[peirce-l] Re: What
List, I could not follow the last discussion on tenacity and related items in all details, since Iwas in Memphis and now in Pittsburgh and with no muchtime nor easy access to Internet. But I think (I only think) that Peirce maid his best efforts in the direction of Logic-Semiotic-Philosophy. Even if he was aware of psychological aspects of thought, inquiry and so on, psychology and/or psychoanalysis are not his more developed fields. Even if Peirce is a kind of Leonardo da Vinci of his time we should (I just propose) change from Peirce to Freud and Lacan (and others) to find more specific information on items like 'reasons' or 'modalities' of inquiry that are not just logical or semiotical reasons. I wrote already about a book of Michel Balat (I don't have the title here, but it's from the same editor as the last book of Bernard Morand). The text or research is already some years old but only recently edited (no so carefully edited as Bernard's one). It is on the concrete relation of Lacan's development of the psychoanalytic theory after having participated (apparently also with Louis Althusser) in a seminar by Recanati on Peirce. Perhaps somebody of the List knows a way of making an English translation of that book... all Percians with some interest in psychological aspects will enjoy it very much... I can tell. Best Claudio [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Original Message - From: Clark Goble To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 1:58 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What On Oct 8, 2006, at 7:52 PM, Juffras, Angelo wrote: Tenacity is not a method of inquiry. A person who is tenacious does not doubt and hence has no annoying disturbance that would require him to inquire. He knows. I'm not sure that is true. There are those who doubt in many ways but their tenacity in effect "blocks" the practical effects of this doubt. One could I suppose call this a kind of double-belief. Exactly how Peirce would treat it I'm not sure. But I think we all know examples of this. The classic one I use as an example is a person who knows their spouse is cheating on them but is tenacious in stating and defending the fidelity of their spouse. I honestly don't recall Peirce addressing the problem of competing and contradictory beliefs. Does anyone know off the top of their head anything along those lines? The closest I can think of is the passage of 1908 to Lady Welby where he talks about the three modalities of being. Relative to the first, that of possibility, he talks of Ideas. One might say that the *idea* of infidelity, for example, can be accepted as well as its contradiction. So perhaps that's one way of dealing with it. The question then becomes how inquiry relates to these ideas. I'd suggest, as you do, that it would cut off inquiry, but not because of knowledge. Rather, as Joe said earlier, it is the individual doing what they can to stave off the loss of a threatened belief. I think this is that they don't *want* discussion to leave the world of possibility and move to the realm of facts (the second of the three universes). It is interesting to me how many people do *not* want to move from possibilities (how ever probable) to the realm of facts or events. I think rather that tenaciousness is, as Joe suggested, more closely related to appeals to authority and their weakness. I'd also note in The Fixation of Belief that Peirce suggests that doubt works by irritation. "Theirritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle *inquiry* though it must be admitted that it is sometimes not a very apt designation." (EP 1:114) To me that suggests something like a small boil or irritation on ones skin or small cut in ones mouth. One can neglect it but eventually it will lead to a change in action. As Peirce notes it may not seem like what we call inquiry. Thus his "sometimes not a very apt designation." But so long as it changes our habits, even if it takes time and is slow, then inquiry is progressing. It might be an error to only call a process of inquiry what we areconscious of as a more directed burden of will. Which I believe was Jim W's point a few days ago. Clark Goble ---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]__ Información de NOD32, revisión 1.1794 (20061006) __Este mensaje ha sido analizado con NOD32 antivirus systemhttp://www.nod32.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Fw: Programa II Jornadas Peirce en Argentina
More information about the II Jornadas Peirce en Argentina in http://www.unav.es/gep/Argentina.html Claudio Guerri - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 3:44 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Fw: Programa II Jornadas Peirce en Argentina This was forwarded to me by Alfredo Horoch, one of the participants in the conference in Argentina which is described below. It is gratifying to see how many scholars are involved and how widely they are dispersed throughout Central and South America now, though I can only guess at the location of a good many of them. Perhaps a later version of the program will indicate the institutional affiliations more explicitly. (The acronyms used are not informative to me.) Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, July 21, 2006 1:08 PM Subject: Programa II Jornadas Peirce en Argentina II Jornadas Peirce en Argentina 7 y 8 de septiembre de 2006 ACADEMIA NACIONAL DE CIENCIAS DE BUENOS AIRES Av. Alvear 1771 3er. Piso (PROGRAMA PROVISIONAL) 7 de Septiembre de 2006 14:00 Recepci¨n-Acreditaci¨n 14:20 Apertura: Palabras de la Lic. Catalina Hynes, Coordinadora GEP Argentina. 14:25 Conferencia Inaugural: Dr. Roberto Walton (Centro de Estudios Filos¨ficos Eugenio Pucciarelli): Peirce y la fenomenolog¨a. Presentaci¨n a cargo del Dr. Jaime Nubiola (Universidad de Navarra). Trabajo en comisiones: Sal¨n de Actos: Mesa panel sobre verdad y error Coordinadora: Evelyn Vargas 15:30 ANDR¨S HEBRARD (UNLP), FEDERICO L¨PEZ (UNLP-CIC): Razones para la convergencia: realidad, comunidad y m¨todo experimental 16:00 EVELYN VARGAS (UNLP- CONICET) La inferencia como s¨mbolo 16:30 CRISTINA DI GREGORI (UNLP- CONICET), CECILIA DURAN (UNLP) John Dewey: acerca del pragmatismo de Peirce 17:00 MARIA AURELIA DI BERNARDINO (UNLP) Máxima Pragmática y abducci¨n Sala CEF: Coordinador: Roberto Marafiotti 15:30 ROBERTO FAJARDO (Univ. de Panamá) Hacia una l¨gica de lo indeterminado; creaci¨n art¨stica y semiosis 16:00 CLAUDIO CORT¨S L¨PEZ (Univ. Finis Terrae - Chile) Semi¨tica y est¨tica de la pintura: una aproximaci¨n desde la teor¨a Peirce-Bense 16:30 IVONNE ALVAREZ TAMAYO ( Univ. Pop. Aut. del Estado de Puebla) Abducci¨n y fenomenolog¨a de Peirce aplicada en procesos de diseño visual y audiovisual 17:00 LORENA STEINBERG (UBA) La semi¨tica aplicada al análisis de las organizaciones 17:30 Pausa caf¨ Trabajo en comisiones: Coordinador: Javier Legris Sal¨n de Actos: 17:45 EDGAR SANDOVAL (Univ. de Panamá) Peirce y la semi¨tica de las afecciones 18:15 DANIEL KAPOLKAS (UBA - CONICET) Verdad, realidad y comunidad: una lectura realista de la teor¨a de la cognici¨n de Charles Sanders Peirce 18:45 CARLOS GARZ¨N (Univ. Nac. de Colombia), CATALINA HERN¨NDEZ (Univ. Nac. de Colombia) C. S. Peirce: realidad, verdad y el debate realismo-antirrealismo 19:15 CATALINA HYNES (UNSTA- UNT) El problema de la unidad de la noci¨n peirceana de verdad 19:45 Mesa Panel (Sal¨n de Actos): El origen de la cuantificaci¨n en Peirce: Javier Legris (UBA), Gustavo Demartin (UNLP), Gabriela Fulugorio (UBA), Sandra Lazzer (UBA) Coordinador: Ignacio Angelelli Sala CEF: Coordinadora: Natalia Rom¨ 17:45 ALEJANDRO RAM¨REZ FIGUEROA (Univ. de Chile) Peirce desde la inteligencia artificial: la abducci¨n y la condici¨n de consistencia 18:15 GUIDO VALLEJOS (Univ. de Chile) Autonom¨a de la abducci¨n e inferencia hacia la mejor explicaci¨n 18:45 SANDRA VISOKOLSKIS (UNVM -UNC) Metáfora, ¨cono y abducci¨n en Charles S. Peirce 19:15 V¨CTOR BRAVARI (Pontificia Univ. Cat¨lica de Chile) Abducci¨n colectiva 19:45 Presentaci¨n del libro (Sala CEF): E. Sandoval (Comp.): Semi¨tica, l¨gica y epistemolog¨a. Homenaje a Ch. S. Peirce (UACM, M¨xico, 2006): Jaime Nubiola (Universidad de Navarra) y Edgar Sandoval (UACM) 8 de Septiembre Sal¨n de Actos: Coordinador: Jorge Roetti 14:00 ROSA MAR¨A MAYORGA (Virginia Tech) Pragmaticismo y Pluralismo 14:30 SARA BARRENA Y JAIME NUBIOLA (Universidad de Navarra) El ser humano como signo en crecimiento 15:00 ALFREDO HOROCH (ARISBE) Arisbe 1888-1914: un hogar para Julliette, Charles, y un refugio para la ciencia estadounidense 15:30 HEDY BOERO (UNSTA) Juicio de consejo y abducci¨n: Tomás de Aquino y C. S. Peirce Sala CEF: Coordinador: Mariano Sanginetto 14:00 CATALINA HERN¨NDEZ Y ANDERSON PINZON (Univ. Nac. de Colombia) Peirce, mente y percepci¨n: una posible cr¨tica 14:30 ALEJANDRA NI¨O AMIEVA (UBA) La abducci¨n en el análisis semi¨tico de imágenes 15:00 OSCAR ZELIS, GABRIEL PULICE (Grupo de Investigaci¨n en Psicoanálisis) Las tres categor¨as Peirceanas y los tres registros lacanianos. La estructura triádica del acto de semiosis como nudo de convergencia entre ambas teorizaciones 15:30 MAR¨A GRISELDA GAIADA (UNLP), CHRISTIAN ROY BIRCH La tercerdidad en la experiencia psicoanal¨tica 16:00 Pausa caf¨ Sal¨n de Actos: Coordinadora
[peirce-l] Re: The Guerri graph about some sign relations.
Ben, Jim, Wilfred, List I just see all this post on "an other"... it is as Ben says just "another" error of mine in English the diagram was made very quick and ugly and the error is just ignorance and not emphasys... I apologize... thanks Ben for the "verbesserung" of the diagram. CL - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Friday, July 14, 2006 4:19 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The Guerri graph about some sign relations. Jim, I said, The only time that one properly splits them without an intervening word is when one indicates vocal stress of "other" by itself apart from "an" along with the syllabification "an-other" -- as in "an other thing." I guess that that does approximate to the situation that you're talkingabout, where one wants a different serving rather than an additional serving. However "an other" just looks like sloppy English, which Claudio wouldn't want if he knew how it looks. Italicization or underlining would be mandatory: "an other serving" or "an other serving" -- in order to represent that somebody was actually speaking with that stress on "other" and clearly pronouncing the "an" separately from "other." Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Friday, July 14, 2006 3:09 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The Guerri graph about some sign relations. Jim, I don't think that in fact you _would_ say "an...other serving" in order to mean "another kind of serving." I think that you're drawing right now on the sense of "other" in a sentence like "He was different, other" -- which is an unusual use of "other" but isclear enough to sustain its sense but only in such a sentence where it is clearly used as a predicate rather than as a adjectival or substantive pronoun.It's a use of"other" to mean that which "otherish" would mean if "otherish" existed. I think it really is a matter of diction and of making Claudio's graphicshow good English. One is supposed to write "another," not "an other," and, again, I think that this is because of pronunciation. We don't pronounce it "an-other," instead we pronounce it "a-nother." It gets split only if there's an intervening word like "whole" as in "a whole other issue." Because of the standard pronunciation "a-nother" the result is that in spoken English people say "a whole nother..." instead of "a whole other" The only time that one properly splits them without an intervening word is when one indicates vocal stress of "other" by itself apart from "an" along with the syllabification "an-other" -- as in "an other thing." But again, people actually say "another" or "a nother". One might call the spelling "another" a holding action against a redivision of the written word into "a nother." I agree about numbers as othernesses. "Other" isnot unlikean ordinal form of the phrase "more". Best, Ben - Original Message - From: "Jim Piat" [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Friday, July 14, 2006 2:28 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The Guerri graph about some sign relations. Dear Ben, Wilfred-- Since much of this discussion has focused on the issue of nominal (categorical) and ordinal (sequential) distinctions, it occurs to me to mention that "an other" and "another" can (I think) be sometimes used to emphasize this distinction."Another" is sometimes used to emphasizes a reference to something that is a second, further or additional something; whereas, "an other" is sometimes used to place more emphasis upon the distinctiveness between two somethings. For example if I wanted a second helping of food I might ask for "another" helping, where as if I wanted a different type of food I might ask for "an other" serving or entree.I may be wrong about the above and mention it not to dispute anyone's anyone's intepretation of these _expression_, but merely suggest that the question at the heart of this discussion is indeed a deep one and not merely question of diction. In what sense Peirce's categories represent nominal verses ordinal modes of being remains unclear to me. Perhaps his categories hold the key to riddle of quality verses quantity as well oridinal vs cardinal numbers.I guess my point is that for me this discussion of what mode of being are signs has been very helpful to me. Not for any definitive conclusion that have been reached but for the issues that have been raised. For example, I'm just now wondering if there is some value in considering the parallels between Firtness and quality, Secondness and quantity, and Thirdness and sequence --- self, an other, another.Otherness in itself may be adequate to account for quantity in as much as the notion of
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! ...real-reality... truth...
Jorge, thanks, but as I wrote, after a glance to the CP I found out that this was Vol. 2 of "The Essential Peirce" which Amazon is delivering for me in Pittsburgh this days... I will pick it up in October... List, does somebody knows some scholars of this Association? ALASE _Asociación Latinoamericana de Semiótica_ [EMAIL PROTECTED] Thanks Claudio - Original Message - From: Jorge Lurac To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 10:22 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! ...real-reality... truth... Claudio, 2.457-458 are not paragraphs. SeeA Sketch of Logical Critics on EP 2, pages 451 to 462. J. Lurac Claudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Joe, Ben, Jim, List thanks for all information I could not find 'A Sketch of Logical Critics', EP 2.457-458, 1911 because (I suppose) it is in Vol. 2 of EP and 2 is for vol and not paragraph... etc. etc... --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Patrick, List, Patrick wrote the 28 June: I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as that object for which truth stands I could not find this definition in the CP... could you tell from where you got it? I found this one, closely related: CP 1.339 [...] Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series. (I imagine that Lo is So) Thanks Claudio --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! ...real-reality... truth...
Joe, Ben, Jim, List thanks for all information I could not find 'A Sketch of Logical Critics', EP 2.457-458, 1911 because (I suppose) it is in Vol. 2 of EP and 2 is for vol and not paragraph... etc. etc... But I got this in Vol. 1 of EP: The Essential Peirce Nathan Houser, Christian Kloesel, eds. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1992. Volume I (1867-1893) Chapter 5 Frasers The Work of George Berkeley pages 88-91 [...] Yet it is perfectly possible so to state the matter that no one shall fail to comprehend what the question was, and how there might be two opinions about it. Are universals real? We have only to stop and consider a moment what was meant by the word real, when the whole issue soon becomes apparent. Objects are divided into figments, dreams, etc., on the one hand, and realities on the other. The former are those which exist only inasmuch as you or I or some man imagines them; the latter are those which have an existence independent of your mind or mine or that of any number of persons. The real is that which is not whatever we happen to think it, but is unaffected by what we may think of it. The question, therefore, is whether man, horse, and other names of natural classes, correspond with anything which all men, or all horses, really have in common, independent of our thought, or whether these classes are constituted simply by a likeness in the way in which our minds are affected by individual objects which have in themselves no resemblance or relationship whatsoever. Now that this is a real question which different minds will naturally answer in opposite ways, becomes clear when we think that there are two widely separated points of view, from which reality, as just defined, may be regarded. Where is the real, the thing independent of how we think it, to be found? There must be such a thing, for we find our opinions constrained; there is something, therefore, which influences our thoughts, and is not created by them. We have, it is true, nothing immediately present to us but thoughts. Those thoughts, however, have been caused by sensations, and those sensations are constrained by something out of the mind. This thing out of the mind, which directly influences sensation, and through sensation thought, because it is out of the mind, is independent of how we think it, and is, in short, the real. Here is one view of reality, a very familiar one. And from this point of view it is clear that the nominalistic answer must be given to the question concerning universals. For, while from this standpoint it may be admitted to be true as a rough statement that one man is like another, the exact sense being that the realities external to the mind produce sensations which may be embraced under one conception, yet it can by no means be admitted that the two real men have really anything in common, for to say that they are both men is only to say that the one mental term or thought-sign "man" stands indifferently for either of the sensible objects caused by the two external realities; so that not even the two sensations have in themselves anything in common, and far less is it to be inferred that the external realities have. This conception of reality is so familiar, that it is unnecessary to dwell upon it; but the other, or realist conception, if less familiar, is even more natural and obvious. All human thought and opinion contains an arbitrary, accidental element, dependent on the limitations in circumstances, power, and bent of the individual; an element of error, in short. But human opinion universally tends in the long run to a definite form, which is the truth. Let any human being have enough information and exert enough thought upon any question, and the result will be that he will arrive at a certain definite conclusion, which is the same that any other mind will reach under sufficiently favorable circumstances. Suppose two men, one deaf, the other blind. One hears a man declare he means to kill another, hears the report of the pistol, and hears the victim cry; the other sees the murder done. Their sensations are affected in the highest degree with their individual peculiarities. The first information that their sensations will give them, their first inferences, will be more nearly alike, but still different; the one having, for example, the idea of a man shouting, the other of a man with a threatening aspect; but their final conclusions, the thought the remotest from sense, will be identical and free from the one-sidedness of their idiosyncrasies. There is, then, to every question a true answer, a final conclusion, to which the opinion of every man is constantly gravitating. He may for a time recede from it, but give him more experience and time for consideration, and he will finally approach it. The individual may not live to reach the truth; there is a residuum of error
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Bernard, Jim, List, First what is really easy: DOC is Denominazione di Origine Controllata, recently also used in Argentina as Denominaci¨n de Origen Controlada (I am not sure what happens in Spain... probably the same). Second... I don't know if I get your question... or perhaps I have no idea at all... I think that if 'all is a sign' and that 'all sign can be analyzed as triadic'... then there is nothing that can be ORIGINALLY First, or Sec... or etc. There is no other 'origin' as CP 2.228... Any sign or aspect of a sign (which is at the same time a sign) can be considered (for a moment) as a capital First or little third... depending on the context... since verbal language (differently from the graphic language) can put only one word after an other in a line... I think... wdyt? Best Claudio - Original Message - From: Bernard Morand [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Saturday, June 24, 2006 6:41 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third... Claudio, Jim and others I have a little game to suggest to everybody on the list who has some time to devote to it. Fortunately, it is related to a question of wines. In French language we have a phrase Appellation d'Origine Controlee (A.O.C.) to characterize at the same time the name, the origin and the level of certification of a bottle of wine. It seems that in English the phrasing would have to be Protected Designation of Origin (P.D.O.). I am sure that Claudio knows how to say that in his mother tongue. I will suppose that anyone of the acronyms is a sign. The question is : among the three elements of this sign (either A,O,C or P,D,O) which of them is the First, the Second and which is the Third? Hoping that you will find that the question is worth answering. Bernard --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] A sign as First or third...
ical success. We had already some explanation and discussions in the List on that subject... not too much success, I have to say... On the other hand (and just repeating Peirce), I think that diagrams (good for applied semiotics) could help to emprove the knowledge around Peirce's theoretical proposal... I see too much discussion "turning around in the void"... Like the triadic approach teaches us, an isolated"First" can not exist fare from Second and Third... on the contary, as already stated... symbols grow... Best Claudio Guerri - Original Message - From: "Jim Piat" [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Friday, June 23, 2006 8:10 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Ben wrote: Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker! 66~~ *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* ~~99 Dear Ben, Folks-- Yes, but Peirce also wrote (chapter 20 Trichotomic of The Essential Peirce Vol 1 page 281 line two of paragraph two) that "A sign is a third mediating between the mind addressed and the object represented". So I find this confusing. A Peircean categorical third is not a caterogical first. A first relates only to iself. There is firstness of thirdness but a third is not a first. In my understanding a sign is pre-eminently a third. Yet, Peirce obviously does say above that a sign is a First that stands in such a genuinely triadic relation to a second and so on. What do you make of this? I find it contradictory to speak of mere firstness functioning as thirdness. The quality of thirdness makes sense to me but firstness (as a Peircean category) in a triadic relation to secondness seems to me a contradiction. So I think we need to seek a different intepretation of Peirce when he say a sign is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a second... Yes, all signs(which are thirds) are also firsts because they have qualities. Likewise all signs are seconds because they exist and have effects. But signs are neither mere Firsts nor mere Seconds. Furthermore, no First (as a mere first in Peirce's categorical sense) stand in triadic relations to anything because to stand in a triadic relation is the essence not of firstness but of thirdness. That's the line of thinking that leads me to believe Jean-Marc has a point -- at least in so far as the interpretation of this particular quote is concerned. The above notwithstanding, I do think Peirce meant for his three trichotomies of signs* to highlight to certain aspects of signs which to me are clearly related to his theory of catergories which I take to be the foundation of his theory of signs. In particular I think his first trichotomy forgrounds the quality of signs themselves as either hypotheticals, singulars or generals; the second trichotomy addresses the ways in which signs can refer to their objects by means of qualitative similarity, existential correlation, or convention; and the the third trichotomy addresses the fact that a sign can represent either a mere quality, an object or another sign. For me this suggest a three by three matrix of sign aspects based on Peirce's categories. As Joe cautions, Peirce's classifications of signs were a work in progress. All the more so for my own limited understanding of Peirce. * I'm working from Peirce's discussion "Three Trichotomies of Signs" as presented on page 101 of Justus Buchler's _Philosophical Writings of Peirce_ Best, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Bernard and List, in this sense there are an agreement in different languages, not only in French... In Italian: non ti sei fatto propio niente referring to the grazed knee anche un nientino lo fa ridere In Spanish: no te hicistes nada de nada even if it is bleeding... se rie de nada In German: Du hast dich gar Nichts gemacht (knee) but in this moment with a feet on the bus... I can think at laughing for nothing... probably somebody of the List can help. On the other side, there is also an other aspect of the dimention of noting when a little kid falls badly on his nose and look up to see what happens, and he kries only if the present parent also shauts up... this related to sensation, feeling, firstness that still is not arriving clearly to thirdness even if secondness hurts... Best Claudio - Original Message - From: Bernard Morand [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Saturday, February 11, 2006 8:25 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Introduction Darrel, Ben, Gary and List, I was away from my home and my computer for a few days and I see when coming back that you are making interesting comments out of Zero and Nothing. Some of you know perhaps that in French the word rien (nothing) can be used to mean also a little thing. For example to say he laughs at the slightest little thing we will say un rien le fait rire. In the same sense we will say to Darrel's daughter if she grazed her knee Its nothing. But if we recognize that it makes her crying we will say: C'est trois fois rien intending in this case that it is just a little thing and thus that she can stop crying. So it seems that when Peirce makes the point that the pure zero is the germinal nothing in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed, he is right according to French language at least. And then as one of our humorists puts it: Trois fois rien c'est deja quelque chose (Three times nothing, it is already something). May be that in order to pass from Nothing to Something repetition is needed? Bernard Gary Richmond a ¨crit : But, Ben, nothing.com produces something, valuable I think, viz. We start, then, with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the nothing of negation. For /not/ means /other than,/ and /other/ is merely a synonym of the ordinal numeral /second./ As such it implies a first; while the present pure zero is prior to every first. The nothing of negation is the nothing of death, which comes /second/ to, or after, everything. But this pure zero is the nothing of not having been born. There is no individual thing, no compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing, in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility -- boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom. Charles S. Peirce http://www.peirce.org/, Logic of Events (1898) This, as I sure you noted, points exactly to what I was just arguing which seems to me of some value (not necessarily how I was arguing it, but what Peirce has to say).. While something.com produced just nothing, at least nothing that I could find. Of course, when one continues on nothing.com one gets http://www.showcasedvd.com/?from=nothing which seems to me next to nothing. So what's the point? Gary Benjamin Udell wrote: Darrel, Tori, Gary, I knew it! I shoulda, woulda, coulda posted my surmise that it was from nothing.com. By the way, did you check out something.com? There's been something there, though the server seems to be down right now. Best, Ben Udell Tori, Being an optimist by nature, I typed www.nothing.com into my web browser. In a rare stroke of Internet Luck I was presented with a Pierce quote and a link to http://www.peirce.org/ and happened upon this forum. Another stroke of luck I must say. Darrel --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
