Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
ve been over your rejection of the Sign as a triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant and your confining of the term 'Sign' to refer only to the mediate Representamen. Again, read 4.551 to its end. There is no positive point in continuing this discussion since it's been done to exhaustion before. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 1:02 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: I know that we have been over this ground before, and I am not interested in repeating our past discussions, but there may be some following along now who were not on the List back then. Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality from existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former. Everything that exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may never be) actualized. Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular. If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals. Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the triad - and it's elsewhere as well. You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general when in a mode of Thirdness. But you know all of that anyway. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: Gary, list: I presume you are being sarcastic. I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently, is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: Edwina, List, It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview Jeff, list "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551 Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying that 'reality
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
in themselves (not their instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may never be) actualized. Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular. If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals. Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the triad - and it's elsewhere as well. You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general when in a mode of Thirdness. But you know all of that anyway. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [4] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [5] On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Gary, list: I presume you are being sarcastic. I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently, is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: Edwina, List, It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview Jeff, list "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551 Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a bacterium. Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate seems to be on the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of th
Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
subset of the former. Everything >>>>> that exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is >>>>> precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their >>>>> instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may >>>>> never be) actualized. >>>>> >>>>> Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular. >>>>> If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see >>>>>> the triad - and it's elsewhere as well. >>>>>> >>>>>> You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad >>>>>> of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general >>>>>> when in a mode of Thirdness. >>>>>> >>>>>> But you know all of that anyway. >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>>>>> sent: >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina, List: >>>>>> >>>>>> I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you >>>>>> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. >>>>>> >>>>>> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that >>>>>> every >>>>>> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my >>>>>> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Gary, list: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I presume you are being sarcastic. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this >>>>>>> view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted >>>>>>> frequently, >>>>>>> is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within >>>>>>> 'material' >>>>>>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in >>>>>>> space >>>>>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I >>>>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of >>>>>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often >>>>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Edwina >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Edwina, List, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as >>>>>>> your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on >>>>>>> logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into >>>>>>> Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about >>>>>>> “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to >>>>>>> clarify >>>>>>> those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless >>>>>>> others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a
Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
gt;>>> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. >>>> >>>> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every >>>> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my >>>> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Gary, list: >>>>> >>>>> I presume you are being sarcastic. >>>>> >>>>> I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this >>>>> view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently, >>>>> is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' >>>>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space >>>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I >>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of >>>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often >>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. >>>>> >>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: >>>>> >>>>> Edwina, List, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your >>>>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on >>>>> logical >>>>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s >>>>> Lowell >>>>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary >>>>> reasoning” >>>>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m >>>>> ready >>>>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to >>>>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena >>>>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most >>>>> complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his >>>>> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in >>>>> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, >>>>> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell >>>>> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that >>>>> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of >>>>> resolving >>>>> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with >>>>> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this >>>>> as >>>>> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Gary f. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] >>>>> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 >>>>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard >>>>> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview >>>>> >>>>> Jeff, list >>>>> >>>>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the >>>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical >>>>> world"not >>>>> only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there >>>>> cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot >>>>> be thought without Signs"...4.551 >>>>> >>>>> Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying >>>>> that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying >>>>> that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances >>>>> embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, >>>>> functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his >>>>> explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, >>>>> in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word >>>>> rather than a bacterium. >>>>> >>>>> Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can >>>>> be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the >>>>> true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate seems to be on >>>>> the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the >>>>> premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account >>>>> [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these >>>>> three forms of argument.. >>>>> >>>>> And I also agree with your other two points. >>>>> >>>>> I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar >>>>> outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> >> >> - >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm>http://www.cspeirce.com/ >> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
> >>>> Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality >>>> from existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former. Everything >>>> that exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is >>>> precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their >>>> instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may >>>> never be) actualized. >>>> >>>> Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular. >>>> If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon >>>> >>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see >>>>> the triad - and it's elsewhere as well. >>>>> >>>>> You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad >>>>> of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general >>>>> when in a mode of Thirdness. >>>>> >>>>> But you know all of that anyway. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>>>> sent: >>>>> >>>>> Edwina, List: >>>>> >>>>> I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you >>>>> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. >>>>> >>>>> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that >>>>> every >>>>> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my >>>>> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Gary, list: >>>>>> >>>>>> I presume you are being sarcastic. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this >>>>>> view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently, >>>>>> is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within >>>>>> 'material' >>>>>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in >>>>>> space >>>>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I >>>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of >>>>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often >>>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. >>>>>> >>>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina, List, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your >>>>>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on >>>>>> logical >>>>>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s >>>>>> Lowell >>>>>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary >>>>>> reasoning” >>>>>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m >>>>>> ready >>>>>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to >>>>>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena >>>>>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most >>>>
Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
t;>>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of >>>>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often >>>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. >>>>>> >>>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina, List, >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your >>>>>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on >>>>>> logical >>>>>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s >>>>>> Lowell >>>>>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary >>>>>> reasoning” >>>>>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m >>>>>> ready >>>>>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to >>>>>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena >>>>>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most >>>>>> complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his >>>>>> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in >>>>>> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, >>>>>> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely >>>>>> Lowell >>>>>> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that >>>>>> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of >>>>>> resolving >>>>>> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone >>>>>> with >>>>>> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this >>>>>> as >>>>>> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Gary f. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] >>>>>> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 >>>>>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard >>>>>> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview >>>>>> >>>>>> Jeff, list >>>>>> >>>>>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the >>>>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical >>>>>> world"not >>>>>> only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there >>>>>> cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot >>>>>> be thought without Signs"...4.551 >>>>>> >>>>>> Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not >>>>>> saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am >>>>>> saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within >>>>>> 'instances embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which >>>>>> is a >>>>>> General, functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his >>>>>> explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, >>>>>> in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a >>>>>> word >>>>>> rather than a bacterium. >>>>>> >>>>>> Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can >>>>>> be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the >>>>>> true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate seems to be >>>>>> on >>>>>> the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the >>>>>> premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account >>>>>> [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these >>>>>> three forms of argument.. >>>>>> >>>>>> And I also agree with your other two points. >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar >>>>>> outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. >>>>>> >>>>>> Edwina >>>>>> >>>>>> >>> >>> - >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe >>> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >>> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> - >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm>http://www.cspeirce.com/ >> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality from existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former. Everything that exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may never be) actualized. Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular. If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals. Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the triad - and it's elsewhere as well. You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general when in a mode of Thirdness. But you know all of that anyway. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [7] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [8] On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Gary, list: I presume you are being sarcastic. I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently, is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: Edwina, List, It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview Jeff, list "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551 Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a bacterium. Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the true/false nature of their premisesan
Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
ate in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality from existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former. Everything that exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may never be) actualized. Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular. If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals. Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the triad - and it's elsewhere as well. You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general when in a mode of Thirdness. But you know all of that anyway. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [4] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [5] On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Gary, list: I presume you are being sarcastic. I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently, is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: Edwina, List, It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview Jeff, list "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551 Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a bacterium. Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the true/false nature of their premisesan
Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
gt; Edwina >>> >>> On Mon 16/10/17 1:02 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>> sent: >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> I know that we have been over this ground before, and I am not >>> interested in repeating our past discussions, but there may be some >>> following along now who were not on the List back then. >>> >>> Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality from >>> existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former. Everything that >>> exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is >>> precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their >>> instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may >>> never be) actualized. >>> >>> Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular. >>> If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the >>>> triad - and it's elsewhere as well. >>>> >>>> You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad >>>> of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general >>>> when in a mode of Thirdness. >>>> >>>> But you know all of that anyway. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>>> sent: >>>> >>>> Edwina, List: >>>> >>>> I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you >>>> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. >>>> >>>> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every >>>> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my >>>> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> >>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Gary, list: >>>>> >>>>> I presume you are being sarcastic. >>>>> >>>>> I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this >>>>> view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently, >>>>> is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' >>>>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space >>>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I >>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of >>>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often >>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. >>>>> >>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. >>>>> >>>>> Edwina >>>>> >>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: >>>>> >>>>> Edwina, List, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your >>>>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on >>>>> logical >>>>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s >>>>> Lowell >>>>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary >>>>> reasoning” >>>>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m >>>>> ready >>>>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to >>>>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena >>>>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most >>>>> comple
Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
a> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the >>> triad - and it's elsewhere as well. >>> >>> You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad of >>> Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general when in >>> a mode of Thirdness. >>> >>> But you know all of that anyway. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com >>> sent: >>> >>> Edwina, List: >>> >>> I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you >>> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. >>> >>> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every >>> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my >>> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Gary, list: >>>> >>>> I presume you are being sarcastic. >>>> >>>> I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this >>>> view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently, >>>> is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' >>>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space >>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I >>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of >>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often >>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. >>>> >>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: >>>> >>>> Edwina, List, >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your >>>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical >>>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell >>>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” >>>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready >>>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to >>>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena >>>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most >>>> complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his >>>> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in >>>> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, >>>> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell >>>> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that >>>> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving >>>> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with >>>> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as >>>> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Gary f. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] >>>> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 >>>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard >>>> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview >>>> >>>> Jeff, list >>>> >>>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the >>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not >>>> only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there >>>> cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot >&g
Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
>>> >>> >>> >>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your >>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical >>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell >>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” >>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready >>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to >>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. >>> >>> >>> >>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena >>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most >>> complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his >>> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in >>> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, >>> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell >>> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that >>> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving >>> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with >>> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as >>> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. >>> >>> >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >>> >>> >>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] >>> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 >>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard >>> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview >>> >>> Jeff, list >>> >>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the >>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not >>> only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there >>> cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot >>> be thought without Signs"...4.551 >>> >>> Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying >>> that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying >>> that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances >>> embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, >>> functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his >>> explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, >>> in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word >>> rather than a bacterium. >>> >>> Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be >>> valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the >>> true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate seems to be on >>> the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the >>> premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account >>> [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these >>> three forms of argument.. >>> >>> And I also agree with your other two points. >>> >>> I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar >>> outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
f Peirce’s whole philosophy. Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview Jeff, list "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551 Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a bacterium. Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate seems to be on the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these three forms of argument.. And I also agree with your other two points. I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. Edwina Links: -- [1] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [2] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Edwina, List: I know that we have been over this ground before, and I am not interested in repeating our past discussions, but there may be some following along now who were not on the List back then. Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality from existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former. Everything that exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may never be) actualized. Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular. If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals. Regards, Jon On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the > triad - and it's elsewhere as well. > > You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad of > Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general when in a > mode of Thirdness. > > But you know all of that anyway. > > Edwina > > On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you > distinguish reality from existence in your statements below. > > I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every > Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time." On my > reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Gary, list: >> >> I presume you are being sarcastic. >> >> I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this >> view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently, >> is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' >> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space >> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I >> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of >> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often >> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce. >> >> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting. >> >> Edwina >> >> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: >> >> Edwina, List, >> >> >> >> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your >> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical >> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell >> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” >> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready >> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to >> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead. >> >> >> >> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena to >> an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete >> public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his >> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in >> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, >> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell >> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that >> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving >> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with >> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as >> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] >> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24 >> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard >> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview >> >> Jeff, list >> >> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the >> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not >> only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there >> cannot be a General without Inst
Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see
the triad - and it's elsewhere as well.
You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the
triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is
general when in a mode of Thirdness.
But you know all of that anyway.
Edwina
On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how
you distinguish reality from existence in your statements below.
I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view
that every Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and
time." On my reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly
general.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Gary, list:
I presume you are being sarcastic.
I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted
frequently, is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential'
within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic
particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or
a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have
any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within
Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of
course, by Peirce.
So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.
Edwina
On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca [4] sent:
Edwina, List,
It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as
your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus
on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into
Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all
about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll
need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell
2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we
move ahead.
As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “
Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his
last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and
their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that
context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to
follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of
them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we
now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce
regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have
been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training
in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into
deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy.
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [5]]
Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [6]; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Jeff, list
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops
there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying
it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551
Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not
saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I
am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists'
within 'instances embodying it'. This means that
Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and
Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of
4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in
time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a
bacterium.
Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction,
can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking
about the true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate
seems to be on the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false
nature of the premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into
account [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your
outline of these three forms of argument..
And I also agree with your other two points.
I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar
outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis.
Edwina
Links:
--
[1
Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Jeff, list "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551 Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances embodying it'. This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a bacterium. Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate seems to be on the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these three forms of argument.. And I also agree with your other two points. I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. Edwina On Mon 16/10/17 12:17 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent: Edwina, List, I assume you are articulating your own view--which is shared by a number of materialist oriented philosophers and scientists including Hobbes, Boyle and others. On my reading of the relevant texts, I believe Peirce argued against such a materialist position--even one that take the material realm to be an "articulation of Mind." It isn't obvious to me what the latter clause adds, but I am willing to be enlightened. Here are four such lines of argument. 1. Arguments for the validity of deduction require at least a verbal definition of the real, where the character of the real is not exhausted by individuals of a material character--not even if one brings a conception of individuals like us with minds into that realm. 2. Arguments for the validity of induction and abduction require a real definition of the real, where that account adds yet more to the character of the real as generals (e.g., general properties, laws of nature, etc.) that govern the relations between what is possible and what is actual. 3. Having developed these two lines of argument within the context of a critical logic, Peirce argues for an account of the real as having the character of what is truly continuous as a regulative principle within methodeutic. Such a principle is necessary for the healthy development and robust communication of scientific theories of all sorts, including natural and social sciences. 4. With these arguments in hand, Peirce applies the principles of logic to the study of questions of metaphysics. Here, he forges a position that unifies elements of both realism and objective idealism. These four strands of argument each seem to work against the claim that there isn't anything 'real' outside of the material world - even when we take the material world to be an articulation of Mind. One way of responding is to say that I'm reading Peirce wrong on one or more of these lines of argument. Another way to respond is to say that your position is different from Peirce's, and that he is wrong and you are right where there is disagreement. Or, there might some third way to respond. Let me know if one of these avenues fits with what you take yourself to be doing. As things stand, it isn't clear to me what you are doing in making such assertions, but my assumption that is fits the second option. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 - From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Sunday, October 15, 2017 1:41 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview I don't think that there is anything 'real' outside of the material world - and I understand the material world to be an articulation of Mind. [Again, I won't repeat 4.551]. I see the reality of Mind as articulated within/as the material world; Mind doesn't exist 'per se' outside of these existential instantiations. Mathematics is an intellectual abstraction of this reality-as-existential. I don't think you arrive at necessary reasoning, deduction, without having gone through the processes of abduction and induction. That is, since Deduction
Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Edwina, List, I assume you are articulating your own view--which is shared by a number of materialist oriented philosophers and scientists including Hobbes, Boyle and others. On my reading of the relevant texts, I believe Peirce argued against such a materialist position--even one that take the material realm to be an "articulation of Mind." It isn't obvious to me what the latter clause adds, but I am willing to be enlightened. Here are four such lines of argument. 1. Arguments for the validity of deduction require at least a verbal definition of the real, where the character of the real is not exhausted by individuals of a material character--not even if one brings a conception of individuals like us with minds into that realm. 2. Arguments for the validity of induction and abduction require a real definition of the real, where that account adds yet more to the character of the real as generals (e.g., general properties, laws of nature, etc.) that govern the relations between what is possible and what is actual. 3. Having developed these two lines of argument within the context of a critical logic, Peirce argues for an account of the real as having the character of what is truly continuous as a regulative principle within methodeutic. Such a principle is necessary for the healthy development and robust communication of scientific theories of all sorts, including natural and social sciences. 4. With these arguments in hand, Peirce applies the principles of logic to the study of questions of metaphysics. Here, he forges a position that unifies elements of both realism and objective idealism. These four strands of argument each seem to work against the claim that there isn't anything 'real' outside of the material world - even when we take the material world to be an articulation of Mind. One way of responding is to say that I'm reading Peirce wrong on one or more of these lines of argument. Another way to respond is to say that your position is different from Peirce's, and that he is wrong and you are right where there is disagreement. Or, there might some third way to respond. Let me know if one of these avenues fits with what you take yourself to be doing. As things stand, it isn't clear to me what you are doing in making such assertions, but my assumption that is fits the second option. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> Sent: Sunday, October 15, 2017 1:41 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview I don't think that there is anything 'real' outside of the material world - and I understand the material world to be an articulation of Mind. [Again, I won't repeat 4.551]. I see the reality of Mind as articulated within/as the material world; Mind doesn't exist 'per se' outside of these existential instantiations. Mathematics is an intellectual abstraction of this reality-as-existential. I don't think you arrive at necessary reasoning, deduction, without having gone through the processes of abduction and induction. That is, since Deduction is operationally triadic, then, in a Necessary Deduction, don't its premises have to be true? For example, can I assume that a purely intellectual opinion/conclusion, 'the universe was created in one day"" - is a necessary deductive? The premises would be: 'the bible says so'...etc. Or is it "Deduction is an argument whose Interpretant represents that it belongs to a general class of possible arguments precisely analogous which are such that in the long run of experience the greater part of those whose premises are true will have true conclusions" 2.267...Now, a "Necessary Deductions are those which have nothing to do with any ratio of frequency but profess [or their interpretants profess for them] that from true premises they must invariably produce true conclusions" 2.267 That is - isn't Peirce's Objective Idealism firmly rooted in phenomenology; i.e., in experience- and these experiences have been shown, by repetition, to be true, such that one no longer requires further experience? Edwina On Sun 15/10/17 4:02 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: Edwina, Despite the accurate Peirce quotes, your last paragraph still confuses Truth with the real law that tends toward the truth. Peirce is clearly saying that this real law operates in any and every universe (domain, realm) which can be the object of a valid argument — including the purely imaginary realm of mathematics. It does not operate only in “the real material world” (as if only the material world were real). Actually, insofar as we are talking about the real law governing deduction, or “necessary reasoning,” we never know whether a conclusion is factual: “Necessary reasoni
Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
I don't think that there is anything 'real' outside of the material world - and I understand the material world to be an articulation of Mind. [Again, I won't repeat 4.551]. I see the reality of Mind as articulated within/as the material world; Mind doesn't exist 'per se' outside of these existential instantiations. Mathematics is an intellectual abstraction of this reality-as-existential. I don't think you arrive at necessary reasoning, deduction, without having gone through the processes of abduction and induction. That is, since Deduction is operationally triadic, then, in a Necessary Deduction, don't its premises have to be true? For example, can I assume that a purely intellectual opinion/conclusion, 'the universe was created in one day"" - is a necessary deductive? The premises would be: 'the bible says so'...etc. Or is it "Deduction is an argument whose Interpretant represents that it belongs to a general class of possible arguments precisely analogous which are such that in the long run of experience the greater part of those whose premises are true will have true conclusions" 2.267...Now, a "Necessary Deductions are those which have nothing to do with any ratio of frequency but profess [or their interpretants profess for them] that from true premises they must invariably produce true conclusions" 2.267 That is - isn't Peirce's Objective Idealism firmly rooted in phenomenology; i.e., in experience- and these experiences have been shown, by repetition, to be true, such that one no longer requires further experience? Edwina On Sun 15/10/17 4:02 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: Edwina, Despite the accurate Peirce quotes, your last paragraph still confuses Truth with the real law that tends toward the truth. Peirce is clearly saying that this real law operates in any and every universe (domain, realm) which can be the object of a valid argument — including the purely imaginary realm of mathematics. It does not operate only in “the real material world” (as if only the material world were real). Actually, insofar as we are talking about the real law governing deduction, or “necessary reasoning,” we never know whether a conclusion is factual: “Necessary reasoning can never answer questions of fact. It has to assume its premisses to be true.” (That’s a quote from Lowell 2). Gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 15-Oct-17 13:39 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview Gary, list: Peirce wrote: "I have no objection to saying that in my opinion what makes a reasoning sound is the real law that the general method which that reasoning more or less consciously pursues does tend toward the truth." And, "The very essence of an argument,— that which distinguishes it from all other kinds of signs,— is that it professes to be the representative of a general method of procedure tending toward the truth. To say that this method tends toward the true is to say that it is a real law that existences will follow." An Argument is a semiosic process, and is as valid in the biological realm as it is in the Seminar Room. The semiosic Argument functions as a 'real law that existences will follow'. Therefore, the existence that emerges/exists within this real law is 'the truth of that law'. That's how I see it. I don't confine 'Truth' to the Seminar Room of rhetoric and human mental analysis; I think it operates in the real material world. Edwina On Sun 15/10/17 1:27 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca [1] sent: Edwina, Your first sentence introduces a bit of confusion. Peirce does not say that truth is a is a real law that existences will follow; he says that the “general method of procedure tending toward the truth” is a real law that existences will follow. This method, or law, is what makes a consequent follow from an antecedent. Every argument implicitly claims to follow that general method, and if it really does, then the argument is sound. But the “following” is independent of the factual truth of the premisses. Peirce is essentially asking us what it means to say that one fact or idea really follows from another, and in Lecture 2 he will give an answer that analyzes the “following” (the inference process) into as many small steps as possible. And he will do this for deductive, mathematical, “necessary” reasoning, where the “facts” are about mathematical objects which have no empirical existence in the usual sense of “empirical.” In short, this law or method is not itself a fact, nor is it “truth.” It is general, and its whole mode of being consists in really governing a reasoning process so that “the conclusions of that method really will be true, to the extent and in the manner in which the argument pretends that they will.” Gary f.
