[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Frances to Jean-Marc... This muse is somewhat off topic, but may be related to the subject. You recently stated here that Peirce wrote some thirds and seconds are degenerate, which means that they have no real existence. The statement that degenerate categories have no real existence is intriguing, but it does confuse me somewhat in that my understanding of Peircean degeneracy is that such categories will have real existence, but will fail to be true to the conditions of their ground. In regard to symbols for example, there are three categories called abstract symbols and singular symbols and genuine symbols, but only genuine symbols are not degenerate, because they are faithful to their conventional ground in that they are formally arbitrary, unlike the other symbols. In any event, degenerate symbols and genuine symbols would both continue to have real existence, regardless of the absence or presence of degeneracy. At issue here perhaps is likely the strict Peircean meaning of such terms as "object" and "real" and "existence" in that say representamen that are not signs have no objects, and are not real if not sensed, yet might have existence as representamen even if not sensed and not real. My reading of meaning into these Peircean terms may of course be off base here. The term "have" here for the thing categories might possess as a sensible objective property, independent of say life and mind, is also a problem for me. For example, would genuine symbols like some lingual words "have" existence or "have" arbitrarity within their form, merely waiting to be sensed and thus be real. The dependence of reality on sense also seems to imply that what is real might be a mental construct, unlike factuality and even actuality which might be held as a material construct. In other words, if an existent fact and whether it is actual or not is not sensed, then it simply is not real, so that a fact is only as real as sense. Jean-Marc Orliaguet partly wrote... "Peirce was a "three-category realist" acknowledging the reality of Firsts and Seconds and Thirds early on. ...Peirce acknowledged the reality of actuality or of secondness...the reality of firsts (the universe of possibility) and of course the reality of thirdness (the universe of thought or signs)...However he wrote that some thirds and seconds are degenerate, meaning that they have no real existence." --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Frances to Joe and others... There is a tendency for me to equate "immediate" or "immediacy" with all metaphysical quiddities and representamens that are not signs, as well as with all categorical primaries and firstnesses or firsts and qualities that exist to sense, but especially to align them with representamens that are signs within acts of semiosis. My reason for trying to do this semiotically and grammatically at least is to make representamens seem consistent as being immediate representamens along with immediate objects and immediate interpretants. The theoretical use this could have might include differentiating semiosic representamens that are signs from synechastic representamens that are not signs. There might then of course be no need to use immediacy as a label for "things" before "objects" or for representamens and phenomena outside semiosis. If for example a diagrammatic table where drawn to illustrate the structure of "grammatic" signs, it might hence be as follows. -- immediate representamens -- immediate dynamic objects objects -- immediate dynamic final interpretants interpretantsinterpretants -- This basic layout and usage of "immediate" for representamens seems reasonable to me, but nothing could be found in Peircean writings yet to support the use of the term "immediate representamen" for some reason, other than as you explained earlier below. The structure of this diagrammatic table however is perhaps rough or vague. It is vertical and even upside down in regard to the usual structure shown of trichotomies, so that there appears to be here three "immediate" firsts aligned to the left column and margin, yet only one "final" third aligned to the right column and margin. If the table were flipped the other side up, then the top row would have three horizontal classes as firsts and the right column would have three vertical classes as thirds, which only seems partly consistent with the trichotomic structure of categories. This problem may simply go to the limits of graphic or visual diagrams, which after all are iconic and merely similar in form to their referred objects, and logically senseless in that icons can be neither false nor true. There is an implication here that all semiotic immediates are probably grammatic in stature and somewhat iconic in structure. Perhaps when immediates as say subicons or when icons and their diagrams become dynamic objects or say dynamic object signs, aligned or connected more so to or as designated hyposemic indexes, will they become somewhat logically sensible and thus must be either false or true. In any event, all representamens to me seem inherently and intrinsically immediate, whether they are synechastically not signs or semiosically as signs, therefore labelling representamens as "immediate representamens" might more clearly assign or reassign them as being semiosic in the field and semiotic in the study. Joe wrote... The passage Jim found runs as follows: "It is usually admitted that there are two classes of mental representation, Immediate Representations or Sensations and Mediate Representations or Conceptions." In the context in which that occurs, Peirce goes on to say: "The former are completely determinate or individual objects of thought; the latter are partially indeterminate or general objects." And he then goes on (in the next paragraph) to say: "But according to my theory of logic, since no pure sensations or individual objects exist... ." I omit the rest of the long and complex sentence since it adds nothing to the point at issue, which is that he does not himself accept the "usually admitted" theory, which he contrasts as based on a different metaphysics than his. I cannot myself think of any reason why he would want to use such a term. The word "icon" is after all his term for a representing entity which presents its object immediately in the sense that no distinction can be drawn between the iconic sign and that of which it is an icon: they are numerically identical... (There is still a formal distinction to be drawn between icon and object, in the sense that there is a difference between representing and being represented, but this does not entail that what represents and what is represented cannot be the same thing. Otherwise there would be no such thing as self-representation. But of course there is.) So of what use would there be for the term "immediate representation" where that is equivalent to "immediate sign" or "immediate representamen"? It would only introduce an awkward expression of no distinctive use in his theoretical work with the negative potentiality of throwing it into confusion. That is why I am questioning your trying to do this. I don't understand what theoretical use it could have. Jim a
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Frances to Joe and Jim and others... No sources could be found by me in Peirce or on Peirce for the terms "immediate representamen" and "immediate sign" but my search continues. The terms "Immediate Representations" and "Mediate Representations" found in Peirce however do raise the further issue of some differences that Peirce might have held between representation and representamen, as well as some differences that he might also have held between representamen and sign. Joe queried... Where does Peirce talk about "immediate representamen" or "immediate sign"? I can't think of any use he would have for such a term. Jim answered... "It is usually admitted that there are two classes of mental representation, Immediate Representations or Sensations and Mediate Representations or Conceptions." - from Essential Peirce, Volume 1, page 106 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Frances to Joseph and listers... The decagon table does not seem to deal with signs as representamens explicitly. The decagon of course does deal with immediate objects and dynamic objects and one immediate interpretant. If it did deal with representamens, it is reasonable to me that such representamens would be only immediate. It is my assumption furthermore that representamens in being primary and monadic are intrinsically only immediate, especially when compared or contrasted trichotomically with dyadic objects and triadic or tridential interpretants. My access to the Peircean writings is limited at present, so it is not known by me whether he used the actual term "immediate representamens" and even "immediate signs" or not. You obviously searched, but did not find the terms. If however representamens are presumptively held to always be immediate firsts within semiosis, then there agreeably would likely be no need for such a term as "immediate representamens" as long as no confusion arises due to the presumption. Nonetheless, this to me is the first time that a curiosity has arisen as to whether Peirce used such terms as "immediate representamens" or "immediate signs" and further even had a use for them. There may of course be uses of these terms by others in sources on Peirce and a quick search will be done at my end for them. Joseph mused... Where does Peirce talk about an "immediate representamen" (or an "immediate sign")? I can't think of any use he would have for such a term. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Frances to Ben and others... In the decadic table or model, the ten classes of signs seem to deal with immediate objects, and dynamic objects, and sparse selections of immediate and dynamic and final interpretants. The decagon does not seem to deal with immediate representamens whatsoever, except perhaps indirectly or subsequently through immediate objects. The first class of signs, posited as qualisigns and sinsigns and legisigns, deals with the immediate objects of a representamen, and probably not with the representamen or sign vehicle itself alone. My guess is that immediate representamen are posited as potisigns and actisigns and famsigns, but are removed from the decadic table or model of semiosis, likely for some reason of expediency by way of illustrating the correlation and interrelation of signs. The present condensed table or model of semiotics as offered in its many forms does seem to serve that basic purpose well enough. The second class of signs, posited as icons and indexes and symbols, deals with the dynamic objects of immediate interpretants, of which immediate rhemes are merely one class of interpretant and indeed only one class of immediate interpretant. The third class of signs, posited as rhemes and dicents and arguments, deals partly with those interpretants that are respectively immediate and dynamic and final. They are only a partial selection, because they are not all the interpretants that are offered in semiosis. They are however trichotomic exemplars of their respected categories, in that rhemes are the first of three immediate interpretants offered, and dicents are the second of three dynamic interpretants offered, and arguments are the third of three final interpretants offered. This condensation actually yields a diagonal layout, which is unusual for categorical trichotomies, which are usually horizontal. Nonetheless, even this architectonic scaffolding is not categorically consistent with the structured trichotomies of phenomena, in that there should be only one immediate class, but two dynamic classes, yet three final classes. The class members of such monadic firstness and dyadic secondness and triadic thirdness would also each fall under there own class holder, presumably of zeroness. It is my suspicion that all the interpretants posited for semiosis are not all of grammatics, the first of the three grand semiotic divisions before critics and rhetorics; and grammatics which is also the sole basis of the decagon. One thorn here for me then is whether all the subsequent signs of critics and rhetorics are indeed only various kinds of grammatic or other interpretants. Another thorn here for me is whether semiotics can be complete at least to some degree, for say nonhuman mechanisms or organisms or even for mature humans, if only the grammatic division of signs is present as information, to the exclusion of critics and grammatics in any particular situation of semiosis. This of course implies that making signs to some extent, and thus making the logic of signs to some extent, and thus making the ideal sought seem real to some extent, is not limited only to mature intelligent humans. If this speculation of mine is correct, then just what role the decadic table or model of signs is intended to fully play as a degenerate condensation of logical semiosis becomes unclear to me, and there surely must be an important role. Given what is now known of Peirce, it would not be reasonable to hold the decagon as confused. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: RE : Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign
Title: Message Frances on Gilles to listers... These semiotic diagrams in the posted message and in the linked website are a welcome addition to the trichotomic topic, and will surely be the cause of much more reflection. The positing of "réel" for the "real" object is assumed here an adjective or label that holds the dynamic object to be an indirect thing inaccessible to sense, until it is related to a sign. This use of the term "real" however might be misleading, if it broadly means phenomenal or essential or existential, or even if it is a mere synonym that means factual or actual or material. My understanding of the term real and reality in Peirce is that if any phenomenal existent fact that may also be actually concrete is not sensed, then it is not yet real, at least not real to the mind that senses. The reality of a fact or object therefore is only as real as sense. If an object as a fact is not given to sense, then it is not real. Now, while it is true Peirce claims that an object must determine a sign, because signs after all are themselves simply objects, it is not clear to me whether it is the referring object in semiosis that does this, or does it for its own referent sign only, or must be real to do it, or must be sensible and sensed to do it. It seems the position here in the presented diagram is that the dynamic object of semiosis and semiotics is indeed real and the object that determines the very existence of the sign as related to the object. To speculate on Peircean intentions, one way around this problem of objects determining signs, whether the objects are sensed and real or not, might be to differentiate between synechastic objects and semiosic objects. This is for me to suggest that phenomenal synechastic objects continue to exist outside and even prior to acts of semiosis, thereby having the disposed potential for determining signs to exist as objects themselves but as signs of other semiosic objects, and this by the process of phenomenal representation. These synechastic objects might be held as representamen that are not signs. The phenomenal semiosic objects that are then found by sense to really exist inside acts of semiosis, thereby are referred by their own referent signs, and this also by the process of phenomenal representation. These semiosic objects might be held as representamen that are signs. The initiate synechastic object in acts of evolution thus has the purpose to determine the mere existence of the sign. The immediate semiosic object in semiosis, acting variously as a qualisign and sinsign and legisign, thus has the further purpose to determine the very real presence of a probable representing representamen or sign, acting variously as a potisign and actisign and famsign. The dynamic semiosic object in semiosis thus has the still further purpose to determine the main kind a real representamen or sign will be, as an icon or index or symbol. The act of determination, by an object towards itself as a sign of itself or another object, or by an object towards another object as a sign of itself or another object, is here understood by me to mean a determinate limit or a ground, but not a cause or a source. The purpose to act by any phaneron is here understood by me to mean a disposed tendency or inclined trait that the phenomenon is naturally compelled to conform with. - Original Message - From: Gilles Arnaud To: Peirce Discussion Forum Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, June 14, 2006 5:29 AM Subject: [peirce-l] RE : Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign bonjour, ma conception spéculative sur ce sujet : schéma de 8.334 http://perso.orange.fr/a/a/Peirce/le_signe_hexadique2.htm Les treillis de R.Marty : http://perso.orange.fr/a/a/Peirce/le_treillis.htm CordialementARNAUD Gilles --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign
Frances to listers... As posited by Peirce under speculative grammatics, it is clear enough to me that the classes of immediate object signs are qualisigns and sinsigns and legisigns, and that the classes of dynamic object signs are icons and indexes and symbols, and that the various interpretant signs of these signs are classed as immediate and dynamic and final. What is not clear to me however is what classes of signs Peirce may have posited to account for immediate representamen signs. These would presumably be determined by the immediate and dynamic objects they refer to, and would in turn presumably determine the various terns of interpretants they generate as an effect. Such representamens therefore would presumably constitute the sign vehicles or carriers that moderate between their objects and their interpretants. The only tern of signs Peirce mentions that might be posited to fit this class called immediate representamen signs are potisigns and actisigns and famsigns. There is however some seeming resistance among semioticians and pragmatists to allocate this fundamental tern in such a way, but the reasons usually turn either on substitutions, whereby they are claimed to be mere synonyms stated earlier by Peirce for what is now correctly deemed to be immediate object signs, or on the fact that they are not mentioned in the familiar ten classes of signs. If these reasons justly warrant dismissing them from serious semiotic concern, then the problem persists for me as to just what exactly are immediate representamen signs within semiosis. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign
Frances to listers... The broad theme of this topic and its leading threads is a subject that remains intriguingly foggy for me. At the core of my haze perhaps is the forced application of categorics upon semiotics, yet with synechastics lurking in the wings. In my attempt to wrestle with the many classes of signs in acts of semiosis as listed by Peirce, it is tempting to take various kinds of signs he mentioned and organize them within a sort of tridential diagram of soles and pairs and terns. Some of those signs would require a tentative assumption that they are not mere synonyms of each other. These signs might include potisigns and actisigns and famsigns as immediate representamen signs or moderating vehicles, and then qualisigns and sinsigns and legisigns as immediate object signs of fundamental reference, and then icons and indexes and symbols as dynamic object signs of advanced reference. These might also include semes or rhemes and sumisigns and terms as immediate interpretant signs of initial effect, and then phemes and dicisigns or dicents and propositions as dynamic interpretant signs of obstinate or remediate effect, and last delomes or dolemes and suadisigns and arguments as final interpretant signs of destinate and culminate and ultimate effect. Another thorn here for me is that those classes of dynamic object signs and dynamic interpretant signs are of secondness, but are not listed or structured in a trichotomically consistent manner. In other words and for example, icons would be a sole first, with indexes and symbols as a subsequent dual pair under some categorical umbrella, which is seemingly missing here. All these signs furthermore might rest only within the first semiosic division of grammatics, often called the inscriptive information of signs by Morrisean semioticians. Many of the signs mentioned correctly as other interpretant signs might very well be kinds of "super" signs that rest further within the other semiosic divisions of critics and rhetorics, where critics is often called the descriptive evaluation of signs, and rhetorics is often called the prescriptive evocation of signs, again by Morrisean semioticians. Those other interpretant "super" signs that could be deemed post grammatic might include normative assurances to the signer or semiotician of the sign. Another thorn for me is whether Peirce intended that these further divisions of critics and rhetorics, and seemingly infused with advanced interpretant signs, would be categorically structured as phenomenal trichotomies. In this regard, it remains tempting for me to structure the Peircean divisions of grammatics and critics and rhetorics each with the Morrisean dimensions of syntactics and semantics and pragmatics. This might then allow for advanced interpretants to take on the critical characteristics of appraised syntactic values and defined semantic meanings and inferred pragmatic judgements or worths, and for further advanced interpretants under rhetorics to deal with the syntactic means of communication and the semantic signification of modes and the pragmatic methods of responsive actions. All signs would of course be speculative. The further assumption by me is that while these signs in acts of semiosis are all objective logical constructs, semiotics or logics in the broadest sense actually embraces both nonlingual and lingual signs, and lingual signs would presumably embrace both nonverbal and verbal signs, but linguistics and its languages is held to a practical science by Peirce, and thus excluded from semiotic concern as having no logical import. Of course, all logical signs used by humans are seemingly proposed by Peirce as degenerate forms of pure logic, so that there should be little problem in permitting lingual signs into semiotics and thus into logic. This may imply however that semiotics with linguistics is degenerate logics, while the normative sciences aligned as aesthetics and ethics and logics is less so. Nonetheless, interpretants like terms and propositions are both held by Peirce to be either nonlingual or lingual, thereby probably yielding arguments where some of their premises are nonlingual or nonverbal yet allowing the competent performance of illocutionary acts in any event. This would certainly correct the psychologistic subjectivism of notions and the nominalism of mentions and notations that Peirce wanted to avoid, at least as global approaches to the generality and universality of logical signs. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign
Frances to Wilfred Berendsen... These signs are of recurring interest to me also, and several past messages dealing with them by experts are in the list archive. Any replies to you will hence be followed with enthusiasm. My present access to the writings of Peirce is limited, but other writers who refer to these signs might indeed be found in further sources. My thought here turns for example to books by Alfred Ayer, James Feiblemen, Thomas Goudge, Benjamin Lee, Winfried Noth, David Savan, and Thomas Sebeok who all mention and discuss these Peircean signs to varying degrees, if this is what you are after. One initial point is that in a strict categorization the correct ordering of these signs is as qualisigns and sinsigns and legisigns. They are also seemingly not only subjective notions stirred in mind, but are deemed objective logical constructs that are found or discovered to exist in the ontic arena of the world, which can then of course be used to evoke mental notions. My understanding is that these signs are of immediate objects, and might further be best called iconic subsigns. To be categorically consistent, these signs in my opinion might be held to have subordinate subclasses that fall under them, so that qualisigns would perhaps have tones, while sinsigns would perhaps have tokens and replicas, yet legisigns would perhaps have types and something like codes and semes. There is a tendency however for some interpreters of Peirce to claim that tones and tokens and types are either mere alternate synonyms for qualisigns and sinsigns and legisigns, or are a broader class of signs in semiosis that goes to making the ideal seem real to sense. The subsequent dynamic objects of signs or the main "proper" signs of semiosis as generated by immediate interpretants would then be called icons and indexes and symbols. My tentative reading of the Peircean literature also leads me to understand that the signs or iconic subsigns of preceding immediate representamen are perhaps called potisigns and actisigns and famsigns. The allocation of this fundamental trident or class of signs in such a way is however not fully clear to me, as they are often suggested by many scholars to be mere early substitutes for qualisigns and sinsigns and famsigns. This explanation would seem to be unlikely though, since they are after all listed by Peirce as a separate class of signs. The issue of determinate objects and degenerate signs might also be of some importance in regard to the subsigns or subclasses of semiotic immediacy. Wilfred wrote... Currently I am very interested in the notions of sinsign, legisign and qualisign. I know there have been discussions about this before, with phrases out of texts from CS Peirce defining these terms. What I however would like to know, is in what texts (preferably from the essential peirce 1&2 since I have these) from Peirce and also in what texts of other scientists explaining his notions, it is best explained what these notions are all about. I am looking for texts or combinations of texts where these notions are explained as complete as possible. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Nonagon Revisited [...from "naming definite individuals"] (2)
Frances to Claudio... On the relatedness of Peirce to Althusser and Lacan, with the categorization of Peirce as a firstness with say logic and semiotics and philosophy, and of Althusser as a secondness with say behavior and habit and conduct and social practice, and of Lacan as a thirdness with psychoanalysis and psychology, there is a strong tridential suggestion of "objectivism" and "relativism" and "subjectivism" diagrammed here. Under realist pragmatism, these three theories would fail as global approaches in the general or universal sense, but would be useful as special theories to address specific issues. This would leave "objective relativism" and "subjective relativism" from which realist pragmatism might choose a global theory. It is likely however that "subjective relativism" would also fail, because it holds that say the percipient of a sign must be brought into a relation with their own sense of the object, rather than with the object of their sense. This might leave "objective relativism" as a global theory that could be acceptable to realist pragmatism, because it holds that say the percipient of a sign must be brought into a relation with the object of their sense, and not with their own inner sense of the object, since it is the object after all that is being sensed and not the sense of it. This approach would impact well on the aesthetics of art for example, in that it is say the object that is said to be beautiful and not the sense of it. This theory of "objective relativism" in realist pragmatism might be called "contextualism" if that label is not already used. The issue to then address is how well this kind of global approach might sit with the ideas of Lacan in particular. The ideas of Peirce on reality might of course fit well here, in that he seemingly holds an existent phenomenal fact is only real if it is sensed, thereby making reality a mental construct. Through signs, the ideal is thus objectively related to the real, and the real is objectively related to the idea or say the ideareal. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Nonagon Revisited [...from "naming definite individuals"] (1)
Frances to Claudio... My thought that a constructed building to be architectural in the broadest sense need not be inhabited and resided in or even occupied as a dwelling, does not exclude the necessity that the designed building be utilized or implemented in some manner. It would be my contention furthermore that the designed building must be actually built in concrete terms to be architecture, and perhaps also to be art if that is a relevant point here. The preparatory model or intended score or proposed script of a planned project after all are not the work of art nor the product of architecture. It could be debated also whether there might be a difference for a building being architecture or art in regard to its being satisfied and completed and finished. My thought here turns to pictural depictions like paintings that might for example be held as syntactically satisfied, but semantically incomplete, yet pragmatically finished as a closed work of fine art; or even to ordinary nonart objects in nature or culture like caves and dams that come to be held and closed as lofty art and design objects. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Nonagon Revisited [...from "naming definite individuals"]
Frances to Claudio and others... Tools as instruments and implements are traditionally of interest to scholars studying in the fields of anthropology and ethnology, but also cross over to ethology and epistemology. Tools studied as representative signs are perhaps intrinsically a kind of existent index, although they can be either physical constructs or psychical constructs. To be categorically consistent, this phenomenal construction would render tools dyadic and thus dichotic or dichotomic in structure. Tools presumably can be found or made, and then accidentally or deliberately. They are probably the constructs of all living organisms to some degree, but especially of animals and humans. With human organisms, the crafted tools that they find or make likely act as indexic artifacts that express some practical use in their cultures. As utilities, it seems clear that tools are brutal in their connective relation to persons and objects, but might be held as being either synthetic or prosthetic. Tools can thus include the signs of signages and languages, as well as the signs of logics and mathematics. These mental tools as kinds of indexes would of course be degenerate in regard to genuine causation, but they would be indexes nonetheless because they compel driven attention. This extension of tools to the nonhuman arena may of course push the concept too far for some theorists. As useful as they are, the use of tools should be approached with suspicious alarm and skeptical caution, because all tools are fallible, and some more so than others. The use of diagrams as tools to show ideas for example are icons, and thus are neither false nor true, but are logically senseless. At best, they are vague impressions and appearances of objects. As instruments used by researchers in laboratories, tools are necessary to test selected samples, and thus are necessary for the very advance and expanse and progress of inquiry. Otherwise, scientific empiricism would be very limited, or at least kept in waiting by techne to invent further tools. As instruments used by architects in projects, tools are also necessary to build selected designs, and thus are necessary for humans to move from merely occupying caves to inhabiting edifices. The idea that tools are indexic signs is enhanced by considering the role of immediate objects called tones and tokens and types in the evolution of tools, all of which such objects are immediate iconic subsigns. The original acquisition and utilization of an object as a tool for the first time establishes the attributed essences and tonal qualities that go to make up the toolness of that that tool. The original however is also a singular token of its own tone and that by which it becomes a particular type of itself. The subsequent experimental making of another replicate of the first token tool, develops a further token tool that yields a stereotype of the prototype, and further token variants will yield yet further types. Out of this growth will emerge a normal typical object with a usual tonal quality called the tool, of which all token members will share the same identical properties as others in the class. The issue to address here is whether there can be a standard tool or global object of any class, and whether that type is really an objective material construct, or if it is merely a subjective mental construct in the form of a rational notion or nominal mention. The same might be said of architecture, as a useful tool and as a global object. The concept of tools as signs and then as indexes and artifacts is not shared globally among experts in different fields. The same could be said of many terms used for many kinds of signs. There is a need for scholars to now bring together the many pluralistic kinds of theories related to the nonlogical and logical study of signs, which traditionally range from semiotics and structuralism and semiology and linguistics. These theories with their terms often overlap in fields other than semiotics and semiology and linguistics, but there is an interdependence of disciplines here. The simple standardization of sign terms from diverse theories and fields and studies for example would alone justify this global attempt. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Nonagon Revisited [...from "naming definite individuals"]
Frances to Claudio... In regard to the two diagrams you posited earlier, their end use would presumably be as conceptual tools used mainly by architectural designers in the practice of their craft. The first design diagram you posit is: 1ness - Math- geom./design - Aesthetics 2ness - Physics - calculus - Ethics Chemistry - construction - ??? 3ness - Logic - social rules RRHH? - Anthropology Semiotics - behavior - Sociology Philosophy - habits - Psychology The other different but related diagram you posit is: 1ness - Peirce 2ness - Althusser 3ness - Lacan As a starting point towards the integration of knowledge about the signs of design, you muse over whether these diagrams are related. (The meaning of "RRHH?" and "???" above is unknown by me.) The proposed diagrammatic table relating "Peirce and Althusser and Lacan" seems promising, but the ideas of Althusser and Lacan are outside my current area of expertise. Any further explanatory comments will therefore be welcome. The relatedness of Peirce to Althusser and Lacan, along with the categorization of Peirce as a firstness, would be of special interest. The proposed diagrammatic matrix on the field of design is assumed held to include such institutional and industrial and professional practices as graphic design and fashion design and product design and architectural design and engineering design. It is not fully clear to me if design is held here to be mainly an art or a craft or a techne, or rooted as a teleonomic process of purposive goals in the cosmic evolution of the physical world, or indeed if even nonhumans can engage in acts of design. It is also not fully clear to me if the finished objects of human design are held to be mainly aesthetic objects or artistic objects, or other intrinsic kinds of objects like structural objects or technical objects. In regard to the contents of the matrix and if it is important, the relevant human acts listed by Morris were roughly art and tech and science, and the normative methodic sciences listed by Peirce were roughly aesthetics and ethics and logics. These two terns of labels would make an interesting matrix of quadrants on their own. The technical aspects of aesthetics and ethics and logics in particular would be most relevant here and very revealing. To condense the formal science of general philosophy into a pragmatist trident that could work in an orienting diagram, it might carry as its main sciences those of ontology and cosmology and epistemology. Ontology might then carry metaphysical phenomenology, to include synechastics and categorics and mathematics and astronomics and theistics. Cosmology might then carry physics and teleology, to include the teleonomics of design. Epistemology might then carry say psychology and semiology and methodology. The formal sciences of philosophy would then lead into the natural sciences of say physiology and biology, and the social sciences of say ideology and ethnology and sociology. In regard to all these sciences, there is also the further consideration of theoscopy along with phaneroscopy and ideoscopy and coenoscopy. To go beyond the sciences however is to go beyond the phenomenal world, which according to realist pragmatism is likely outside the experiential and intellectual limits of the human mind. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Nonagon Revisited [...from "naming definite individuals"]
Frances to Claudio... Thanks for your comments and directions, all of which will be considered in my own pursuit of showing semiotics in suitable graphic forms to different audiences, and the nonagon is certainly one of those forms. On the terms "trident" and "tern" in some of my messages, they are used by me simply in an attempt to avoid any suggestions of pointed specificity, and thus to accommodate all the "3-adic" things some tridential structures or tern of systems implies in Peircean debates, such as triadic or trichotic or trichotomic or triune or trinity. The term "trident" is used as an overall umbrella, because no other word seemed available to me. The term "trichotomic" of course would be strictly correct, but not always appropriate for all Peircean oriented topics. (Incidentally, if a "pair" is two in say a dyad and a "tern" is three in say a triad, then what if anything is a "group" of four in say a tetrad?) One further point on some nonagons that use the terms "design" and "construction" and "habitability" as main labels, it still seems to me that a finished building in the broadest sense need not be resided in or even occupied to be architectural. The building however would perhaps be required to be used in the sense of utility or utilization, although as a sign the building might need only be subject to realization, and then of an emotional or practical or intellectual kind. Then again, animals residing in an architecturally designed zoo that is electronically controlled in the absence of any subsequent human intervention might count as satisfying the condition of "habitability" if this is not too broad an application of the term. There may of course be some reason peculiar to the design field of architecture for using the word "habitability" that escapes me. The word "ideareal" was concocted by me to suggest a law of control in the human mind that governs the conformity and provides some assurance that the real indeed properly represents the ideal. The tridential tern of ideal qualities and real facts and "ideareal" laws is my way of understanding the phenomenal metaphysics of signs. This trident would be held as an act of sense for me, so that the ideal and the real and the "ideareal" are all mental constructs in the act of semiosis. The placing of real here as a secondness should not be assumed as material or physical, although it could be held as phenomenal and existential and experiential. The point is that for me reality is an act of sense in mind. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Nonagon Revisited [...from "naming definite individuals"]
Frances to Claudio and others... Your assumptions are that design is mainly an applied technical discipline that produces industrial products, and thus is not mainly an art or science; that it is best structured and understood in a tridential form as a sign; that the logical trident is difficult for design students to comprehend; that the structure of design as a trident is best shown to students in a visible diagram; that the semiotic nonagon as a matrix table is the best form of diagram to serve this instructional purpose; that the nonagon can be used as a practical tool in the actual field; and that the nonagon of design is an example of applied semiotics in action. Your subsequent conclusion is that designers can wrestle with issues of their concern using semiotics as a conceptual instrument to analyze their projects in regard to their properties and processes and products. For you the role of synechastic disposition and logical abduction from pragmatism would thus be of great importance here. You further hold that the main labels for the quadrants of the slots in the nonagon matrix could adequately be "form" and "existence" and "value" because these as it is your understanding properly reflect the semiotic structure and system of pragmatist signs. You state however that these core semiotic labels from realist pragmatism could be replaced or at least should be expanded to show the relations of signs within the quadrants more fully, and to hence make the nonagon even more useful. You feel that labels from other available sign typologies should perhaps be incorporated into the pragmatist nonagon, but that selecting the best typologies for this purpose now seems difficult. The sign typologies of Peirce and Morris are of course clearly implied and included. The sign typology of Lacan had been considered as a candidate because it categorizes signs as the imaginary and the real and the symbolic, but this was correctly challenged due to its heavy reliance on the subjective nature of signs, and the improper location of the "real" as central. The mixing of sign typologies from varied sources may be a route to take in building a diagram, but it means abandoning the pragmatist typology of Peirce as the sole one. The problem remains nonetheless as to relating the mixture in ways that are not arbitrary. The process of the project in making and using a diagram perhaps goes to the "collection" of suitable labels, and their best "connection" to relates, and the "correction" of given labels and relates to satisfy the needs at hand. In addition to types of signs or classes of sign systems, you suggest that the slots might also be supplemented by the inclusion of certain functions that signs and thus designs ought to perform. You claim that design should actually be concerned with satisfying many functions that are collateral to a design being a good sign, such as the theoretical and economical and political for example. The implication here is that good design is tethered or limited by such functions, when in fact they may actually be marginal and peripheral to it. To push the Peircean semiotic divisions into being the key horizontal functions of signs and designs would roughly yield as related labels the "grammatical" or informative hermeneutical form, and the "critical" or evaluative significal fact, and the "rhetorical" or evocative methodeutical force. To further push the Morrisean semiotic dimensions into being the core vertical functions of signs and designs would roughly yield as correlated labels the "syntactical" or formal vehicle and value and means, and the "semantical" or referential content and meaning and mode, and the "pragmatical" or instrumental effect and worth and purpose. The initial interrelated division of informative forms would for example yield representational sign vehicles and referential sign objects and interpretational sign effects. These dimensions in structure would respectively be monadic and dyadic and triadic. Many other functional criteria as labels may not work in relation to these or to each other. For instance, the "economical" in actual practice is variable and so will seldom be "theoretically" consistent or "politically" expedient, and the "political" is often hostile and volatile. Some other functions on the other hand that seem necessary are obviously absent, such as the "aesthetical" and "material" and "technical" and "ergonomical" and "environmental" and "ethical" and "psychical" and "pedagogical" and "logical" for example. Furthermore, the very pragmatist criteria upon which the nonagon and design is predicated ought to be global, but may indeed be limited by the actual context of its concrete application. In other words, the natural environments and cultural venues and social locales to include their governmental ideologies could be the determining factor of pragmatist limits and thus the success of the working project. In any event and regardless of functions, on t
[peirce-l] 1 BEN Re: Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from "Peircean elements" topic)
Frances to Ben... Thanks for you comments on my pragmatist interpretations and speculations. There are several motives driving me to muse on pragmatism as both an idealist and realist thrust. The main muse is to explore whether the world of phenomena can be expanded and bracketed with nomena or noumena and epiphenomena to allow an extended grasp of ideals, such as gods and forms. Making good arguments that give sound reasons to believe in theism and deity would be included in this exploration. Finding if there are synechastic objects outside and before semiosis that determine semiosic objects is another search, as well as whether the world of phenomena itself is prone to dispositional tendencies and teleonomic designs and purposive actions. The enlarging of concepts about design is of particular interest to me at the present, as to how broad design ought to be thought of in its various fields and studies. The graphic showing of pragmatist theories like synechastics and categorics and semiotics in visible diagrams that are clear is a further practical motive. Trying to reduce these theories to some essential substance in layouts with labels can be taxing, especially when the icons must be tailored to fit diverse audiences from learning students to learned experts. (To be continued immediately in a new thread on evolution.) --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Peircean elements
Frances to Claudio and listers... Forgive me because this reply is a little late and a little long. It deals mainly with color as a sign and this being a good example of semiotics in application to the field of visible design. The attempt here is to explore the use of diagrams as a good means to partially show the triadic structure of signs, and to address the failure of any tetradic or polyadic valency for the phenomenal categories that might be incorporated into any model of signs, and to probe the collateral experience as being in synechastic representamens but preexistent to semiosic signs, and then as being embedded in semiotic representamens as semiosic trichotomies. The first thing that sighted persons see with their eyes is likely the color of the object scanned. Since the object "has" color in its form, it is reasonable to conclude that color is also a sign of the object. The study of color as a sign is hence held here to be an application of Peircean semiotics to the field of visible art, to include the graphic art of pictures and the plastic art of sculptures and the design of tectonic art as architecture crafted in the built environment of humans. The term "visible" is deliberately used to imply artifacts that are seen by the eyes of sighted persons in the optical and ocular sense. The term "visual" on the other hand is avoided, because it implies that even the congenitally blind person can experience colors visually as a mental vision, so that color for them would not be tethered by any sense modality, and this may complicate or frustrate the present theory of color signs. This discussion is a critical review and analytical judgement of the semiotic nonagon, which is an attempt to formalize the study of architecture as a sign, including the tectural property of color. The nonagon is an iconic diagram of a hypothetical color theory. This icon is a transformed abstraction of the theory as an object, whose features must be pertinent, so as to be immediately observed by sense and directly suspected as true. The diagram is likely necessary to reason about the theory. Its content and meaning however may be an objective material construct, or a subjective mental construct. The discussion here also explores whether color as a sign can be posited in a complex diagram like a tetradic model of quadrants, to include the collateral recognizant or agnoscent as a final entity. The basis of approaching color semiosis tetradically is thus found in the semiotic nonagon. The older nonagon box of nine slots, which is a triadic matrix, would then be replaced if it happened with a newer polygon box of sixteen slots, which is a tetradic matrix. This new approach is assumed an attempt to correct the existing trichotomic structure of semiotics, which is derived from the phenomenal categories of realist pragmatism. This tern would initially be replaced with a broader polyadic structure using a pair of dichotomies with poles, but connected as a tetrad of four quadrants. If the tetradic matrix itself however is further built as a tetrichotomy the result would yield a complex of fourteen classes, as opposed to the ten classes emerging from a trichotomy. This would yield a complex structure of signs for color or any other form, and likely an unwieldy disordered one. The initial guess here is that this is not a viable or necessary alternative, because the trichotomic categories are already firmly established in the whole philosophic system as built by pragmatists, and because the collateral experience of signers can be accounted for synechastically, or neatly incorporated into semiosis semiotically without expanding the categoric structure of signs. In fact, every attempted argument used to warrant a fourth category or valency for signs, in order to permit the collateral experience, could easily be explained and justified by tridential categorics and semiotics. In any event, no valency greater than a tern is allowed in semiotics. The structures used for explaining the existence of potential forms in semiosis, like colors and shapes in action as signs, is currently presented under several theories in diagrammatic models, such as monadic wholes and dyadic poles and triadic points and tetradic quadrants, including that of matrixes and tables. One familiar analytical model of this kind in particular is the semiotic nonagon. It is structured tridentially, making it consistent with the phenomenal categories of realist pragmatism. The current nonagon is an attempt to apply semiotics as an operative tool for planners in the actual practice of architectural design. The suggested task here is to probe whether the map of color as a sign can be better structured as a new tetradic table by adding a fourth category in the diagram, rather than by keeping the usual triadic table. The new slot would embrace the experiential recognition of color within semiosis, which had been previously held as collateral to semiosis. It should ho
[peirce-l] Re: Peircean elements
Frances to Thomas and Ben... Forgive me for being a little late in this response to your earlier remarks, and also allow me to speculate on defending the position of realist pragmatism in regard to its phenomenal categories. >From the beginning, each infinite continuum such as perpetual time or eternal space likely has dispositional tendencies embodied in their form, and this is thereby combined by evolution into the metaphysical continua of phenomena. The sporting velocity of time in phenomenal relation to space will hence yield what seems to be energy and later gravity, which is the essential start of particulate materiality. Continuent multiple continua therefore is a state of hierarchical polyadic plurality. The evolution of continuent phenomena and even of existent phenomena seems to be a process enacted by nature of first collections, and then connections, and last corrections. If we however go back to the primordial origins of the evolving world, through a process of regressive elimination, there will likely be one original and final continuum remaining. For atheists, this genesis may be pure time. For theists, it may be the mind of god, yet even god must presumably advance with at least the continuum of time. Whatever that original primordial continuum might be found as, in any event it will be monadic and qualitative. If some property of any infinite continuum can be sensed, it will be done so as a phenomenal representamen that exists as a relational fact or object as a sign, and this act of sense will make the fact real in mind. In the absence of sense, the real cannot be. If any thing or object or being therefore cannot be sensed, it may exist as an unknown fact or continuum, but it will not be real. Unlike factuality which is a material construct, reality is a mental construct and only as real as sense. If nomenal and epiphenomenal stuff or as yet unknown phenomenal stuff is to be sensed and known, it must furthermore be done so analogously with the existent facts of representational phenomena. If some phenomenal property like existent continuity can be sensed of an infinite continuum like eternal time, then that ideal is made real in mind by sense. The use of phenomenal representamens that are assigned to act as existent signs by way of teleonomic design will go to making the ideal seem real to sense. The only way for all this to work in mind however is by way of signs, and they have been found through empirical inquiry as facts to actually be phenomenal and categorical and tridential. The whole system of the phenomenal world indeed has been discovered by mind to be structured in just this manner. Any simple application of mathematical geometry and logical relativity will prove this to be so. It is nonetheless admitted that the categoric path from nomenal zeroness to phenomenal terness may eventually yield epiphenomenal enthness like fourthness and beyond, but not as phanerons nor as representamens. The ontic and cosmic and epistemic arenas of continua and existentia must be represented to sense in mind only by phenomena. Phenomenal representamens in the form of existent objects engaged by signers in acts of representation and referention and interpretation are found within the grammatical information of signs. Acts of interpreting the value and meaning and worth of those signs are then found within the critical evaluation of signs. These informative and evaluative acts are not substitutes for the validation or verification or confirmation of signs, which does however go partly to the critical evaluation of a signs judged worth and then to its rhetorical force, which empowers signs to be good and true. Structurally, these acts are all states of semiosis and are preparatory necessities to the methods of inquiry, but they are not directly part of inquiry itself. The fact is that signs progress through all the divisions of semiotics to some degree, before finally resting as some main kind of sign in each situation of semiosis. If some assurance of form or content or value or truth for example is needed by a signer, then this can be sought and caught through the appropriate divisions. It is a matter of determination where signs are limited to a certain purposive ground as warranted by the signer. The best way to attain such assurance however is by the means of empirical inquiry. This entails holding other ways to skeptical doubt, which includes the very fallible methods tendency and obstinacy and authority. For human thinkers this determinative act may take interpretants through all the divisions of semiotics to reach the desired goal of say truth. These interpretants may also be held as the "cognitive content" or "recognizant" of an empowered sign, and also require some experience collateral to semiosis on the part of the signer to fully get the sign, but this does not imply nor entail a tetradic structure for semiotics. It simply goes either to the preparatory synechastic state of signer
[peirce-l] Re: Peircean elements
Frances to Claudio and Ben and others... In regard to its phenomenal categorization, it seems that if the experience as a "recognizant" or "agnoscent" is to be collateral to semiotic grammatics, but not to semiotics as a whole, and since semiotics in part or whole must remain tridential and trichotomic rather than tetradic, then any collateral entity might be justly held as one of the many interpretant signs that progress onward to succeed grammatics or critics or even rhetorics, and possibly also semiotics itself. After becoming an interpretant in grammatics it is likely that all signs in critics and rhetorics are some kind of interpretant sign or say supersign. These could very well in maturity advance beyond semiosis and semiotics. It is admitted after all that many representamens in fact are not signs, and therefore are peripheral and marginal to semiosis. Some may indeed synechastically precede semiosis, but others may certainly succeed it. Semiosis would then be full of representamens that are signs, but which state is bracketed by representamens that are not signs. In any event, they are at least collateral to grammatics, and if representamen that are not signs can enter semiosis and become representamen that are signs, then acting as advanced interpretant signs they can possibly become representamen that are again no longer signs, and this perhaps would consequently make them collateral to semiotics, but only in a contingent and provisional way. It may be that things and objects and beings like experiential recognizants and agnoscents are such a preparatory or contributory or consummatory representamen, and in acting collaterally before or during or after semiosis, or aside and beside and inside and outside semiotics, they are nonetheless combinatory. The collateral then becomes a correlative corollary. How to show this complete state of semiotics in a single diagram, such as a trident tricon with paths or a nonagon table with labels or a matrix model with slots or a dyadic bridge with poles or a tetradic square with quadrants, would clearly be an interesting problem of graphic design to solve. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Frances to Jim... It might be useful here to differentiate between the progressive advance of a sign in its always being a combination of icons and indexes and symbols to some degree, and in its being mainly of one kind of sign in any given situation as dominantly an icon or index or symbol, and in its being intrinsically only one kind of sign. The proper personal name thus is intrinsically a lingual symbol but in some situations can be dominantly a nonlingual index, such as an identificative label or indicative pointer. If however the name refers abstractly or discretely to a person in their absence, then it seems to me that the name must then be mainly a singular symbol. Calling a person by name in their presence and inciting an excited response is the responsive effect of a stimulative cause, and thus nothing more than a hyposemic situation of crude signaling. The issuing of and the reaction to the sign is simply the result of an engrained or conditioned habit. In fact, any nonlingual or lingual sign assigned as an indexic indicator or expressor would likely do. In regard to the personal name being intrinsic or dominant, it may go to the actual assigning of the name to an individual person, which is an overt action and thus indexic. Furthermore and from an anthropic stance, the mere vocal utterance or orthal letterance of a lingual name applied to a person who is in the absence or presence of the signer, can be caused by only one phanerism and that is a human organism, which makes all language in any form intrinsically a natural index, well before it is mainly any other kind of sign. From this position, the somatic act of speaking or writing or naming seems to be intrinsically a causal subindexic expressor. (Would the pretentious use of a "make-believe" name by an actor performing on a stage in a fictional play make the symbolic name mainly an icon? or does the use make it mainly an index?) (Would my use of the personal name "Hitler" to express or excite disgust make the symbolic name manly an icon? but then does the intent or effect make it mainly an index?) Jim partly wrote... Suppose I am the signer. So, it makes a difference if I use "Frances" in your presence or use "Frances" in your absence? It also makes a difference whether I use the sign at all. Let me first get one case straight. 1. I use "Frances" in your presence. Why would this be anything other than an index? The use is a singular occurence. I agree that the causal relation is suspect. But suppose I say "Frances" and you turn your head. Here there is efficient causality. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Frances to Jim and others... This is perhaps a related comment to your request for quoted passages. In his 1968 book "The Origins of Pragmatism" the author A.J. Ayer talks at some length about Peircean signs and especially indexes with what appears to be some keen insights. There is mention in Peirce of icons as being of one kind called hypoicons (CP:2.277), and of indexes as being of two kinds called hyposemes and subindexes (CP:2.284), and of symbols as being of three kinds called abstract symbols and singular symbols and genuine symbols (CP:2.293). This trichotomic structuring of signs seems justified, as it is consistent with the phenomenal categories. These grammatic signs however would be of dynamic objects only. Those grammatic signs dealing with immediate objects would be qualisigns and sinsigns and legisigns, all of which are nearly pure icons. It is my tentative assumption that tones, and tokens with reagents and replicas, and types like codes and basic semes, are respective species of these genus subsigns. They are all however in a preparatory mix for the signs of dynamic objects. Furthermore, the last kind of sign in any class is genuine, while all others that precede it are degenerate to some extent. In the case of indexes that must signify only definite existent individuals, only indexes as subindexes would be genuine in regard to their causal grounds. It seems to me that if a proper name is used to label an existent individual person in the actual concrete presence of the signer, then the sign is mainly an index, but only as a degenerate hyposeme and not as a causal subindex, because the name is after all an arbitrary word and a lingual symbol in a verbal language. If on the other hand the name is used to label that same person in their definite discrete absence away from the signer, or to label a nonexistent fictional person, then the sign is mainly a symbol, but only as a degenerate singular symbol, because the sign in its conventional ground can stand alone with complete meaning in isolation of other signs, such as an emblem or trademark and herald might. There is nonetheless one particular thorn here for me in regard to indexes, and that is whether Peirce intended for indexes to potentially be dynamic signs in some situations of semiosis apart from their necessarily being hyposemes or subindexes. If so, this in effect would render three main kinds of indexical signs, rather than only two as it categorically should seem to be. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from "Peircean elements" topic)
Frances to Ben and listers... There has been a lot of clarifying here on this topical subject. It does not seem to me however that there is yet any agreement on whether the collateral experience and even in the form of a recognizant is indeed part of semiosis and thus a trichotomic semiosis. In any event, here are a few further comments of mine that may be to the point. If the semiosic recognizant, as the experience of a sign by any sentient organism, is to be held remaining within semiosis as an object that acts as the sign of another object, and also still be held as collateral in some way, then this collateral idea might be salvaged by assigning the experiential recognizant to the rhetorical or methodeutical division of semiosis, as say the pragmatic response to the grammatical interpretant effect and the critical judgemental worth of the sign. The rhetoric recognizant would then only be collateral or peripheral and marginal to grammatics and critics, but not to semiosics or semiotics as a whole, thereby leaving signs and their experience in tact as being only categorically trichotomic. If on the other hand, the recognizant is to be relegated as other than a sign in any division of semiosis, but still remain as an existent object, then it might be classed as a representamen that is not an object or sign, and thus fall outside the semiosic arena of phenomena and within the synechastic arena of phenomena. This would make the recognizant collateral to trichotomic semiosis, but would deny it the status of being a sign, although as a synechastic object it would be a preparatory candidate as a sign. The issue then turns on the categorical trichotomic structure of representamen that are not signs but that act to represent themselves intrinsically, and also of synechastic phenomena that may be infinitely continuent as mere fleeting things or existent as brute sporting objects. In any event and under realist pragmatism, all these aspects or entities would be phenomenal phanerons and representamens, including the recognizant and as either synechastic or semiosic. The evolving nature of the synechastic recognizant as a "dispositional tendency" prior to semiosis might account for its being collateral to semiosis. In a strict semiotic manner, any phenomenal representamen or thing that is logically determined is an objective construct and properly within semiosis, whereby it acts as an object and a sign of an object. In other words, if mind wants to sense or think or know about any phaneron, it must do it by utilizing signs, which signs then stand analogously for other things that may not be objects or signs, such as essences or unicorns or angels. Indeed, if the assumed nomenal or epiphenomenal aspects of the world are to be sensed at all, it must be only by phenomenal signs that act as analogies. The purpose of phenomenal representamen that act as objects is thus to be assigned naturally as signs and to be reassigned as signs of other objects. The main purpose of signs then is to make the continuent ideals of the world seem existentially real to sense in mind. If the experiential recognizant is not part of semiosis, then for me its presence in the phenomenal act of representation must therefore be accounted for by other means or in ways other than semiosic. The alternate option would likely be presemiotic or synechastic. To be the object of logical determination, such a synechastic object or thing need only be sensed analogously by semiosis and thus signs. To merely be the object or thing of phenomenal representation in the absence of sense or logic need not require the synechastic object to be semiotic. Even if the synechastic object or thing were on occasion a logical determination, this act alone would not render it intrinsically nor exclusively semiosic or semiotic. In the absence or presence of the recognizant, and with it as a synechastic object, semiotics would thus remain categorically trichotomic. The act of mind merely engaging in the logical determination of a synechastic representamen does not make that phenomenal thing or object intrinsically a semiosic object, neither finitely nor definitely or indefinitely, because there can be phenomenal representamen that is not a sign. Considerations of logical determination by mind will place the recognizant within semiosis as a sign, since semiosis is the place of logical determination, but the assigning or reassigning or conferring of such analogous placement with signs by itself does not constitute intrinsic semiosis for the object of signs, because many such objects are intrinsically synechastic and will remain so well after semiosis is exhausted with them. If you sense some continuent thing or existent object, such as a collateral recognizant for example, that is not logically determined as either a semiosic representamen or object or interpretant, then what is present to mind is not intrinsically a fourth semiosic category or fourth categoric phane
[peirce-l] Signer Label
Frances to listers... The arbitrary use of my concocted term "signer" in messages has generated some interest. It is used merely to identify the thing that structures or employs an object as a sign. The search for some proper term in the widest sense had caused me some irritating frustration. When a phaneron of matter or life engages a phenomenal object to act as a sign, that "engager" who assigns or reassigns the object to be a sign of an object might tentatively be called a "signer" simply in the absence of some other suitable label. The alternates to "signer" could be "phaneron" or "initiator" or "percipient" or "moderator" and even "actor" or "designer". Only when a sign is found or made in the act of any communication for example can the "signer" then be clearly called a "communicator" generally, or more specially an "originator" and "producer" and "expeditor" or "transformer" and "translator" and "transporter" or "receiver" and "consumer" and "interpreter" or simply the maker and giver and sender or finder and framer and driver or getter and taker and user, or even encoder and recoder and decoder. The problem for me is that these good alternates carry too much specific ambiguous baggage with them to be globally useful. When located in certain contexts, these alternate labels are however necessary. It is unknown to me if Peirce or other semioticians posited a broad label, therefore the label "signer" seems tentatively adequate and appropriate. It is admitted that "signer" is often used in deaf communities to identify the user of cherical signs, but this ought not be a deterrent, because even the tern "sign" is used in diverse contexts other than semiotics or philosophy and science. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited" was "Peircean elements")
Frances to Joseph and listers... If "representamens" and "signs" are held to be separate and distinct, this will certainly make the world more complex and its field of logical study more complicated, and perhaps needlessly so. For now, my task is to carefully read all the passages from the Peircean writings available to me on the matter, before rendering some further appreciation or opinion. There is still perhaps a further related distinction for me to ponder, which is whether there might be any substantive difference between the terms "representamen" and "representation" that might exist in Peircean philosophy. It seems tentatively clear to me nonetheless that the concept of "representation" is about trichotomics and semiotics, and is say a property of signs. This however may not be so with "representamen" if it does indeed differ. My intended study of the writings may of course resolve this muse. Incidentally, the term "reference" is also used occasionally in early Peircean logic to separate and segregate qualitative grounds and relative correlates and interpretive representations. The implication here for me is that things like qualities and grounds and relations and correlates can be "referred" to by some means in isolation of representations, and presumably of signs as icons and indexes and symbols. Those other means may indeed be by way of "representamens" that are not interpretive representations or signs. This passage is liberally edited by me from the source noted below. "We may also make the following scheme. Let 1 stand for reference to a ground, 2 stand for reference to a correlate, 3 stand for reference to an interpretant. The [1] is quality, [1/2] is relation, [1/2/3] is representation. In relation, the references are separable in equiparance which we may write [1-2] and inseparable in disquiparance which we may write [1+2]. In representation: in likeness the references are all separable [1-2-3]; in indication reference to a ground is not separable but the two first references are separable together [1+2-3]; in symbolization all are inseparable [1+2+3]." Peirce Chronological Edition, CE1.476 (1866) Finally, the mature human mind may not be able to think logically about phenomena in the world that it senses without the use of representative signs, nor perhaps should logical semiotics be concerned with such illogical stuff, but that does not necessarily mean that phenomena other than sensible representative signs are senseless or that they cannot by some means be found to in fact exist. It seems to me that metaphysical philosophy and empirical science must leave the representative door to inquiry ajar a little. Otherwise, proposing some rational argument in favor of say supereal deity for example might well prove to be impossible. Allow me for now to posit this speculative and tentative musement. In metaphysical philosophy, a representamen is a phenomenal phaneron serving to represent anything and everything to physiotic matter or biotic life, and represent it to that continuent or existent phaneron itself solely alone; while a representation on the other hand is an existent object serving to represent something to quasi mind or mind for some purpose other than for the mechanistic or organic phaneron itself, which representation in effect is as a representative sign. An important consideration here in scientific semiotics and logics is perhaps that the normal human mind needs representations as signs to think about representamen, even if such thought is nondiscursive and senseless and irrational and illogical. Furthermore and aside from phanerons sensing or thinking or knowing phenomena, it seems that in the whole evolving world all phenomenal phanerons to include representamens can feel to some degree, which means that primordial phenomena can feel either as representamen or can feel other representamen as such. Only in this way can evolving matter and life be semiotically or logically accounted for, because it is not likely that representative signs alone are able to do so. Joseph Ransdell wrote... Neither Theresa nor I disagree with what you are saying about the vernacular word "sign" being more narrow in scope of application than the word "representamen" and I assume you agree that there are several quotations which make clear that he regards the one as a technical explication of the other. If so there is no disagreement there. I think I was mistaken, though, in identifying confusion about the nature of that distinction as being what would account for the unintelligibility I find (or think I find) in her message. Also, I agree with Theresa in objecting to what Frances says in the passage she quotes from her: "In my guess, it may be that for Peirce in the evolution of things "representamens" are more say monadic or dyadic and primitive then "signs" where objects that act as "signs" require them to be say triadic and the "thought" of organisms, while "representamens
[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and SemioticsRevisited"was "Peircean elements")
Frances to Theresa... Thanks for your kind comments and leads. They will help me in my reading of the available Peircean passages on the matter. For now, we might agree to disagree. The dispute may eventually boil down to just how broad pragmatism and semiotics should hold representamens and signs to be, even to limiting them for only rational human thought. My preference incidentally is to communicate here in american english for the shear purpose of contact and exchange and archive, if you can allow it. Furthermore, you should not assume anything about me simply because my email address seems to be in some country. In any event, some messages recently posted to the list by me for other members may cover some points you raised. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited"was "Peircean elements")
Frances to Theresa... You partly wrote that for Peirce the word "representamen" is more a technical term than the word "sign" at least within logical contexts. One thorn here is whether "signs" in some extended nonlogical sense are to be admitted or allowed in the nonhuman biotic arena, or even in the nonorganic dead world prior to life, given that matter is deemed semiotically a quasi mind and that mind is after all of matter. Aside from this issue, much that Peirce writes of about "representamens" is as they might exist within semiosis, and then as logical "signs" of which claim there is no dispute for me. This placing of "representamens" as "signs" in semiosis is seemingly however not the final word on "representamens" in Peircean philosophy. The fact is that Peirce clearly states there are "representamens" that are not tridential and not signs, and that do not determine interpretants, and that are not mental thoughts. It is difficult for me to simply ignore these distinctions, especially since they may turn out to indeed be substantive, albeit outside logical contexts. It is still unclear to me nonetheless whether this mixture of the terms is mere substitution on his part, or if in fact he sought a prior nonsemiotic arena for "representamens" where all things in the world are such, rather than their being signs. This would make "representamens" the primordial genus umbrella under which falls as species that of existent objects, and objects as signs, and objects of signs, and interpretants of signs. If this intent by Peirce is so, then it may very well introduce semioticians to the logical categories of nothingness, like zeroness as an empty class holder ready to be filled with the phenomenal terness of firsts and seconds and thirds; or even to the logical categories of enthness, like fourths and beyond into anythingness and everythingness and allthingness. Perhaps this could be the neglected argument for collateral "representamens" like ephemeral or ethereal recognizants, and supereal aliens or deity. This musing of mine is a guess that maybe the world of phenomena is not as broad as previously thought for logical categories or representamens. If the phenomenal world is in fact bracketed by other possible aspects of the world, like the nomenal world and the epiphenomenal world, then phenomena is categorically and trichotomically only a secondness itself, and thus not even a sign. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited" was "Peircean elements")
Gary... Thanks for your search and post. As you implied, the distinction attempted to be made by me is in deed the difference between "representamens" that are broader and prior to all else in the world, including existent objects and "signs" and semiosis, and that are independent of thought and mind and sense and life itself. The reason for my making this attempt is simply the seeming distinction made by Peirce himself in his many passages quoted here. Agreeably, it may certainly prove useful to distinguish between "signs" conveying notions to human minds and those "representamens" which can not or need not do so. My train of thought on this matter may of course be way off track, in that there may be no substantial distinction at all. The Peircean writings recently posted to the list by you on the terms "representamen" and "representamens" and "representamina" will be read by me in detail for some insight. -Frances --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Representamens and Signs (was "Design and Semiotics Revisited" was "Peircean elements")
Frances to Joseph Ransdell and listers... You replied partly in effect that the distinction between "sign" and "representamen" for Peirce in his writings is indifferent. You stated that the word "representamen" was likely introduced by Peirce as the name for his refined conception of the word "sign" which then enabled him to understand interpretational processes more broadly than the word "sign" would ordinarily permit, though he later thought that he did not need to have recourse to "representamen" at all, presumably meaning that he thought the word "sign" could be used more broadly than he thought it could earlier; so that wherever interpretation is involved, he uses the two terms indifferently. You then kindly provided some passages in support of this position. This basically was my assumption as well, but there are however some other passages that for me seem to contradict your reasoned claim. They had confused me somewhat, which lead me into positing the two words differently within my understanding of Peircean philosophy. In my guess, it may be that for Peirce in the evolution of things "representamens" are more say monadic or dyadic and primitive then "signs" where objects that act as "signs" require them to be say triadic and the "thought" of organisms, while "representamens" may not. My current access to the published writings of Peirce is however limited, which further irritates me. "A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamen that have been much studied." CP:2.242 (1903) "A 'Sign', or 'Representamen', is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its 'Object', as to be capable of determining a Third, called its 'Interpretant', to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. ...A 'Sign' is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant. Possibly there may be Representamens that are not Signs. Thus, if a sunflower, in turning towards the sun, becomes by that very act fully capable, without further condition, of reproducing a sunflower which turns in precisely corresponding ways toward the sun, and of doing so with the same reproductive power, the sunflower would become a Representamen of the sun. But 'thought' is the chief, if not the only, mode of representation." CP:2.274 (circa 1902) "I make the best analysis I can of what is essential to a sign, and I define a representamen as being whatever that analysis applies to. ...in particular, all signs convey notions to human minds; but I know no reason why every representamen should do so." CP 1.541 (1903) "A sign is plainly a species of medium of communication and a medium of communication is a species of medium, and a medium is a species of third." MS 283 "The Basis of Pragmaticism" (circa 1905) --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from "Peircean elements" topic)
Frances to Ben and others... Recognizants you define as the experiences in mind of objects acting as signs. If the experiential recognition however is itself not acting as a sign or as part of a sign situation, then it is for the signer only collateral to semiosis. This hence implies that not all phenomenal things that exist in the world are signs or objects of signs, or perhaps even prone to teleonomic designs and assigns. If the pragmatist thrust on the matter is correctly understood by me, the "experience" for Peirce when it is deemed within semiosis is itself held by him to be a sign, and therefore an objective logical construct. Just exactly what kind of sign it is remains unclear for me. It may go to informative grammatic effects, or evaluative critical worths, or rhetorical evocative responses; and all in the Morrisean pragmatic manner, if it can be put that way. On the other hand, the "experience" may be partly preparatory to semiosis, and thus often collateral to signs. All things that are felt to continue evolving in the world and that are given uncontrolled to sense after all are phenomenal representamen that exist as objects, but not necessarily objects that act as signs. This may be the condition for experiencing and recognizing objects, whether the objects and recognizants are signs or not. Besides differentiating these states or kinds of objects, there must also be a differentia maintained between representamens and signs, because there are phenomenal representamens that are continuent but not existent, and thus that are not objects or signs, nor interpretants. You stated earlier that by "recognizant" is meant some experiential recognition, formed as collateral to the sign and its interpretant in respect of its object. This means that where a normal human signer senses the object, they then recognize that object as being as they interpreted some sign to represent that object. The experiential recognizant therefore would strictly not be in semiosis nor be a sign. In other words, if the sign and interpretant do not carry or convey any direct experience of the object, then the idea that any dependent familiar understanding of the sign is thus outside the interpretant. The sign may have the recognizant as an object and content it carries or have it as an interpretant effect, but otherwise the sign and interpretant would not intrinsically be the experienced recognizant itself. The recognizant cannot be, within the same relation or mind, the mental experience or recognition of the object, and also the sign or interpretant of the object. To hold that both exist simultaneously in semiosis or in the same mind would be a logical contradiction. Signers need the experience and recognition of objects, because signs and interpretants in semiosis themselves do not convey the experience of the objects that they signify or mean. The experience and recognition of objects is thus necessarily collateral to the signs that signify those objects. If the experiential recognizant is not part of semiosis, then its presence in the act must therefore be accounted for by other means or in ways other than semiosic. When the "experience" however is perhaps deemed before and outside semiosis but within synechastics as a phenomenal representamen that is an object but not yet fully a sign, then the "experience" here might be held by him to be a phaneron that acts as a signer, such as the maker or giver or sender or framer or driver or taker or user of a sign. For example, if a phenomenal object by itself alone acts solely as a representative sign of itself as its own object to itself for itself, as an isolated evolving atom might, then that phaneron acts as a signer and is engaged in an act of "experience" to the extent that it can do so. If this pushes the "experience" too far back into its primordial physiotic beginnings, then the same synechastic state might exist in biotics for say a newborn organism. One thorn here of course is that it renders some "experiences" like that of some objects or of some representamens or of some phenomena as being independent of semiosis, at least in their early evolutionary growth, which may not be allowed for the "experience" by Peircean pragmatism. The main point to remember for me perhaps is that signs objectively and logically continue to exist in the absence of mind or life or matter. They may be accidentally discovered as dispositions by thinkers, but they are not arbitrarily invented as deliberations by them; at least not as logicomathematic constructs. This presumably would go to the idealism of pragmatist realism; and why Peirce tried to avoid positing any global sense of psychologistic subjectivism into his brand of logic and semiotics. For me to fully appreciate what is meant by the concept of your "recognizant" requires a fuller assay of objects, as they might be given to sense in all of their various being. My thrust here is that there may in fact be objects that act as
[peirce-l] Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from "Peircean elements" topic)
Frances to Ben and Claudio and others: Forgive the interjection, but here are some interpretations of mine on Peircean ideas that may be related to your present concerns in signs and my current interests in designs. Let me state my speculations and invite corrections to them. The initial grammatic division of semiosis, or the fundamental structure of signs as information they bear, does rightly consist of: (1) representamens; and (2) referred objects; and (3) interpretants. This grammatic division however is only the first of three divisions, where interpretants in fact go on to permeate the other two divisions, which divisions are roughly critics and rhetorics. The "recognizant" as a sign force therefore may be merely a further development of an interpretant supersign beyond the information it is sensed to bear, and perhaps mainly within the rhetoric division. The "recognizant" thus would be part of a tridential and trichotomic system of signs, and should then not be held as the basis of some extended tetradic model of signs. If further quasi categories are to be found or deemed beyond the trichotomic phenomenal categories of terness, in the familiar plan of firstness and secondness and thirdness, then they might be of nomenal zeroness as an empty class holder in waiting, or even perhaps of epiphenomenal enthness to include fourthness and beyond. This however takes mind into some extra semiotic arena of the celestreal or ethereal or supereal world, which is not phenomenal or existential or experiential, nor logically categorical for that matter. States of thingness beyond phenomenal terness are after all senseless and illogical, because they are absolutely of nothingness or vaguely of anythingness and everythingness, which when outside the existence and experience of tridential phenomena makes them pointless and meaningless and useless. It is not known by me if Peirce admitted any aspects of the world that might be held to precede or succeed the phenomenal world. It is clear however that only phenomena can be felt or sensed or known, and that any other aspect before or beyond phenomena must then be done so by analogy using phenomenal representamen that are signs. Now, there are continuent phenomenal representamen or eternal things that are seemingly not objects nor signs, but that are felt by all phenomena or phanerons, to include physiotic mechanisms of dead matter and biotic organisms of live life; and if evolution takes things that far, there are existent phenomenal representamen or synechastic objects that are semiosic signs of semiosic objects. These are certainly felt, but may and can also be sensed and willed and known by phenomena acting as signers. Exactly just how phenomena evolve into being representamens, and then into infinite continua and definite or indefinite existentia is open to exploratory probes, but it is likely by some process of representation, upon which the logic of relations or relativity could be brought to bear. The whole wide world nonetheless is surely permeated and fully perfused with representamen, if not with signs. Phenomena is thus more of metaphysical "seeming" than of nomenal or epiphenomenal being. What thus "seems" to sense is likely that all objects are phenomenal and existent representamen, but that there are objects that are not signs. This makes the representamen of phenomena the umbrella over all else, and means that representamen is not necessarily a synonym of sign. The sequential layout of phenomenal synechastic representamen might thus range from (1) object to (2) sign to (3) signer, where signer might embrace the recognizant. The sequential layout of phenomenal semiosic representamen might then range in acts of semiosis from (1) sign to (2) object to (3) purpose like effect or worth or response or some other outcome. One issue here for me is whether existent phenomenal objects can be classed as synechastic and as semiosic justly within a Peircean scheme. One point on the "semiotic square" as a diagrammatic model is that for me tentatively it is seemingly not dyadic or tetradic or polyadic, but is basically triadic. My view holds that it consists of related poles whose signs are of: (1) horizontal contradictarity or opposition, such as false and true on the top plane with doubt and belief on the bottom plane; and (2) diagonal contrariety or reposition, thereby allowing for the critical judgement of say a doubted truth or a believed falsity; and (3) vertical complimentarity or apposition, such as a doubted falsity or a believed truth. In using the model, my experience furthermore has been that any attempt to fit too much of divisional semiosis and semiotics into one square may often fail. It is also usually the diagonal poles that yield the enlightening brute position of secondness, which is after all the key to factuality and sensibility and reality. This kind of restructuring for the "semiotic square" does violate its semiological origins, but seems
[peirce-l] Re: What's going on here?
Frances to Thomas and listers... There may for many persons be some things that are outside the scope and venue of objective semiotics or logic and not be prone as objects of study to the laws of scientific belief, such as articles of religious faith for example, but not for Peirce and his brand of idealist and realist pragmatism. Within a Peircean framework, let us ask whether the inner subjective phobias and pains of individual persons are absolute states that are never confused as being anything else, or are they referent signs that stand objectively for something else? Since according to Peirce all phenomenal things that are sensed are representamens and existent objects, then they must necessarily be signs, and signs that refer to other objects. Now, if a person is unconscious or conscious of their own inner state, such as pain for example, which they do not confuse as being anything other than pain and only the pain of their own self and not the pain of another person, the only way that subjective state can be a sign is if it were falsifiable and fallible in some way. In other words, if the pain of the self as sensed was actually mistaken in that it was a referred phantom pain, of say an amputated limb, then that state is not absolute, and in fact is a sign. To the extent therefore that some consciousness is interpretable and translatable, then it is all conceivably and probably an objective logical construct. Indeed, all of subjectivity would then fall under this phenomenal umbrella, which is existential and experiential. Thomas writes... Frances partly wrote: "It would seem that objective logic must hence allow and admit some degree of psychologistic subjectivism after all." Frances also partly wrote: "Human logic according to Peirce is thus seemingly an obstinate and degenerate form of pure logic that thinkers discover. What is likely found however is not a rigid mechanical world predetermined to exist by some agent of design, but rather is a dispositional tendency for the natural world to simply evolve logically. The human aquisition and utilization of pure logic is perhaps one of intermediate phenomena, acting as a bridge laying related between say immediate nomena and mediate epiphenomena, if it can be put in those terms within a Peircean framework." In CP 4.80 Peirce writes: "Second intentional, or, as I also call it, Objective Logic [...]" I do not have much use for the distinction between "subjective" and "objective" in your sense, though I do seem to understand very well what you mean, Frances. The problem is: the more subjective people are in one sense, the more objective they are in another sense. Take phobias. Very subjective thing. Usually I couldn't produce such effects personally with me. But being afflicted with it there is a button and each time it is pushed: whooom. It happens. Very mechanistically. Each time the very same thing. On and on. Many years ago I learned to do "psychotherapy". What clients try to do is change habits. That's learning, often very serious learning, and that interested me. In the Freudian schools you learn beforehand what's good and what's bad. "Projection" is bad: You see your husband and then you see your stepfather in him and then you are in trouble etc. So far so bad. But then, perhaps we can put the very same effect to a good use. There is something interesting and maybe I got that from Fritz Pearls or Virgina Satir. I don't remember. It's this: Client tells you his or her problem. You don't understand what's going on. Neither does your client. And you'd better know that you don't know what's going on. For if you really know what's going on, you have the same problem as your client. Then you are usually not so particularly qualified to help, since you haven't been able to solve your own problem. If, on the other hand, you hear what is said and then say: Ah, that's easy, you don't have to have that problem, since I do not have it. Here is my good advice. I'll tell you... Well, then your client will go away. And for very good reasons. If your client stays for some reason, the best you could do, is teach him a new language, with words like "suppression", "resistance", "Ego", "Superego", Gestalt etc etc in it. The client then has her problem, as before, and a new foreign language to talk about it. More problems, not less. And when you have even a Latin name for your problem and it's a scientific thing, you can't simply forget, in a natural way, to have your problem. It will never leave you. It's Latin, you know. That's more confusion and not less and not at all what the patient came for. So I hear what the description of the problem is and let's say it's about grandma, father and poor me and so on. Then I'd say: OK, let's see what you have in your pockets. And there is a knife, a handkerchief, a coin, etc. And we put things on the table here and there and there and the handkerchief is poor me, the coin is grandma and so on. I don't understand what t
