Frances to Joseph and listers... If "representamens" and "signs" are held to be separate and distinct, this will certainly make the world more complex and its field of logical study more complicated, and perhaps needlessly so. For now, my task is to carefully read all the passages from the Peircean writings available to me on the matter, before rendering some further appreciation or opinion.
There is still perhaps a further related distinction for me to ponder, which is whether there might be any substantive difference between the terms "representamen" and "representation" that might exist in Peircean philosophy. It seems tentatively clear to me nonetheless that the concept of "representation" is about trichotomics and semiotics, and is say a property of signs. This however may not be so with "representamen" if it does indeed differ. My intended study of the writings may of course resolve this muse. Incidentally, the term "reference" is also used occasionally in early Peircean logic to separate and segregate qualitative grounds and relative correlates and interpretive representations. The implication here for me is that things like qualities and grounds and relations and correlates can be "referred" to by some means in isolation of representations, and presumably of signs as icons and indexes and symbols. Those other means may indeed be by way of "representamens" that are not interpretive representations or signs. This passage is liberally edited by me from the source noted below. "We may also make the following scheme. Let 1 stand for reference to a ground, 2 stand for reference to a correlate, 3 stand for reference to an interpretant. The [1] is quality, [1/2] is relation, [1/2/3] is representation. In relation, the references are separable in equiparance which we may write [1-2] and inseparable in disquiparance which we may write [1+2]. In representation: in likeness the references are all separable [1-2-3]; in indication reference to a ground is not separable but the two first references are separable together [1+2-3]; in symbolization all are inseparable [1+2+3]." Peirce Chronological Edition, CE1.476 (1866) Finally, the mature human mind may not be able to think logically about phenomena in the world that it senses without the use of representative signs, nor perhaps should logical semiotics be concerned with such illogical stuff, but that does not necessarily mean that phenomena other than sensible representative signs are senseless or that they cannot by some means be found to in fact exist. It seems to me that metaphysical philosophy and empirical science must leave the representative door to inquiry ajar a little. Otherwise, proposing some rational argument in favor of say supereal deity for example might well prove to be impossible. Allow me for now to posit this speculative and tentative musement. In metaphysical philosophy, a representamen is a phenomenal phaneron serving to represent anything and everything to physiotic matter or biotic life, and represent it to that continuent or existent phaneron itself solely alone; while a representation on the other hand is an existent object serving to represent something to quasi mind or mind for some purpose other than for the mechanistic or organic phaneron itself, which representation in effect is as a representative sign. An important consideration here in scientific semiotics and logics is perhaps that the normal human mind needs representations as signs to think about representamen, even if such thought is nondiscursive and senseless and irrational and illogical. Furthermore and aside from phanerons sensing or thinking or knowing phenomena, it seems that in the whole evolving world all phenomenal phanerons to include representamens can feel to some degree, which means that primordial phenomena can feel either as representamen or can feel other representamen as such. Only in this way can evolving matter and life be semiotically or logically accounted for, because it is not likely that representative signs alone are able to do so. ------------ Joseph Ransdell wrote... Neither Theresa nor I disagree with what you are saying about the vernacular word "sign" being more narrow in scope of application than the word "representamen" and I assume you agree that there are several quotations which make clear that he regards the one as a technical explication of the other. If so there is no disagreement there. I think I was mistaken, though, in identifying confusion about the nature of that distinction as being what would account for the unintelligibility I find (or think I find) in her message. Also, I agree with Theresa in objecting to what Frances says in the passage she quotes from her: "In my guess, it may be that for Peirce in the evolution of things "representamens" are more say monadic or dyadic and primitive then "signs" where objects that act as "signs" require them to be say triadic and the "thought" of organisms, while "representamens" may not." I take it that what she objects to in Frances saying that representamens need not be triadic. Are they not defined as being triadic, just as signs are? We are talking about entities which represent in either case, and that is surely a relation.Can a monad, considered as such, be a representation? Can a mere other as such be a representation? What would be the point in calling a monad or a dyad something that represents? Perhaps we could make sense of it if he means to say that a representamen is a sign that is not a symbol but only an icon or an index, but then why talk about it as a definitional explication of the idea of a sign and define it again and again in just the way he defines sign? The only other possibility I can see is that it is -- as Frances seems to think -- a term for referring to things as they would be if there were no minds to take account of them. Are we to suppose that he would put this forth as his basic term for the sort of entity which semiotic is particularly concerned to study? Peirce did not invent the term, by the way. In the Century Dictionary, Peirce defines it as follows: "In metaph.,representation, an object serving to represent something to the mind." This is attributed to Sir W. Hamilton. ------------ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
