Ben, list: Thank you for these references on Firstness, Ben, and for reminding us of Gary Richmond¹s posts; specially for the notion of a ³triadic moment². It does not seem to me as an acquiescence to Kant¹s time intuition. I am not familiar with Schelling¹s ideas on time, yet these Peircean references on the ego, consciousness and Firstness (with a definite exclusion of the notion of the Self) reminds me of some references I gathered on this subject long time ago before CD-ROM and hypertext, but that I cherished immensely while transcribing: 1.306 and following; 1. 324 and following; 5.265 and following [mostly from Concerning Certain Faculties] 5.289; 5.44; 5. 462; 7.364 and following; 7.531; 7.540; and many others. I am most grateful for your recent inklings on this subject and Gary¹s, and if there is more of Peirce to it (the ³triadic moment²), it would be more than inklings. Great insights. Eduardo Forastieri-Braschi
On 3/17/12 1:00 PM, "Benjamin Udell" <[email protected]> wrote: > Jason, list, > > That's a good question. In the relevant paragraph (CP 7.536, of which I quoted > only the last part), Peirce begins by saying: "It remains to be shown that > this element is the third Kainopythagorean category. All flow of time involves > learning; and all learning involves the flow of time." The element that he was > discussing was a "continuity" which he had just called a "direct experience" > (CP 7.535). (This is also another 'score' for Gary Richmond in his April 8, > 2011 post http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/6995 to > peirce-l, in which he said "It seems to me that for Peirce being present means > being present to the flow, which flow implies all three modalities: past, > present, and future....") > > I'm kind of reluctant to go out on a limb right now, having misinterpreted > Peirce's Oct. 12, 1904 letter to Lady Welby and spent a number of posts > cleaning up after myself. My guess is that, in virtue of their triadic parts > in the flow of learning, inference, and representation and interpretation, all > three times are Thirds, with Secondness, Firstness, and Thirdness strong but > not overwhelmingly so in past, present, and future, respectively. In other > words, learning-past as Secundan Third, learning-present as Priman Third, and > learning-future as Tertian Third. But I have no strong opinion at this point! > > Best, Ben > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Khadimir > To: [email protected] > Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2012 12:29 PM > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] a question > > Would it not be fair to say that the conscious experience of the immediate > present must always be at least a second? That is the view I hold. > > Jason H. > > On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: >> >> >> >> Claudio, Eduardo, Diane, Gary R., list, >> >> >> I've found more of Peirce on the present-past-future trichotomy. This time, >> from Chapter 1 of the _Minute Logic_ (1902) manuscript, in CP 2.84 (on the >> past as Second), 2.85 (on the present as First), and 2.86 (on the future as >> Third). From CP 2.85: >> >>> Let us now consider what could appear as being in the present instant were >>> it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess; for nothing is >>> more occult than the absolute present. There plainly could be no action; >>> and without the possibility of action, to talk of binarity would be to >>> utter words without meaning. There might be a sort of consciousness, or >>> feeling, with no self; and this feeling might have its tone. Notwithstanding >>> what William James has said, I do not think there could be any continuity >>> like space, which, though it may perhaps appear in an instant in an educated >>> mind, I cannot think could do so if it had no time at all; and without >>> continuity parts of the feeling could not be synthetized; and therefore >>> there would be no recognizable parts. There could not even be a degree of >>> vividness of the feeling; for this [the degree of vividness] is the >>> comparative amount of disturbance of general consciousness by a feeling. At >>> any rate, such shall be our hypothesis, and whether it is psychologically >>> true or not is of no consequence. The world would be reduced to a quality of >>> unanalyzed feeling. Here would be an utter absence of binarity. I cannot >>> call it unity; for even unity supposes plurality. I may call its form >>> Firstness, Orience, or Originality. It would be something _which is what it >>> is without reference to anything else_ within it or without it, regardless >>> of all force and of all reason. Now the world is full of this element of >>> irresponsible, free, Originality. Why should the middle part of the >>> spectrum look green rather than violet? There is no conceivable reason for >>> it nor compulsion in it. [...] >> >> >> Note that there he discusses "what could appear as being in the present >> instant were it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess; for >> nothing is more occult than the absolute present." >> >> >> Elsewhere, at the end of CP 7.536 in an undated manuscript, he says "The >> consciousness of the present, as the boundary between past and future, >> involves them both.": >> >>> >>> >>> Thus, every reasoning involves another reasoning, which in its turn >>> involves another, and so on _ad infinitum_. Every reasoning connects >>> something that has just been learned with knowledge already acquired so >>> that we thereby learn what has been unknown. It is thus that the present is >>> so welded to what is just past as to render what is just coming about >>> inevitable. The consciousness of the present, as the boundary between past >>> and future, involves them both. Reasoning is a new experience which >>> involves something old and something hitherto unknown. The past as above >>> remarked is the _ego_. My recent past is my uppermost _ego_; my distant >>> past is my more generalized _ego_. The past of the community is _our ego_. >>> In attributing a flow of time to unknown events we impute a quasi-_ego_ to >>> the universe. The present is the immediate representation we are just >>> learning that brings the future, or non-ego, to be assimilated into the >>> _ego_. It is thus seen that learning, or representation, is the third >>> Kainopythagorean category. >> >> >> So that _consciousness of_ the present seems to match that which Gary >> Richmond said at peirce-l on April 8, 2011 about the present "moment" as >> distinguished from the present "instant," the present moment as a "triadic >> moment" http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/6995 >> >> >> I also find that, in Peirce's letter of Oct. 12, 1904 to Lady Welby, if I >> had looked at what he had written in the same (long) paragraph (CP 8.330) >> before the excerpt that I sent, I would have seen Peirce discusses Firstness >> of the quiet and Firstness of a shrill piercing whistle, and does so in a >> way that supports the idea of the present as a First. For it is the breaking >> of the quiet by the shrill whistle that he says involves Secondness, and >> that is the breaking of one moment by another, though each moment, taken >> apart, simply has its quality, its Firstness. >> >> >> Bet, Ben >> >> >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: Benjamin Udell >> To: [email protected] >> >> Sent: Friday, March 16, 2012 7:10 PM >> Subject: Re: [peirce-l] a question > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > --- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of > the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. 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