[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! ...real-reality... truth...

[Claudio Guerri]

Joe, Ben, Jim, List   thanks for all information   I could not find 'A Sketch of Logical Critics', EP 2.457-458, 1911 because (I suppose) it is in Vol. 2 of EP and 2 is for vol and not paragraph... etc. etc...   But I got this in Vol. 1 of EP: -------------------------------------------------------------------- The Essential Peirce Nathan Houser, Christian Kloesel, eds. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1992. Volume I (1867-1893) Chapter 5 Fraser’s The Work of George Berkeley pages 88-91   [...] Yet it is perfectly possible so to state the matter that no one shall fail to comprehend what the question was, and how there might be two opinions about it. Are universals real? We have only to stop and consider a moment what was meant by the word real, when the whole issue soon becomes apparent. Objects are divided into fig­ments, dreams, etc., on the one hand, and realities on the other. The former are those which exist only inasmuch as you or I or some man imagines them; the latter are those which have an existence indepen­dent of your mind or mine or that of any number of persons. The real is that which is not whatever we happen to think it, but is unaffected by what we may think of it. The question, therefore, is whether man, horse, and other names of natural classes, correspond with anything which all men, or all horses, really have in common, independent of our thought, or whether these classes are constituted simply by a likeness in the way in which our minds are affected by individual objects which have in themselves no resemblance or relationship what­soever. Now that this is a real question which different minds will naturally answer in opposite ways, becomes clear when we think that there are two widely separated points of view, from which reality, as just defined, may be regarded. Where is the real, the thing independent of how we think it, to be found? There must be such a thing, for we find our opinions constrained; there is something, therefore, which influences our thoughts, and is not created by them. We have, it is true, nothing immediately present to us but thoughts. Those thoughts, how­ever, have been caused by sensations, and those sensations are con­strained by something out of the mind. This thing out of the mind, which directly influences sensation, and through sensation thought, because it is out of the mind, is independent of how we think it, and is, in short, the real. Here is one view of reality, a very familiar one. And from this point of view it is clear that the nominalistic answer must be given to the question concerning universals. For, while from this standpoint it may be admitted to be true as a rough statement that one man is like another, the exact sense being that the realities external to the mind produce sensations which may be embraced under one conception, yet it can by no means be admitted that the two real men have really anything in common, for to say that they are both men is only to say that the one mental term or thought-sign "man" stands indifferently for either of the sensible objects caused by the two exter­nal realities; so that not even the two sensations have in themselves anything in common, and far less is it to be inferred that the external realities have. This conception of reality is so familiar, that it is un­necessary to dwell upon it; but the other, or realist conception, if less familiar, is even more natural and obvious. All human thought and opinion contains an arbitrary, accidental element, dependent on the limitations in circumstances, power, and bent of the individual; an element of error, in short. But human opinion universally tends in the long run to a definite form, which is the truth. Let any human being have enough information and exert enough thought upon any ques­tion, and the result will be that he will arrive at a certain definite conclusion, which is the same that any other mind will reach under sufficiently favorable circumstances. Suppose two men, one deaf, the other blind. One hears a man declare he means to kill another, hears the report of the pistol, and hears the victim cry; the other sees the murder done. Their sensations are affected in the highest degree with their individual peculiarities. The first information that their sensa­tions will give them, their first inferences, will be more nearly alike, but still different; the one having, for example, the idea of a man shouting, the other of a man with a threatening aspect; but their final conclusions, the thought the remotest from sense, will be identical and free from the one-sidedness of their idiosyncrasies. There is, then, to every question a true answer, a final conclusion, to which the opinion of every man is constantly gravitating. He may for a time recede from it, but give him more experience and time for consideration, and he will finally approach it. The individual may not live to reach the truth; there is a residuum of error in every individual's opinions. No matter; it remains that there is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on the whole and in the long run, tending. On many questions the final agreement is already reached, on all it will be reached if time enough is given. The arbitrary will or other individual peculiarities of a sufficiently large number of minds may postpone the general agree­ment in that opinion indefinitely; but it cannot affect what the charac­ter of that opinion shall be when it is reached. This final opinion, then, is independent, not indeed of thought in general, but of all that is arbitrary and individual in thought; is quite independent of how you, or I, or any number of men think. Everything, therefore, which will be thought to exist in the final opinion is real, and nothing else. What is the POWER of external things, to affect the senses? To say that people sleep after taking opium because it has a soporific power,' is that to say anything in the world but that people sleep after taking opium because they sleep after taking opium? To assert the existence of a power or potency, is it to assert the existence of anything actual? Or to say that a thing has a potential existence, is it to say that it has an actual existence? In other words, is the present existence of a power anything in the world but a regularity in future events relating to a certain thing regarded as an element which is to be taken account of beforehand, in the conception of that thing? If not, to assert that there are external things which can be known only as exerting a power on our sense, is nothing different from asserting that there is a general drift in the history of human thought which will lead it to one general agreement, one catholic consent. And any truth more perfect than this destined conclusion, any reality more absolute than what is thought in it, is a fiction of metaphysics. It is obvious how this way of thinking harmo­nizes with a belief in an infallible Church, and how much more natural it would be in the Middle Ages than in Protestant or positivist times. This theory of reality is instantly fatal to the idea of a thing in itself,-a thing existing independent of all relation to the mind's con­ception of it. Yet it would by no means forbid, but rather encourage us, to regard the appearances of sense as only signs of the realities. Only, the realities which they represent would not be the unknowable cause of sensation, but noumena, or intelligible conceptions which are the last products of the mental action which is set in motion by sensa­tion. The matter of sensation is altogether accidental; precisely the same information, practically, being capable of communication through different senses. And the catholic consent which constitutes the truth is by no means to be limited to men in this earthly life or to the human race, but extends to the whole communion of minds to which we belong, including some probably whose senses are very different from ours, so that in that consent no predication of a sensible quality can enter, except as an admission that so certain sorts of senses are affected. This theory is also highly favorable to a belief in external realities. It will, to be sure, deny that there is any reality which is absolutely incognizable in itself, so that it cannot be taken into the mind. But observing that "the external" means simply that which is independent of what phenomenon is immediately present, that is of how we may think or feel; just as "the real" means that which is independent of how we may think or feel about it; it must be granted that there are many objects of true science which are external, because there are many objects of thought which, if they are independent of that thinking whereby they are thought (that is, if they are real), are indisputably independent of all other thoughts and feelings. It is plain that this view of reality is inevitably realistic; because general conceptions enter into all judgments, and therefore into true opinions. Consequently a thing in the general is as real as in the concrete. It is perfectly true that all white things have whiteness in them, for that is only saying, in another form of words, that all white things are white; but since it is true that real things possess whiteness, whiteness is real. It is a real which only exists by virtue of an act of thought knowing it, but that thought is not an arbitrary or accidental one dependent on any idiosyncrasies, but one which will hold in the final opinion. This theory involves a phenomenalism. But it is the phenomenal­ism of Kant, and not that of Hume. Indeed, what Kant called his Copernican steps was precisely the passage from the nominalistic to the realistic view of reality. It was the essence of his philosophy to regard the real object as determined by the mind. That was nothing else than to consider every conception and intuition which enters necessarily into the experience of an object, and which is not transi­tory and accidental, as having objective validity. In short, it was to regard the reality as the normal product of mental action, and not as the incognizable cause of it. This realistic theory is thus a highly practical and common-sense position. Wherever universal agreement prevails, the realist will not be the one to disturb the general belief by idle and fictitious doubts. For according to him it is a consensus or common confession which constitutes reality. What he wants, therefore, is to see questions put to rest. And if a general belief, which is perfectly stable and immovable, can in any way be produced, though it be by the fagot and the rack, to talk of any error in such belief is utterly absurd. The realist will hold that the very same objects which are immediately present in our minds in experience really exist just as they are experienced out of the mind; that is, he will maintain a doctrine of immediate perception. He will not, therefore, sunder existence out of the mind and being in the mind as two wholly improportionable modes. When a thing is in such rela­tion to the individual mind that that mind cognizes it, it is in the mind; and its being so in the mind will not in the least diminish its external existence. For he does not think of the mind as a receptacle, which if a thing is in, it ceases to be out of. To make a distinction between the true conception of a thing and the thing itself is, he will say, only to regard one and the same thing from two different points of view; for the immediate object of thought in a true judgment is the reality. The realist will, therefore, believe in the objectivity of all necessary concep­tions, space, time, relation, cause, and the like. No realist or nominalist ever expressed so definitely, perhaps, as is here done, his conception of reality. It is difficult to give a clear notion of an opinion of a past age, without exaggerating its distinctness. But careful examination of the works of the schoolmen will show that the distinction between these two views of the real-one as the fountain of the current of human thought, the other as the unmoving form to which it is flowing-is what really occasions their disagreement on the question concerning universals. The gist of all the nominalist's argu­ments will be found to relate to a res extra animam, while the realist defends his position only by assuming that the immediate object of thought in a true judgment is real. The notion that the controversy between realism and nominalism had anything to do with Platonic ideas is a mere product of the imagination, which the slightest exami­nation of the books would suffice to disprove. [...]   End quote --------------------------------------------------------------------------   I would like to answer Jim, but my List-time is over for today... and tomorrow we have Argentina-Germany and Italy-Ukraine... nobody is perfect... Best Claudio           ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jim Piat" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu> Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 4:49 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! > >> It is found in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear": >> >> The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who >> investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in >> this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality.  CP >> 5.407 >> >> Joe Ransdell >> > > > Dear Folks, > > Thanks for all the discussion of real, true and existence.   I take the > above quote to mean that truth (or the lack of it) is a property of opinions > and real (or the lack of it) is a property of the objects to which those > opinions (signs) refer.  An opinion that is true represents an object that > is real. > > But what is the relation between real and existance?  Can a first (such as a > quality) whose mode of being is mere potential (not actual) be in itself > real?  A quality embodied in a real object I agree is real, but I remain > puzzled as to the reality of qualites as mere firsts.   I guess what I > wondering is whether Peirce equates the real soley with what actually exist > or whether real can also be applied to mere firsts. > > I suppose one could use Peirce's above definition of real to apply to mere > qualities (as firsts).  For example,  if one were to express a true opinion > as to what potential qualities might be realized in objects or what the > character of those qualities might be, those qualities (as the hypothetical > objects of those opinions) would be real.  One could also express false > opinions regarding mere qualities (how many there are and their nature) in > which case the qualities referred to would not be real. > > And if the immediately above interpretation of real is correct (as I now > think it is) then I would say that real  is a property of all modes of being > (potential, actual and general).  To be,  is to be real.  However true or > false is a property only of thought. Unreal is a property only of objects > that are falsely represented.  Anything that has potential or actual being > is real but we can mis-represent or falsely represent both qualities and > objects and to the extent that that either is falsely represented (or > interpreted) that quality or object is not real. > > So, for example, hallucinations are real but they are falsely interpreted > and the objects they are thought to represent by the person experiencing the > hallucination are not real.  Similarly possible objects do not necessarily > exist but if truly (faithfully) represented then they are real. All > potentially possible objects (truly represented) are real but impossible > objects are not.  And so on... > > I think that sovles the problem for me.  My basic conclusion is that all > modes of being are real.  An object need not exist to be real but it must be > possible. Some representations are true and some are false.  Objects > represented are real or false to the extent the representation is true.  I > wanted to make sure I had an understanding of real, true and actual that > allowed for all sorts of conceptions including lies, illusions, > contradictory statements, and mere potential states of affairs.  I think the > above does it but would welcome errors being pointed out. > > Cheers, > Jim Piat > > > --- > Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > __________ Información de NOD32, revisión 1.1632 (20060629) __________ > > Este mensaje ha sido analizado con  NOD32 antivirus system > http://www.nod32.com > > --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com