Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John:

While the abstractions of mathematics are extremely powerful, 
and have had profound influence on our economic systems,
such abstractions are far less powerful in analysis of complex systems of 
chemistry and biology.
I believe that your statement below is categorically in error.

> On Jul 27, 2021, at 2:55 PM, John F. Sowa  wrote:
> 
>  In his three universes of
> discourse -- possibilities, actualities, and necessities -- mathematics
> is first because it includes every possible pattern of any kind.  That
> includes everything that any human or any living thing of any kind could
> imagine -- plus all the possible patterns that no finite being could
> imagine.

Scientific languages and semiotic grounding of the chemical and genetic symbol 
systems are 
syntactically developed from the epistemology of human sensory interpretations 
and symbolizations.

The illations that connect the chemical and genetic symbol systems are not 
necessarily grounded in mathematics,
 but rather are ground in semiotics and the epistemologies of the natural 
sciences.

In short, the abductive logic used by CSP in the 
illative assertions of the trichotomy is 
relative to the adductive logic of mathematics 
BUT remote from the multiplicative logic of physical philosophy.

Furthermore, at present, no mathematical or physical method exists to calculate 
all possible chemical patterns (isomers) because of the multiplicity of 
branchings associated with concatenations of chemical elements (atomic numbers) 
with valences exceeding 2.

Once again, in my opinion,
 the logical operations of geometrically based mathematical theories are
 insufficient to ground the calculations
 of the semantically grounded and syntactically grounded calculations of number 
theory of chemistry. 

I would urge you to peruse the mathematics of an introductory organic chemistry 
textbook from the perspective of (atomic) number theory and the quanta physics 
of electricity. CSP grasp the essential elements of this obligatory logic a 
century ago and you certainly can too. CSP valued semiotic reasoning higher 
than geometry when he expressed his views on the simplest mathematics. 
(4.240-243).  

Cheers

Jerry 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in Diagrams vs Thinking in Words

[Jon Awbrey]

Dear Robert,

That was something between idle snark and off-the-cuff remark,
as that's all my current dis-array of interrupredations allow
me right now, but it does touch on pressing issues about the
present reception and comprehension of Peirce's impact which
have been tugging at the edges of my wariness increasingly
over the past couple of decades, so I will try to make my
worries more effable in the fulsome-mess of time ...

But I wouldn't wish to hijack this topic with all that
so I'll came back to it under another subject line ...

Regards,

Jon

On 7/29/2021 10:08 AM, robert marty wrote:

Dear Jon, List,


I know what book you are talking about; today it can be downloaded for
free...
I looked at your diagram... it rejuvenated me... indeed, I was always the
terror of my students because, whenever they presented me with a diagram I
demanded that every single point, every single line be documented... so I
look at your diagram and I see first of all ovals,5 , with words inside...
I wonder if they delimit sets of points of the plane which would represent
each one an object of the extension of each of the labels inscribed in the
oval... the answer is obvious, it's not. So the ovals are just decorative
elements that direct attention to the 5 terms of the language they surround.
I come to the lines ... the graphic conventions in use (signs of law)
strongly suggest to me that they are relationships between concepts ...
perhaps of dependence given the context of communication ... the same
conventions and context suggest that they should be considered top-down
relationships ... I can't go beyond that as I have no information about
these lines and the modes of correspondence they cover ... in advance of
the upcoming debate, I say that if all the lines represent top-down
dependency relationships then this diagram comes into open conflict with
Peirce's classification ... conflict involving debate in the Sciences of
Discovery ...I am ready...

On Thu. Jul 29, 2021 at 2:30 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
Dear Robert, John, Edwina, ...
This discussion reminds me a lot of the time I spent the big bucks
buying a book on "Diagrammatology" which ran to over 500 pages with
many sections in very small print and had just over 50 diagrams in
the whole thing.

So I think the real "versus" here is more like the difference
between people who "think in words about thinking in diagrams"
and people who "think in words about thinking in words".

Those of us, the very few, who have actually been
working on "moving pictures" from the very get-go,
have learned to see things somewhat differently.

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-syllabus.jpg

Regardez,

Jon

On 7/29/2021 5:27 AM, robert marty wrote:

Dear John, Edwina, List

Let me clarify my question:

The references in parentheses refer to the classification
<

https://www.academia.edu/5148127/The_outline_of_Peirces_classification_of_sciences_1902_1911_


compiled by Tommi Vehkavaara.

The classification of the Sciences of Discovery places Mathematics (AI)
ex-ante the Phaneroscopy; the whole mathematical activity is per se,
independent of any implementation and does not depend on anything, since

it

incorporates its own mathematics (of Logic) (AIa) as a constituent part

of

itself.

The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and then

the

Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on them.

The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and then

the

Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on these last ones.

In the ladder of dependencies that penetrate inside the "well of truth"
(Peirce's metaphor is a way of expressing his agreement with Auguste

Comte)

comes the (AII) Cenoscopy - Philosophia prima, which is only a generic
label covering all the positive sciences "which rests upon familiar,
general experience." At the first rank of them, the Phenomenology (AIIa),
the study of Universal Categories "all present in any phenomenon:
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness." Indeed, any particular science of

nature

is the study of a phenomenology. We can see that it is at this level that
Peirce situates the elaboration of his universal categories.

I will stop here for a moment before addressing the question of the
Normative Sciences (AIIb) because you have referred three Universes of
Discourse.

JS >. " *In his three universes of** discourse -- possibilities,
actualities, and necessities – mathematics is first because it includes
every possible pattern of any kind.*"

In Universe of Discourse | Dictionary | Commens
 there is

a

set of texts in which Peirce expresses himself on his conception of the
Universe of Discourse. I take one of them, which seems to me to be
representative (if this were not the case, you could indicate to me

whether

I am introducing any bias by this choice:

   *"1903 | Graphs, Little Account [R] | MS [R] S27:9-10*

*…if one person is to convey any 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in Diagrams vs Thinking in Words

[robert marty]

Dear Jon, List,

> I know what book you are talking about; today it can be downloaded for
> free...
> I looked at your diagram... it rejuvenated me... indeed, I was always the
> terror of my students because, whenever they presented me with a diagram I
> demanded that every single point, every single line be documented... so I
> look at your diagram and I see first of all ovals,5 , with words inside...
> I wonder if they delimit sets of points of the plane which would represent
> each one an object of the extension of each of the labels inscribed in the
> oval... the answer is obvious, it's not. So the ovals are just decorative
> elements that direct attention to the 5 terms of the language they surround.
> I come to the lines ... the graphic conventions in use (signs of law)
> strongly suggest to me that they are relationships between concepts ...
> perhaps of dependence given the context of communication ... the same
> conventions and context suggest that they should be considered top-down
> relationships ... I can't go beyond that as I have no information about
> these lines and the modes of correspondence they cover ... in advance of
> the upcoming debate, I say that if all the lines represent top-down
> dependency relationships then this diagram comes into open conflict with
> Peirce's classification ... conflict involving debate in the Sciences of
> Discovery ...I am ready...
>
> On Thu. Jul 29, 2021 at 2:30 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> Dear Robert, John, Edwina, ...
> This discussion reminds me a lot of the time I spent the big bucks
> buying a book on "Diagrammatology" which ran to over 500 pages with
> many sections in very small print and had just over 50 diagrams in
> the whole thing.
>
> So I think the real "versus" here is more like the difference
> between people who "think in words about thinking in diagrams"
> and people who "think in words about thinking in words".
>
> Those of us, the very few, who have actually been
> working on "moving pictures" from the very get-go,
> have learned to see things somewhat differently.
>
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-syllabus.jpg
>
> Regardez,
>
> Jon
>
> On 7/29/2021 5:27 AM, robert marty wrote:
> > Dear John, Edwina, List
> >
> > Let me clarify my question:
> >
> > The references in parentheses refer to the classification
> > <
> https://www.academia.edu/5148127/The_outline_of_Peirces_classification_of_sciences_1902_1911_
> >
> > compiled by Tommi Vehkavaara.
> >
> > The classification of the Sciences of Discovery places Mathematics (AI)
> > ex-ante the Phaneroscopy; the whole mathematical activity is per se,
> > independent of any implementation and does not depend on anything, since
> it
> > incorporates its own mathematics (of Logic) (AIa) as a constituent part
> of
> > itself.
> >
> > The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and then
> the
> > Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on them.
> >
> > The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and then
> the
> > Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on these last ones.
> >
> > In the ladder of dependencies that penetrate inside the "well of truth"
> > (Peirce's metaphor is a way of expressing his agreement with Auguste
> Comte)
> > comes the (AII) Cenoscopy - Philosophia prima, which is only a generic
> > label covering all the positive sciences "which rests upon familiar,
> > general experience." At the first rank of them, the Phenomenology (AIIa),
> > the study of Universal Categories "all present in any phenomenon:
> > Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness." Indeed, any particular science of
> nature
> > is the study of a phenomenology. We can see that it is at this level that
> > Peirce situates the elaboration of his universal categories.
> >
> > I will stop here for a moment before addressing the question of the
> > Normative Sciences (AIIb) because you have referred three Universes of
> > Discourse.
> >
> > JS >. " *In his three universes of** discourse -- possibilities,
> > actualities, and necessities – mathematics is first because it includes
> > every possible pattern of any kind.*"
> >
> > In Universe of Discourse | Dictionary | Commens
> >  there is
> a
> > set of texts in which Peirce expresses himself on his conception of the
> > Universe of Discourse. I take one of them, which seems to me to be
> > representative (if this were not the case, you could indicate to me
> whether
> > I am introducing any bias by this choice:
> >
> >   *"1903 | Graphs, Little Account [R] | MS [R] S27:9-10*
> >
> > *…if one person is to convey any information to another, it must be upon
> > the basis of a common experience. They must not only have this common
> > experience, but each must know the other has it; and not only that but
> each
> > must know the other knows that he knows the other has it; so that when
> one
> > says ‘It is cold’ the other may know that he does not mean 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in Diagrams vs Thinking in Words

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list

Hmm. Does this claim, 

" the difference 
  between people who "think in words about thinking in diagrams" 
  and people who "think in words about thinking in words". 

1]..not lead to the problem where it will be claimed that X-people
or X-person couldn't think about the situation because they didn't
have the vocabulary to do so?

I am aware that such a claim is made about certain languages  but I
am not convinced of its validity. 

2] I think that languages are flexible and the people can come up
with new terms for experiences.

3] But, on the other hand, there are people who prefer taxonomic
analysis, where each situation and event is classified and labelled
into a niche of purity.

Edwina
 On Thu 29/07/21  8:30 AM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
 Dear Robert, John, Edwina, ... 
 This discussion reminds me a lot of the time I spent the big bucks 
 buying a book on "Diagrammatology" which ran to over 500 pages with 
 many sections in very small print and had just over 50 diagrams in 
 the whole thing. 
 So I think the real "versus" here is more like the difference 
 between people who "think in words about thinking in diagrams" 
 and people who "think in words about thinking in words". 
 Those of us, the very few, who have actually been 
 working on "moving pictures" from the very get-go, 
 have learned to see things somewhat differently. 

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-syllabus.jpg
[1] 
 Regardez, 
 Jon 
 On 7/29/2021 5:27 AM, robert marty wrote: 
 > Dear John, Edwina, List 
 >  
 > Let me clarify my question: 
 >  
 > The references in parentheses refer to the classification 
 > <
https://www.academia.edu/5148127/The_outline_of_Peirces_classification_of_sciences_1902_1911
[2]_ > 
 > compiled by Tommi Vehkavaara. 
 >  
 > The classification of the Sciences of Discovery places Mathematics
(AI) 
 > ex-ante the Phaneroscopy; the whole mathematical activity is per
se, 
 > independent of any implementation and does not depend on anything,
since it 
 > incorporates its own mathematics (of Logic) (AIa) as a constituent
part of 
 > itself. 
 >  
 > The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and
then the 
 > Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on them. 
 >  
 > The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and
then the 
 > Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on these last ones. 
 >  
 > In the ladder of dependencies that penetrate inside the "well of
truth" 
 > (Peirce's metaphor is a way of expressing his agreement with
Auguste Comte) 
 > comes the (AII) Cenoscopy - Philosophia prima, which is only a
generic 
 > label covering all the positive sciences "which rests upon
familiar, 
 > general experience." At the first rank of them, the Phenomenology
(AIIa), 
 > the study of Universal Categories "all present in any phenomenon: 
 > Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness." Indeed, any particular science
of nature 
 > is the study of a phenomenology. We can see that it is at this
level that 
 > Peirce situates the elaboration of his universal categories. 
 >  
 > I will stop here for a moment before addressing the question of
the 
 > Normative Sciences (AIIb) because you have referred three
Universes of 
 > Discourse. 
 >  
 > JS >. " *In his three universes of** discourse -- possibilities, 
 > actualities, and necessities – mathematics is first because it
includes 
 > every possible pattern of any kind.*" 
 >  
 > In Universe of Discourse | Dictionary | Commens 
 >  [3] there is a 
 > set of texts in which Peirce expresses himself on his conception
of the 
 > Universe of Discourse. I take one of them, which seems to me to be

 > representative (if this were not the case, you could indicate to
me whether 
 > I am introducing any bias by this choice: 
 >  
 >   *"1903 | Graphs, Little Account [R] | MS [R] S27:9-10* 
 >  
 > *…if one person is to convey any information to another, it must
be upon 
 > the basis of a common experience. They must not only have this
common 
 > experience, but each must know the other has it; and not only that
but each 
 > must know the other knows that he knows the other has it; so that
when one 
 > says ‘It is cold’ the other may know that he does not mean
that it is cold 
 > in Iceland or in Laputa, but right here. In short it must be
thoroughly 
 > understood between them that they are talking about objects of a
collection 
 > with which both have some familiarity. **The collection of objects
to which 
 > it is mutually understood that the propositions refer is called by
exact 
 > logicians the universe of discourse." *[emphasize mine] 
 >  
 > Then you consider the three universes of discourse which are
possibilities, 
 > actualities, and necessities. In other words, the universe of
discourse 
 > discussed above is now divided into 3 collections of objects. It
remains to 
 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in Diagrams vs Thinking in Words

[Jon Awbrey]

Dear Robert, John, Edwina, ...

This discussion reminds me a lot of the time I spent the big bucks
buying a book on "Diagrammatology" which ran to over 500 pages with
many sections in very small print and had just over 50 diagrams in
the whole thing.

So I think the real "versus" here is more like the difference
between people who "think in words about thinking in diagrams"
and people who "think in words about thinking in words".

Those of us, the very few, who have actually been
working on "moving pictures" from the very get-go,
have learned to see things somewhat differently.

https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-syllabus.jpg

Regardez,

Jon

On 7/29/2021 5:27 AM, robert marty wrote:

Dear John, Edwina, List

Let me clarify my question:

The references in parentheses refer to the classification
< 
https://www.academia.edu/5148127/The_outline_of_Peirces_classification_of_sciences_1902_1911_
 >
compiled by Tommi Vehkavaara.

The classification of the Sciences of Discovery places Mathematics (AI)
ex-ante the Phaneroscopy; the whole mathematical activity is per se,
independent of any implementation and does not depend on anything, since it
incorporates its own mathematics (of Logic) (AIa) as a constituent part of
itself.

The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and then the
Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on them.

The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and then the
Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on these last ones.

In the ladder of dependencies that penetrate inside the "well of truth"
(Peirce's metaphor is a way of expressing his agreement with Auguste Comte)
comes the (AII) Cenoscopy - Philosophia prima, which is only a generic
label covering all the positive sciences "which rests upon familiar,
general experience." At the first rank of them, the Phenomenology (AIIa),
the study of Universal Categories "all present in any phenomenon:
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness." Indeed, any particular science of nature
is the study of a phenomenology. We can see that it is at this level that
Peirce situates the elaboration of his universal categories.

I will stop here for a moment before addressing the question of the
Normative Sciences (AIIb) because you have referred three Universes of
Discourse.

JS >. " *In his three universes of** discourse -- possibilities,
actualities, and necessities – mathematics is first because it includes
every possible pattern of any kind.*"

In Universe of Discourse | Dictionary | Commens
 there is a
set of texts in which Peirce expresses himself on his conception of the
Universe of Discourse. I take one of them, which seems to me to be
representative (if this were not the case, you could indicate to me whether
I am introducing any bias by this choice:

  *"1903 | Graphs, Little Account [R] | MS [R] S27:9-10*

*…if one person is to convey any information to another, it must be upon
the basis of a common experience. They must not only have this common
experience, but each must know the other has it; and not only that but each
must know the other knows that he knows the other has it; so that when one
says ‘It is cold’ the other may know that he does not mean that it is cold
in Iceland or in Laputa, but right here. In short it must be thoroughly
understood between them that they are talking about objects of a collection
with which both have some familiarity. **The collection of objects to which
it is mutually understood that the propositions refer is called by exact
logicians the universe of discourse." *[emphasize mine]

Then you consider the three universes of discourse which are possibilities,
actualities, and necessities. In other words, the universe of discourse
discussed above is now divided into 3 collections of objects. It remains to
know how this division occurs.

Peirce gives us a well-known (but not exclusive) answer, as one could do in
any observational science:

* "** Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron
I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense
present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real
thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I
leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that
those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at
all times and to all minds. So far as I have developed this science of
phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron*"(CP
1.284) [emphasize mine]

It is well specified further on:

*" What I term phaneroscopy is that study which, supported by the direct
observation of **phanerons and generalizing its observations, signalizes
several very broad classes of **phanerons; describes the features of each**;
shows that although they are so **inextricably mixed together that no one
can be isolated, yet it is manifest that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Robert, list

1] If I understand your question correctly - is it 

- our first experience is: the phaneron. This is essentially the
qualisign experience of one material entity with its surroundings.
I'd say this compares with Peirce's outline of cosmology - see 1.412
and 6.217 and 6.191,..200 ie, from the vague to the definite'. , a
state of being 'before logic'..."the utter vagueness of completely
undetermined and dimensionless potentiality" 6.193.

See also his famous blackboard example 6.203..where Peirce outlines
the development of the three categories, or 'modes of being'. And
points out that Thirdness, or habit-formation' ..'must have its
origin in the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality.
Continuity, as generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is
essentially general" 6.204.

- understanding this phaneron is based upon reasoning about
it...which involves diagrammatic reasoning about relations - ie,
mathematics.

2] Your question posed to John Sowa. if I understand it correctly,
refers to his locating mathematical reasoning within the universe of
Firstness while you locate it within the universe of Thirdness??

Edwina
 On Thu 29/07/21  5:27 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com
sent:
Dear John, Edwina, List  
Let me clarify my question: 
The references in parentheses refer to the  classification compiled
by Tommi Vehkavaara. 
The classification of the Sciences of Discovery places Mathematics
(AI) ex-ante the Phaneroscopy; the whole mathematical activity is per
se, independent of any implementation and does not depend on anything,
since it incorporates its own mathematics (of Logic) (AIa) as a
constituent part of itself. 

The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and
then the Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on them.  
The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and
then the Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on these last ones.  
In the ladder of dependencies that penetrate inside the "well of
truth" (Peirce's metaphor is a way of expressing his agreement with
Auguste Comte) comes the (AII) Cenoscopy - Philosophia prima, which
is only a generic label covering all the positive sciences "which
rests upon familiar, general experience." At the first rank of them,
the Phenomenology (AIIa), the study of Universal Categories "all
present in any phenomenon: Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness." Indeed,
any particular science of nature is the study of a phenomenology. We
can see that it is at this level that Peirce situates the elaboration
of his universal categories.  

I will stop here for a moment before addressing the question of the
Normative Sciences (AIIb) because you have referred three Universes
of Discourse.  
JS >. " In his three universes of discourse -- possibilities,
actualities, and necessities – mathematics is first because it
includes every possible pattern of any kind." 
In Universe of Discourse | Dictionary | Commens there is a set of
texts in which Peirce expresses himself on his conception of the
Universe of Discourse. I take one of them, which seems to me to be
representative (if this were not the case, you could indicate to me
whether I am introducing any bias by this choice: 
 "1903 | Graphs, Little Account [R] | MS [R] S27:9-10 

…if one person is to convey any information to another, it must be
upon the basis of a common experience. They must not only have this
common experience, but each must know the other has it; and not only
that but each must know the other knows that he knows the other has
it; so that when one says ‘It is cold’ the other may know that he
does not mean that it is cold in Iceland or in Laputa, but right here.
In short it must be thoroughly understood between them that they are
talking about objects of a collection with which both have some
familiarity. The collection of objects to which it is mutually
understood that the propositions refer is called by exact logicians
the universe of discourse." [emphasize mine] 

Then you consider the three universes of discourse which are
possibilities, actualities, and necessities. In other words, the
universe of discourse discussed above is now divided into 3
collections of objects. It remains to know how this division occurs. 
Peirce gives us a well-known (but not exclusive) answer, as one
could do in any observational science:   
 " Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the 
phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in
any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it
corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to
whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, never
having entertained a doubt that those features of the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[robert marty]

Dear John, Edwina, List



Let me clarify my question:



The references in parentheses refer to the classification

compiled by Tommi Vehkavaara.



The classification of the Sciences of Discovery places Mathematics (AI)
ex-ante the Phaneroscopy; the whole mathematical activity is per se,
independent of any implementation and does not depend on anything, since it
incorporates its own mathematics (of Logic) (AIa) as a constituent part of
itself.

The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and then the
Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on them.



The discrete mathematics (so the algebra) (AIb) depend on it, and then the
Mathematics of Continuum (AIc) depends on these last ones.



In the ladder of dependencies that penetrate inside the "well of truth"
(Peirce's metaphor is a way of expressing his agreement with Auguste Comte)
comes the (AII) Cenoscopy - Philosophia prima, which is only a generic
label covering all the positive sciences "which rests upon familiar,
general experience." At the first rank of them, the Phenomenology (AIIa),
the study of Universal Categories "all present in any phenomenon:
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness." Indeed, any particular science of nature
is the study of a phenomenology. We can see that it is at this level that
Peirce situates the elaboration of his universal categories.

I will stop here for a moment before addressing the question of the
Normative Sciences (AIIb) because you have referred three Universes of
Discourse.



JS >. " *In his three universes of** discourse -- possibilities,
actualities, and necessities – mathematics is first because it includes
every possible pattern of any kind.*"



In Universe of Discourse | Dictionary | Commens
 there is a
set of texts in which Peirce expresses himself on his conception of the
Universe of Discourse. I take one of them, which seems to me to be
representative (if this were not the case, you could indicate to me whether
I am introducing any bias by this choice:



 *"1903 | Graphs, Little Account [R] | MS [R] S27:9-10*

*…if one person is to convey any information to another, it must be upon
the basis of a common experience. They must not only have this common
experience, but each must know the other has it; and not only that but each
must know the other knows that he knows the other has it; so that when one
says ‘It is cold’ the other may know that he does not mean that it is cold
in Iceland or in Laputa, but right here. In short it must be thoroughly
understood between them that they are talking about objects of a collection
with which both have some familiarity. **The collection of objects to which
it is mutually understood that the propositions refer is called by exact
logicians the universe of discourse." *[emphasize mine]

Then you consider the three universes of discourse which are possibilities,
actualities, and necessities. In other words, the universe of discourse
discussed above is now divided into 3 collections of objects. It remains to
know how this division occurs.



Peirce gives us a well-known (but not exclusive) answer, as one could do in
any observational science:



* "** Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron
I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense
present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real
thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I
leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that
those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at
all times and to all minds. So far as I have developed this science of
phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron*"(CP
1.284) [emphasize mine]



It is well specified further on:



*" What I term phaneroscopy is that study which, supported by the direct
observation of **phanerons and generalizing its observations, signalizes
several very broad classes of **phanerons; describes the features of each**;
shows that although they are so **inextricably mixed together that no one
can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their **characters are quite
disparate; then proves, beyond question, that a certain very short **list
comprises all of these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and
finally **proceeds to the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the
principal subdivisions **of those categories. *(CP 1.286, 1902) [emphasize
mine]



That this answer is not exclusive, he showed it himself by having recourse
to justify it, on many occasions, to the triadic reduction of polyadic
relations that he did not really establish himself. It was established
later, notably by Herzberger, Burch and more recently by Dau F., Correia
J.H. (2006 )



*" A 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[John F. Sowa]

In my previous note, I accidentally typed the word 'nominalists' twice, 
In the corrected version below, the second occurrence is changed to
'scientists'.
Actuality consists of everything that
exists in space and time.  It's
what nominalists claim is
everything.  But they have no answer to the
mathematicians about the
reality of mathematics.  And they have no
answer to the scientists
about the reality of the laws of nature.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[John F. Sowa]

Robert> This leads me to a final question to be discussed:  should
the
classification of sciences according to Peirce be considered as a
kind
of imperative to be respected or can phenomenology be approached
from
the logic that depends on it according to this
classification?

There is no conflict among any of those views. 
Peirce's classification
subsumes, relates, and clarifies all of
them.  In his three universes of
discourse -- possibilities,
actualities, and necessities -- mathematics
is first because it
includes every possible pattern of any kind.  That
includes
everything that any human or any living thing of any kind could
imagine -- plus all the possible patterns that no finite being could
imagine.

It's not possible for anybody to imagine any pattern
that cannot be be
described and analyzed by mathematics (Alice in
Wonderland, for example,
was imagined by a
mathematician/logician).

Actuality consists of everything that
exists in space and time.  It's
what nominalists claim is
everything.  But they have no answer to the
mathematicians about the
reality of mathematics.  And they have no
answer to the nominalists
about the reality of the laws of nature.

Peirce's three
universes include Aristotle's answer to Plato:
mathematical forms are
pure possibilities, which exist in actuality only
when embodied.  But
those forms are really real in the sense that they
exist
independently of what anybody may think of them.

As for the
scientific methodology in the Stanford article, that is an
example of
Peirce's methodeutic for evaluating any proposed theory.
That is an
example of normative logic, as distinguished from formal
logic, which
is a branch of pure mathematics.

John


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[John F. Sowa]

Terry, Jack, Helmut, Edwina, List,
TLR> Perhaps “our knowledge
base” isn’t either learned 
or innate (per exclusive disjunction), but both learned
and innate.
The nature/nuture/culture issues have been
debated for centuries, and there is a lot of evidence that is sometimes
clear and sometimes ambiguous.
The only thing that's clear is that
all animals learn a lot from experience.  Even a one-celled paramecium
with no brain learns to avoid certain kinds of obstacles and to remember
regions that are nutritious vs barren or threatening.  In general, animals
that spend a long time with their parents learn more from them than
animals that never meet their mothers
Humans have an innate ability
to learn languages, but it's not clear how much is innate.  Children who
have the ability to hear, but whose parents are deaf, learn sign language
from an early age.   Instead of babbling vocally, they babble with their
hands.
Children who are born with one hearing and one deaf parent
become bilingual in a spoken language and a sign language.  And they have
equal fluency with both at every stage of learning.
This is good
evidence that (a) the ability to  represent what they experience in some
symbolic form is innate, and (b) the symbols and patterns of symbols need
not be spoken words.
As for animals other than humans, there is
increasing evidence that the more intelligent mammals (monkeys and apes)
and birds (ravens and parrots)  do have regional cultures that are passed
along from one generation to the next.
This is further evidence that
thinking in images or diagrams is more basic than thinking in
words.
John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[robert marty]

Barthes was exaggerating ... he went back on his declarations later ... but
symbolic violence (which is exerted in particular on cultural minorities)
is a useful concept adopted by sociologists (Pierre Bourdieu and his school
in particular) ... and let's not forget Aesop: "language is the best and
the worst of things"!
RM

Le dim. 25 juil. 2021 à 18:36, Edwina Taborsky  a
écrit :

> Robert, List
>
> 1] What?! Language is fascist?! Does he even know what the term means?
> Most people who fling out this term have no understanding of its meaning.
> No, he's ignoring the work of, if I recall, someone like Michel Breal, who
> focused on language or speech as a living, almost biological reality that
> changed as its users changed. And Bakhtin's dialogic emphasis - as well as
> Peirce's dialogue and triad.
>
> You wrote:" language is a powerful filter in the expression of thought,
> while diagrams, which depend only on universal (or almost universal) graphic
> conventions, are virtually free of any influence."  Yes - language/speech
> ties meaning to its immediate users.
>
> 2] I agree with your pointing out this obligation to find a 'formal
> mathematized model and look for it in the "mathematical repository."
> Without such grounds - as you point out, we become sophists or 'bricoleurs'.
>
> 4] The answer is obvious.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun 25/07/21 11:21 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Dear John, List
>
> Your message leads me to multiple questions, which, in my opinion, raise
> fundamental problems.
>
>
>
> 1. JS > "Different people have different ways of thinking and talking."
>
>
> Yes, but the individuals, as a whole, do not think nor speak independently
> of each other; diverse common cultural codes connect them learned,
> inculcated like languages and signs organized in systems; for a significant
> part of them, they are imposed (symbolic violence). The semiologist Roland
> Barthes in his speech of reception, remained famous to the College of
> France (1977), denounced the languages as follows: "Language, as the
> performance of all language, is neither reactionary nor progressive; it is
> quite simply fascist; for fascism is not to prevent saying, it is to oblige
> to say." This is obviously a figure of exaggeration. However, it reflects
> that languages incorporate worldviews common to the people who use them
> natively (the Hegelian weltanschauung). For my part, I put this quote from
> Peirce at the beginning of my Ph.D. (1987): "All speech is but such an
> algebra, the repeated signs being the words, which have relations by virtue
> of the meanings associated with them."(CP 3.418). The fundamental
> distinction I share with you between thinking in words and thinking in
> diagrams thus results from the fact that language is a powerful filter in
> the expression of thought, while diagrams, which depend only on universal
> (or almost universal) graphic conventions, are virtually free of any
> influence.
>
> 2. JS > "Phenomenology, phaneroscopy, or phenoscopy is the first stage of 
> analyzing
> and interpreting the phaneron in diagrams.  It depends on the three
> branches of mathematics (formal logic, discrete math, and continuous math)
> to derive and classify the elements and patterns of elements."
>
> I agree, but I add that there are two ways to situate these observations:
>
>
>
> · either in the "Practical Sciences"( i.e.: "scientific inquiry
> with an ulterior end (1911) "- "for the uses of life",- "e.g. science of
> morality (ethics in common sense) "(see The outline of Peirce's
> classification of sciences
> 
> (1902-1911) compiled by Tommi Vehkavaara)
>
>
>
> · either in the "Sciences of Discovery" in which they depend on
> mathematics. Then we have to consider a formal mathematized model and look
> for it in the "mathematical repository."
>
>
>
> Question: If we find such a model (which is very easy considering only
> Peirce's definitions and what he says about the interdependence between the
> universal categories by involvement), don't we have an obligation to take
> it into account all along its deployment with Phenomenology in the first
> line, because the dependence of Phaneroscopy to Mathematics becomes quite
> explicit? Otherwise, won't we remain confined to the Practical Sciences in
> the company of the eternal conservative-bricoleurs?
>
> 3. JS  > "The patterns are possibilities (hypotheses or guesses) whose 
> probability
> is evaluated by the normative sciences." The syntactic mathematical model
> having been implemented in the universal categories become a semantic
> model. It appears then constitutive of phaneroscopy as a universal science
> of discovery; it is neither hypothesis nor enigma, because it does not have
> to be submitted to an evaluation, being exact by nature in all locations
> and at all times, unlike the experimental models whose 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Robert, List

1] What?! Language is fascist?! Does he even know what the term
means? Most people who fling out this term have no understanding of
its meaning. No, he's ignoring the work of, if I recall, someone like
Michel Breal, who focused on language or speech as a living, almost
biological reality that changed as its users changed. And Bakhtin's
dialogic emphasis - as well as Peirce's dialogue and triad. 

You wrote:" language is a powerful filter in the expression of
thought, while diagrams, which depend only on universal (or almost
universal) graphic conventions, are virtually free of any influence."
 Yes - language/speech ties meaning to its immediate users.

2] I agree with your pointing out this obligation to find a 'formal
mathematized model and look for it in the "mathematical repository." 
Without such grounds - as you point out, we become sophists or
'bricoleurs'.

4] The answer is obvious.

Edwina
 On Sun 25/07/21 11:21 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com
sent:
Dear John, List 

Your message leads me to multiple questions, which, in my opinion,
raise fundamental problems. 
1. JS > "Different people have different ways of thinking and
talking." 
 Yes, but the individuals, as a whole, do not think nor speak
independently of each other; diverse common cultural codes connect
them learned, inculcated like languages and signs organized in
systems; for a significant part of them, they are imposed (symbolic
violence). The semiologist Roland Barthes in his speech of reception,
remained famous to the College of France (1977), denounced the
languages as follows: "Language, as the performance of all language,
is neither reactionary nor progressive; it is quite simply fascist;
for fascism is not to prevent saying, it is to oblige to say." This
is obviously a figure of exaggeration. However, it reflects that
languages incorporate worldviews common to the people who use them
natively (the Hegelian weltanschauung). For my part, I put this quote
from Peirce at the beginning of my Ph.D. (1987): "All speech is but
such an algebra, the repeated signs being the words, which have
relations by virtue of the meanings associated with them."(CP 3.418).
The fundamental distinction I share with you between thinking in words
and thinking in diagrams thus results from the fact that language is a
powerful filter in the expression of thought, while diagrams, which
depend only on universal (or almost universal) graphic conventions,
are virtually free of any influence. 

 2. JS > "Phenomenology, phaneroscopy, or phenoscopy is the first
stage of analyzing and interpreting the phaneron in diagrams.  It
depends on the three branches of mathematics (formal logic, discrete
math, and continuous math) to derive and classify the elements and
patterns of elements."  

I agree, but I add that there are two ways to situate these
observations: 
· either in the "Practical Sciences"( i.e.: "scientific
inquiry with an ulterior end (1911) "- "for the uses of life",- "e.g.
science of morality (ethics in common sense) "(see The outline of
Peirce's classification of sciences (1902-1911) compiled by Tommi
Vehkavaara) 
· either in the "Sciences of Discovery" in which they
depend on mathematics. Then we have to consider a formal mathematized
model and look for it in the "mathematical repository." 
 Question: If we find such a model (which is very easy considering
only Peirce's definitions and what he says about the interdependence
between the universal categories by involvement), don't we have an
obligation to take it into account all along its deployment with
Phenomenology in the first line, because the dependence of
Phaneroscopy to Mathematics becomes quite explicit? Otherwise, won't
we remain confined to the Practical Sciences in the company of the
eternal conservative-bricoleurs? 

3. JS  > "The patterns are possibilities (hypotheses or guesses)
whose probability is evaluated by the normative sciences." The
syntactic mathematical model having been implemented in the universal
categories become a semantic model. It appears then constitutive of
phaneroscopy as a universal science of discovery; it is neither
hypothesis nor enigma, because it does not have to be submitted to an
evaluation, being exact by nature in all locations and at all times,
unlike the experimental models whose universality must be verified. 

The above argumentation is clearly in line with the framework below
extracted from The Structure of Scientific Theories (Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy) :

"A table helps summarize general aspects of the three views’
analyses of the structure of scientific theories: 
Syntactic View 

Semantic View 

Pragmatic View 
Theory Structure 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[robert marty]

Dear John, List

Your message leads me to multiple questions, which, in my opinion, raise
fundamental problems.



1. JS > "*Different people have different ways of thinking and talking."*


Yes, but the individuals, as a whole, do not think nor speak independently
of each other; diverse common cultural codes connect them learned,
inculcated like languages and signs organized in systems; for a significant
part of them, they are imposed (symbolic violence). The semiologist Roland
Barthes in his speech of reception, remained famous to the College of
France (1977), denounced the languages as follows: "*Language, as the
performance of all language, is neither reactionary nor progressive; it is
quite simply fascist; for fascism is not to prevent saying, it is to oblige
to say*." This is obviously a figure of exaggeration. However, it reflects
that languages incorporate worldviews common to the people who use them
natively (the Hegelian weltanschauung). For my part, I put this quote from
Peirce at the beginning of my Ph.D. (1987): *"All speech is but such an
algebra, the repeated signs being the words, which have relations by virtue
of the meanings associated with them*."(CP 3.418). The fundamental
distinction I share with you between thinking in words and thinking in
diagrams thus results from the fact that language is a powerful filter in
the expression of thought, while diagrams, which depend only on universal
(or almost *universal) *graphic conventions, are virtually free of any
influence.

2. JS >* "Phenomenology, phaneroscopy, or phenoscopy is the first stage of**
analyzing and interpreting the phaneron in diagrams.  It depends on the
three branches of mathematics (formal logic, discrete math, and continuous
math) to derive and classify the elements and patterns of elements." *

I agree, but I add that there are two ways to situate these observations:



· either in the "*Practical Sciences*"( *i.e.: "scientific inquiry
with an ulterior end (1911) "- "for the uses of life",- "e.g. science of
morality (ethics in common sense)* "(see The outline of Peirce's
classification of sciences

(1902-1911) compiled by Tommi Vehkavaara)



· either in the "Sciences of Discovery" in which they depend on
mathematics. Then we have to consider a formal mathematized model and look
for it in the "mathematical repository."



Question: If we find such a model (which is very easy considering only
Peirce's definitions and what he says about the interdependence between the
universal categories by involvement), don't we have an obligation to take
it into account all along its deployment with Phenomenology in the first
line, because the dependence of Phaneroscopy to Mathematics becomes quite
explicit? Otherwise, won't we remain confined to the Practical Sciences in
the company of the eternal conservative-bricoleurs?

3. JS*  > "The patterns are possibilities (hypotheses or guesses) whose**
probability is evaluated by the normative sciences." *The syntactic
mathematical model having been implemented in the universal categories
become a semantic model. It appears then constitutive of phaneroscopy as a
universal science of discovery; it is neither hypothesis nor enigma,
because it does not have to be submitted to an evaluation, being exact by
nature in all locations and at all times, unlike the experimental models
whose universality must be verified.

The above argumentation is clearly in line with the framework below
extracted from The Structure of Scientific Theories (Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy)
 :

"A table helps summarize general aspects of the three views’ analyses of
the structure of scientific theories:

*Syntactic View*

*Semantic View*

*Pragmatic View*

Theory Structure

Uninterpreted axiomatic system

(i) State-space,
(ii) Model-/set-theoretic

Internal and external pluralism

Theory Interpretation

Correspondence rules

(i) Hierarchy of models,
(ii) Similarity,
(iii) Isomorphism

(i) Structure already inflected by practice, function, and application
(ii) Pragmatic virtues

Is theory interpretation an aspect of theory structure?

Yes

No

Yes, although the distinction is hard to make.

Table 2. General aspects of each view’s analysis of the structure of
scientific theories."

4. RM > his leads me finally to a final question to be discussed: should
the classification of sciences according to Peirce be considered as a kind
of imperative to be respected or can phenomenology be approached from the
logic that depends on it according to this classification?
Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le sam. 24 juil. 2021 à 04:28, John F. Sowa  a écrit :

> Different people have different ways of thinking and talking.  

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Tom - exactly, exactly. [I've added this reply to the Peirce list
since I think your diagrams/models are excellent examples of the
Peircean categories and the Peircean relations in diagrams]. 

1]  Your 'knowledge graphs: ' Internationally, all individuals of
all ages can see and understand the visualization of knowledge in a
graph. The format is simple; nodes are connected by lines where each
is labelled with a common name."

And " knowledge graphs are derived from the provable reality in each
of the Peircean Categories of Possibility, Actuality, and Necessity.
In each category and as a whole, knowledge graphs expose the logical
truth."

The point is, graphs show Relations - not words or single object
units - but the relations these 'objects' can or do  have.

2] And - I noticed something else: You wrote about 'knowledge domain
layers' that: "an ontology document [can] only import another ontology
document from the same layer or from a lower level layer". This is
exactly the same ontological format that is being set up and
discussed here - with mathematics being a 'lower level layer' than
the phaneron'. 

So - your functional use of the Peircean framework - in 'model
driven architecture -  shows us that Peirce provided a logical
analysis of reality. 

Many thanks for the link. 

Edwina
 On Sun 25/07/21 10:41 AM , Tom Tinsley ttins...@tampabay.rr.com
sent:
 Edwina,Here are some dynamic diagrams in each Peircean category :
https://otterserver.com/logically-consistent-knowledge-graphs/peircean-categories-visualization/Tom
Tinsley
  Sent from my Verizon, Samsung Galaxy smartphone
  Original message From: Edwina Taborsky  Date:
7/25/21  8:55 AM  (GMT-05:00) To: tabor...@primus.ca,
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu, "John F. Sowa"  Cc:
ontolog-fo...@googlegroups.com  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in
diagrams vs thinking in words 
 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

I wonder if diagrammatic thinking is focused more on relations than
specific and separate individual units, i.e., verbs and
subjects/objects.

That is, I long ago noticed that some indigenous languages which are
oral rather than literate- and I'd include ancient Chinese and Latin -
have the verb at the end of the sentence.  So, the format is
Subject/Object/Verb.  Our modern format - and that includes modern
Chinese, has put the verb in between the Subject and Object. So,  the
meaning becomes X does something to Y...and in a way, X is not
affected by the action.  

To me, this old oral format means that the subject and object are
together co-involved within the actions of the verb. I think this
fits in with Peirce's triadic format where the Representamen/Sign
mediates between the Object and Interpretant. And where the
Interpretant does affect the original Object.  So, the format here is
X/Y are involved in an action. ..and both are affected by this action.


So- I'm wondering if diagrams are also easier to understand because
they clarify the relations that are going on. 

Edwina
 On Sat 24/07/21  6:06 PM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Edwina,
 Yes.  That is a major advantage of diagrams:
 ET> I agree that diagrams are more fundamental than words, since
their
 attributes are less open to multiple interpretations.  That includes
 both the written and spoken word, with the latter overlaid with
 meanings provided by tone and rhythm and the former open to many
 misinterpretations because of the lack of both.  [As we find in
email
 and text messages].
 The phaneron, as initially experienced, is independent of any bias.
 But every step of interpreting the experience adds biases from
 the individual's conscious knowledge, unconscious habits, cultural
 traditions, and linguistic constraints of vocabulary, syntax, and
 semantics.  Those biases may be good, bad, or neutral.
 As an example, the subjects for a psycholinguistic experiment
 were asked to sort photographs into similar groups, according
 to any grouping they considered relevant.  Some of the
 subjects happened to be native speakers of Yoruba, which has
 a color classification that is very different from English
 and other European languages.
 After the subjects did their sorting, the experimenter said
 "Think in Yoruba."  The subjects laughed and immediately resorted
 the photographs in a completely different grouping.  When they
 switched from thinking in English to thinking in Yoruba, they
 completely reorganized their interpretations.
 And by the way, I also cc'd a note to Peirce-L, which I had sent
 to Ontolog Forum with the title "Modal Logic is an Immense
 Swamp".  That note addresses issues about logic for which
 Peirce's writings are still at the forefront of  research today.
 Before reading that note, I recommend the slides I cited in it:
 http://j

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

I wonder if diagrammatic thinking is focused more on relations than
specific and separate individual units, i.e., verbs and
subjects/objects.

That is, I long ago noticed that some indigenous languages which are
oral rather than literate- and I'd include ancient Chinese and Latin -
have the verb at the end of the sentence.  So, the format is
Subject/Object/Verb.  Our modern format - and that includes modern
Chinese, has put the verb in between the Subject and Object. So,  the
meaning becomes X does something to Y...and in a way, X is not
affected by the action. 

To me, this old oral format means that the subject and object are
together co-involved within the actions of the verb. I think this
fits in with Peirce's triadic format where the Representamen/Sign
mediates between the Object and Interpretant. And where the
Interpretant does affect the original Object.  So, the format here is
X/Y are involved in an action. ..and both are affected by this action.


So- I'm wondering if diagrams are also easier to understand because
they clarify the relations that are going on.

Edwina
 On Sat 24/07/21  6:06 PM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Edwina,
 Yes.  That is a major advantage of diagrams:
 ET> I agree that diagrams are more fundamental than words, since
their
 attributes are less open to multiple interpretations.  That includes
 both the written and spoken word, with the latter overlaid with
 meanings provided by tone and rhythm and the former open to many
 misinterpretations because of the lack of both.  [As we find in
email
 and text messages].
 The phaneron, as initially experienced, is independent of any bias.
 But every step of interpreting the experience adds biases from
 the individual's conscious knowledge, unconscious habits, cultural
 traditions, and linguistic constraints of vocabulary, syntax, and
 semantics.  Those biases may be good, bad, or neutral.
 As an example, the subjects for a psycholinguistic experiment
 were asked to sort photographs into similar groups, according
 to any grouping they considered relevant.  Some of the
 subjects happened to be native speakers of Yoruba, which has
 a color classification that is very different from English
 and other European languages.
 After the subjects did their sorting, the experimenter said
 "Think in Yoruba."  The subjects laughed and immediately resorted
 the photographs in a completely different grouping.  When they
 switched from thinking in English to thinking in Yoruba, they
 completely reorganized their interpretations.
 And by the way, I also cc'd a note to Peirce-L, which I had sent
 to Ontolog Forum with the title "Modal Logic is an Immense
 Swamp".  That note addresses issues about logic for which
 Peirce's writings are still at the forefront of  research today.
 Before reading that note, I recommend the slides I cited in it:
 http://jfsowa.com/talks/eswc.pdf
 1. For a brief overview of existential graphs, skip to slides
 14 to 21 of escw.pdf.
 2. For issues about mapping English (and other languages) to EGs,
 see slides 21 to 35.
 3. For the differences between thinking in diagrams and thinking
 in words, see slides 36 to 52.
 To complete the loop, I'm also cc'ing this note to Ontolog Forum.
 John 
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