Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831
Thanks a million, Matt. I've made the corrections and mentioned you. (I had already made one of the corrections, but computers often show the viewer the cache instead of the recentest live version.) Usually I continue proofing for a while after I post something, but this time I did only a little bit. http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm http://www.iupui.edu/%7Earisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm List, to clear the cache, click on reload or press Enter while the cursor is still in the address field. - Best, Ben On 8/4/2015 10:51 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: Thanks Ben, for telling us about this and transcribing it! I noticed a few typos. Pg. 6: replace [X] with C. 1. Any member of Section A not belonging to Section B may read a paper if he has paid his subscription, but otherwise not. And the same applies to every member of Section B not belonging to Section *[X]*, and to every member of Section C not belonging to Section A. Pg. 9, replace all with call: Supposing such a machine to be constructed, ought we, or ought we not, to *all* it a reasoning-machine? Pg. 16, you put two a's before 'coffin': In like manner, we may picture to ourselves a number of men each in *a a* coffin to signify that he is mortal, one of the number being labelled Aquinaldo. Pg. 24, fist should be first, and cases should be case: Even effects of color contrast, which deceive one at *fist* so absolutely, become much weakened, in time. In this *cases*, we... Pg. 26, change read to red, whem to when, add to. one deep *read* and the other appearing quite white *whem* seen by itself, the two being brought *to* the same degree of apparent luminosity. The observer looks... Matt On 7/22/15 8:32 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: List, Harvard has placed more Peirce manuscript images online. They keep changing the URL for the list of Peirce MS images online, and now one has to search at Harvard's Oasis instead of Harvard's Hollis. I'll need to update the info at Arisbe. Anyway, for the current list of Harvard's online images of Peirce's manuscripts, go (or try to go) to http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/deepLinkDigital?_collection=oasisinoid=nullhistno=nulluniqueId=hou02614 One of the manuscripts newly available is MS 831. I've mentioned MS 831 a number of times, based on the Robin Catalog's description of it: 831. [Reasoning and Instinct] A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 2–29, incomplete. The fine gradations between subconscious or instinctive mind and conscious, controlled reason. Logical machines are not strictly reasoning machines because they lack the ability of self-criticism and the ability to correct defects which may crop up. Three kinds of reasoning: inductive, deductive, hypothetical. Quasi-inferences. I've transcribed and posted MS 831 at http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm Best, Ben -- Matt - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831
Thanks Ben, for telling us about this and transcribing it! I noticed a few typos. Pg. 6: replace [X] with C. 1. Any member of Section A not belonging to Section B may read a paper if he has paid his subscription, but otherwise not. And the same applies to every member of Section B not belonging to Section *[X]*, and to every member of Section C not belonging to Section A. Pg. 9, replace all with call: Supposing such a machine to be constructed, ought we, or ought we not, to *all* it a reasoning-machine? Pg. 16, you put two a's before 'coffin': In like manner, we may picture to ourselves a number of men each in *a a* coffin to signify that he is mortal, one of the number being labelled Aquinaldo. Pg. 24, fist should be first, and cases should be case: Even effects of color contrast, which deceive one at *fist* so absolutely, become much weakened, in time. In this *cases*, we... Pg. 26, change read to red, whem to when, add to. one deep *read* and the other appearing quite white *whem* seen by itself, the two being brought *to* the same degree of apparent luminosity. The observer looks... Matt On 7/22/15 8:32 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: List, Harvard has placed more Peirce manuscript images online. They keep changing the URL for the list of Peirce MS images online, and now one has to search at Harvard's Oasis instead of Harvard's Hollis. I'll need to update the info at Arisbe. Anyway, for the current list of Harvard's online images of Peirce's manuscripts, go (or try to go) to http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/deepLinkDigital?_collection=oasisinoid=nullhistno=nulluniqueId=hou02614 One of the manuscripts newly available is MS 831. I've mentioned MS 831 a number of times, based on the Robin Catalog's description of it: 831. [Reasoning and Instinct] A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 2–29, incomplete. The fine gradations between subconscious or instinctive mind and conscious, controlled reason. Logical machines are not strictly reasoning machines because they lack the ability of self-criticism and the ability to correct defects which may crop up. Three kinds of reasoning: inductive, deductive, hypothetical. Quasi-inferences. I've transcribed and posted MS 831 at http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm Best, Ben -- Matt - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831.. Difference between Logic and Reasoning
Ben, List: On Jul 26, 2015, at 9:29 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: Jerry, you're simply using the word 'individual' in another way than Peirce does. When Peirce uses the word 'individual' he generally means something such as this horse (Bucephalus), that building (the Empire State Building), yonder tree (located on 7th St. in Manhattan), etc. In Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined (starting on p. 289 in EP 2, also appearing in CP 2.233-72) Peirce introduces his 10-class system made out of three trichotomies of signs; he recapitulates it in a 1904 letter to Lady Welby in CP 8.327-41. In that system, any individual serving as a sign is a sinsign; also in that system, all symbols are legisigns, none are sinsigns, i.e., no symbols are individuals. He's explicit about it. Peirce also discusses there and elsewhere how the same sign can incorporate icons, indices, symbols. You see a chemical analogy with Peirce's sign classifications, but if the analogy puts you at odds with what Peirce said in plain English, then your analogy isn't quite working. Trying to get me to be less rigid in my interpretation of Peirce won't help your analogy if I'm correct about Peirce. Anyway, Peirce may have been inspired by some chemical analogies, and his meditations on complex chemical structures surely helped him think more skillfully about other complex structures, but he was quite explicit about not basing philosophical semiotic (or any other kind of cenoscopy) _logically_ on any idioscopic principles or theories (such as physics or chemistry). Ben, I find your thinking to be utterly confused. You are not distinguishing between a sin-sign, as a specific object with predicates (such as indices) from the broad generalities of the broad concepts used to classify related terms. Your attempt, several months ago, to use set theory to analyze CSP texts shows, to me at least, such a rigid and and not pragmatic perspective. In my opinion, CSP logic is remote from the propositions of set theory. The trichotomy itself, not the extension to classes of signs, is composed of nine interrelated semantic and rhetorical terms. The entelechy, the goal, the purpose of the trichotomy was to express a consistent form of argument, not to classify or categorize. The magnitude of this categorical error is for you to decide. CSP's form of argument (in the trichotomy) was not derived from either De Morgan nor Boole. But it was, never-the-less, a consistent, complete and decidable (in the sense of Hilbert) form of argument, or at least, that is CSP's assertion. This is expressed very directly and with logical import in his development of his view of graphs as contrasted with sets. It is also expressed with his rejection of the Kempe approach to spots and relations. One must note that 5 of the nine terms were created by CSP! That is, he was creating a language for argumentation that he designed to be coherent with the rhetoric of scientific logic with the complete absence of direct reference to mathematics. This fact is amazing. How does one account for this? Set theory and NP of FS ignore CSP's basic concern with the scientific argumentation style that the trichotomy develops. One must further note that all the terms must contain information about the sin-sign otherwise the trichotomy would not work as a rhetoric system of thought. One must further note that this rhetorical scheme follows CSP's view that information is implication (1860's). That is, each of the rhetorical terms must contribute to the argument. Modal logic? I didn't mention species, but since you bring it up: The word 'species' in Peirce's time was taken to refer to a _kind_ as opposed to a total population of that kind. There is a relatively recent shift of meaning, as John Collier has pointed out, by some biologists to refer by the word 'species' not just to the species as a kind but to the species' total population during the course of the species' existence - that total population as a somewhat scattered and long-existent collective individual - sort of like an individual swarm or flock, etc., but with much more dispersion, longevity, and turnover in membership. In that sense, the sense of a concrete individual (soever scattered, etc.), a species is an individual even in Peirce's sense. Is that your sense of 'biological species'? Meanwhile, I look up 'chemical species' and find that definitions vary on whether it is an _ensemble_ of identical atoms or identical molecules or identical ions etc. under observation, or whether it is simply the unique _kind_ to which the identical atoms or identical molecules, etc. belong. An individual ensemble is a collective individual, as far as I can tell. But if 'chemical species' just means the kind to which identical atoms (or the like) belong, then it is not an individual in
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831
Ben, Jerry, lists, Ben: . . . . . When Peirce uses the word 'individual' he generally means something such as this horse (Bucephalus), that building (the Empire State Building), yonder tree (located on 7th St. in Manhattan), etc. In Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined (starting on p. 289 in EP 2, also appearing in CP 2.233-72) Peirce introduces his 10-class system made out of three trichotomies of signs; he recapitulates it in a 1904 letter to Lady Welby in CP 8.327-41. In that system, any individual serving as a sign is a sinsign; also in that system, all symbols(072615-1) are legisigns, none are sinsigns, i.e., no symbols are individuals. . . . Sung: I know that the 10 classes of signs Peirce defined based on the 9 types of signs (or sign relations) do not admit of any symbolic sinsign and all symbols are legisigns, i.e., only symbolic legisigns are allowed, as Ben mentioned. I have one question. In 1998, Lu et al. [1] were able to isolate a single molecule of the enzyme called cytochrome oxidase and measured its enzymic activity, for the first time, as a function of time. Why can't we consider this enzyme molecule that Lu et al. studied as an INDIVIDUAL and its name cytochrome oxidase as a SYMBOL ? In other words, what would be wrong to consider cytochrome oxidase as a symbol standing for the actual enzyme molecule (i.e., a sinsign) rather than a natural law (i.e., legisign) ? If we can divide sign processes into two categories --- MICROSEMIOTICS (i.e., the study of molecular signs such as DNA) and MACROSEMIOTICS (i.e., the study of macroscopic signs such as Peircean writings) --- depending on the physical size of the representamens invovled (e.g., moleucules in the former and printed words in the latter) [2-6], I wonder if not all the assertions that Peirce made based primarily on macrosemiotics apply to microsemiotics, just as not all the assertions valid in macrophysics (e.g., Newtonian mechanics, thermodynamics) are found to be valid in microphysics (e.g., quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics). If this analysis is right, the interesting debate that is on going between Ben and Jerry may be akin to the debates in the last century between classical physicists and quantum physicists. All the best.s Sung References: [1] Lu, H. P., Xun, L. and Xie, X. S. (1998). Single-Molecule Enzymatic Dynamics. *Science* *282*:1877-1882. [2] Ji, S. (1997). Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: Molecular Biological, Bioinformatic and Linguistic Implications. *BioSystems* *44*:17-39. [3] Ji, S. (1999). The Linguistics of DNA: Words, Sentences, Grammar, Phonetics, and Semantics.* Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci*. *870*:411-417. [4] Ji, S. (2001). Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: Micro- and Macrosemiotics. In: *Semiotics 2000: “Sebeok’s Century”* (S. Simpkins and J. Deely, eds.), Legas,Ottawa. Pp. 354-374. [5] Ji, S. (2001). Isomorphism between Cell and Human Languages: Micro- and Macrosemiotics. In: Semiotics 2000: “Sebeok’s Century” (Simpkins, S., and Deely, J., eds.), Legas, New York. Pp. 357-373. [6] Ji, S. (2002). Microsemiotics of DNA. *Semiotica* 138 (1/4): 15-42. (The PDF files of References 2 through 6 are available at http://www.conformon.net under Publications Proceedings Abstracts or Refereed Journal Articles.) On Sun, Jul 26, 2015 at 10:29 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Jerry, you're simply using the word 'individual' in another way than Peirce does. When Peirce uses the word 'individual' he generally means something such as this horse (Bucephalus), that building (the Empire State Building), yonder tree (located on 7th St. in Manhattan), etc. In Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined (starting on p. 289 in EP 2, also appearing in CP 2.233-72) Peirce introduces his 10-class system made out of three trichotomies of signs; he recapitulates it in a 1904 letter to Lady Welby in CP 8.327-41. In that system, any individual serving as a sign is a sinsign; also in that system, all symbols are legisigns, none are sinsigns, i.e., no symbols are individuals. He's explicit about it. Peirce also discusses there and elsewhere how the same sign can incorporate icons, indices, symbols. You see a chemical analogy with Peirce's sign classifications, but if the analogy puts you at odds with what Peirce said in plain English, then your analogy isn't quite working. Trying to get me to be less rigid in my interpretation of Peirce won't help your analogy if I'm correct about Peirce. Anyway, Peirce may have been inspired by some chemical analogies, and his meditations on complex chemical structures surely helped him think more skillfully about other complex structures, but he was quite explicit about not basing philosophical semiotic (or any other kind of cenoscopy) _ *logically*_ on any idioscopic principles or theories (such as physics
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831
Jerry, you're simply using the word 'individual' in another way than Peirce does. When Peirce uses the word 'individual' he generally means something such as this horse (Bucephalus), that building (the Empire State Building), yonder tree (located on 7th St. in Manhattan), etc. In Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined (starting on p. 289 in EP 2, also appearing in CP 2.233-72) Peirce introduces his 10-class system made out of three trichotomies of signs; he recapitulates it in a 1904 letter to Lady Welby in CP 8.327-41. In that system, any individual serving as a sign is a sinsign; also in that system, all symbols are legisigns, none are sinsigns, i.e., no symbols are individuals. He's explicit about it. Peirce also discusses there and elsewhere how the same sign can incorporate icons, indices, symbols. You see a chemical analogy with Peirce's sign classifications, but if the analogy puts you at odds with what Peirce said in plain English, then your analogy isn't quite working. Trying to get me to be less rigid in my interpretation of Peirce won't help your analogy if I'm correct about Peirce. Anyway, Peirce may have been inspired by some chemical analogies, and his meditations on complex chemical structures surely helped him think more skillfully about other complex structures, but he was quite explicit about not basing philosophical semiotic (or any other kind of cenoscopy) _/logically/_ on any idioscopic principles or theories (such as physics or chemistry). I didn't mention species, but since you bring it up: The word 'species' in Peirce's time was taken to refer to a _/kind/_ as opposed to a total population of that kind. There is a relatively recent shift of meaning, as John Collier has pointed out, by some biologists to refer by the word 'species' not just to the species as a kind but to the species' total population during the course of the species' existence - that total population as a somewhat scattered and long-existent collective individual - sort of like an individual swarm or flock, etc., but with much more dispersion, longevity, and turnover in membership. In that sense, the sense of a concrete individual (soever scattered, etc.), a species is an individual even in Peirce's sense. Is that your sense of 'biological species'? Meanwhile, I look up 'chemical species' and find that definitions vary on whether it is an _/ensemble/_ of identical atoms or identical molecules or identical ions etc. under observation, or whether it is simply the unique _/kind/_ to which the identical atoms or identical molecules, etc. belong. An individual ensemble is a collective individual, as far as I can tell. But if 'chemical species' just means the kind to which identical atoms (or the like) belong, then it is not an individual in Peirce's sense, except in an abstract universe of discourse with abstract singulars. Now, we often talk that way, speaking of 'individual kinds' and so on. I suspect that that's what you mean by 'individual species' both in biology and in chemistry - you mean a (taxically more-or-less bottom-rung) _/kind/_. Or maybe you do mean this or that individual ensemble. In any case I really don't think that by 'chemical species' you mean, for example, the total population of O_2 molecules as a single concrete collective (though dispersed) object throughout space and time. Anyway in Peirce the main sense of 'individual' is not that in the phrase 'individual kind'. You have not clarified your sense of the word 'individual'. In calling an atomic symbol 'individual', do you mean (A) an individual instance of the symbol, a symbolic expression appearing on a certain page of a certain copy of a certain book? Or do you mean (B) that atomic symbol in general, across all its instances in a given language or (C) that atomic symbol in general, across all its instances in all languages and thought? (B) and (C), in Peirce's system, are legisigns, i.e., generals serving as signs. If you mean (B) or (C), then you're simply using the word 'individual' in another way than Peirce does. Best, Ben On 7/24/2015 4:17 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:Ben, List: Although we discussed aspects of this question before, fresh citations may shed a different hue on the meaning of the CSP's usage in various contexts. Frankly, I think that your reading of the meaning of the term symbol is to rigid. First, CSP's trichotomy separates the concept of a sign (qualisign, sinsign and legisign) sharply and distinctly from the concept of symbol (and its association of symbol, index and icon) as the identities associated with and related to the first row terms. If my recall is correct he asserts that the terms (icon, index and symbol) contains parts of one another. (This is consistent with chemical units where all three are used in representation and all three are representations are products of the human mind from
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831
Ben, List: Although we discussed aspects of this question before, fresh citations may shed a different hue on the meaning of the CSP's usage in various contexts. Frankly, I think that your reading of the meaning of the term symbol is to rigid. First, CSP's trichotomy separates the concept of a sign (qualisign, sinsign and legisign) sharply and distinctly from the concept of symbol (and its association of symbol, index and icon) as the identities associated with and related to the first row terms. If my recall is correct he asserts that the terms (icon, index and symbol) contains parts of one another. (This is consistent with chemical units where all three are used in representation and all three are representations are products of the human mind from analysis of data and historical precedence. In this sense, the formulations of arguments (rhema, dicisign, arguments, that is logically meaningful terms) necessary draws on the immediacy of (icon, index, symbol) meanings to formulate the arguments, general or not. In Natural Propositions, FS cites the book of Mark Greaves, the Philosophical Status of Diagrams, (from the Stanford group). This book compares CSP's logical diagrams with various other forms - Aristotle, the Square, Venn, and so forth. This book is an historical perspective that compares logics and diagrams. An extra-ordinary book to be sure! Are symbols used in diagrams? Are symbols used in graphs? Are symbols used in calculations? CSP writes wrt 'beta' graphs, It reasonings generally turn upon the properties of individual objects to one another. 4.510-4.511, (Greaves, p. 167 ) When looking at the trichotomy as a whole, I believe that you are seeking to outlaw the intertwining and interlacing of meanings of terms, under the guise of independence. For example, Nevertheless, a symbol that incorporates an index (supplied by one's mind or more physically) makes a sign that can represent an individual action as an instance of a practice, a form of conduct, a norm, a general. makes no sense to me. The atomic symbols incorporate indices (physically measurable attributes. And they are NOT generals. More generally speaking, to the extent that an individual is an instance of a general, it is the individual that represents the general, not vice versa, Peirce's idea here being that generals, norms, etc., govern, more-or-less determine, individuals, not vice versa (or not significantly vice versa); and objects influence, more-or-less determine, signs to represent them, not vice versa, so the individuals take the sign role, the generals the object role, in such cases. Again, I find this gloss to be meaningless. In the natural sciences, a species is a species is a species. The concept of a individual (species) is fundamental to the logic of biology and medicine as well as chemistry. It is necessary for logic. The sentence seems to me to be an ad hoc mixture of concepts of set theory, mathematical independence, and shapeless philosophical usages. In the pragmatic world, a symbol may represent you as your name, Ben, or a collection (your family). Grammatically, this is merely a case of single or plural with respect individuals. What philosophical point is gained by invoking this sort of sentence? For closure, I return to my opening remark, your gloss here is to rigid for my simple mind. Cheers Jerry On Jul 23, 2015, at 11:52 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: Hi, Jerry, You're welcome again. Now, in Peirce's view, symbols not only are generals but also do not, of themselves, symbolize anything but generals, so that excludes individual actions from being symbolized. Nevertheless, a symbol that incorporates an index (supplied by one's mind or more physically) makes a sign that can represent an individual action as an instance of a practice, a form of conduct, a norm, a general. More generally speaking, to the extent that an individual is an instance of a general, it is the individual that represents the general, not vice versa, Peirce's idea here being that generals, norms, etc., govern, more-or-less determine, individuals, not vice versa (or not significantly vice versa); and objects influence, more-or-less determine, signs to represent them, not vice versa, so the individuals take the sign role, the generals the object role, in such cases. (I give an example in an appendix to this message.) A symbol is itself individually instanced, in Peirce's system, not by a concrete individual symbol, which doesn't exist in Peirce's system, but instead by a kind of indexical sinsign that points to one's experience of the symbolized object. But is the question you're asking something more like: Are there unconscious, instinctual, merely animal-level symbols? In Peirce's system, they're certainly allowed, since a symbol is a sign that represents by norm or disposition of interpretation regardless of
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831
Ben: Thanks for your work in posting this work. A minor technical question: It is apparently the case that some pages contain only a few words. Is there any apparent reason for this? Is the date of the writing known to you? Cheers jerry On Jul 22, 2015, at 7:32 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: List, Harvard has placed more Peirce manuscript images online. They keep changing the URL for the list of Peirce MS images online, and now one has to search at Harvard's Oasis instead of Harvard's Hollis. I'll need to update the info at Arisbe. Anyway, for the current list of Harvard's online images of Peirce's manuscripts, go (or try to go) to http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/deepLinkDigital?_collection=oasisinoid=nullhistno=nulluniqueId=hou02614 One of the manuscripts newly available is MS 831. I've mentioned MS 831 a number of times, based on the Robin Catalog's description of it: 831. [Reasoning and Instinct] A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 2–29, incomplete. The fine gradations between subconscious or instinctive mind and conscious, controlled reason. Logical machines are not strictly reasoning machines because they lack the ability of self-criticism and the ability to correct defects which may crop up. Three kinds of reasoning: inductive, deductive, hypothetical. Quasi-inferences. I've transcribed and posted MS 831 at http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm Best, Ben - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831
Thanks again, Ben. (Where would this list serve be without you?) After reading this again, it became obvious to me (I am a slow learner) that the underlying issue here is the origin of symbolization with respect to biological / human actions. Ben, do you suppose that instinctual actions (such as those that are directly comparable to animal behavior, such as fight or flight, or feeding,) are not symbolized? The quasi-hypotheses being merely mental patterns of spontaneous neuronal assemblies that manifest the material reality by activating communication toward the ecosystem through internal electrical musculatures? Cheers Jerry On Jul 23, 2015, at 10:16 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: Hi, Jerry, you're welcome. Yes, some of the pages contain few words. If something looks wrong, you can check it against the manuscript online at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL.HOUGH:12486086 (also linked at my transcription http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm ) and please do let me know if something's missing. I don't think I missed anything but sometimes it takes one a few days to see an error, because, I guess, of slowness of change of frame of mind. MS 831 is undated but one can see that it must have been written after the publication of _Studies in Logic_ (1883) because Peirce mentions its publication. Another way maybe to narrow the date down: In MS 831, Peirce uses the words inference and reasoning to mean pretty much the same thing, and uses quasi-inference to mean instinctive or otherwise automatic inference. There comes a time when he uses reasoning to mean conscious, deliberate inference, thus widening the sense of inference to encompass instinctive inference (quasi-inference in MS 831). I'm not sure how consistent he was about that in later years, but assembling the dates of later quotes on reasoning and inference might help suggest a more specific time period during which he wrote MS 831. Best, Ben On 7/23/2015 10:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: Ben: Thanks for your work in posting this work. A minor technical question: It is aparently the case that some pages contain only a few words. Is there any apparent reason for this? Is the date of the writing known to you? Cheers jerry On Jul 22, 2015, at 7:32 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: List, Harvard has placed more Peirce manuscript images online. They keep changing the URL for the list of Peirce MS images online, and now one has to search at Harvard's Oasis instead of Harvard's Hollis. I'll need to update the info at Arisbe. Anyway, for the current list of Harvard's online images of Peirce's manuscripts, go (or try to go) to http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/deepLinkDigital?_collection=oasisinoid=nullhistno=nulluniqueId=hou02614 One of the manuscripts newly available is MS 831. I've mentioned MS 831 a number of times, based on the Robin Catalog's description of it: 831. [Reasoning and Instinct] A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 2–29, incomplete. The fine gradations between subconscious or instinctive mind and conscious, controlled reason. Logical machines are not strictly reasoning machines because they lack the ability of self-criticism and the ability to correct defects which may crop up. Three kinds of reasoning: inductive, deductive, hypothetical. Quasi-inferences. I've transcribed and posted MS 831 at http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm Best, Ben - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831
Hi, Jerry, you're welcome. Yes, some of the pages contain few words. If something looks wrong, you can check it against the manuscript online at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL.HOUGH:12486086 (also linked at my transcription http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm ) and please do let me know if something's missing. I don't think I missed anything but sometimes it takes one a few days to see an error, because, I guess, of slowness of change of frame of mind. MS 831 is undated but one can see that it must have been written after the publication of _Studies in Logic_ (1883) because Peirce mentions its publication. Another way maybe to narrow the date down: In MS 831, Peirce uses the words inference and reasoning to mean pretty much the same thing, and uses quasi-inference to mean instinctive or otherwise automatic inference. There comes a time when he uses reasoning to mean conscious, deliberate inference, thus widening the sense of inference to encompass instinctive inference (quasi-inference in MS 831). I'm not sure how consistent he was about that in later years, but assembling the dates of later quotes on reasoning and inference might help suggest a more specific time period during which he wrote MS 831. Best, Ben On 7/23/2015 10:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: Ben: Thanks for your work in posting this work. A minor technical question: It is aparently the case that some pages contain only a few words. Is there any apparent reason for this? Is the date of the writing known to you? Cheers jerry On Jul 22, 2015, at 7:32 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: List, Harvard has placed more Peirce manuscript images online. They keep changing the URL for the list of Peirce MS images online, and now one has to search at Harvard's Oasis instead of Harvard's Hollis. I'll need to update the info at Arisbe. Anyway, for the current list of Harvard's online images of Peirce's manuscripts, go (or try to go) to http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/deepLinkDigital?_collection=oasisinoid=nullhistno=nulluniqueId=hou02614 One of the manuscripts newly available is MS 831. I've mentioned MS 831 a number of times, based on the Robin Catalog's description of it: 831. [Reasoning and Instinct] A. MS., n.p., n.d., pp. 2–29, incomplete. The fine gradations between subconscious or instinctive mind and conscious, controlled reason. Logical machines are not strictly reasoning machines because they lack the ability of self-criticism and the ability to correct defects which may crop up. Three kinds of reasoning: inductive, deductive, hypothetical. Quasi-inferences. I've transcribed and posted MS 831 at http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm Best, Ben - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More Peirce MSS posted online by Harvard, incl [Reasoning and Instinct] - MS 831
Hi, Jerry, You're welcome again. Now, in Peirce's view, symbols not only are generals but also do not, of themselves, symbolize anything but generals, so that excludes individual actions from being symbolized. Nevertheless, a symbol that incorporates an index (supplied by one's mind or more physically) makes a sign that can represent an individual action as an instance of a practice, a form of conduct, a norm, a general. More generally speaking, to the extent that an individual is an instance of a general, it is the individual that represents the general, not vice versa, Peirce's idea here being that generals, norms, etc., govern, more-or-less determine, individuals, not vice versa (or not significantly vice versa); and objects influence, more-or-less determine, signs to represent them, not vice versa, so the individuals take the sign role, the generals the object role, in such cases. (I give an example in an appendix to this message.) A symbol is itself individually instanced, in Peirce's system, not by a concrete individual symbol, which doesn't exist in Peirce's system, but instead by a kind of indexical sinsign that points to one's experience of the symbolized object. But is the question you're asking something more like: Are there unconscious, instinctual, merely animal-level symbols? In Peirce's system, they're certainly allowed, since a symbol is a sign that represents by norm or disposition of interpretation regardless of (non-)resemblance or dynamical (non-)connection to its object. Such a norm or disposition could be instinctual. There are places (I forget where off-hand) Peirce says that not all symbols are artificial (I mean in the sense that words are), some are natural in some sense. Unfortunately I don't remember those discussions well. Best, Ben Appendix: So, let's say you have an accurate computer-program model of a storm. Indices help make the program part of a representation of the storm; but without the indices, the program is a general diagram, and the actual storm an individual diagram, of the same object, a mathematical structure. (It would be an impossibly lucky program, to have been made without indexical connection to the actual storm yet mirror the storm so well that indices merely need to be added to make the result able to represent the storm to an interpretant.) On 7/23/2015 11:38 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: Thanks again, Ben. (Where would this list serve be without you?) After reading this again, it became obvious to me (I am a slow learner) that the underlying issue here is the origin of symbolization with respect to biological / human actions. Ben, do you suppose that instinctual actions (such as those that are directly comparable to animal behavior, such as fight or flight, or feeding,) are not symbolized? The quasi-hypotheses being merely mental patterns of spontaneous neuronal assemblies that manifest the material reality by activating communication toward the ecosystem through internal electrical musculatures? Cheers Jerry On Jul 23, 2015, at 10:16 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: Hi, Jerry, you're welcome. Yes, some of the pages contain few words. If something looks wrong, you can check it against the manuscript online at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL.HOUGH:12486086 (also linked at my transcription http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms831/ms831.htm ) and please do let me know if something's missing. I don't think I missed anything but sometimes it takes one a few days to see an error, because, I guess, of slowness of change of frame of mind. MS 831 is undated but one can see that it must have been written after the publication of _Studies in Logic_ (1883) because Peirce mentions its publication. Another way maybe to narrow the date down: In MS 831, Peirce uses the words inference and reasoning to mean pretty much the same thing, and uses quasi-inference to mean instinctive or otherwise automatic inference. There comes a time when he uses reasoning to mean conscious, deliberate inference, thus widening the sense of inference to encompass instinctive inference (quasi-inference in MS 831). I'm not sure how consistent he was about that in later years, but assembling the dates of later quotes on reasoning and inference might help suggest a more specific time period during which he wrote MS 831. Best, Ben On 7/23/2015 10:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
