RE: [biosemiotics:7087] Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Example of Dicisign?
Ben, Tom, lists, It’s true that denotation (the noun) is one of the synonyms for extension or breadth (as opposed to comprehension or depth) when applied to a term. But Peirce, from early on, extended the application of these terms from terms to propositions; and in any context where he is discussing the proposition and its structure, as he is in “Kaina Stoicheia”, he is always careful to distinguish between denoting and signifying as the semiotic functions which furnish the proposition with its breadth and depth respectively. In a proposition the subject denotes the individual object (indexically), while the predicate signifies its characters (iconically). The noun form “denotation” is properly derived from the verb “denote”, but this can lead to confusion if applied to terms. In his Baldwin’s Dictionary entry on “Signification” — http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Signification — where Peirce tried to clear up some of the confusion resulting from Mill’s use of “connotation” for depth, he wrote: A general term denotes whatever there may be which possesses the characters which it signifies; J. S. Mill uses, in place of signifies, the term connotes, a word which he or his father picked up in Ockham. But signify has been in uninterrupted use in this sense since the 12th century, when John of Salisbury spoke of ‘quod fere in omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse appellativa significant, et aliud esse quod nominant. Nominantur singularia; sed universalia significantur.’ Nothing can be clearer. Singulars are denoted (or named), universals are signified; or in more Peircean English, a proposition conveys information by denoting an individual object and signifying the general characters of that object. Rhemes and predicates cannot denote. In the dicisign, which has the same structure, the denoting is done by an index, and the signifying by an icon; the icon is incapable of denoting, but the index must involve an icon (which may be quite complex) in order to inform the ‘reader’ of the sign about the object (which, though singular, can also be quite complex). Rhemes, predicates and icons This is crucial for understanding the syntax of the dicisign, which is the subject of NP 3.7. gary f. From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: 4-Oct-14 7:35 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:7087] Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Example of Dicisign? Gary F., Tom, list, Gary, are you sure you're not confusing denotation with designation or indication? The denotation of 'red' is all red things, or the population of red things; the comprehension (or significance) of 'red' is the quality _red _ and all that that implies. That's why denotation (breadth) and comprehension (depth) vary inversely when the information remains the same. Anyway, that's how I've understood it. Best, Ben On 10/4/2014 7:11 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: Tom, I’m afraid you’re adding to the confusion here by talking about “two kinds of denotation.” In a proposition, the subject denotes objects, while the predicate signifies characters. This is what Peirce is saying in your quote from “Kaina Stoicheia” (MS 517), and it’s the standard terminology in Peircean logic. If we confuse denoting with signifying, we will end up confusing indices with icons, and then we’ll be lost when it comes to the semiotics of dicisigns, which must connect iconic with indexical signs. gary f. From: Tom Gollier [mailto:tgoll...@gmail.com] Sent: 4-Oct-14 5:55 PM Evgenii and list, I find your example interesting in that the two kinds of denotation: If a sign, B, only signifies characters that are elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, A, then B is said to be a predicate (or essential part) of A. If a sign, A, only denotes real objects that are a part or the whole of the objects denoted by another sign, B, then A is said to be a subject (or substantial part) of B. (MS 517) involved with the subject and predicate of a dicisign seem clearer. 1. The analogical denotation of the subject between the shape of the artwork and the shape of the United States. While this analogy is not so problematic here, it can be, and I think the commentators have been too quick to dismiss it, if they even mention it. The casuistry surrounding this denotation has been lost to philosophy, thanks to Pascal, but it still survives, to some extent, in our legal profession, and being the basis of applying the dicisign in the first place, it should not be ignored. 2. The consequential denotation of the predicate, the guns filling the United States. This does involve the operations of the dicisign and the way that the guns fill the country. As with all works of art, there is some ambiguity there. But more importantly, as denoting the same object as the subject, it involves the truth of the different expressions, they different ways guns fill or characterize the country.
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7091] Re: Example of Dicisign?
Tom, lists, See my previous message (sorry about the bit before the last sentence that I forgot to delete before sending). My replies to this one are inserted: gary f. From: Tom Gollier [mailto:tgoll...@gmail.com] Sent: 4-Oct-14 7:50 PM Gary and list, A does signify B in the first part of the quote. That's what I took as the operational sense. But in the second part of the quote it says: If a sign, A, only denotes real objects that are a part or the whole of the objects denoted by another sign, B, then A is said to be a subject (or substantial part) of B. [GF] It should be clear that the sign B here is a proposition. Far from confusing Peirce, I think this distinguishes him from the modern tendency toward infinite signifying (semiosis), on the one hand, and postulating a metaphysical universe of true facts, on the other. [GF] I think I see what you mean here, but I also think it’s more important for our purposes to emphasize Peirce’s definition of “fact” in “Kaina Stoicheia” (EP2:304): “What we call a “fact” is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to express “fact,” and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe.” This sounds very much like “postulating a metaphysical universe of true facts,” but note what Peirce says just before the part you quoted: “it is highly convenient to express ourselves in terms of a metaphysical theory; and we no more bind ourselves to an acceptance of it than we do when we use substantives such as “humanity,” “variety,” etc. and speak of them as if they were substances, in the metaphysical sense.” Tom - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [biosemiotics:7079] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word symbol is used in the language of physics. As such, it explains why the language of physics is of limited use in semiotics. In discussing Natural Propositions, we are deploying Peirces definition of symbol as a sign which is fit to serve as such simply because it will be so interpreted (http://www.gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm#3e). This post, for example, is a symbol because the semiotic systems (languages and technologies) at my end are sufficiently similar to those at your end that I can assume that it will be interpreted as a sign of what I mean to say. The rules governing semiotic systems can be called codes if you like, and thus as Bateson put it, All messages are coded. Peirce on the other hand calls them legisigns. (The laws of nature are also legisigns.) gary f. From: Howard Pattee [mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com] Sent: 4-Oct-14 9:54 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List' Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:7079] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6 At 01:39 PM 10/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman quotes Peirce: Peirce: When an assertion is made, there really is some speaker, writer, or other signmaker who delivers it; and he supposes there is, or will be, some hearer, reader, or other interpreter who will receive it. It may be a stranger upon a different planet, an æon later; or it may be that very same man as he will be a second after. In any case, the deliverer makes signals to the receiver. HP: Here is another view of how this works. In our case, from the moment we type an assertion, draw a diagram, or attach a photo, all the communicated information is immediately coded into bit sequences by Boolean algebra (not logic) and transmitted worldwide by Hertzian waves or light (the same thing at shorter wavelengths). In principle, all the coding can be done by Peirce Arrows (NAND gates) and all the electrons and waves obey Maxwell's equations. At the receiver sequences are decoded, and the sender and receiver do not care about the math, physics, or the bit sequences, which is precisely why the bit sequences are pure symbols and not icons, indices, or any tokens with intrinsic physical similarities or meanings. In the language of physics, the conditions for a pure symbol vehicle with the function of efficiently communicating information of any type is that neither the physical structure nor the sequential order of the symbols are determined or influenced by physical laws. That means the sequences do not differ significantly in energy or forces between them. All efficient information structures like sequences and memories are called energy degenerate. That does not mean communication is independent of laws. The 2nd law of thermodynamics says that every bit of information added, erased, coded, decoded or used will dissipate a little energy (On the Internet this adds up to enormous energy dissipation). Also, the speed and size of symbol manipulating chemistry in brains or hardware gates is limited by quantum mechanics. In the language of Communication Theory, for efficient communication of any type of information, all the meaning should be hidden by codes that translate the information into meaningless symbols. Howard - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [biosemiotics:7087] Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Example of Dicisign?
Gary F., Tom, lists,
A predicate's denotation can be narrowed (and anyway can't be broadened)
by an index attached to it. The resultant compound's denotation is thus
the index's denotation. So one could get to thinking that the index does
the denoting, while the icon or symbol does not. Yet the falsehood of a
proposition is reflected in a clash of denotations: 'Jack is a farmer'
is false if 'farmer' does not include Jack in its denotation, which
amounts to the same thing as that Jack lacks the characteristic
signified by 'farmer'.
Predicates, rhemes, etc., can and do denote. (Also, both subject sign
and predicate sign are rhemes.) I don't think that Peirce, for his part,
ever said or implied otherwise.
As to the Salisbury quote:
[Quote Peirce]
This has to do with the distinction of logical Extension and
Comprehension which Professor Bowen teaches was discovered by the
Port Royalists although it was pretty well known in the middle ages.
Enough so for John of Salisbury to refer to it as quod fere in
omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse quod appellativa
_/significant/_, et aliud esse quod _/nominant/_. Nominantur
singularia, sed universalia significantur. By _/appellativa/_ here
he means as I take it adjectives and such like.
[W 2.328 in Ockham, Lecture 3 on British logicians, 1869]
Note there Peirce identifies the notion of logical Extension with the
idea of naming, not just of describing. Singulars are denoted, named
('singularia nominantur'), not only by proper names (proper nouns) but
also by common names (common nouns). 'Lion' is a name for lions; it also
signifies certain characters. (Translation of Salisbury's quote: which
almost in everyone's mouth frequently is that one thing clearly is that
which appellatives signify, and another is that which they name. Named
are singulars, universals are signified.)
Best, Ben
On 10/5/2014 7:15 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Ben, Tom, lists,
It’s true that /denotation/ (the noun) is one of the synonyms for
/extension/ or /breadth/ (as opposed to /comprehension/ or /depth/ )
when applied to a term. But Peirce, from early on, extended the
application of these terms from /terms/ to /propositions/ ; and in any
context where he is discussing the proposition and its structure, as
he is in “Kaina Stoicheia”, he is always careful to distinguish
between /denoting / and /signifying/ as the semiotic functions which
furnish the proposition with its breadth and depth respectively. In a
proposition the subject /denotes/ the individual object (indexically),
while the predicate /signifies/ its characters (iconically).
The noun form “denotation” is properly derived from the verb “denote”,
but this can lead to confusion if applied to /terms/ . In his
/Baldwin’s Dictionary/ entry on “Signification” —
http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Signification — where
Peirce tried to clear up some of the confusion resulting from Mill’s
use of “connotation” for /depth/ , he wrote:
A general term denotes whatever there may be which possesses the
characters which it signifies; J. S. Mill uses, in place of
signifies, the term connotes, a word which he or his father picked
up in Ockham. But signify has been in uninterrupted use in this
sense since the 12th century, when John of Salisbury spoke of
‘quod fere in omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse
appellativa /significant/ , et aliud esse quod /nominant/ .
Nominantur singularia; sed universalia significantur.’ Nothing can
be clearer.
Singulars are denoted (or named), universals are signified; or in more
Peircean English, a proposition conveys information by denoting an
individual object and signifying the general characters /of that
object/ . Rhemes and predicates cannot denote. In the dicisign, which
has the same structure, the denoting is done by an index, and the
signifying by an icon; the icon is incapable of denoting, but the
index must involve an icon (which may be quite complex) in order to
inform the ‘reader’ of the sign /about/ the object (which, though
singular, can also be quite complex). Rhemes, predicates and icons
This is crucial for understanding the syntax of the dicisign, which is
the subject of NP 3.7.
gary f.
From: Benjamin Udell
*Sent:* 4-Oct-14 7:35 PM
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Subject:*
Re: [biosemiotics:7087] Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Example of Dicisign?
Gary F., Tom, list,
Gary, are you sure you're not confusing denotation with designation
or indication? The denotation of 'red' is all red things, or the
population of red things; the comprehension (or significance) of
'red' is the quality _/red/ _ and all that that implies. That's why
denotation (breadth) and comprehension (depth) vary inversely when
the information remains the same. Anyway, that's how I've understood it.
Best, Ben
On 10/4/2014 7:11 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Tom, I’m afraid you’re adding to the confusion here by
[PEIRCE-L] Resources On Category Theory (ROCT)
Peircers Others, For the benefit of readers who want to learn about mathematical category theory and may have missed earlier discussions, I will use this thread to collect a few links and texts on the subject. Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] role of a basic sign
I'd like to ask Frederik about the role of what I consider a basic Peircean Sign, the Rhematic Indexical Legisign. This triad operates within all three categorical modes; it's in the centre, so to speak, of the ten classes. I see it as important because of the openness of its Interpretation Relation, which is in a mode of Firstness. The Object Relation is in a mode of Secondness, which suggests that indexical or physical contact with the external Dynamic Object. But, unlike the three Dicent Signs, the output or Interpretant Relation is NOT in a mode of Secondness (which would provide us with a specific description of that Dynamic Object)...it's in a mode of Firstness. This is openness, and thus enables and requires (maybe) networking with other Signs to add clarity; it requires collateral experience to come to a specific conclusion. Otherwise, that Sign remains open. The collaterial experience could describe the experience of the object within an empirical factual existence...empirical to the local surroundings. Or, it could even move the object into a mythic nature. So, my individual interpretation of a local sighting of a black object in the sky could, with added facts...be interpreted as a plane. Or, could be interpreted as an Evil Spirit of Dire Warning. ...depending on my networking with other Signs. Edwina - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Resources On Category Theory (ROCT)
o~o~o~o~o~o~o ROCT. Note 2 o~o~o~o~o~o~o My e-neurones tell me that I apparently collected a lot of material from previous discussions here: InterSciWiki : Jon Awbrey : Mathematical Notes http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/User:Jon_Awbrey/Mathematical_Notes There are excerpts ''Categories for the Working Mathematician'' by Saunders Mac Lane that I posted to various discussion lists back in the days when there was a lot more cross-fertilization between different communities du web than is common these days. InterSciWiki : Jon Awbrey : Mathematical Notes : Category Theory http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/User:Jon_Awbrey/Mathematical_Notes#CAT._Category_Theory One could hardly do better than to begin with Mac Lane's book: | Saunders Mac Lane, | Categories for the Working Mathematician, | 2nd edition, Springer, New York, NY, 1997. I'll be busy over the next few days re-formatting those old wiki notes to make them more useful for the sake of our discussions here. Regards, Jon o~o~o~o~o~o~o academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
At 08:50 AM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote: Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word symbol is used in the language of physics. As such, it explains why the language of physics is of limited use in semiotics. HP: Of course it is of limited use. It only explains why the most efficient and unambiguous communication is by simple coded sequences with bits that are not icons or indices or tokens with semantic content. GF: In discussing Natural Propositions, we are deploying Peirce's definition of symbol as a sign which is fit to serve as such simply because it will be so interpreted HP: Yes, like bit strings. These physical and information theory conditions do not depend on Peirce's theory of signs or naming bits symbols or legisigns. You are free to ignore these laws, but no semiotic practice can avoid them. In any case, we cannot continue this efficient communication without bit sequences. Howard In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice they are not. Einstein - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [biosemiotics:7087] Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Example of Dicisign?
Ben, lists, OK, let me put it this way: a rheme can “denote” a range of possibilities — but only if it is a symbol. Same goes for a predicate, which is symbolic by virtue of being a necessary part of a proposition, which is a symbol (and by virtue of being verbal). To elaborate on this, I’ll include below Peirce’s account of the Rhematic Symbol. But in this seminar we’re talking about dicisigns, which are not necessarily symbols. What is necessary for a dicisign is an index involving an icon. It can’t be the other way round because an icon cannot involve an index. A symbol can involve either or both. We have to keep track of where we are in this terminological maze if we hope to get out of it. [[[ We conclude, then, that, if we have succeeded in threading our way through the maze of these abstractions, a Dicisign, defined as a Representamen whose Interpretant represents it as an Index of its Object, must have the following characters: First, it must, in order to be understood, be considered as containing two parts. Of these, the one, which may be called the Subject, is or represents an Index of a Second existing independently of its being represented, while the other, which may be called the Predicate, is or represents an Icon of a Firstness. Second, these two parts must be represented as connected; and that in such a way that if the Dicisign has any Object, it must be an Index of a Secondness subsisting between the Real Object represented in one represented part of the Dicisign to be indicated and a Firstness represented in the other represented part of the Dicisign to be Iconized. Let us now examine whether these conclusions, together with the assumption from which they proceed, hold good of all signs which profess to convey information without furnishing any rational persuasion of it; and whether they fail alike for all signs which do not convey information as well as for all those which furnish evidence of the truth of their information, or reasons for believing it. If our analysis sustains these tests, we may infer that the definition of the Dicisign on which they are founded, holding, at least, within the sphere of signs, is presumably sound beyond that sphere. Our definition forbids an Icon to be a Dicisign, since the proper Interpretant of an Icon cannot represent it to be an Index, the Index being essentially more complicated than the Icon. There ought, therefore, to be no informational signs among Icons. We find that, in fact, Icons may be of the greatest service in obtaining information,—in geometry, for example;—but still, it is true that an Icon cannot, of itself, convey information, since its Object is whatever there may be which is like the Icon, and is its Object in the measure in which it is like the Icon. ]] EP2:277-8] And finally, for those whose patience is not yet exhausted, here’s Peirce on the Rhematic Symbol and its denotation: [[[ A Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme, is a sign connected with its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the Replica is interpreted as a Sign of an Object that is an instance of that concept. Thus, the Rhematic Symbol either is, or is very like, what the logicians call a General Term. The Rhematic Symbol, like any Symbol, is necessarily itself of the nature of a general type, and is thus a Legisign. Its Replica, however, is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind, in that the image it suggests to the mind acts upon a Symbol already in that mind to give rise to a General Concept. In this it differs from other Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns, including those which are Replicas of Rhematic Indexical Legisigns. Thus, the demonstrative pronoun “that” is a Legisign, being a general type; but it is not a Symbol, since it does not signify a general concept. Its Replica draws attention to a single Object, and is a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign. A Replica of the word “camel” is likewise a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, being really affected, through the knowledge of camels, common to the speaker and auditor, by the real camel it denotes, even if this one is not individually known to the auditor; and it is through such real connection that the word “camel” calls up the idea of a camel. The same thing is true of the word “phoenix.” For although no phoenix really exists, real descriptions of the phoenix are well known to the speaker and his auditor; and thus the word is really affected by the Object denoted. But not only are the Replicas of Rhematic Symbols very different from ordinary Rhematic Indexical Sinsigns, but so likewise are Replicas of Rhematic Indexical Legisigns. For the thing denoted by “that” has not affected the replica of the word in any such direct and simple manner as that in which, for
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
Howard, HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me: Is it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that bit some kind of sign? GF: My answer to your question is: 1. (as opposed to 0). But without the symbolic context which makes the bit interpretable *as the answer to the question*, - part of which context is the legisign establishing that 1 is in binary opposition to 0 - that bit conveys zero information and is not a sign of anything. Can you give me a one-bit question? gary f. -Original Message- From: Howard Pattee [mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com] Sent: 5-Oct-14 3:53 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6 At 01:15 PM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote: Nobody (least of all Peirce!) is naming bits symbols or legisigns. Bits (as the name implies!) can only be small pieces of symbols in the semiotic sense of the word symbol; they are not symbols in the Peircean sense because a bit by itself, out of any context, will not and cannot be interpreted as a sign. HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me: Is it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that bit some kind of sign? Howard There are 10 kinds of people in the world. Those who know binary, and those who don't. Don Knuth - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7077] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6, modern chemistry and icons commit themselves to nothing at all
But, if chemical icons are a direct consequence of physical laws, that would mean, they can be reduced to them. In a prebiotic world, they would not be icons, but only likenesses not interpreted. I think, an icon is an interpreted likeness, and interpretation of a likeness (icon) requires an animal with a brain with a network of neurons to depict and compare. But I agree, that, if there in prebiotic world there is a mudhole containing a mixture of different salts, and by drying out, on one edge of the mudhole a crystal of one salt is growing, on another edge another, and so on, but is this interpretation, iconicity? I doubt that. Cheers, Helmut Von:Jerry LR Chandler jerry_lr_chand...@me.com List, Frederik, Jeff: On Oct 4, 2014, at 3:22 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: (citing CSP), icons commit themselves to nothing at all This is a clear and crisp example of the influence of historical usage on the meaning of words, grammar, signs, symbols, terms, expressions, logic and so forth. In modern chemistry, the principle icons are chemical structures that correspond exactly with indices, rhemata, decisigns, arguments, legisigns, the symbols of the chemical table of elements and the sinsign as the source of qualisigns. Furthermore, chemical icons, at a deeper abstract level, are a direct consequence of physical laws and physical experimentation and chemical mathematics of the atomic numbers. Chemists call an icon a chemical identity and, and as a class, chemical identities are the basis for the formal logic of mathematical chemistry and a form of logic of relatives developed from the conceptualization of matter as atoms with unique properties. CSP (1839-1914?) died long before chemists learned construct chemical icons from the indices representing electrical units and integers. Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
On Oct 5, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me: Is it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that bit some kind of sign? GF: My answer to your question is: 1. (as opposed to 0). But without the symbolic context which makes the bit interpretable *as the answer to the question*, - part of which context is the legisign establishing that 1 is in binary opposition to 0 - that bit conveys zero information and is not a sign of anything. Can you give me a one-bit question? The type/token distinction seems definitely to apply here. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
Gary F, I was responding to your statement: Bits (as the name implies!) can only be small pieces of symbols in the semiotic sense of the word symbol; they are not symbols. Of course, a bit is not a symbol or a piece of symbol. It is a measure of information. I was trying to indicate that there are one-bit answers. By definition of sign, any sign used to answer must be interpretable. An I agree or I disagree or a Yes or No require just as clear interpretation as a 0 or 1. Howard - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6
At 06:41 PM 10/5/2014, Clark Goble wrote: The type/token distinction seems definitely to apply here [Pattee-Fuhrman disagreement]. HP: I agree. Bits are ambiguous. Bit may refer to a measure or type of information, or bit may refer to a token of information, like 0 or 1. Howard - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Resources On Category Theory (ROCT)
o~o~o~o~o~o~o ROCT. Note 3 o~o~o~o~o~o~o A few years ago I made an attempt to tease out the underlying continuities connecting diverse ideas of categories through history, from their origins in Aristotle to Kant and Peirce to their echoes in more recent mathematics. Various renditions of that essay can be found at these locations: • http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/12/20/precursors-of-category-theory-1/ • http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/12/30/precursors-of-category-theory-2/ • http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2014/01/03/precursors-of-category-theory-3/ • http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Precursors_of_Category_Theory Regards, Jon o~o~o~o~o~o~o academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
