peirce to the present has used that criterion to justify
> their rules of inference.
>
> The converse of soundness is completeness:  The rules of inference for
> a logic are *complete* if and only if every entailment (p entails q)
> can be demonstrated by a proof (p implies q).
>
> For first-order logic, Kurt Gödel (1930) showed that the usual rules
> of inference are sound and complete.  That is true for Peirce's FOL
> rules for both his algebraic notations and his graph notations.
>
> But in 1931, Gödel proved his famous incompleteness theorem for
> higher-order logic (more explicitly, the version in Whitehead &
> Russell's _Principia Mathematica_).  Gödel showed that there are
> infinitely many HOL statements that are true, but not provable.
>
> Frankly, I feel a deep disconnect is lurking here somewhere.
>>
>
> I hope that the above helps to show the connections.  If you want more,
> I recommend two kinds of studies:  Peirce's sources from Aristotle to
> the Scholastics, and Peirce's successors in the 20th and 21st centuries.
>
> I just noticed that I had replied to one of Gary F's earlier notes
> by clicking "Reply" instead of "Reply list".  That reply, copied
> below, may also be helpful.
>
> John
> __
>
> Gary,
>
> I certainly agree that the world needs more introductory tutorials
> about many aspects of Peirce's theories.  But different people with
> different backgrounds need very different kinds of introductions.
>
> GF
>
>> While I can more or less appreciate the qualities of Peirce’s
>> post-1906 presentation, I’m not looking for an optimal way of
>> proving theorems, or for greater generality in that respect.
>> I’m looking for a way of getting across the concepts of
>> Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness.
>>
>
> Peirce's logic and his 1-2-3 categories are both important, and there
> are relationships between them.  But any intro to any subject has to
> be tailored to the background and interests of the students.
>
> Since very few people know anything about Peirce's EGs and very few
> know his categories, trying to introduce both in the same lecture is
> not likely to be successful.  But I have been successful in teaching
> EGs with the following slides:  http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/egintro.pdf
>
> Over the years, I have taught beginners and advanced students -- but
> at different speeds.  The three most advanced groups were Dana Scott
> and his logic seminar at CMU, Jon Barwise and his seminar at Indiana,
> and John McCarthy and his seminar at Stanford.  All three groups knew
> logic very well, and I could relate predicate calculus to the material
> in egintro.pdf in a one-hour lecture.
>
> For students with little knowledge of logic, I covered most of that
> material in a 3-day short course (about 12 hours of lectures with
> lots of questions and discussions).
>
> For a 5-day short course on "Patterns of Logic and Ontology", see the
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Jun 12, 2017, at 8:25 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> After those debates, they came to the conclusion that all three were
> equivalent in computational power. 

In John Sowa’s context, how does one relate such assertions to semiotics in 
light of 3.468-3.475?

Is computation power relevant to semiotics?  If so, what are the forms of the 
propositions that transform illations to relations?

Frankly, I feel a deep disconnect is lurking here somewhere.  Any guesses?

Cheers

Jerry





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Jun 12, 2017, at 6:50 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> ERGO present just the THEN part.

from Wikipedia (sorry!)

Ergo may refer to:
A Latin 
 
word meaning "therefore" as in Cogito ergo sum 
.
A Greek word έργο meaning "work", used as a prefix ergo-, for example, in 
ergonomics 
.

Pragmatically, the syntactical force of “ergo” vastly exceeds the syntactical 
force of “then”.

Just my opinion.

Cheers

jerry


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[kirstima]

Jerry, list

Dictionary may not be the source to turn to. ERGO is an abbreviation 
used by CSP to his audience at the time. There are hidden parts, assumed 
to be self-evidently known to all his readers.


In another parts of his writings CSP tells that the primary and 
fundamental logical relation is: IF - THEN.


ERGO present just the THEN part.

The funny thing with the IF -part is that it can never get fully 
explicated.


Gödel proved this, in his part. But still his proof has not been fully 
believed in.


The ppoof is absolutely valid. Just hard to understand.

Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 11.6.2017 04:10:

Open questions to the list:

The following quote, posted by gnox (Thanks, Gary) appears to be a
deep conundrum from several perspectives of 21 st Century logic.


On Jun 9, 2017, at 8:44 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

Peirce, CP 3.440 (1896):
[[ I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and
fundamental logical relation, that of illation, expressed by _ergo_.
A proposition, for me, is but an argumentation divested of the
assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion. This makes every
proposition a conditional proposition at bottom. In like manner a
“term,” or class-name, is for me nothing but a proposition with
its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite. The common noun
happens to have a very distinctive character in the Indo-European
languages. In most other tongues it is not sharply discriminated
from a verb or participle. “Man,” if it can be said to mean
anything by itself, means “what I am thinking of is a man.” ]]


First we note that CSP notes that he has held the view for 29 years!

Second, we note the singularity of the assertion


there is but one primary and fundamental logical relation


Thirdly, we note that this single ur-form of logic is expressed by a
single term:


expressed by _ergo_.


In English, the word Ergo means therefore.

Next, CSP expresses his conclusion on the nature of a proposition:


A proposition, for me, is but an argumentation divested of the
assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion.


With this simple sentence, does the single term, “argumentation”
replace the traditional ur-logical ground of logic, antecedent and
consequence? How important is this sentence?

If "divested of the assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion”,
then what is the meaning of the grammar? Or the meaning of arithmetic?
Are arguments to be fabricated in a completely ad hoc manner,
depending solely on the emotions whims of the author?

The sentence


In like manner a “term,” or class-name, is for me nothing but a
proposition with its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite.


suggests that all of language is merely a blank form. The notion of
“counting” is apparently completely discounted.

My gut level response to CP 3.440, in toto, is that if I take this
description of a fundamental logical relation as a conclusive
statement, it seems to deny the realism of my experiences.

I am very curious as to how others interpret this gloss of 3.440 and
welcome both online as well as offline responses.

Cheers

Jerry



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[gnox]

Jerry C and list,

 

The context of CP 3.440 (which I quoted in my post) is Peirce’s 1896 Monist 
article “The Regenerated Logic”, which is really a long review of Schröder's 
Exact Logic in which Peirce explains how his own views on the subject differ 
from Schröder's. I think if you read the paragraph in that context, as well as 
the broader context of Peircean logic (as John Sowa has done in his post), it 
would be quite transparent, or at least much clearer than your gloss on it. 
Personally I find it clearer than John’s explanation, but maybe that’s because 
I’ve learned what little I know of logic from reading Peirce, and am not 
familiar with the terminology of later logicians who developed different (and 
not often better) ways of saying what Peirce said about logic.

 

What interested me about the paragraph I quoted out of that context was that 
(1) it anticipates by several years Peirce’s rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy 
of signs, and (2) it says that the primacy of illation among logical relations, 
and of argument among signs (such that terms and propositions are relatively 
fragmentary or incomplete), was not a new semiotic idea for Peirce but one that 
he had “maintained since 1867.” Moreover, it was shortly after this Monist 
article that Peirce invented his Existential Graphs, and the article helps to 
explain Peirce’s motivation for inventing them.

 

Peirce says in CP 3.429 that “Logic may be defined as the science of the laws 
of the stable establishment of beliefs.” I’ll quote a bit more of the article 
below, but I’d recommend reading the whole of it in CP 3, if you have access to 
it.

 

Gary f.

 

 

430. “Exact” logic, in its widest sense, will (as I apprehend) consist of three 
parts. For it will be necessary, first of all, to study those properties of 
beliefs which belong to them as beliefs, irrespective of their stability. This 
will amount to what Duns Scotus called speculative grammar. For it must analyse 
an assertion into its essential elements, independently of the structure of the 
language in which it may happen to be expressed. It will also divide assertions 
into categories according to their essential differences. The second part will 
consider to what conditions an assertion must conform in order that it may 
correspond to the “reality,” that is, in order that the belief it expresses may 
be stable. This is what is more particularly understood by the word logic. It 
must consider, first, necessary, and second, probable reasoning. Thirdly, the 
general doctrine must embrace the study of those general conditions under which 
a problem presents itself for solution and those under which one question leads 
on to another. As this completes a triad of studies, or trivium, we might, not 
inappropriately, term the last study Speculative rhetoric. This division was 
proposed in 1867 by me, but I have often designated this third part as 
objective logic. 

… 

432. … Now, proof does not consist in giving superfluous and superpossible 
certainty to that which nobody ever did or ever will doubt, but in removing 
doubts which do, or at least might at some time, arise. A man first comes to 
the study of logic with an immense multitude of opinions upon a vast variety of 
topics; and they are held with a degree of confidence, upon which, after he has 
studied logic, he comes to look back with no little amusement. There remains, 
however, a small minority of opinions that logic never shakes; and among these 
are certain observations about assertions. The student would never have had a 
desire to learn logic if he had not paid some little attention to assertion, so 
as at least to attach a definite signification to assertion. So that, if he has 
not thought more accurately about assertions, he must at least be conscious, in 
some out-of-focus fashion, of certain properties of assertion. When he comes to 
the study, if he has a good teacher, these already dimly recognised facts will 
be placed before him in accurate formulation, and will be accepted as soon as 
he can clearly apprehend their statements. 

 

433. Let us see what some of these are. When an assertion is made, there really 
is some speaker, writer, or other signmaker who delivers it; and he supposes 
there is, or will be, some hearer, reader, or other interpreter who will 
receive it. It may be a stranger upon a different planet, an æon later; or it 
may be that very same man as he will be a second after. In any case, the 
deliverer makes signals to the receiver. Some of these signs (or at least one 
of them) are supposed to excite in the mind of the receiver familiar images, 
pictures, or, we might almost say, dreams — that is, reminiscences of sights, 
sounds, feelings, tastes, smells, or other sensations, now quite detached from 
the original circumstances of their first occurrence, so that they are free to 
be attached to new occasions. The deliverer is able to call up these images at 
will (with more or less 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rheme and Reason. A comment on CP 3.440

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Open questions to the list:

The following quote, posted by gnox (Thanks, Gary) appears to be a deep 
conundrum from several perspectives of 21 st Century logic.  
> On Jun 9, 2017, at 8:44 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> Peirce, CP 3.440 (1896):
> [[ I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and fundamental 
> logical relation, that of illation, expressed by ergo. A proposition, for me, 
> is but an argumentation divested of the assertoriness of its premiss and 
> conclusion. This makes every proposition a conditional proposition at bottom. 
> In like manner a “term,” or class-name, is for me nothing but a proposition 
> with its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite. The common noun 
> happens to have a very distinctive character in the Indo-European languages. 
> In most other tongues it is not sharply discriminated from a verb or 
> participle. “Man,” if it can be said to mean anything by itself, means “what 
> I am thinking of is a man.” ]]

First we note that CSP notes that he has held the view for 29 years!  

Second, we note the singularity of the assertion
> there is but one primary and fundamental logical relation

Thirdly, we note that this single ur-form of logic is expressed by a single 
term:
> expressed by ergo.


In English, the word Ergo means therefore.

Next, CSP expresses his conclusion on the nature of a proposition:
> A proposition, for me, is but an argumentation divested of the assertoriness 
> of its premiss and conclusion. 


With this simple sentence, does the single term, “argumentation” replace the 
traditional ur-logical ground of logic, antecedent and consequence?  How 
important is this sentence?

If  "divested of the assertoriness of its premiss and conclusion”, then what is 
the meaning of the grammar?  Or the meaning of arithmetic?  Are arguments to be 
fabricated in a completely ad hoc manner, depending solely on the emotions 
whims of the author?

The sentence 
> In like manner a “term,” or class-name, is for me nothing but a proposition 
> with its indices or subjects left blank, or indefinite.


suggests that all of language is merely a blank form.  The notion of “counting” 
is apparently completely discounted.  

My gut level response to CP 3.440, in toto, is that if I take this description 
of a fundamental logical relation as a conclusive statement, it seems to deny 
the realism of my experiences. 

I am very curious as to how others interpret this gloss of 3.440 and welcome 
both online as well as offline responses.

Cheers

Jerry 


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