RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[a . breemen]

Gary F.

Much better detailed and disentangled from the dispute going on about the role 
of a 'reality' test in doing semiotics.  I think we are in agreement.



Auke

> Op 30 april 2020 om 16:02 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> I think I’m in agreement with what Auke says here, but would put it a 
> little differently. My way of looking at this kind of problem in speculative 
> grammar is this:
> 
>  
> 
> The triadicity of semiosic relations determines that in many (if not all) 
> semiotic contexts, there will be exactly three interpretants, i.e. a 
> trichotomy of them into a 1st, 2nd and 3rd categorially. Communication is one 
> context, deductive reasoning is another, etc. These sets of three have a 
> “family resemblance” to one another, but that doesn't guarantee that any one 
> set can be exactly mapped onto another.
> 
>  
> 
> I think the same goes for the two objects. In an earlier post i proposed 
> that in an action-perception cycle such as one taking place in an animal with 
> a complex (hierarchical) visual system, the Dynamic Object can be mapped onto 
> the bottom-up stream of neural activity, while the Immediate Object can be 
> mapped onto the top-down stream. But this only applies to a semiosic process 
> going on in a single brain; there is no guarantee that it will match up 
> exactly with the mapping we use in another semiotic context, such as 
> communication between people.
> 
>  
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> 
> From: a.bree...@chello.nl 
> Sent: 30-Apr-20 06:46
> To: Jon Alan Schmidt ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation
> 
>  
> 
> Jon Alan,
> 
> So, we need the intentional and effectual interprretants for the 
> introduction of different minds, that is we need them in order to get 
> semiotics from a terminological exercize into a semiotic study of 
> communication. 
> 
> best,
> 
> Auke
> 
> > > 
> > Op 30 april 2020 om 2:48 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt 
> > mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com >:
> > 
> > Auke, List:
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > As I explained at some length, my current view is as follows.
> > 
> > * The intentional interpretant is:
> >   o the dynamical interpretant of a previous sign token 
> > with the same dynamical object, because it is a determination of the mind 
> > of the utterer.
> >   o the final interpretant of this sign token, because it 
> > is its intended effect and thus the effect that it would have under ideal 
> > circumstances.
> > * The effectual interpretant is the dynamical interpretant, 
> > because it is a determination of the mind of the interpreter; i.e., the 
> > sign's actual effect.
> > * The communicational interpretant is the immediate 
> > interpretant, because it is a determination of the commens and therefore 
> > internal to the sign.
> > 
> > More to come in the other thread.
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > Regards,
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> > 
> > > 


 

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> 
> 
> 
> 


 

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[a . breemen]

Jon Alan,

So, we need the intentional and effectual interprretants for the introduction 
of different minds, that is we need them in order to get semiotics from a 
terminological exercize into a semiotic study of communication. 

best,

Auke

> Op 30 april 2020 om 2:48 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> As I explained at some length, my current view is as follows.
> * The intentional interpretant is:
>   o the dynamical interpretant of a previous sign token with the 
> same dynamical object, because it is a determination of the mind of the 
> utterer.
>   o the final interpretant of this sign token, because it is its 
> intended effect and thus the effect that it would have under ideal 
> circumstances.
> * The effectual interpretant is the dynamical interpretant, because 
> it is a determination of the mind of the interpreter; i.e., the sign's actual 
> effect.
> * The communicational interpretant is the immediate interpretant, 
> because it is a determination of the commens and therefore internal to the 
> sign.
> More to come in the other thread.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 2:00 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Of lately I work with webmail and that puts in another adress. So, 
> > with delay my response to Jon Alan.
> > 
> > >  Oorspronkelijk bericht --
> Van: Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@upcmail.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@upcmail.nl >
>     Aan: Peirce-L < peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
> mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >
> Datum: 27 april 2020 om 10:30
> Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation
> 
> Jon Alen,
> 
> You wrote: Thanks for confirming that Peirce identified exactly 
> three interpretants in the quoted passage. 
> 
> --
> 
> Since interpretants always come in triples, This is no wonder, at 
> the least we might expect a triple of triples. I object against  your 
> rethorics. Suggesting that the count counts .
> 
> I see that you didn't do your substitution in:
> 
> There is the Intentional Interpretant, the Effectual 
> Interpretant, and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the 
> Cominterpretant. 
> 
> It has to be done before we can proceed.
> 
> It is a sign, it has its immediate and dynamical object. After 
> the substitution is done we compare the immediate and dynamical objects 
> suggested by the dictionary meaning of the terms. After that we know whether 
> only three interpretants, i.e. immediate, dynamical and normal is a feasible 
> option. I predict it is not. 
> 
> Thanks beforehand,
> 
> Auke
> 
> 

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

As I explained at some length, my current view is as follows.

   - The intentional interpretant is:
  - the dynamical interpretant of a *previous *sign token with the same
  dynamical object, because it is a determination of the mind of
the utterer.
  - the final interpretant of *this* sign token, because it is its
  *intended* effect and thus the effect that it *would *have under
  ideal circumstances.
  - The effectual interpretant is the dynamical interpretant, because
   it is a determination of the mind of the interpreter; i.e., the sign's
   *actual* effect.
   - The communicational interpretant is the immediate interpretant,
   because it is a determination of the commens and therefore *internal* to
   the sign.

More to come in the other thread.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 29, 2020 at 2:00 AM  wrote:

> Of lately I work with webmail and that puts in another adress. So, with
> delay my response to Jon Alan.
>
> -- Oorspronkelijk bericht --
> Van: Auke van Breemen 
> Aan: Peirce-L 
> Datum: 27 april 2020 om 10:30
> Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation
>
> Jon Alen,
>
> You wrote: Thanks for confirming that Peirce identified *exactly three*
> interpretants in the quoted passage.
>
> --
>
> Since interpretants always come in triples, This is no wonder, at the
> least we might expect a triple of triples. I object against  your
> rethorics. Suggesting that the count counts .
>
> I see that you didn't do your substitution in:
>
> There is the Intentional Interpretant, the Effectual Interpretant,
> and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the Cominterpretant.
>
> It has to be done before we can proceed.
>
> It is a sign, it has its immediate and dynamical object. After the
> substitution is done we compare the immediate and dynamical objects
> suggested by the dictionary meaning of the terms. After that we know
> whether only three interpretants, i.e. immediate, dynamical and normal is a
> feasible option. I predict it is not.
>
> Thanks beforehand,
>
> Auke
>
>

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Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[a . breemen]

Of lately I work with webmail and that puts in another adress. So, with delay 
my response to Jon Alan.

 Oorspronkelijk bericht --
Van: Auke van Breemen 
Aan: Peirce-L 
Datum: 27 april 2020 om 10:30
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation




Jon Alen,

You wrote: Thanks for confirming that Peirce identified exactly three 
interpretants in the quoted passage. 

--

Since interpretants always come in triples, This is no wonder, at the least we 
might expect a triple of triples. I object against  your rethorics. Suggesting 
that the count counts .

I see that you didn't do your substitution in:

There is the Intentional Interpretant, the Effectual Interpretant, and the 
Communicational Interpretant, or say the Cominterpretant. 

It has to be done before we can proceed.

It is a sign, it has its immediate and dynamical object. After the substitution 
is done we compare the immediate and dynamical objects suggested by the 
dictionary meaning of the terms. After that we know whether only three 
interpretants, i.e. immediate, dynamical and normal is a feasible option. I 
predict it is not. 


Thanks beforehand,

Auke



Op 27 april 2020 om 3:08 schreef

Jon Alan Schmidt : 

Auke, List:

Thanks for confirming that Peirce identified exactly three interpretants in the 
quoted passage.  As I already noted, both Johansen and the EP editors align the 
intended or intentional interpretant with the immediate interpretant, and the 
communicational interpretant with the final interpretant, thus either 
implicitly or explicitly aligning the effectual interpretant with the dynamical 
interpretant.  This last assignment is pretty obvious, since at about the same 
time--every single quotation or citation in this post is from 1906--Peirce 
elsewhere defines the dynamical interpretant as "the actual effect of the 
Sign"; namely, "that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the 
Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a 
Sign" (CP 4.536).

The other two assignments happen to be precisely where I disagree with most of 
the secondary literature, and I presented my reasoning on the List a couple of 
years ago.  I now offer it again, but with some adjustments to reflect my 
current views; believe it or not, I have changed my mind about some things over 
time.  EP 2:555n2 implies that its listed associations are all based on 
Peirce's Logic Notebook (R 339:412[275r], 414[276r], 422-425[283r-286r]), but 
it turns out that he never actually mentions the intentional, effectual, and 
communicational interpretants at all in that manuscript.  Fortunately, he does 
make some relevant remarks right after briefly defining the normal, dynamic, 
and immediate interpretants.

CSP:  I have thus omitted the intended interpretant. So far as the intention is 
betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is 
not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of another sign, but it is in no 
sense the interpretant of that sign. (R 339:414[276r])

Peirce thus explains the switch from "intended" on one page (275r 
https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/preview.php?from=search=13309
 , dated March 31) to "immediate" on the next (276r 
https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/preview.php?from=search=13311
 , dated April 2).  It was only a few weeks previously (March 9) that in a 
letter to Lady Welby he had defined the intentional interpretant as "a 
determination of the mind of the utterer" as quoted below.  Apparently he 
realized that, as such, it obviously cannot be an interpretant of the sign that 
the utterer is currently uttering; instead, it must be an interpretant of a 
previous sign determined by the same dynamical object.  From that standpoint, 
the intentional interpretant is another dynamical interpretant--the antecedent 
sign whose own dynamical interpretant is the sign now being uttered.

On the other hand, a few months later (August 27) Peirce characterized two of 
the ten divisions of signs as being "according to the Purpose of the Eventual 
Interpretant" and "according to the Nature of the Influence the Sign is 
intended to exert" (R 339:424[285r 
https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/preview.php?from=search=13321
 ]; emphases added).  The latter is the familiar trichotomy for the relation of 
the sign to its final interpretant as rheme/dicisign/argument, here crossed out 
and replaced with seme/pheme/delome.  In that sense, then, the intentional 
interpretant is the final interpretant--the effect that the utterer intends the 
sign to have on the interpreter, and thus the effect that the sign would have 
on the interpreter under ideal circumstances.

As for the communicational interpretant, it is important to pay careful 
attention to how Peirce describes the mind of which it is a determination.

CSP:  This mind may be called the commens. It 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

Thanks for confirming that Peirce identified *exactly three* interpretants
in the quoted passage.  As I already noted, both Johansen and the EP
editors align the intended or intentional interpretant with the immediate
interpretant, and the communicational interpretant with the final
interpretant, thus either implicitly or explicitly aligning the effectual
interpretant with the dynamical interpretant.  This last assignment is
pretty obvious, since at about the same time--every single quotation or
citation in this post is from 1906--Peirce elsewhere defines the dynamical
interpretant as "the actual effect of the Sign"; namely, "that which the
Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the
latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign" (CP 4.536).

The other two assignments happen to be precisely where I disagree with most
of the secondary literature, and I presented my reasoning on the List a
couple of years ago.  I now offer it again, but with some adjustments to
reflect my current views; believe it or not, I have changed my mind about
some things over time.  EP 2:555n2 implies that its listed associations are
all based on Peirce's Logic Notebook (R 339:412[275r], 414[276r],
422-425[283r-286r]), but it turns out that he never actually mentions the
intentional, effectual, and communicational interpretants *at all* in that
manuscript.  Fortunately, he does make some relevant remarks right after
briefly defining the normal, dynamic, and immediate interpretants.

CSP:  I have thus omitted the *intended* interpretant. So far as the
intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate
Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant
of *another* sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of *that* sign.
(R 339:414[276r])


Peirce thus explains the switch from "intended" on one page (275r
,
dated March 31) to "immediate" on the next (276r
,
dated April 2).  It was only a few weeks previously (March 9) that in a
letter to Lady Welby he had defined the intentional interpretant as "a
determination of the mind of the utterer" as quoted below.  Apparently he
realized that, as such, it obviously cannot be an interpretant of the sign
that the utterer is *currently* uttering; instead, it must be an
interpretant of a *previous* sign determined by the same dynamical object.
>From that standpoint, the intentional interpretant is another
*dynamical *interpretant--the
*antecedent* sign whose own dynamical interpretant is the sign now being
uttered.

On the other hand, a few months later (August 27) Peirce characterized two
of the ten divisions of signs as being "according to the *Purpose* of the
Eventual Interpretant" and "according to the Nature of the Influence the
Sign is *intended* to exert" (R 339:424[285r
];
emphases added).  The latter is the familiar trichotomy for the relation of
the sign to its *final* interpretant as rheme/dicisign/argument, here
crossed out and replaced with seme/pheme/delome.  In that sense, then, the
intentional interpretant is the *final *interpretant--the effect that the
utterer *intends *the sign to have on the interpreter, and thus the effect
that the sign *would *have on the interpreter under ideal circumstances.

As for the communicational interpretant, it is important to pay careful
attention to how Peirce describes the mind of which it is a determination.

CSP:  This mind may be called the *commens. *It consists of all that is,
and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the
outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function ...
Thus the Form conveyed is always a determination of the dynamical object of
the *commind.* (EP 2:478)


The essential ingredient of the utterer is the dynamical object, which
determines the sign; the essential ingredient of the interpreter is the
dynamical interpretant, which the sign determines; and the essential
ingredient of the commens is the sign itself, which welds the utterer and
interpreter into one quasi-mind (CP 4.551).  Put another way, the sign
serves as "a Medium for the communication of a Form" (EP 2:544n22) from the
dynamical object to the dynamical interpretant, both of which are *external*
to the sign itself.  However, any determination of the commens must be
*internal* to the sign.  Therefore, the communicational interpretant
is the *immediate
*interpretant, "the interpretant as it is revealed in the right
understanding of the Sign itself" (CP 4.536).

Moreover, recall that Peirce's eventual names for the division according to
the mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant are
hypothetic/categorical/relative, and that these correspond to the number of
lines of identity in an 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[a . breemen]

Jon Alan, List,

JAS: How many different interpretants does Peirce identify in the passage 
quoted below (EP 2:478, 1906)?

There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of 
the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind 
of the interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the 
Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of 
utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should 
take place. This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all that is, 
and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in 
order that the sign in question should fulfill its function.

--

LETS set up a dictionary:

Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the utterer

the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the 
interpreter

the Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the minds 
of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication 
should take place

AND shorten the quote accordingly:

There is the Intentional Interpretant, the Effectual Interpretant, and the 
Communicational Interpretant, or say the Cominterpretant. 

NOW, since there are exactly and only three interpretants in your view 
(immediate, dynamical and final/normal), which terms would you substitute at 
the different occurences?

Best,

Auke




> Op 26 april 2020 om 2:54 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> How many different interpretants does Peirce identify in the passage 
> quoted below (EP 2:478, 1906)?  Does he mention any additional interpretants 
> in that particular letter?  Are there any manuscripts whatsoever where Peirce 
> explicitly identifies more than three interpretants in the same analysis?  If 
> not, why conclude that there are more than three, just because he uses 
> different names in different lists of exactly three?  How is this more 
> justified than viewing Peirce as experimenting over time with different names 
> for the same three interpretants?  Note that these are questions, not 
> assertions; I am inviting persuasion that Auke's approach is more warranted 
> than mine.  On the other hand, all the recent List discussions were initially 
> prompted by Robert Marty's paper introducing the podium diagram, which (based 
> on the three categories) implies that one sign must have exactly two objects 
> and exactly three interpretants.  Where does such an analysis supposedly go 
> wrong?
> 
> Besides, limiting the interpretants to exactly three is by no means a 
> novel proposal.  As long ago as 1993, Jorgen Dines Johansen stated in his 
> book, Dialogic Semiosis:  An Essay on Signs and Meaning, "The most important 
> divisions of the interpretant are the immediate, the dynamical, and the 
> final" (p. 173).  He then aligned some of the alternative names 
> accordingly--essential and intended with immediate; communicational, 
> rational, and ultimate logical with final.  Five years later, the editors of 
> Volume 2 of The Essential Peirce similarly associated intentional, 
> impressional, and initial with immediate; effectual, factual, middle, and 
> dynamic with dynamical; and communicational, normal, habitual, and eventual 
> with final (p. 555 n. 2).  I disagree with a couple of these specific 
> assignments, but the point is that it is quite common in the secondary 
> literature to understand Peirce as having identified exactly three 
> interpretants, while varying considerably in what he ca!
 lled them.
> 
> Again, "the gamma part of semiotics" is an aspect of Auke's speculative 
> grammar, not Peirce's own; just as the immediate object/interpretant 
> pertaining to a type, the dynamical object/interpretant pertaining to a 
> token, and the final interpretant pertaining to the sign itself are aspects 
> of my speculative grammar, not Peirce's own.  Nevertheless, our different 
> speculative grammars are both recognizably Peircean.  As with Robert, I 
> sincerely appreciate Auke's scholarship--especially, as he mentions below, 
> our mutual dedication to studying Peirce's unpublished texts--even though we 
> have reached some different conclusions when it comes to the details.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 8:02 AM Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@chello.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Gary f., list,
> > 
> > I understand to have hit on a great devide between groups of 
> > listers. As far as JAS is concerned, I already indicated my objections, and 
> > I already indicated that I value it highly that he took the trouble to 
> > seriously read the unpublished pages. I seldom meet a person 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, List:

When have I ever declared that my "conclusion is what Peirce intended"?
When have I ever described my objective as "developing a definitive
reconstruction of Peirce's semeiotic"?  When have I ever maintained that my
"version [of semeiotic] is what Peirce intended"?  When have I ever
denied that my "conclusions are [my] own, not Peirce's"?  When have I ever
"construct[ed] a long thread of quotations ... and derive[d] some rigid
conclusion that [I] claim[] is what Peirce intended"?  Please provide *specific
*quotes from me to back up *each *of these serious allegations.  Otherwise,
I request a retraction and an apology.

On the contrary, I have explicitly acknowledged that my speculative grammar
is *not *identical to Peirce's, and I have even pointed out some
*specific *differences--such
as abandoning the 66-sign taxonomy based on a linear ordering of the ten
trichotomies, as well as associating the immediate object/interpretant with
a type, the dynamical object/interpretant with a token, and the final
interpretant with the sign itself.  I have recently stated plainly on
multiple occasions that all my posts are expressions of my personal
opinions based on my interpretations of Peirce's writings, and that this
should go without saying.

On the other hand, I have read many books and papers in the secondary
literature that assert, "Peirce believed X" or "Peirce held Y" or
"According to Peirce, Z."  There is absolutely nothing wrong with such
statements--even when X, Y, and Z are paraphrases or summaries, rather than
verbatim quotations--as long as they can be adequately supported from
Peirce's actual writings.  John's slides linked below are a good example of
this, translating some of Peirce's ideas into the concepts and terminology
of modern logic.  Why is such an approach acceptable for him
in a conference presentation, but not for me in an e-mail list discussion?
Again, *why the double standard?*

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 8:51 AM John F. Sowa  wrote:

> Gary,
>
> That sentence up to the comma is my primary objection to Jon's writings.
> As for the substance, my second objection is Jon's claim that his
> conclusion is what Peirce intended:
>
> GR> Your arguments *contra* Jon Alan Schmidt have been consistently
> methodological, not at all substantive.
>
> Jon has done useful work in highlighting some important quotations in
> Peirce's writings and stating his own opinions about how they are related.
> That's OK.  But I object to his claim of developing a definitive
> reconstruction of Peirce's semeiotic.  That is a task that Peirce attempted
> to do on several occasions.  But his ideas were constantly growing as he
> was writing.  He could never produce a single coherent version.  If Peirce
> himself could not produce a definitive version, nobody can claim that their
> version is what Peirce intended.
>
> GR> More to the point, there are those scholars who rather completely
> disagree with your and Edwina's (mis)characterization of Jon's work.
>
> Please quote anybody who objected to what I said about Jon's work.  If you
> can't dig up some ancient quotations, please ask them to restate their
> objections.
>
> GR> Jon's work falls into a category of Peirce scholarship, *semeiotic
> grammar*, which you and Edwina seem to oppose almost in principle, but
> which is seen by many Peirce scholars -- and to this day -- as essential,
> even quintessential, in the understanding of what Peirce's philosophy
> involves, the changes in his  terminology often being expressions of the
> conceptual growth -- or fine turning -- of important, even crucial
> philosophical concepts; and not only in his logic as semeiotic, but also in
> his phenomenology and metaphysics.
>
> I believe that work is very important.  I have learned a lot from reading
> much of it -- certainly not all of it.  But the most reliable authors
> clearly state or imply that their conclusions are their own, not Peirce's.
> When they do make some claims about what Peirce meant, they add some hedge,
> such as "Peirce seems to say..." or "If I am right..."
>
> What I find most objectionable about Jon's method is the way he constructs
> a long thread of quotations, each taken out of context, and derives some
> rigid conclusion that he claims is what Peirce intended.  If anybody
> objects to that conclusion by citing other quotations, Jon find some excuse
> for rejecting them.
>
> GR> Your seeming rush to 'application' is, as I now see it, based on your
> hubristic (there's no more accurate term for it) estimation that you
> *already* grasp what's important in Peirce's philosophy...
>
> I am writing for  21st c audience.  I often quote Peirce's writings as a
> motivation for the work I'm doing, but I don't claim that my work is what
> he meant or intended.  Following is a 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, Gary R., John, List:

I agree with Edwina that she has *established *her own speculative grammar,
which she believes to be recognizably Peircean, and has sought to apply it
in the special sciences, most notably biology.  However, I understand Gary
R.'s point to be that she persistently rejects any suggestion of a
need for *reexamination
*of the conclusions that she reached long ago.  In other words, she comes
across as the one with the "rigid box," unwilling to give serious
consideration to any alternatives.  By the way, speculative grammar is the
study of *all *signs, not just symbols; and it concerns not only their
relations with their *interpretants*, but also their relations with their
*objects*.

I agree with Edwina that publication of an article does not imply
endorsement of its conclusions, only the reasonableness of its methods and
arguments.  However, I understand Gary R.'s point to be exactly
that--John's *methodological *criticisms directed at me are misplaced,
because my approach is well within the mainstream of Peirce scholarship and
philosophical inquiry in general.  The real issue is that John (apparently)
disagrees with many of my *conclusions*, but as I have said multiple times
before, the proper course of action is then to *make a better
argument* for *different
*conclusions.  Again, I invite *persuasion*, rather than bare assertions
that I am guilty of "serious misinterpretations."

Edwina and John both seem to think that focusing (as I admittedly do) on
Peirce's words, including his terminology, detracts from what they deem to
be a more pressing and more important task--applying his ideas to today's
problems.  By contrast, I continue to maintain that getting his ideas
right *requires
*paying careful attention to his words and terminology, and getting his
ideas wrong obviously *precludes *applying them at all.  Instead, it
results in applying *one's own* ideas to today's problems, while creating
the mistaken impression that they are *Peirce's *ideas--precisely the
transgression of which I have been repeatedly (and falsely) accused.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 8:38 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, list
>
> I'm going to reject your view that I 'oppose almost in principle' the
> research known as speculative grammar, which is research into the nature
> of a sign as symbol and the nature of symbols ..to their interpretants.
>
> I think that my published work in this area, focused on the relations and
> categories within the triad, rejects your opinion of such an opposition.
>
> Furthermore - I think that the discussion between Auke and JAS [in which I
> have participated] focuses on terminology and this 'speculative grammar'
> with the debate between how many interpretants are actually operative in
> the Peircean framework -. This is an important discussion, for my whole
> point about terminology is that it is not enough to simply define the
> terms. One has to examine their functionality in the 'real pragmatic
> world'. That's why, for example, this discussion between Auke and JAS is
> important - because the increased variety of Interpretants increases the
> capacity of the semiosic action to provide diversity and complexity. And
> that's why we keep asking for examples!
>
> On another point - it should be pointed out that a published article [my
> own included] does not mean that the content is 'the truth'! I'm very sure
> that you have - as have I - often been a reviewer for scholarly articles to
> be published in peer-reviewed journals. The normal criteria for publication
> is whether the article is coherent, well-written, and referenced - but
> that's all. I would never, and I'm very sure you would never as well -
> judge an article as to whether or not I personally agreed with the
> argument, with the content, with the approach or felt it was 'right' or
> 'the truth'. . Such decisions must be left up to the wider 'community of
> scholars' - and never to the reviewer.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sat 25/04/20 1:58 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> John, List,
>
> I so thoroughly disagree with you that at this point there's not much
> more to be said. Your arguments contra Jon Alan Schmidt have been
> consistently methodological, not at all substantive. And as far as I can
> see, you have conclusively shown yourself to have a double standard in that
> regard. It would indeed be easy to cite many, many examples of this
> hypocritical double standard and, indeed, many have been cited on this
> list. I would certainly not be loathe to rehearse some of them if need be.
>
> More to the point, there are those scholars who rather completely disagree
> with your and Edwina's (mis)characterization of Jon's work. One need only
> look over the last couple of decades of articles published in Transactions
> of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

How many different interpretants does Peirce identify in the passage quoted
below (EP 2:478, 1906)?  Does he mention any additional interpretants in
that particular letter?  Are there any manuscripts whatsoever where Peirce
explicitly identifies more than three interpretants in the same analysis?
If not, why conclude that there are more than three, just because he uses
different names in different lists of exactly three?  How is this more
justified than viewing Peirce as experimenting over time with different
names for the same three interpretants?  Note that these are questions, not
assertions; I am inviting *persuasion* that Auke's approach is more
warranted than mine.  On the other hand, all the recent List discussions
were initially prompted by Robert Marty's paper introducing the podium
diagram, which (based on the three categories) implies that one sign
*must *have
exactly two objects and exactly three interpretants.  Where does such an
analysis supposedly go wrong?

Besides, limiting the interpretants to exactly three is by no means a novel
proposal.  As long ago as 1993, Jorgen Dines Johansen stated in his
book, *Dialogic
Semiosis:  An Essay on Signs and Meaning*, "The most important divisions of
the interpretant are the immediate, the dynamical, and the final" (p.
173).  He then aligned some of the alternative names accordingly--essential
and intended with immediate; communicational, rational, and ultimate
logical with final.  Five years later, the editors of Volume 2 of *The
Essential Peirce* similarly associated intentional, impressional, and
initial with immediate; effectual, factual, middle, and dynamic with
dynamical; and communicational, normal, habitual, and eventual with final
(p. 555 n. 2).  I disagree with a couple of these specific assignments, but
the point is that it is quite common in the secondary literature to
understand Peirce as having identified exactly three interpretants, while
varying considerably in what he called them.

Again, "the gamma part of semiotics" is an aspect of *Auke's *speculative
grammar, not Peirce's own; just as the immediate object/interpretant
pertaining to a type, the dynamical object/interpretant pertaining to a
token, and the final interpretant pertaining to the sign itself are aspects
of *my *speculative grammar, not Peirce's own.  Nevertheless, our different
speculative grammars are both recognizably *Peircean*.  As with Robert, I
sincerely appreciate Auke's scholarship--especially, as he mentions below,
our mutual dedication to studying Peirce's unpublished texts--even though
we have reached some different conclusions when it comes to the details.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 8:02 AM Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> Gary f., list,
>
> I understand to have hit on a great devide between groups of listers. As
> far as JAS is concerned, I already indicated my objections, and I already
> indicated that I value it highly that he took the trouble to seriously read
> the unpublished pages. I seldom meet a person that, as I did, took the
> trouble.
>
> I suggested already to look at this from a semiotical point of view:
>
> Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding
> possible?
>
> --
>
> Curiously enough this example fits in nicely with the discussion about the
> total number of interpretants Peirce distinguished.
>
> 1906|Letters to Lady Welby|EP 2:478
>
> There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the
> mind of the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination
> of the mind of the interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or
> say the Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which
> the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any
> communication should take place. This mind may be called the commens. It
> consists of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and
> interpreter, at the outset, in order that the sign in question should
> fulfill its function.
>
> ---
>
> Here we are in, what I call, the gamma part of semiotics. Demanding its
> own identification of differences between interpretants. This cannot simply
> be reduced to: immediate, normal and final interpretant.
>
> Auke
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[John F. Sowa]

Gary,
That sentence up to the comma is my primary objection to
Jon's writings.  As for the substance, my second objection is Jon's claim
that his conclusion is what Peirce intended:
GR> Your arguments
*contra* Jon Alan Schmidt have been consistently methodological, not at
all substantive.
Jon has done useful work in highlighting some
important quotations in Peirce's writings and stating his own opinions
about how they are related.  That's OK.  But I object to his claim of
developing a definitive reconstruction of Peirce's semeiotic.  That is a
task that Peirce attempted to do on several occasions.  But his ideas were
constantly growing as he was writing.  He could never produce a single
coherent version.  If Peirce himself could not produce a definitive
version, nobody can claim that their version is what Peirce
intended.
GR> More to the point, there are those scholars who
rather completely disagree with your and Edwina's (mis)characterization of
Jon's work.
Please quote anybody who objected to what I said about
Jon's work.  If you can't dig up some ancient quotations, please ask them
to restate their objections.
GR> Jon's work falls into a category
of Peirce scholarship, *semeiotic grammar*, which you and Edwina seem to
oppose almost in principle, but which is seen by many Peirce scholars --
and to this day -- as essential, even quintessential, in the understanding
of what Peirce's philosophy involves, the changes in his  terminology
often being expressions of the conceptual growth -- or fine turning -- of
important, even crucial philosophical concepts; and not only in his logic
as semeiotic, but also in his phenomenology and metaphysics.
I
believe that work is very important.  I have learned a lot from reading
much of it -- certainly not all of it.  But the most reliable authors
clearly state or imply that their conclusions are their own, not
Peirce's.  When they do make some claims about what Peirce meant, they add
some hedge, such as "Peirce seems to say..." or "If I am
right..."
What I find most objectionable about Jon's method is
the way he constructs a long thread of quotations, each taken out of
context, and derives some rigid conclusion that he claims is what Peirce
intended.  If anybody objects to that conclusion by citing other
quotations, Jon find some excuse for rejecting them.
GR> Your
seeming rush to 'application' is, as I now see it,  based on your
hubristic (there's no more accurate term for it) estimation that you
*already* grasp what's important in Peirce's philosophy...
I am
writing for  21st c audience.  I often quote Peirce's writings as a
motivation for the work I'm doing, but I don't claim that my work is what
he meant or intended.  Following is a revised version of the slides I
presented at a Peirce session of an APA meeting in 2015: 
http://jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf .
As a result of that work, Fernando
Zalamea invited me to participate in a workshop in Columbia on existential
graphs.  At that workshop, I presented another version of the ppe.pdf
slides.  As a result, I was invited to convert those slides to an article
for a special issue of the Journal of Applied Logics.   Slide 2 of ppe.pdf
has the URL of that article, which takes 72 printed pages.
Please
let me know what you find "rushed" or "hubristic".  I
have posted many other articles and slides on my web site.  If you like, I
can send you the URLs of others that rush to apply Peirce's writings to
what I'm working on.
John

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Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F,  - heh-  that's a neat comment!!. I wasn't even discussing
whether or not your suggestion that my posts 'block the road of
inquiry' were successful or not. I can't imagine how they would be.
But you specifically asked that I be asked to 'stop blocking the path
of inquiry'. And so - I asked for examples. I gave some examples of
how I felt MY comments were 'blocked' - and note you have ignored
such examples. 

And yes - I do see the difference between 'inquiry' and 'personal
opinion' so I think that's another red herring. Examples would help.

Edwina
 On Sat 25/04/20  9:10 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina, sorry, I didn’t mean to imply that your attempts to block
the road of inquiry (such as your “six principles”) have been
successful.

 However, if you don’t see the difference between inquiry and
expressing a personal opinion, it would be futile for me to try to
explain it here. Anyway I would only be paraphrasing what I (and
Peirce and Susan Haack) said at
http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/rlb.htm#attend [1].

 Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky  
 Sent: 25-Apr-20 08:22
 To: 'Peirce-L' 

; g...@gnusystems.ca
 Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation
Gary F - please tell me how I am 'blocking the way to inquiry'.

When I am critiqued by JAS when I use the phrase 'dynamic semiosis'
because Peirce used the term 'dynamic' in a textual reference to the
dyadic action of Secondness - that response is, in my view 'blocking
the way to inquiry'. 

When I am critiqued by JAS that when I refer to Peircean thought
WITHOUT using a textual reference - that such an analysis is just my
personal opinion - then that response is, in my view, blocking the
way to inquiry'. 

 After all - it is absurd to consider that most of us - who have
been studying Peirce for years - should not be allowed to discuss
Peircean theories unless every statement is supported by a specific
text!

When I refer to Peircean texts to support my interpretations [eg, of
cosmology] and am instead told by JAS that 'this is early Peirce' and
therefore not necessarily valid - I feel that this is 'blocking the
way to inquiry'.

 I think that providing the Peircean text does not also mean that
one understands that text in the full depth of Peircean thought. Such
a tactic can, in itself, 'block the way of inquiry' for it doesn't
allow the researcher to examine how the MEANING can be used to
examine realityand thus - can be moved into examining the
biological and societal worlds.

Edwina
 On Sat 25/04/20 8:00 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca [2]  sent:

Auke, list,

 Since a remark of mine was misappropriated by Edwina recently as an
excuse for yet another attack on Jon Alan Schmidt, I think I have a
responsibility to support what our moderator has said about these
attacks — and to ask Edwina and Jon S. kindly to stop blocking the
path of inquiry. 

John Sowa in particular has made some valuable contributions to the
list, but in the past year or so he’s contributed nothing new,
turning instead to vociferous attacks on JAS and nonsensical claims
about what Peirce would “cringe” at. I think the motivation for
these attacks is laid bare in your own post (copied below): Jon’s
ongoing inquiry into the development of Peirce’s speculative
grammar has consistently relied on direct quotations from Peirce,
many of which have never been posted to the list before. Apparently
this is deeply resented by John and Edwina (and you too?) because
these Peirce texts are difficult to reconcile with their preconceived
notions of what Peirce was doing. It is those notions which constitute
a “rigid box” in which they would like to confine Peircean
scholarship — while forbidding other scholars such as Jon from
paraphrasing Peirce, or even pointing out connections between one
Peirce quote and another. If you don’t see the hypocrisy of this,
you must have a girder in your own eye.  

As I said before, I don’t have a strong interest in Jon’s
inquiry, except where his discoveries urge me to reconsider what
I’ve previously written about Peircean semiotics in my book. Jon
doesn’t have a strong interest in my book, either. But it’s
obvious to me that his constantly evolving inquiry is an exemplary
instance of Peircean scholarship and has provided the greater part of
the original work that’s been posted to this list in the last year
or two. The claim that he “  denies it to others to have their
interpretation of Peirce's thought” is frankly absurd. His real
crime, in the view of those others, is to build his systematic
interpretation of Peirce’s speculative grammar on a broad
foundation of texts by Peirce himself. If you disagree, say so and
say why, but to attack him for posting it at all is nothing more or
less than an attempt to block the road of inquiry.  

Gary f.

} Owing to general causes, logic always must be far

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list

I'm going to reject your view that I 'oppose almost in principle'
the research known as speculative grammar, which is research into the
nature of a sign as symbol and the nature of symbols ..to their
interpretants. 

I think that my published work in this area, focused on the
relations and categories within the triad, rejects your opinion of
such an opposition. 

Furthermore - I think that the discussion between Auke and JAS [in
which I have participated] focuses on terminology and this
'speculative grammar'  with the debate between how many interpretants
are actually operative in the Peircean framework -. This is an
important discussion, for my whole point about terminology is that it
is not enough to simply define the terms. One has to examine their
functionality in the 'real pragmatic world'. That's why, for example,
this discussion between Auke and JAS is important - because the
increased variety of Interpretants increases the capacity of the
semiosic action to provide diversity and complexity. And that's why
we keep asking for examples! 

On another point - it should be pointed out that a published article
[my own included] does not mean that the content is 'the truth'! I'm
very sure that you have - as have I - often been a reviewer for
scholarly articles to be published in peer-reviewed journals. The
normal criteria for publication is whether the article is coherent,
well-written, and referenced - but that's all. I would never, and I'm
very sure you would never as well - judge an article as to whether or
not I personally agreed with the argument, with the content, with the
approach or felt it was 'right' or 'the truth'. . Such decisions must
be left up to the wider 'community of scholars' - and never to the
reviewer.

Edwina
 On Sat 25/04/20  1:58 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 John, List,
 I so thoroughly disagree with you that at this point there's not
much more to be said. Your arguments contra Jon Alan Schmidt have
been consistently methodological, not at all substantive. And as far
as I can see, you have conclusively shown yourself to have a double
standard in that regard. It would indeed be easy to cite many, many
examples of this hypocritical double standard and, indeed, many have
been cited on this list. I would certainly not be loathe to rehearse
some of them if need be. 
 More to the point, there are those scholars who rather completely
disagree with your and Edwina's (mis)characterization of Jon's work.
One need only look over the last couple of decades of articles
published in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society to see
that some (but hardly all, since his philosophical interests are
rather far-ranging) of Jon's work falls into a category of Peirce
scholarship,  semeiotic grammar, which you and Edwina seem to oppose
almost in principle, but which is seen by many Peirce scholars -- and
to this day -- as essential, even quintessential, in the understanding
of what Peirce's philosophy involves, the changes in his terminology
often being expressions of the conceptual growth -- or fine turning
-- of important, even crucial philosophical concepts; and not only in
his logic as semeiotic, but also in his phenomenology and metaphysics.
To ignore such conceptual development expressed in Peirce's develop of
terminological subtlety seems to me to smack of intellectual laziness.
If Jon can hold in memory many of Peirce's semeiotic grammatical
distinctions and their relations to each other (something which I
certainly struggle to do), well all the more power to him. And let us
not forget that semeiotic grammar is the first of the three branches
of logic as semeiotic which Peirce posits and develops. 
 Your seeming rush to 'application' is, as I now see it,  based on
your hubristic (there's no more accurate term for it) estimation that
you already grasp what's important in Peirce's philosophy, indeed,
that you have come to 'determine' what it *is*, something which you
accuse others of doing even while they -- Jon in this case -- much
more modestly pursue abductions which their research has brought them
to: no more. This is nothing short of hypocritical and, so, from the
standpoint of the ethics of science,  repugnant. 
 I might note as a sign of Jon's work being seen as of growing
interest and value to the Peirce community more generally than you
and Edwina see it, that a paper of his is scheduled to appear in an
upcoming edition of Transactions, the premiere journal of Peircean
scholarship. And it is my prediction that Jon's work in semeiotic and
metaphysics (to mention just two areas of his interest) will grow in
importance within the Peirce community at large. You may not
understand and/or value it, but I and others do: it's just that
simple. 
 This is not to suggest that on-list and off-list that Jon and I have
agreed on everything. Far from 

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[gnox]

Edwina, sorry, I didn’t mean to imply that your attempts to block the road of 
inquiry (such as your “six principles”) have been successful.

However, if you don’t see the difference between inquiry and expressing a 
personal opinion, it would be futile for me to try to explain it here. Anyway I 
would only be paraphrasing what I (and Peirce and Susan Haack) said at 
http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/rlb.htm#attend.

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky  
Sent: 25-Apr-20 08:22
To: 'Peirce-L' ; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

 

Gary F - please tell me how I am 'blocking the way to inquiry'.

When I am critiqued by JAS when I use the phrase 'dynamic semiosis' because 
Peirce used the term 'dynamic' in a textual reference to the dyadic action of 
Secondness - that response is, in my view 'blocking the way to inquiry'. 

When I am critiqued by JAS that when I refer to Peircean thought WITHOUT using 
a textual reference - that such an analysis is just my personal opinion - then 
that response is, in my view, blocking the way to inquiry'.

 After all - it is absurd to consider that most of us - who have been studying 
Peirce for years - should not be allowed to discuss Peircean theories unless 
every statement is supported by a specific text!

When I refer to Peircean texts to support my interpretations [eg, of cosmology] 
and am instead told by JAS that 'this is early Peirce' and therefore not 
necessarily valid - I feel that this is 'blocking the way to inquiry'.

I think that providing the Peircean text does not also mean that one 
understands that text in the full depth of Peircean thought. Such a tactic can, 
in itself, 'block the way of inquiry' for it doesn't allow the researcher to 
examine how the MEANING can be used to examine realityand thus - can be 
moved into examining the biological and societal worlds.

Edwina



 

On Sat 25/04/20 8:00 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  sent:

Auke, list,

Since a remark of mine was misappropriated by Edwina recently as an excuse for 
yet another attack on Jon Alan Schmidt, I think I have a responsibility to 
support what our moderator has said about these attacks — and to ask Edwina and 
Jon S. kindly to stop blocking the path of inquiry. 

John Sowa in particular has made some valuable contributions to the list, but 
in the past year or so he’s contributed nothing new, turning instead to 
vociferous attacks on JAS and nonsensical claims about what Peirce would 
“cringe” at. I think the motivation for these attacks is laid bare in your own 
post (copied below): Jon’s ongoing inquiry into the development of Peirce’s 
speculative grammar has consistently relied on direct quotations from Peirce, 
many of which have never been posted to the list before. Apparently this is 
deeply resented by John and Edwina (and you too?) because these Peirce texts 
are difficult to reconcile with their preconceived notions of what Peirce was 
doing. It is those notions which constitute a “rigid box” in which they would 
like to confine Peircean scholarship — while forbidding other scholars such as 
Jon from paraphrasing Peirce, or even pointing out connections between one 
Peirce quote and another. If you don’t see the hypocrisy of this, you must have 
a girder in your own eye. 

As I said before, I don’t have a strong interest in Jon’s inquiry, except where 
his discoveries urge me to reconsider what I’ve previously written about 
Peircean semiotics in my book. Jon doesn’t have a strong interest in my book, 
either. But it’s obvious to me that his constantly evolving inquiry is an 
exemplary instance of Peircean scholarship and has provided the greater part of 
the original work that’s been posted to this list in the last year or two. The 
claim that he “ denies it to others to have their interpretation of Peirce's 
thought” is frankly absurd. His real crime, in the view of those others, is to 
build his systematic interpretation of Peirce’s speculative grammar on a broad 
foundation of texts by Peirce himself. If you disagree, say so and say why, but 
to attack him for posting it at all is nothing more or less than an attempt to 
block the road of inquiry. 

Gary f.

} Owing to general causes, logic always must be far behind the practice of 
leading minds. [Peirce, BD ’Method’] {

 <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ transition conversation

 

 

 

From: Auke van Breemen 
Sent: 25-Apr-20 05:32
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

 

Gary, List,

Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding 
possible?

For me the sliver pertains to John and the girder to JAS. 

 

It is JAS who on the one hand demands literal quotes (which belongs to text 
exegesis) but on the other avoids the meat (i.e. doing semiotics as a science). 

And on top of that for himself leaves room to divert: 

Again, it should go without saying for all my posts (includ

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary f., list,

I understand to have hit on a great devide between groups of listers. As far as 
JAS is concerned, I already indicated my objections, and I already indicated 
that I value it highly that he took the trouble to seriously read the 
unpublished pages. I seldom meet a person that, as I did, took the trouble.


I suggested already to look at this from a semiotical point of view:

Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding 
possible?

--

Curiously enough this example fits in nicely with the discussion about the 
total number of interpretants Peirce distinguished.  

1906|Letters to Lady Welby|EP 2:478

There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of 
the utterer; the EffectualInterpretant, which is a determination of the mind of 
the interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the 
Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of 
utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should 
take place. This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all that is, 
and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in 
order that the sign in question should fulfill its function.

---

Here we are in, what I call, the gamma part of semiotics. Demanding its own 
identification of differences between interpretants. This cannot simply be 
reduced to: immediate, normal and final interpretant.


Auke

> Op 25 april 2020 om 14:00 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> Auke, list,
> 
> Since a remark of mine was misappropriated by Edwina recently as an 
> excuse for yet another attack on Jon Alan Schmidt, I think I have a 
> responsibility to support what our moderator has said about these attacks — 
> and to ask Edwina and Jon S. kindly to stop blocking the path of inquiry.
> 
> John Sowa in particular has made some valuable contributions to the list, 
> but in the past year or so he’s contributed nothing new, turning instead to 
> vociferous attacks on JAS and nonsensical claims about what Peirce would 
> “cringe” at. I think the motivation for these attacks is laid bare in your 
> own post (copied below): Jon’s ongoing inquiry into the development of 
> Peirce’s speculative grammar has consistently relied on direct quotations 
> from Peirce, many of which have never been posted to the list before. 
> Apparently this is deeply resented by John and Edwina (and you too?) because 
> these Peirce texts are difficult to reconcile with their preconceived notions 
> of what Peirce was doing. It is those notions which constitute a “rigid box” 
> in which they would like to confine Peircean scholarship — while forbidding 
> other scholars such as Jon from paraphrasing Peirce, or even pointing out 
> connections between one Peirce quote and another. If you don’t see the 
> hypocrisy of this, you must have a girder in your own eye.
> 
> As I said before, I don’t have a strong interest in Jon’s inquiry, except 
> where his discoveries urge me to reconsider what I’ve previously written 
> about Peircean semiotics in my book. Jon doesn’t have a strong interest in my 
> book, either. But it’s obvious to me that his constantly evolving inquiry is 
> an exemplary instance of Peircean scholarship and has provided the greater 
> part of the original work that’s been posted to this list in the last year or 
> two. The claim that he “denies it to others to have their interpretation of 
> Peirce's thought” is frankly absurd. His real crime, in the view of those 
> others, is to build his systematic interpretation of Peirce’s speculative 
> grammar on a broad foundation of texts by Peirce himself. If you disagree, 
> say so and say why, but to attack him for posting it at all is nothing more 
> or less than an attempt to block the road of inquiry.
> 
> Gary f.
> 
> } Owing to general causes, logic always must be far behind the practice 
> of leading minds. [Peirce, BD ’Method’] {
> 
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ transition 
> conversation
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> From: Auke van Breemen 
> Sent: 25-Apr-20 05:32
> To: Peirce-L 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation
> 
>  
> 
> Gary, List,
> 
> Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding 
> possible?
> 
> For me the sliver pertains to John and the girder to JAS. 
> 
>  
> 
> It is JAS who on the one hand demands literal quotes (which belongs to 
> text exegesis) but on the other avoids the meat (i.e. doing semiotics as a 
> science).
> 
> And on top of that for himself leaves room to divert: 
> 
> Again, it should go without saying for all my posts (inc

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F - please tell me how I am 'blocking the way to inquiry'.

When I am critiqued by JAS when I use the phrase 'dynamic semiosis'
because Peirce used the term 'dynamic' in a textual reference to the
dyadic action of Secondness - that response is, in my view 'blocking
the way to inquiry'. 

When I am critiqued by JAS that when I refer to Peircean thought
WITHOUT using a textual reference - that such an analysis is just my
personal opinion - then that response is, in my view, blocking the
way to inquiry'.

 After all - it is absurd to consider that most of us - who have
been studying Peirce for years - should not be allowed to discuss
Peircean theories unless every statement is supported by a specific
text!

When I refer to Peircean texts to support my interpretations [eg, of
cosmology] and am instead told by JAS that 'this is early Peirce' and
therefore not necessarily valid - I feel that this is 'blocking the
way to inquiry'.

I think that providing the Peircean text does not also mean that one
understands that text in the full depth of Peircean thought. Such a
tactic can, in itself, 'block the way of inquiry' for it doesn't
allow the researcher to examine how the MEANING can be used to
examine realityand thus - can be moved into examining the
biological and societal worlds.

Edwina
 On Sat 25/04/20  8:00 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Auke, list,

Since a remark of mine was misappropriated by Edwina recently as an
excuse for yet another attack on Jon Alan Schmidt, I think I have a
responsibility to support what our moderator has said about these
attacks — and to ask Edwina and Jon S. kindly to stop blocking the
path of inquiry. 

John Sowa in particular has made some valuable contributions to the
list, but in the past year or so he’s contributed nothing new,
turning instead to vociferous attacks on JAS and nonsensical claims
about what Peirce would “cringe” at. I think the motivation for
these attacks is laid bare in your own post (copied below): Jon’s
ongoing inquiry into the development of Peirce’s speculative
grammar has consistently relied on direct quotations from Peirce,
many of which have never been posted to the list before. Apparently
this is deeply resented by John and Edwina (and you too?) because
these Peirce texts are difficult to reconcile with their preconceived
notions of what Peirce was doing. It is those notions which constitute
a “rigid box” in which they would like to confine Peircean
scholarship — while forbidding other scholars such as Jon from
paraphrasing Peirce, or even pointing out connections between one
Peirce quote and another. If you don’t see the hypocrisy of this,
you must have a girder in your own eye. 

As I said before, I don’t have a strong interest in Jon’s
inquiry, except where his discoveries urge me to reconsider what
I’ve previously written about Peircean semiotics in my book. Jon
doesn’t have a strong interest in my book, either. But it’s
obvious to me that his constantly evolving inquiry is an exemplary
instance of Peircean scholarship and has provided the greater part of
the original work that’s been posted to this list in the last year
or two. The claim that he “ denies it to others to have their
interpretation of Peirce's thought” is frankly absurd. His real
crime, in the view of those others, is to build his systematic
interpretation of Peirce’s speculative grammar on a broad
foundation of texts by Peirce himself. If you disagree, say so and
say why, but to attack him for posting it at all is nothing more or
less than an attempt to block the road of inquiry. 

Gary f.

} Owing to general causes, logic always must be far behind the
practice of leading minds. [Peirce, BD ’Method’] {

 http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ [1] }{ transition conversation
From: Auke van Breemen  
 Sent: 25-Apr-20 05:32
 To: Peirce-L 
 Subject:  Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation
Gary, List,

Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a
misunderstanding possible?

For me the sliver pertains to John and the girder to JAS. 
It is JAS who on the one hand demands literal quotes (which belongs
to text exegesis) but on the other avoids the meat (i.e. doing
semiotics as a science). 

And on top of that for himself leaves room to divert: 

Again, it should go without saying for all my posts (including this
one) that they are expressions of my personal opinions based on my
interpretations of his writings.

But denies it to others to have their interpretation of Peirce's
thought.
Auke

 Op 25 april 2020 om 4:35 schreef Gary Richmond : 

Auke, List, 
 Auke wrote: I got flabbergasted reading JAS response to John.
GR: Yes, seeing John's self-contradictions spelled out was pretty
astonishing, and revealing, to me as well. They've been pointed out
before; I've done so myself

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[gnox]

Auke, list,

Since a remark of mine was misappropriated by Edwina recently as an excuse for 
yet another attack on Jon Alan Schmidt, I think I have a responsibility to 
support what our moderator has said about these attacks — and to ask Edwina and 
Jon S. kindly to stop blocking the path of inquiry.

John Sowa in particular has made some valuable contributions to the list, but 
in the past year or so he’s contributed nothing new, turning instead to 
vociferous attacks on JAS and nonsensical claims about what Peirce would 
“cringe” at. I think the motivation for these attacks is laid bare in your own 
post (copied below): Jon’s ongoing inquiry into the development of Peirce’s 
speculative grammar has consistently relied on direct quotations from Peirce, 
many of which have never been posted to the list before. Apparently this is 
deeply resented by John and Edwina (and you too?) because these Peirce texts 
are difficult to reconcile with their preconceived notions of what Peirce was 
doing. It is those notions which constitute a “rigid box” in which they would 
like to confine Peircean scholarship — while forbidding other scholars such as 
Jon from paraphrasing Peirce, or even pointing out connections between one 
Peirce quote and another. If you don’t see the hypocrisy of this, you must have 
a girder in your own eye.

As I said before, I don’t have a strong interest in Jon’s inquiry, except where 
his discoveries urge me to reconsider what I’ve previously written about 
Peircean semiotics in my book. Jon doesn’t have a strong interest in my book, 
either. But it’s obvious to me that his constantly evolving inquiry is an 
exemplary instance of Peircean scholarship and has provided the greater part of 
the original work that’s been posted to this list in the last year or two. The 
claim that he “denies it to others to have their interpretation of Peirce's 
thought” is frankly absurd. His real crime, in the view of those others, is to 
build his systematic interpretation of Peirce’s speculative grammar on a broad 
foundation of texts by Peirce himself. If you disagree, say so and say why, but 
to attack him for posting it at all is nothing more or less than an attempt to 
block the road of inquiry.

Gary f.

} Owing to general causes, logic always must be far behind the practice of 
leading minds. [Peirce, BD ’Method’] {

 <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ transition conversation

 

 

 

From: Auke van Breemen  
Sent: 25-Apr-20 05:32
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

 

Gary, List,

Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding 
possible?

For me the sliver pertains to John and the girder to JAS. 

 

It is JAS who on the one hand demands literal quotes (which belongs to text 
exegesis) but on the other avoids the meat (i.e. doing semiotics as a science).

And on top of that for himself leaves room to divert: 

Again, it should go without saying for all my posts (including this one) that 
they are expressions of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of his 
writings.

But denies it to others to have their interpretation of Peirce's thought.

 

Auke

Op 25 april 2020 om 4:35 schreef Gary Richmond mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> >: 

Auke, List, 

 

Auke wrote: I got flabbergasted reading JAS response to John.

 

GR: Yes, seeing John's self-contradictions spelled out was pretty astonishing, 
and revealing, to me as well. They've been pointed out before; I've done so 
myself on-list and off-list, apparently to no avail.

 

Auke: It proves possible to tenaciously stick to the authoritarian method in 
order to uphold one's own a priori principles. But only at the price of 
disregarding or disqualifying a lot of what has been written by the authority.

 

GR: Indeed, John has certainly demonstrated this the last couple of years. It 
always surprises -- nay, shocks -- me. The double standard is patent.

 

Auke: As my mother used to say: One sees the sliver in the eye of the other, 
but not the girder in ones own eye.

 

GR: My mother used to say this too. It was, of course, Jesus who first said it 
(see: Matthew 7:3-5; Luke 6:42). It's certainly apt here. Luke's version:

 

Either how canst thou say to thy brother, Brother, let me pull out the mote 
that is in thine eye, when thou thyself beholdest not the beam that is in thine 
own eye? Thou hypocrite, cast out first the beam out of thine own eye, and then 
shalt thou see clearly to pull out the mote that is in thy brother's eye. 

 

Auke: That's the moment dialogue gets a nasty taste.

 

GR: I agree that such obvious hypocrisy is a nasty practice. As list moderator, 
I'm writing this to hopefully nip it in the bud. We've been through this sort 
thing here before and even rather recently (last year). This kind of 
double-standard is truly appalling and, as I've argued herel, completely 
counter to forum culture. 

 

Best,

 

Gary Richmond (writing as li

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary, List,

Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding 
possible?

For me the sliver pertains to John and the girder to JAS. 


It is JAS who on the one hand demands literal quotes (which belongs to text 
exegesis) but on the other avoids the meat (i.e. doing semiotics as a science).

And on top of that for himself leaves room to divert: 

Again, it should go without saying for all my posts (including this one) that 
they are expressions of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of his 
writings.

But denies it to others to have their interpretation of Peirce's thought.


Auke

> Op 25 april 2020 om 4:35 schreef Gary Richmond :
> 
> Auke, List,
> 
> Auke wrote: I got flabbergasted reading JAS response to John.
> 
> GR: Yes, seeing John's self-contradictions spelled out was pretty 
> astonishing, and revealing, to me as well. They've been pointed out before; 
> I've done so myself on-list and off-list, apparently to no avail.
> 
> Auke: It proves possible to tenaciously stick to the authoritarian method 
> in order to uphold one's own a priori principles. But only at the price of 
> disregarding or disqualifying a lot of what has been written by the authority.
> 
> GR: Indeed, John has certainly demonstrated this the last couple of 
> years. It always surprises -- nay, shocks -- me. The double standard is 
> patent.
> 
> Auke: As my mother used to say: One sees the sliver in the eye of the 
> other, but not the girder in ones own eye.
> 
> GR: My mother used to say this too. It was, of course, Jesus who first 
> said it (see: Matthew 7:3-5; Luke 6:42). It's certainly apt here. Luke's 
> version:
> 
> > > 
> > Either how canst thou say to thy brother, Brother, let me pull out 
> > the mote that is in thine eye, when thou thyself beholdest not the beam 
> > that is in thine own eye? Thou hypocrite, cast out first the beam out of 
> > thine own eye, and then shalt thou see clearly to pull out the mote that is 
> > in thy brother's eye.
> > 
> > > 
> Auke: That's the moment dialogue gets a nasty taste.
> 
> GR: I agree that such obvious hypocrisy is a nasty practice. As list 
> moderator, I'm writing this to hopefully nip it in the bud. We've been 
> through this sort thing here before and even rather recently (last year). 
> This kind of double-standard is truly appalling and, as I've argued herel, 
> completely counter to forum culture. 
> 
> Best,
> 
> Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)
> 
> 
> 
> "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox
> 
> 
> 
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>  
> http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email_source=link_campaign=sig-email_content=webmail
> Virus-free. www.avg.com 
> http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email_source=link_campaign=sig-email_content=webmail
> 
> On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 4:53 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > 
> > List,
> > 
> > I got flabbergasted reading JAS response to John.
> > 
> > 
> > It proves possible to tenaciously stick to the authoritarian method 
> > in order to uphold one's own a priori principles.
> > 
> > But only at the price of disregarding or disqualifying a lot of 
> > what has been written by the authority.
> > 
> > 
> > As my mother used to say: One sees the sliver in the eye of the 
> > other, but not the girder in ones own eye.
> > 
> > That's the moment dialogue gets a nasty taste.
> > 
> > 
> > Regards,
> > 
> > Auke 
> > 
> > > 
>  
> http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email_source=link_campaign=sig-email_content=webmail
> Virus-free. www.avg.com 
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> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[Gary Richmond]

John, List,

I so thoroughly disagree with you that at this point there's not *much*
more to be said. Your arguments *contra* Jon Alan Schmidt have been
consistently methodological, not at all substantive. And as far as I can
see, you have conclusively shown yourself to have a double standard in that
regard. It would indeed be easy to cite many, many examples of this
hypocritical double standard and, indeed, many have been cited on this
list. I would certainly not be loathe to rehearse some of them if need be.

More to the point, there are those scholars who rather completely disagree
with your and Edwina's (mis)characterization of Jon's work. One need only
look over the last couple of decades of articles published in *Transactions
of the Charles S. Peirce Society* to see that some (but hardly all, since
his philosophical interests are rather far-ranging) of Jon's work falls
into a category of Peirce scholarship, *semeiotic grammar*, which you and
Edwina seem to oppose almost in principle, but which is seen by many Peirce
scholars -- and to this day -- as essential, even quintessential, in the
understanding of what Peirce's philosophy involves, the changes in his
terminology often being expressions of the conceptual growth -- or fine
turning -- of important, even crucial philosophical concepts; and not only
in his logic as semeiotic, but also in his phenomenology and metaphysics.
To ignore such conceptual development expressed in Peirce's develop of
terminological subtlety seems to me to smack of intellectual laziness. If
Jon can hold in memory many of Peirce's semeiotic grammatical distinctions
and their relations to each other (something which I certainly struggle to
do), well all the more power to him. And let us not forget that semeiotic
grammar is the first of the three branches of logic as semeiotic which
Peirce posits and develops.

Your seeming rush to 'application' is, as I now see it,  based on your
hubristic (there's no more accurate term for it) estimation that you
*already* grasp what's important in Peirce's philosophy, indeed, that you
have come to 'determine' *what* *it* *is*, something which you accuse
*others* of doing even while they -- Jon in this case -- much more modestly
pursue abductions which their research has brought them to: no more. This
is nothing short of hypocritical and, so, from the standpoint of the ethics
of science,  repugnant.

I might note as a sign of Jon's work being seen as of growing interest and
value to the Peirce community more generally than you and Edwina see it,
that a paper of his is scheduled to appear in an upcoming edition of
*Transactions*, the premiere journal of Peircean scholarship. And it is my
prediction that Jon's work in semeiotic and metaphysics (to mention just
two areas of his interest) will grow in importance within the Peirce
community at large. You may not understand and/or value it, but I and
others do: it's just that simple.

This is not to suggest that on-list and off-list that Jon and I have agreed
on everything. Far from it. Indeed, in our off-list discussions (with Gary
Fuhrman) on Peirce's conception of Time, both Gary and I have sometimes
very much disagreed with Jon as to the character and importance of
phenomenology vs the mathematics and logic of time. But I have *never*
found him to be anything but receptive to deeply considering arguments
which we have presented to him. Of course he puts forth his own strong
arguments and strongly defend the -- until he is convinced of another's
argumentation. Yet in papers on Peirce's conception of time which he has
been developing, it is clear that he *has* significantly modified his views
as he came to seen the value of Gary and my phenomenological perspectives
(which, by the way, are quite different from each other's). In short, he is
not a rigid theoretical dogmatist. Far from it. I'd say, the opposite of
it. He is certainly significantly more humble than any of his critics on
this list despite their arguments to the contrary.

In conclusion, I think it would behoove you -- at least in this forum -- to
work to develop you own semeiotic rather than continuing to attempt to
denigrate Jon's, an attempt which if persisted in I am certain will fail.
And to offer yet another prediction, I do not think that future scholars
will look at such denigration of another scholar's work favorably.

Best,

Gary R


"Time is not a renewable resource." gnox

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*








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On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 12:06 AM John F. Sowa  wrote:

> Gary,
>
> As I said before, I believe that JAS has been trying to force Peirce's
> writings into a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[John F. Sowa]

Gary,
As I said before, I believe that JAS has been trying to
force Peirce's writings into a rigid box.  Peirce repeatedly said that his
ideas were constantly growing.  In fact, that is why he was unable to
finish his many book projects:  as he starts writing, he gets so many new
ideas that earlier chapters need to be rewritten.  When he does that, he
needs to rewrite the later ones.  That leads to an endless cycle of
revisions.
But Jon's project is  static.  It's impossible for any
static project to capture the open-ended growth of Peirce's
ideas.
GR>  seeing John's self-contradictions spelled out was
pretty astonishing, and revealing, to me as well. They've been pointed out
before; I've done so myself on-list and off-list, apparently to no
avail.
No!  When anybody points out a mistake that I made, I
immediately correct it.
But neither you nor JAS has ever found a
self-contradiction in anything I
 wrote.  There are some points where you disagreed with my
interpretation of what Peirce wrote.  The issues are rather subtle, and
 I've been busy with other writings.  When they're published, I'll show
how they explain the issues that Peirce was addressing.
As for that
off-list note, I did not respond because the note was so hopelessly wrong
that there was no point in saying anything.
As for my reasons for
supporting the comments by Edwina, Auke, and others, the reasons are
simple:  they have a more open-ended attitude that is closer in spirit to
what Peirce was writing,   Even when I have some quibbles about what they
write, they are more willing to discuss the issues and evaluate the
alternatives.
I find their manner of discussion a breath of fresh
air in comparison to Jon's rigid box.  I have often pointed out some
serious misinterpretations that Jon made.   But he never admits any
alternative.
John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

[Gary Richmond]

Auke, List,

Auke wrote: I got flabbergasted reading JAS response to John.

GR: Yes, seeing John's self-contradictions spelled out was pretty
astonishing, and revealing, to me as well. They've been pointed out before;
I've done so myself on-list and off-list, apparently to no avail.

Auke: It proves possible to tenaciously stick to the authoritarian method
in order to uphold one's own a priori principles. But only at the price of
disregarding or disqualifying a lot of what has been written by the
authority.

GR: Indeed, John has certainly demonstrated this the last couple of years.
It always surprises -- nay, shocks -- me. The double standard is patent.

Auke: As my mother used to say: One sees the sliver in the eye of the
other, but not the girder in ones own eye.

GR: My mother used to say this too. It was, of course, Jesus who first said
it (see: Matthew 7:3-5; Luke 6:42). It's certainly apt here. Luke's version:


Either how canst thou say to thy brother, Brother, let me pull out the mote
that is in thine eye, when thou thyself beholdest not the beam that is in
thine own eye? Thou hypocrite, cast out first the beam out of thine own
eye, and then shalt thou see clearly to pull out the mote that is in thy
brother's eye.


Auke: That's the moment dialogue gets a nasty taste.

GR: I agree that such obvious hypocrisy is a nasty practice. As list
moderator, I'm writing this to hopefully nip it in the bud. We've been
through this sort thing here before and even rather recently
(last year). This kind of double-standard is truly appalling and, as I've
argued herel, completely counter to forum culture.

Best,

Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)

"Time is not a renewable resource." gnox

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*








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On Fri, Apr 24, 2020 at 4:53 AM  wrote:

>
> List,
>
> I got flabbergasted reading JAS response to John.
>
>
> It proves possible to tenaciously stick to the authoritarian method in
> order to uphold one's own a priori principles.
>
> But only at the price of disregarding or disqualifying a lot of what has
> been written by the authority.
>
>
> As my mother used to say: One sees the sliver in the eye of the other, but
> not the girder in ones own eye.
>
> That's the moment dialogue gets a nasty taste.
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Auke
>


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