Re: [peirce-l] A Question About Categories
hi claudio, I am traveling through the middle of next week, with only my iphone to hand. that was a rather abbreviated way of explaining categories and would require supplementation. if it were only a matter of mathematics, that would suffice, but we are talking about phenomenology, categories of appearance, so the question is what complexity of mathematical models are forced on us by the complexity of the phenomenal domain before us. regards, jon On Mar 29, 2012, at 1:15 PM, Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com wrote: Dear Jon, thanks for the constant 'help' that to give to all listers I have found your explanation of the categories very practical (below in red), and since I'd like to quote it, I wanted to ask you if it is yours or if you can give me the origin. Thanks again Best CL -- Prof. Dr. Arch. Claudio F. Guerri Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo Universidad de Buenos Aires Home address: Gral. Lemos 270 (1427) Buenos Aires – Argentina Telefax: (0054-11) 4553-4895 or 4553-7976 Cell phone: (0054-9-11) 6289-8123 E-mail: claudiogue...@fibertel.com.ar Jon Awbrey said the following on 14/03/2012 03:14 p.m.: Diane, Between any 2 sets of 3 there are 3! (count 'em, 6) ways of forming a 1-to-1 correspondence, and there may be reason for considering the sense of each 1. When it comes to Peirce's categories, which are best understood as the dimensions of relations, roughly speaking, what monadic, dyadic, triadic relations, respectively, have in common, it is also good to recall that Peirce often stressed the order: 1st, 2nd, 3rd = First, Last, Middle. | By the third, I mean the medium or connecting | bond between the absolute first and last. | The beginning is first, the end second, | the middle third. | | Peirce, CP 1.337 Regards, Jon Diane Stephens wrote: In the book *Semiotics I* by Donald Thomas, he includes a chart which shows concepts associated with firsts, seconds and thirds. For example, a first is *quality*, a second is *fact* and a third is *law.* I understand all but second as past as in: First - *present * Second - *past * Third - *future * I would appreciate some help. Thanks. -- Prof. Dr. Arch. Claudio F. Guerri Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo Universidad de Buenos Aires Home address: Gral. Lemos 270 (1427) Buenos Aires – Argentina Telefax: (0054-11) 4553-4895 or 4553-7976 Cell phone: (0054-9-11) 6289-8123 E-mail: claudiogue...@fibertel.com.ar - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] a question
Ben, list: Thank you for these references on Firstness, Ben, and for reminding us of Gary Richmond¹s posts; specially for the notion of a ³triadic moment². It does not seem to me as an acquiescence to Kant¹s time intuition. I am not familiar with Schelling¹s ideas on time, yet these Peircean references on the ego, consciousness and Firstness (with a definite exclusion of the notion of the Self) reminds me of some references I gathered on this subject long time ago before CD-ROM and hypertext, but that I cherished immensely while transcribing: 1.306 and following; 1. 324 and following; 5.265 and following [mostly from Concerning Certain Faculties] 5.289; 5.44; 5. 462; 7.364 and following; 7.531; 7.540; and many others. I am most grateful for your recent inklings on this subject and Gary¹s, and if there is more of Peirce to it (the ³triadic moment²), it would be more than inklings. Great insights. Eduardo Forastieri-Braschi On 3/17/12 1:00 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Jason, list, That's a good question. In the relevant paragraph (CP 7.536, of which I quoted only the last part), Peirce begins by saying: It remains to be shown that this element is the third Kainopythagorean category. All flow of time involves learning; and all learning involves the flow of time. The element that he was discussing was a continuity which he had just called a direct experience (CP 7.535). (This is also another 'score' for Gary Richmond in his April 8, 2011 post http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/6995 to peirce-l, in which he said It seems to me that for Peirce being present means being present to the flow, which flow implies all three modalities: past, present, and future) I'm kind of reluctant to go out on a limb right now, having misinterpreted Peirce's Oct. 12, 1904 letter to Lady Welby and spent a number of posts cleaning up after myself. My guess is that, in virtue of their triadic parts in the flow of learning, inference, and representation and interpretation, all three times are Thirds, with Secondness, Firstness, and Thirdness strong but not overwhelmingly so in past, present, and future, respectively. In other words, learning-past as Secundan Third, learning-present as Priman Third, and learning-future as Tertian Third. But I have no strong opinion at this point! Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Khadimir To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2012 12:29 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] a question Would it not be fair to say that the conscious experience of the immediate present must always be at least a second? That is the view I hold. Jason H. On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: Claudio, Eduardo, Diane, Gary R., list, I've found more of Peirce on the present-past-future trichotomy. This time, from Chapter 1 of the _Minute Logic_ (1902) manuscript, in CP 2.84 (on the past as Second), 2.85 (on the present as First), and 2.86 (on the future as Third). From CP 2.85: Let us now consider what could appear as being in the present instant were it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess; for nothing is more occult than the absolute present. There plainly could be no action; and without the possibility of action, to talk of binarity would be to utter words without meaning. There might be a sort of consciousness, or feeling, with no self; and this feeling might have its tone. Notwithstanding what William James has said, I do not think there could be any continuity like space, which, though it may perhaps appear in an instant in an educated mind, I cannot think could do so if it had no time at all; and without continuity parts of the feeling could not be synthetized; and therefore there would be no recognizable parts. There could not even be a degree of vividness of the feeling; for this [the degree of vividness] is the comparative amount of disturbance of general consciousness by a feeling. At any rate, such shall be our hypothesis, and whether it is psychologically true or not is of no consequence. The world would be reduced to a quality of unanalyzed feeling. Here would be an utter absence of binarity. I cannot call it unity; for even unity supposes plurality. I may call its form Firstness, Orience, or Originality. It would be something _which is what it is without reference to anything else_ within it or without it, regardless of all force and of all reason. Now the world is full of this element of irresponsible, free, Originality. Why should the middle part of the spectrum look green rather than violet? There is no conceivable reason for it nor compulsion in it. [...] Note that there he discusses what could appear as being in the present instant were it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess; for nothing is more occult than the absolute present. Elsewhere, at the end of CP 7.536
Re: [peirce-l] A Question About Peirce's Categories
Diane, Steven, Jon: I have tried, but I am not yet happy with these trichotomies concerning time. However, should ordinary linear time sequencing rather than tenseless earlier/later relations (so called B-series) be the pivot for their conception, then, perhaps, actual indexicality (Secondness) and modality (possible Firstness and possible Thirdness) should be paramount: First: may be -now- this/that Second is -now- this/that Thirdwould be -now/then- this/that Best to you, Eduardo Forastieri-Braschi On 3/15/12 9:26 AM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote: Steven, I think the point about sequentiality is correct. Relations are ordered according to their arities or dimensions, and Peirce holds that three are enough to generate all others, but not all relations of constraint or determination, that is, information, are causal or temporal in nature, not even if we try to imagine some order of triadic causality or temporality. Attempting to understand the relational categories by setting out ordered lists of terms that are regarded as naming absolute, monadic, non-relational essences is a sign that our understanding has gone off track and fallen into yet another rut of reductionism. I don't know what to call it -- absolutism? monadicism? non-relativism? -- but it's just as bad a form of reductionism as nominalism. Regards, Jon Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote: Dear Diane, I agree with those that question whether Peirce would be comfortable using notions of linear time, as Jon's quote highlights. In the context of time conceptions (for me, time is simply a way of speaking) I would prefer: 1st = the immediate experience 2nd = the accessible record 3rd = the manifold of unity In brief: immediacy, record, unification. It would be important for me to observe that no sequential nature should be read into the process suggested by these categories, they covary in what I would call the eternal moment. The conception of time is a product of the unifying effect of what Peirce calls thirdness. With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Mar 14, 2012, at 8:56 AM, Diane Stephens wrote: In the book Semiotics I by Donald Thomas, he includes a chart which shows concepts associated with firsts, seconds and thirds. For example, a first is quality, a second is fact and a third is law. I understand all but second as past as in: First - present Second - past Third - future I would appreciate some help. Thanks. -- Diane Stephens Swearingen Chair of Education Wardlaw 255 College of Education University of South Carolina Columbia, SC 29208 803-777-0502 Fax 803-777-3193 - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] a question
Well, in terms of the quality-fact-law trichotomy, if the present is pure quality, then facts only calcify out of that flux of pure qualities once the present has passed. -m At 11:56 AM -0400 3/14/12, Diane Stephens wrote: In the book Semiotics I by Donald Thomas, he includes a chart which shows concepts associated with firsts, seconds and thirds. For example, a first is quality, a second is fact and a third is law. I understand all but second as past as in: First - present Second - past Third - future I would appreciate some help. Thanks. -- Diane Stephens Swearingen Chair of Education Wardlaw 255 College of Education University of South Carolina Columbia, SC 29208 803-777-0502 Fax 803-777-3193 - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] a question
Dear Diane, I agree with those that question whether Peirce would be comfortable using notions of linear time, as Jon's quote highlights. In the context of time conceptions (for me, time is simply a way of speaking) I would prefer: 1st = the immediate experience 2nd = the accessible record 3rd = the manifold of unity In brief: immediacy, record, unification. It would be important for me to observe that no sequential nature should be read into the process suggested by these categories, they covary in what I would call the eternal moment. The conception of time is a product of the unifying effect of what Peirce calls thirdness. With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Mar 14, 2012, at 8:56 AM, Diane Stephens wrote: In the book Semiotics I by Donald Thomas, he includes a chart which shows concepts associated with firsts, seconds and thirds. For example, a first is quality, a second is fact and a third is law. I understand all but second as past as in: First - present Second - past Third - future I would appreciate some help. Thanks. -- Diane Stephens Swearingen Chair of Education Wardlaw 255 College of Education University of South Carolina Columbia, SC 29208 803-777-0502 Fax 803-777-3193 - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Re: [peirce-l] A Question about Metaphysics and Logic
Jason, Universal is an ambiguous word sometimes used to translate Aristotle's _katholos_ even when Aristotle means merely that which in everyday English is called general, something true of more than one object. Some philosophers say universals and particulars where Peirce (with his better English) said generals and singulars or individuals. In logic, a universal proposition has the form All G is H, and a particular proposition has the form Some G is H and is not singular but merely vague as to which singular or singulars are being referred to. Universal in its etymological sense means that which is true of everything, or at least of everything in a given class. Such a universal is maximally general in some sense. So Peirce's arguments that there are real generals and not only singulars also support the reality of universals. I'm willing to distinguish universals such as numbers from among other kinds of generals, but I haven't found philosophers interested in doing that. I'd also allow a universal that is singular (but usually polyadic) and non-general, e.g., a total population cdefgab etc. of a universe of discourse. So, as far as I know, in something like a response to your question, I'm not aware of philosophers dealing with universals differently than with generals, although I'd sure like to know of philosophers who do so. The word universal also has some other senses. See universal in the Century Dictionary. The entry looks like it could well have been written by Peirce. Djvu version http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/08/index08.djvu?djvuoptspage=415 JPG version http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=08page=415 Google version http://books.google.com/books?id=MPdOYAAJpg=PA6623 See entry below. - Best, Ben universal (u-ni-ver'sa??l), a. and n. [ F. universel = Sp. Pg. universal = It. universale, L. universalis, of or belonging to all or to the 'whole, universus,all together, whole, entire, collective, general: see universe. Hence colloq. abbr. vernal, varsal.] I. a. 1. Pertaining to the universe in its entirety, or to the human race collectively. Sole monarch of the universal earth. Shak., K. and J., ilL 2. 94. All partial evil, universal good. Pope, Essay on Man, i. 292. 2. Pertaining to all things or to all mankind distributively. This is the original and most proper signification. Those men which have no written law of God to shew what Is good or evil carry written in their hearts the universal law of mankind, the Law of Reason, whereby they judge, as by a rule which God hath given unto all men for that purpose. Hooker, Eccles. Polity, L 16. Nothing can be to us Catholic or universal in Religion but what the Scripture teaches. Milton, Eikonoklastes, xiii. Which had the universal sanction of their own and all former ages. Story, Speech, Salem, Sept. 18,1828. 3. Belonging to or predicated of all the members of a class considered without exception: as, a universal rule. This meaning arose In logic, where it is called the complex sense of universal, and has been common in Latin since the second century. Hearing applause and universal shout. Shak., M. of V..11L 2. 144. We say that every argument which tells in favour of the universal suffrage of the males tells equally in favour of female suffrage. Macaulay, West. Rev. Def. of Mill. 4. In logic, capable of being predicated of many individuals or single cases; general. This, called the simple sense of universal, in which the word is precisely equivalent to general, is quite opposed to its etymology, and perpetuates a confusion of thought due to Aristotle, whose ??? it translates. (See II., 1 (b).) In Latin it is nearly as old, perhaps older, than def. 3.- Universal agent, in law, on agent with unqualified power to act, in place of his principal, in all things which the latter can delegate, as distinguished from a general agent, who has unrestricted power in respect to a particular kind of business or at a particular place.-Universal arithmetic, algebra.-Universal chuck, a form of chuck having a face-plate with dogs which can move radially and simultaneously, to hold objects of different sizes.- Universal church, in theol., the church of God throughout the world.-Universal cognition. See cognition. -Universal compass, a compass with extension legs adapted for striking circles of either large or small size.- Universal conception, a general concept.-Universal conversion. See conversion, 2.-Universal coupling, a coupling so made that the parts united may meet at various angles, as a gimbal Joint-Universal deluge. See deluge, 1.-Universal dial. See dial.-Universal ferment. See ferment.-Universal Friends, an American sect of the eighteenth century, followers of Jemima Wilkinson, who professed to have prophetic and miraculous powers.-Universal galvanometer, a galvanometer capable of measuring either currents or
Re: [peirce-l] A Question about Metaphysics and Logic
Dear Jason, I've published a paper which distinguishes between 'universals' as discussed in contemporary Australian metaphysics (most particularly in the work of D.M. Armstrong), and 'generals' as discussed by Peirce. Here is the abstract: This paper contrasts the scholastic realists of David Armstrong and Charles Peirce. It is argued that the so-called 'problem of universals' is not a problem in pure ontology (concerning whether universals exist) as Armstrong construes it to be. Rather, it extends to issues concerning which predicates should be applied where, issues which Armstrong sets aside under the label of 'semantics', and which from a Peircean perspective encompass even the fundamentals of scientific methodology. It is argued that Peirce's scholastic realism not only presents a more nuanced ontology (distinguishing the existent front the real) but also provides more of a sense of why realism should be a position worth fighting for. If that sounds of interest, the link is here: http://hdl.handle.net/10289/2918 Cheers, Cathy And here is the abstract: The link On Sun, Mar 4, 2012 at 4:34 PM, Khadimir khadi...@gmail.com wrote: Greetings, I have a question for those knowledgeable and willing to answer a general question for those more steeping in classical metaphysics and logic than I. What are the distinctions between claiming the reality of universals vs. generals? How would one argue that universals are not merely merely generals? By the latter, for example, I mean general concepts created through a process of induction or what Locke called abstraction. I offer an example to indicate what I mean by generality, though the definition is informal. I am familiar with Peirce's article on Berkeley, which I enjoy, and I would look forward to Peircean and other views on the matter. Citations and references with limited explanation would be a fine way to answer, as I would not ask too much of anyone's time. Best and Thank You, Jason Hills - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
