Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project, was, Re: Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
Robert, I agree that lattices would make a good formal structure for classifying and organizing interpretants. If all the interpretants are derived by formal rules of inference according to some formal logic, then a lattice would be the appropriate mathematical structure for organizing and displaying them. Following is an article that I presented at a conference on formal ontology in 2006: A Dynamic Theory of Ontology, https://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/dynonto.htm . The basic idea is a dynamically growing lattice that has no limit on size. Whenever any word shifts its meaning in the slightest -- from one microsense to another, a new branch in the lattice is created. But I also realize that such a system could quickly grow beyond what people are capable of understanding. It's not likely to be the way that people normally use language. Peirce also recognized the vagueness and complexity and immense variability of the way language is normally used, Since Peirce had a very strong background in formal mathematics and logic, a very strong background in language and the linguistics and psychology of his day, and a very practical sense of how people reason about commonsense and the informal significs of Lady Welby, he was trying to find some way to relate and integrate all these methods. That led to his final decade of 2003 to 2013, when he was frantically trying to relate and integrate and synthesize everything -- with a few people like William James, Lady Welby, and some others as correspondents. It's amazing how far he got, but it's not surprising that there are many loose ends that don't quite fit. It's good to explore further developments of his ideas, but we have to be careful to distinguish his words from our extensions. Anything other than an exact quotation is the opinion of the author. Nobody can claim that his or her ideas are what Peirce intended, John From: "robert marty" John, List John, concerning Peirce's mathematical background, I can't find a note attached to your message, but perhaps I misread it? I want to point out, however, that I did some research to find out whether Peirce was aware of Lattice Theory since I think you are aware that over forty years ago, I showed that classes of signs were naturally organized in lattice structures (10, 28, 66 conditionally, depending on the respective number of constituents 3, 6 or 10). I argued that Peirce had intuited these structures as affinities (CP 2.264). Here's what I've found that answers the question positively. As you know, Garrett Birkhoff found Lattice Theory in purely algebraic terms in his eponymous 1940 book: Birkhoff, Garrett, 1940, Lattice Theory, Revised Edition (1948), Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming: Internet Archive. Peirce is cited several times as the precursor who formalized the foundations of Lattice Theory right from the first page of Chapter I, in which Birkhoff gives the mathematical definition of Partly (or Partially) Ordered Sets: -Page n18 1 From the German "teilweise geordnete Menge," Hausdorff [1], first ed., Ch, VI, §2. The assumptions go back to C. S. Peirce [1], and were also studied by Schroder [1]. They occur in a fragmentary way in Leibniz's works (circa 1690); see C. I. Lewis, A survey of symbolic Logic, Berkeley, U. S. A., 1918, pp. 373-87; for a fuller account, see L. Couturat, La logique de Leibniz d'aprés des documents inbditSy Paris, 1901, Ch. VIII. Thus PI is Leibniz's Property 7 (p. 3^), P2 his Property 17 (p. 382), and P3 his Property 15 (p. 382). He is also the author of fundamental definitions and notations: - Page n33 The definition of sums and products in terms of inclusion is due to C. S. Peirce [1, p. 33]; see also E. Schroder [1, p. 197], Th. Skolem [1]. H. Whitney has suggested the names "cap'' and "cup" for the symbols ... - Page n36 This notation is due to C. S. Peirce [2]. Birkhoff even cites a controversy concerning Peirce, who seems to have advanced on distributive lattices by being the victim of "severe influenza" if we are to believe the letter he sent to E. V. Huntington, which the latter reproduced. - Page n150 I Historical note: It is curious that C. S. Peirce [1] should have thought that every lattice was distributive. He even said L6', L6" are "easily proved, but the proof is too tedious to give"! His error was demonstrated by Schroder [1, p. 282], who showed that L6', L6'' were not implied by L1-L4, but (p. 286) implied each other and L6. A. Korselt (Math. Ann. 44 (1894), 156-167) gave another demonstration. Peirce at first [2] gave way before these authorities, but later (cf. E. V. Huntington [1, pp. 300-301]) boldly defended his original view. Peirce is quoted again in connection with more complex structures, such as Lattice-Ordered Semigroups, - Page n227 ** See C. S. Peirce, Mem. Am. Acad. Arts. Sci. 9 (1870), 317-78; E. Schroder [1, vol. Ill]; J. C. C.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project, was, Re: Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
John, List John, concerning Peirce's mathematical background, I can't find a note attached to your message, but perhaps I misread it? I want to point out, however, that I did some research to find out whether Peirce was aware of Lattice Theory since I think you are aware that over forty years ago, I showed that classes of signs were naturally organized in lattice structures (10, 28, 66 conditionally, depending on the respective number of constituents 3, 6 or 10). I argued that Peirce had intuited these structures as affinities (CP 2.264). Here's what I've found that answers the question positively. As you know, Garrett Birkhoff found Lattice Theory in purely algebraic terms in his eponymous 1940 book: Birkhoff, Garrett, 1940, Lattice Theory, Revised Edition (1948), Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming: Internet Archive. Peirce is cited several times as the precursor who formalized the foundations of Lattice Theory right from the first page of Chapter I, in which Birkhoff gives the mathematical definition of Partly (or Partially) Ordered Sets: * -Page n18* 1 From the German "teilweise geordnete Menge," Hausdorff [1], first ed., Ch, VI, §2. *The assumptions go back to C. S. Peirce [1]*, and were also studied by Schroder [1]. They occur in a fragmentary way in Leibniz's works (circa 1690); see C. I. Lewis, A survey of symbolic Logic, Berkeley, U. S. A., 1918, pp. 373-87; for a fuller account, see L. Couturat, La logique de Leibniz d'aprés des documents inbditSy Paris, 1901, Ch. VIII. Thus PI is Leibniz's Property 7 (p. 3^), P2 his Property 17 (p. 382), and P3 his Property 15 (p. 382). He is also the author of fundamental definitions and notations: - *Page n33* T*he definition of sums and products in terms of inclusion is due to C. S. Peirce [1, p. 33]*; see also E. Schroder [1, p. 197], Th. Skolem [1]. H. Whitney has suggested the names "cap'' and "cup" for the symbols ... - *Page n36* *This notation is due to C. S. Peirce [2]*. Birkhoff even cites a controversy concerning Peirce, who seems to have advanced on distributive lattices by being the victim of "severe influenza" if we are to believe the letter he sent to E. V. Huntington, which the latter reproduced. -* Page n150* I Historical note: *It is curious that C. S. Peirce [1]* should have thought that every lattice was distributive. He even said L6', L6" are "easily proved, but the proof is too tedious to give"! His error was demonstrated by Schroder [1, p. 282], who showed that L6', L6'' were not implied by L1-L4, but (p. 286) implied each other and L6. A. Korselt (Math. Ann. 44 (1894), 156-167) gave another demonstration. Peirce at first [2] gave way before these authorities, but later (cf. E. V. Huntington [1, pp. 300-301]) boldly defended his original view. Peirce is quoted again in connection with more complex structures, such as Lattice-Ordered Semigroups, -* Page n227* ** *See C. S. Peirce, Mem. Am. Acad. Arts. Sci. 9 (1870), 317-78*; E. Schroder [1, vol. Ill]; J. C. C. McKinsey, Jour. Symbolic Logic 6 (1940), 85-97; A. Tarski, ibid. 6 (1941), 73-89. The two Peirce articles mentioned are, of course, included in Birkhoff's bibliography. *- Page n290* C. S. Peirce, [1] On the algebra of Logic. Am. Jour. 3 (1880), 15-57; [2] On the algebra of Logic, ibid. 7 (1884), 180-202, It's clear, then, that by the 1870s-80s, Peirce had mastered the fundamentals of Lattice Theory. We may then ask why he failed to see that classes of signs with 3, 6, or 10 elements were organized in lattice structures. Nevertheless, the notion of affinity between triadic classes of signs and his evocation of the syntax of some of them are explicit expressions of this. The answer is not to be found in a possible limitation of his capacity as a mathematician to recognize in the universe of signs forms that were in his mind. The answer lies in the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of breaking out of the set-theoretic framework in which the most advanced mathematics of his time was embedded, a framework that Category Theory considerably expanded and formalized long after his death. I followed in Peirce's footsteps and made my way through Category Theory, a field with which I'm familiar, from 1977 and 1990 in French, and especially from 1982 in English. I quickly obtained the ten classes of triadic signs (naturally associated with the only ten possible functors between two elementary categories). The next step, the one that naturally enables us to understand the relationships between these classes, is that of the natural transformations of these functors, which define the immanent relationships that exist between these ten functors. The point of natural transformations is that they are transformations between functors (of the same source and target). The concept of natural transformation is specific to category theory. Categories can be seen as generalizations of structured sets and functors as generalizations of appropriate transformations for these
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project, was, Re: Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
Gary R, Robert M, Jon AS, Edwina, List, Thanks, Gary, for explaining our points of agreement. As you emphasize in bold face, we all agree with Nathan Houser and with Short that Peirce’s later taxonomy “is sketchy, tentative, and, as best I can make out, incoherent” (Short 2007, p. 260). But he [GR, Short] quickly went on to point out that it is not the inconclusiveness of Peirce’s own findings but “the kind of project” he had conceived and was pursuing that is important. I also emphasize our agreement with Max Fisch, who pointed out, during the final six years of Peirce’s life he was engaged on a system of logic considered as semiotic which he hoped would “stand for realism in the twentieth century. I also agree with the other sentences you emphasized in bold. Since I have finished the article on phaneroscopy, I am now writing the article on Delta Graphs. That is an example where Peirce was on solid ground with his deep understanding of logic and mathematics. Next week, I'll send the abstract and preview of the new article, which shows how Peirce anticipated a version of logic that was developed in the 21st century (2006 to be exact). Since I also agree with Robert Marty's emphasis on Peirce's mathematical background, I include his note below. The emphasis on mathematics is essential. It explains Peirce's successes and the areas where he was less successful, such as the points that Short said were sketchy, tentative, and even incoherent. I agree that the questions about interpretants are important, but the answers depend on issues of cognitive science that are so complex that our best known mathematical methods are inadequate. This is still an open research area, and the most we can say is that the problems Peirce attempted to solve are still unsolved. John From: "robert marty" List, I agree with JAS on the architectonic character of the classification of the sciences. I want to complement what he says further and be even more precise about Peirce's deeper thinking. Indeed, JAS is perfectly suitable to note that applying the principle of classification (which Peirce borrows from Auguste Comte, revisiting it as JAS mentioned) leads to placing the Special Sciences in a position to receive their principles from semiotics. But strictly speaking, applying the principle from the first trichotomy of the Sciences of Discovery (CP 1.180) must lead to the more general conclusion that semiotics itself receives its principles from Mathematics and Philosophy (or Cenoscopy). More precisely, as we progress through the successive trichotomies, we see that semiotics receives its principles from a chain of dependencies that necessarily begins with Mathematics and continues with Phenomenology, Aesthetics, Ethics, and Logic (the science of the general laws of signs), which then trichotomizes into Speculative Grammar, Critic and Methodeutic, before providing its principles to Metaphysics. Peirce is very precise on this point and on what needs to happen in the minds of the scientists concerned: I set out from Comte's well-known scheme (or schemes). It seemed to me that this embodied a most striking truth about the relations of sciences, along with some glowing falsities. That truth I conceived, and still conceive, to be that the results of one science, A, will often be applied by another science, B, as principles or tools wherewith to solve its problems (not of course, without research of its own), while science, B, will perhaps suggest problems to science, A, but will not furnish it with any great aid in solving its problems. I thought I ought to use this principle of Comte's for all it was worth, without allowing it to run away with me. For what I wish to produce is a scheme which shall exhibit, as far as possible, the most real affinities of the different branches of science as these sciences exist in the minds of those who are now actively pursuing them, or better, as these men are coming to regard these affinities. (MS 1339: p.4-5) Peirce situates this schema in the Well of Truth, a metaphor that deserves our attention, for it is in this Well that the Sciences of Discovery, and hence scientific knowledge, will be built: [ …] Auguste Comte wrote that the sciences form a sort of ladder descending into the Well of truth, each one leading on to another, those which are more concrete and special drawing their principles from those which are more abstract and general. (CP 2.119) Every systematic philosopher must provide himself a classification of the sciences. Comte first proposed to arrange the sciences in a series of steps, each leading another. This general idea may be adopted, and we may adapt our phraseology to the image of the Well of truth with flights of stairs leading down into it (MS 1345, p.001, undated, NEM, vol III.2: 1122) The first step of the ladder into the Well is the mathematical step. The
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project, was, Re: Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
List, I agree with JAS on the architectonic character of the classification of the sciences. I want to complement what he says further and be even more precise about Peirce's deeper thinking. Indeed, JAS is perfectly suitable to note that applying the principle of classification (which Peirce borrows from Auguste Comte, revisiting it as JAS mentioned) leads to placing the Special Sciences in a position to receive their principles from semiotics. But strictly speaking, applying the principle from the first trichotomy of the Sciences of Discovery (CP 1.180) must lead to the more general conclusion that semiotics itself receives its principles from Mathematics and Philosophy (or Cenoscopy). More precisely, as we progress through the successive trichotomies, we see that semiotics receives its principles from a chain of dependencies that necessarily begins with Mathematics and continues with Phenomenology, Aesthetics, Ethics, and Logic (the science of the general laws of signs), which then trichotomizes into Speculative Grammar, Critic and Methodeutic, before providing its principles to Metaphysics. Peirce is very precise on this point and on what needs to happen in the minds of the scientists concerned: *I set out from Comte's well-known scheme (or schemes). It seemed to me that this embodied a most striking truth about the relations of sciences, along with some glowing falsities. That truth I conceived, and still conceive, to be that the results of one science, A, will often be applied by another science, B, as principles or tools wherewith to solve its problems (not of course, without research of its own), while science, B, will perhaps suggest problems to science, A, but will not furnish it with any great aid in solving its problems. I thought I ought to use this principle of Comte's for all it was worth, without allowing it to run away with me. For what I wish to produce is a scheme which shall exhibit, as far as possible, the most real affinities of the different branches of science as these sciences exist in the minds of those who are now actively pursuing them, or better, as these men are coming to regard these affinities. *(MS 1339: p.4-5) Peirce situates this schema in the Well of Truth, a metaphor that deserves our attention, for it is in this Well that the Sciences of Discovery, and hence scientific knowledge, will be built: [ …] *Auguste Comte wrote that the sciences form a sort of ladder descending into the Well of truth, each one leading on to another, those which are more concrete and special drawing their principles **from those** which are more abstract and general. *(CP 2.119) *Every systematic philosopher must provide himself a classification of the sciences. Comte first proposed to arrange the sciences in a series of steps, each leading another. This general idea may be adopted, and we may adapt our phraseology to the image of the Well of truth with flights of stairs leading down into it *(MS 1345, p.001, undated, NEM, vol III.2: 1122) The first step of the ladder into the Well is the mathematical step. The application of Comte's principle, revisited and iterated, leads to the conclusion that everything that happens in the Well of Truth depends on Mathematics and that without Mathematics, one cannot claim to be working inside the Well. The result is that any formal construction, any opinion, however authoritative, that does not justify a solidly established relationship with mathematics is outside the Well. In this way, a host of informal doctrines are produced, which can nevertheless be helpful insofar as it is possible to give them a mathematized form inside the Well. I realize this is not everyone's liking, especially those bricoleurs who think they've done mathematics because they've drawn a childish picture with universal categories. It should also be clear that the mathematics Peirce refers to cannot be limited to those of his own time. A century separates us from the mathematics of which Peirce was aware, a century of mathematical production available today on the first step of the Well. No one can refuse the use of new mathematical objects, especially if they are well connected with Peirce's intuitions because they lack the training to enable them to apprehend them themselves. What's worse is that, for the same reasons, a classification of the sciences that begins with phenomenology, free of any mathematical dependency, is most often presented. The reason I intervene at the heart of this rather literalist debate on interpretants is that I have seen the notion of "*sufficiently penetrating mind*" appear: *[CSP] "The Normal Interpretant is the Genuine Interpretant, embracing all that the sign could reveal concerning the Object to a sufficiently penetrating mind..." * This notion must be considered within the Peircean social conception of science; that some minds are more penetrating than others, in general, is conceivable. But rather than posing this question in terms of
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project, was, Re: Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
Jon, I would tend to strongly agree with what you've written. However, this passage seems to me to need a bit of 'unpacking' to be entirely clear. JAS: The necessity of collateral experience/observation for any sign to be understood is one of Peirce's most notable insights. It leads to the recognition that every name in a proposition is a subject that indexically denotes one of its objects, while its syntax is the pure predicate that iconically signifies its interpretant as the general form of their logical relations Best, Gary Richmond On Fri, Feb 9, 2024 at 7:57 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Gary, List: > > Indeed, as I have said before, usefulness is in the eye of the beholder; > and as Peirce himself said, "True science is distinctively the study of > useless things. For the useful things will get studied without the aid of > scientific men" (CP 1.76, c. 1896). Nobody should disparage one particular > field of study merely because that person does not happen to find it useful > for his/her peculiar purposes. > > Moreover, Peirce's entire architectonic classification of the sciences is > based on "the idea that one science depends upon another for fundamental > principles, but does not furnish such principles to that other" (CP 1.180, > EP 2:258, 1903). Accordingly, *all *the special sciences--including > cognitive science, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, > neuroscience, and anthropology--depend on the normative science of logic as > semeiotic for fundamental principles, but do not furnish such principles to > semeiotic. That being the case, the generality of semeiotic is a feature, > not a bug--like the other branches of philosophy, it "contents itself with > observations such as come within the range of every man's normal > experience, and for the most part in every waking hour of his life" (CP > 1.241, 1902). > > Of course, Peirce famously calls himself "a pioneer, or rather a > backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call > *semiotic*, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental > varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor > too great, for a first-comer" (CP 5.488, EP 2:413, 1907). I agree with > Houser--by the way, the quoted paper is excellent, and I commend it to > anyone who can get their hands on it--that there is still plenty of work to > be done, and we would be foolish to start over from scratch instead of > forging ahead from the ground that Peirce has already cleared for us, > however incompletely. > > Regarding his theory of interpretants, I appreciate the reference to my > own paper on that topic. In addition, I find it quite baffling that anyone > would suggest that the context-dependence of uttered signs is somehow > inconsistent with it. On the contrary, the necessity of collateral > experience/observation for any sign to be understood is one of Peirce's > most notable insights. It leads to the recognition that every name in a > proposition is a subject that indexically denotes one of its objects, while > its syntax is the pure predicate that iconically signifies its interpretant > as the general form of their logical relations (CP 5.542, c. 1902-3; CP > 5.151, EP 2:208, 1903; R 611, 1908 Oct 28; NEM 3:885-886, 1908 Dec 5; SS > 70-72, 1908 Dec 14; R 664, 1910 Nov 26-27). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Feb 9, 2024 at 6:08 PM Gary Richmond > wrote: > >> List, John, Edwina, Jon, >> >> How differently some other distinguished scholars see this matter of the >> 'usefulness' of Peirce's semeiotic project than John Sowa appears to. >> Consider this passage near the conclusion of a paper by Nathan Houser in a >> festschrift for Lucia Santaella published just last year, a passage near >> the end which would seem to contradict even John's conclusion regarding Tom >> Short's take on especially Peirce's late taxonomy of signs. I've subdivided >> the long paragraph in the interest of readability on the List and in order >> to emphasize certain salient points. Houser writes (emphasis added by me): >> >> >> *Conclusion (and Call to Carry On)* >> >> After devoting a great deal of care to Peirce’s later efforts to unravel >> the puzzle of semiosis and to produce an extended classification of the >> fundamental varieties of possible signs, *T. L. Short concluded that >> Peirce’s later taxonomy “is sketchy, tentative, and, as best I can make >> out, incoherent” (Short 2007, p. 260). But he *[GR, Short] *quickly went >> on to point out that it is not the inconclusiveness of Peirce’s own >> findings but “the kind of project” he had conceived and was pursuing that >> is important.* This reflects Peirce’s candid assessment that the >> semiotic project he had launched was a great undertaking, far too large for >> a lone inquirer, and that *he must
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project, was, Re: Interpretants, as analyzed and discussed by T. L. Short
Gary, List: Indeed, as I have said before, usefulness is in the eye of the beholder; and as Peirce himself said, "True science is distinctively the study of useless things. For the useful things will get studied without the aid of scientific men" (CP 1.76, c. 1896). Nobody should disparage one particular field of study merely because that person does not happen to find it useful for his/her peculiar purposes. Moreover, Peirce's entire architectonic classification of the sciences is based on "the idea that one science depends upon another for fundamental principles, but does not furnish such principles to that other" (CP 1.180, EP 2:258, 1903). Accordingly, *all *the special sciences--including cognitive science, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology--depend on the normative science of logic as semeiotic for fundamental principles, but do not furnish such principles to semeiotic. That being the case, the generality of semeiotic is a feature, not a bug--like the other branches of philosophy, it "contents itself with observations such as come within the range of every man's normal experience, and for the most part in every waking hour of his life" (CP 1.241, 1902). Of course, Peirce famously calls himself "a pioneer, or rather a backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call *semiotic*, that is, the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis; and I find the field too vast, the labor too great, for a first-comer" (CP 5.488, EP 2:413, 1907). I agree with Houser--by the way, the quoted paper is excellent, and I commend it to anyone who can get their hands on it--that there is still plenty of work to be done, and we would be foolish to start over from scratch instead of forging ahead from the ground that Peirce has already cleared for us, however incompletely. Regarding his theory of interpretants, I appreciate the reference to my own paper on that topic. In addition, I find it quite baffling that anyone would suggest that the context-dependence of uttered signs is somehow inconsistent with it. On the contrary, the necessity of collateral experience/observation for any sign to be understood is one of Peirce's most notable insights. It leads to the recognition that every name in a proposition is a subject that indexically denotes one of its objects, while its syntax is the pure predicate that iconically signifies its interpretant as the general form of their logical relations (CP 5.542, c. 1902-3; CP 5.151, EP 2:208, 1903; R 611, 1908 Oct 28; NEM 3:885-886, 1908 Dec 5; SS 70-72, 1908 Dec 14; R 664, 1910 Nov 26-27). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Feb 9, 2024 at 6:08 PM Gary Richmond wrote: > List, John, Edwina, Jon, > > How differently some other distinguished scholars see this matter of the > 'usefulness' of Peirce's semeiotic project than John Sowa appears to. > Consider this passage near the conclusion of a paper by Nathan Houser in a > festschrift for Lucia Santaella published just last year, a passage near > the end which would seem to contradict even John's conclusion regarding Tom > Short's take on especially Peirce's late taxonomy of signs. I've subdivided > the long paragraph in the interest of readability on the List and in order > to emphasize certain salient points. Houser writes (emphasis added by me): > > > *Conclusion (and Call to Carry On)* > > After devoting a great deal of care to Peirce’s later efforts to unravel > the puzzle of semiosis and to produce an extended classification of the > fundamental varieties of possible signs, *T. L. Short concluded that > Peirce’s later taxonomy “is sketchy, tentative, and, as best I can make > out, incoherent” (Short 2007, p. 260). But he *[GR, Short] *quickly went > on to point out that it is not the inconclusiveness of Peirce’s own > findings but “the kind of project” he had conceived and was pursuing that > is important.* This reflects Peirce’s candid assessment that the semiotic > project he had launched was a great undertaking, far too large for a lone > inquirer, and that *he must commend it to “future explorers”* (Peirce > 1907, EP 2: 413, 482). > > In looking back over his own explorations with signs, from his “New List” > to his Lowell Lectures of 1903 and the many relevant pages in his Logic > Notebook and late correspondence, Peirce likely would not have assessed the > record of his explorations, even the rapid-fire tries and retries in his > Logic Notebook, to be “incoherent,” but he might have been forced to admit > that it was all “a very snarl of twine,” as he had described himself in > contrast to his life-long friend, William James (CP 6.184). But *Peirce’s > confidence that he had opened the way to a key new science never waned. As > Max Fisch pointed out, during the final six years of
