Re: [SLUG] Re: Need help in choosing distro (Rev Simon Rumble)

2004-11-08 Thread Heracles
Kirti Pankhania wrote:
That sounds interesting.
With Knoppix, how does one save basic config info in hard drive?
 

The distro gives you te option to place a config file on the HDD if you 
do any configuration.

Also is it possible to configure the internet connection to run via Knoppix?
 

Yes. Set it up using the Internet config tool provided with Knoppix.
And, how does one enable deletion of or writing to windows files when
necessary through Linux?
 

Depends upon your security. If you Windows is not nt based just mount 
the directory. If it is then you can still mount the drive, but have to 
provide a password and username acceptable to nt.

I have some programs and internet sites that seem to have piggybacked onto
my system that are impossible to delete, even with the MSDOS prompt.
 

Probably adware or similar. Google for free adware and spyware 
removers.  eg  Adaware, Spyblaster and Spybot search and destroy are 
useful. My daughter uses these three and between them she seems to get 
rid of everything.

Hope that helps.
Stay well and happy
Heracles
PS You know that you can install Knoppix on your HDD if you want don't 
you. Check their site.

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[SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Matthew Palmer
On Mon, Nov 08, 2004 at 01:31:51PM +1100, O Plameras wrote:
 Ken Foskey wrote:
 I am unsure how this would have prevented the attack on the kernel that
 was applied?  Please explain.
 
 With the intruder having acquired unprivileged access to system,  he/she 
 could
 have been confined to limited sets of functions because that is one of 
 the things
 that SELinux does. Because he/she is restricted in what can be done it will
 take a bit longer to figure out ( I assume ) how to escalate privileges 
 to root. In

Only if the set of privileges granted to the program didn't include access
to the flawed function.  It was ptrace(), so an allow only that which is
really required policy would have probably blocked the access, there's no
guarantee.

 the meantime the SysAdmin who does what he does will notice unusual
 activities within his system and so, the intruder could have been 
 detected before
 doing damage to the Servers.

Potentially.  Depends on how many tripwires the attacker managed to hit.

 2. Would 'kerberos' have prevented this sort of break-in ?
 
 The initial attack was by social engineering.  One developers key was
 compromised due to their lack of security thought. With one weak link in
 the chain then it all comes down.
 
 Now, I posed the problem without really knowing  the complete details of 
 the circumstances
 because 'kerberos' is meant to be the strongest security protection 
 against this sort of
 attacks.

Where the hell did you pick that up from?  This sort of attacks could be
one of:

1) Sniff the entry of a password on a previously compromised host: hmm, no,
Kerberos doesn't protect against r00ted boxen.

2) Exploitation of a kernel vulnerability to obtain escalated privileges:
riiight.

3) Use of a stored authentication credential to gain access to a system
account on another system: probably not, and Kerberos is a real pest in this
situation.

 I gather that 'ssh' which I noticed is the cryptographic 
 security procedure used
 at these Debian sites has not prevented the attacks.

Hoo boy.

 I note here some differences between ssh and kerberos:
 
 1. SSH needs local identity files whilst kerberos does not

You mean known_hosts?  No, kerberos just restricts you to a small set of
hosts which you can access (without setting up cross-domain trust
relationships).  And after all, if an attacker has just sniffed your
password, he'd be very, very unlucky not to get the hast you connected as
well.

 2. SSH does not impose time restrictions on a session whilst kerberos 
 does (Prevents
 replay attacks)

From memory, SSH uses some form of challenge/response to set things up, so a
replay attack wouldn't be feasible.

 3. In SSH the client decides what tools and application to run on the server

I call 'horseshit'.  Should have done it two days ago, but there you are.

 whilst in kerberos, the server may restrict the clients from running 
 certain tools and
 applications (Ease and simplicity of management as to who and what to 
 allow or
 disallow)

You've never actually administered, or even smelt, a Kerberos system, have
you?  Ease and simplicity of management is not something I hear often in
connection with Kerberos.

 This is my understanding of SSH and Kerberos so correct me if I'm wrong.

You're wrong.

- Matt


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[SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Matthew Palmer
On Mon, Nov 08, 2004 at 03:50:35PM +1100, O Plameras wrote:
 Tony Green wrote:
 
 
 They can be used together but kerberos on it's own provides no way to  
 remotely (or locally) access the machine.
 
 Kerberos can because it comes with kerberized telnet, rsh, rlogin, rcp, etc.
 that lets us connect to another machine in the realm.

But that's not Kerberos doing that, it's whatever application has been taken
to with a bandsaw to make it do the Kerberos Dance.

 Of course I can ssh to machines that are members of kerberos realm. But why
 should I need ssh when I have kerberos ? The reason I'm running kerberos
 is it is a stronger cryptographic security tool than SSH.

Please feel free to use your sexy Kerberized telnet service to connect to
your server next time I'm nearby with dsniff.

- Matt


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Re: [SLUG] 3d graphics viewing/modelling

2004-11-08 Thread Erik de Castro Lopo
On Sun, 7 Nov 2004 22:12:49 +1100
Jamie Wilkinson [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

 There's a library called gle, the GL Extrusion toolkit, if you just want to
 display the model via the OpenGL pipeline; if you want to get that model
 data out it's possible (through the tesselate callbacks, gle wraps GLU) but
 last I tried to do that, I found the X11 libraries lacking, so it wasn't
 actually possible :-) 
 
 I reckon in the timespan of a codefest I could whip up such a program :-)

Is that an offer?

Erik
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Re: [SLUG] Security adding another 'user' to a web site.

2004-11-08 Thread amos
Michael Lake wrote:
4. Other ways ?
What's the easist way to allow the new user to use windows scp but not 
browse the filesystem. Reading up on chroot jails it seems that they are 
not trivial to setup.
How about webmin-updown module, for instance?
In general, webmin might allow you to give limited access
to certain operations over the web and without giving away shell
access at all.
Another option might be to use a restricting ftp server over
ssh.
BTW - I've just learned about winscp -
http://winscp.sourceforge.net/eng/, it's so much more friendly
than window's command line.
Cheers,
--Amos
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Re: [SLUG] Building kernels [Was: Maybe trying out gentoo again]

2004-11-08 Thread Ken Foskey
On Mon, 2004-11-08 at 10:40 +1100, Jeff Waugh wrote:
 quote who=O Plameras
  For example, it should have taken the break-in longer from the time the
  attempt was first  tried to the time it succeeded. And so, SysAdmin would
  have longer window to realise there has been attempts on the servers ? It
  should have confined the first break-in to within a limited set of
  functionalities ?
 
 Note that the entire break-in started with a sniffed password, which SELinux
 could not help with in the slightest. It may have kept the intruder stuck
 with no where to go.

I am still confused why SELlinux would have prevented the escalation to
root?  There was a method by which a common program could intrude on the
kernel, does it stop you from executing code?

Also note that the only reason the break-in was noticed was because of a
modification to the system.  There was no indication prior to that
point.  The time that the intruder had was not the issue here.  So
boxing them in longer may have discouraged them and they gave up, but
assume that they were persistent.

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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread O Plameras
Matthew Palmer wrote:
On Mon, Nov 08, 2004 at 01:31:51PM +1100, O Plameras wrote:
 

Ken Foskey wrote:
   

I am unsure how this would have prevented the attack on the kernel that
was applied?  Please explain.
 

With the intruder having acquired unprivileged access to system,  he/she 
could
have been confined to limited sets of functions because that is one of 
the things
that SELinux does. Because he/she is restricted in what can be done it will
take a bit longer to figure out ( I assume ) how to escalate privileges 
to root. In
   

Only if the set of privileges granted to the program didn't include access
to the flawed function.  It was ptrace(), so an allow only that which is
really required policy would have probably blocked the access, there's no
guarantee.
 

I cannot comment on this because I do not know what you are talking about.
If you can be clearer.
the meantime the SysAdmin who does what he does will notice unusual
activities within his system and so, the intruder could have been 
detected before
doing damage to the Servers.
   

Potentially.  Depends on how many tripwires the attacker managed to hit.
 

Your're probably right.
 

2. Would 'kerberos' have prevented this sort of break-in ?
   

The initial attack was by social engineering.  One developers key was
compromised due to their lack of security thought. With one weak link in
the chain then it all comes down.
 

Now, I posed the problem without really knowing  the complete details of 
the circumstances
because 'kerberos' is meant to be the strongest security protection 
against this sort of
attacks.
   

Where the hell did you pick that up from?  This sort of attacks could be
one of:
 

I got it from people who should know.
1) Sniff the entry of a password on a previously compromised host: hmm, no,
Kerberos doesn't protect against r00ted boxen.
 

Can you elaborate how kerberos and r00ted boxen works and where the 
latter will be
able to trick kerberos ?

2) Exploitation of a kernel vulnerability to obtain escalated privileges:
riiight.
 

I do not quite follow this. You probably did not read the circumstance 
surrounding
the Debian Break-In. (http://www.wiggy.net/debian/explanation/)

3) Use of a stored authentication credential to gain access to a system
account on another system: probably not, and Kerberos is a real pest in this
situation.
 

You are saying things about kerberos without knowing what kerberos is, 
what it is not,
and what it can do.

I gather that 'ssh' which I noticed is the cryptographic 
security procedure used
at these Debian sites has not prevented the attacks.
   

Hoo boy.
 

I note here some differences between ssh and kerberos:
1. SSH needs local identity files whilst kerberos does not
   

You mean known_hosts?  No, kerberos just restricts you to a small set of
hosts which you can access (without setting up cross-domain trust
relationships).  And after all, if an attacker has just sniffed your
password, he'd be very, very unlucky not to get the hast you connected as
well.
 

Everything in ~/.ssh directory.
2. SSH does not impose time restrictions on a session whilst kerberos 
does (Prevents
replay attacks)
   

From memory, SSH uses some form of challenge/response to set things up, so a
replay attack wouldn't be feasible.
 

From this response, it appears you do not understand what is a 'replay 
attack'. If
you can explain perhaps. Your not as clear as can be.

3. In SSH the client decides what tools and application to run on the server
   

I call 'horseshit'.  Should have done it two days ago, but there you are.
 

What you have above is the real 'horseshit' because in SSH once a client 
connects there
is no mechanism to restrict the user to a subset of commands or functions.

Whereas with Kerberos, there is a mechanism to do this.
whilst in kerberos, the server may restrict the clients from running 
certain tools and
applications (Ease and simplicity of management as to who and what to 
allow or
disallow)
   

You've never actually administered, or even smelt, a Kerberos system, have
you?  Ease and simplicity of management is not something I hear often in
connection with Kerberos.
 

This is another example of 'saying without knowing'. In kerberos, the 
SysAdmin
simply goes to the one Server (Master Server and make changes for a user 
for example)
and that change will be implemented in each servers within the realm.

In SSH the SysAdmin will have to connect to each Server the user is 
connecting to ,
to effect the changes. Imagine if you have a Farm of Servers consisting 
of 500 Servers.

So, I suggest you send yourself back to the drawing board as far as 
Kerberos is concerned.

 

This is my understanding of SSH and Kerberos so correct me if I'm wrong.
   

You're wrong.
 

As you can see you're the one who is wrong.

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[SLUG] SELinux stuff [Was: Building kernels]

2004-11-08 Thread Jeff Waugh
quote who=Ken Foskey

 On Mon, 2004-11-08 at 10:40 +1100, Jeff Waugh wrote:
  Note that the entire break-in started with a sniffed password, which
  SELinux could not help with in the slightest. It may have kept the
  intruder stuck with no where to go.
 
 I am still confused why SELlinux would have prevented the escalation to
 root?  There was a method by which a common program could intrude on the
 kernel, does it stop you from executing code?

SELinux, when configured properly, would have made it inordinately hard for
an unprivileged [1] user to escalate their privileges to the equivalent of
root (because, with SELinux, you can make 'root' or uid 0 entirely useless).
So that common program may not have the capabilities to intrude on the
kernel as it might on other systems.

- Jeff

[1] and with SELinux, we're talking about *much* finer grain privileges and
capabilities that Linux provides

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Re: [SLUG] Building kernels [Was: Maybe trying out gentoo again]

2004-11-08 Thread Benno
On Mon Nov 08, 2004 at 20:59:00 +1100, Ken Foskey wrote:
On Mon, 2004-11-08 at 10:40 +1100, Jeff Waugh wrote:
 quote who=O Plameras
  For example, it should have taken the break-in longer from the time the
  attempt was first  tried to the time it succeeded. And so, SysAdmin would
  have longer window to realise there has been attempts on the servers ? It
  should have confined the first break-in to within a limited set of
  functionalities ?
 
 Note that the entire break-in started with a sniffed password, which SELinux
 could not help with in the slightest. It may have kept the intruder stuck
 with no where to go.

I am still confused why SELlinux would have prevented the escalation to
root?  There was a method by which a common program could intrude on the
kernel, does it stop you from executing code?

Not for sure, but the way this kind of thing should work, is stopping
you from running certain system calls, for example, ptrace.

Benno
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Re: [SLUG] Building kernels [Was: Maybe trying out gentoo again]

2004-11-08 Thread Dave Airlie

  could not help with in the slightest. It may have kept the intruder stuck
  with no where to go.

 I am still confused why SELlinux would have prevented the escalation to
 root?  There was a method by which a common program could intrude on the
 kernel, does it stop you from executing code?

It might not always stop it, but as SELinux is a MAC (Mandatory Access
Control) system you only get access to what you're allowed to, so a user
process wouldn't be able to execute ptracesystem calls in the first place,
but thn again the user wouldn't be able to do anything like debug any
processes on the system.. which depending on the services the machine
presents may not make it useful anymore...

Dave.

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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread O Plameras
Matthew Palmer wrote:
But that's not Kerberos doing that, it's whatever application has been taken
to with a bandsaw to make it do the Kerberos Dance.
 

The point here is having a connection ( established through kerberised 
telnet), and once
that connection is established, the messages exchanged between the two 
computers are
encrypted.

You can prove this to yourself by running tcpdump or ethereal between 
two Linux
boxes connected with ordinary telnet.

Then run tcpdump or ethereal between two Linux boxes connected via 
kerberised
telnet. Then discover for yourself that you won't have a clue what looks the
messages are exchanged between these two computers.

Please feel free to use your sexy Kerberized telnet service to connect to
your server next time I'm nearby with dsniff.
-
I do now believe you do not know what Kerberos is, what it does, what it 
can do,
and why people love it.

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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Jeff Waugh
quote who=O Plameras

 The point here is having a connection ( established through kerberised
 telnet), and once that connection is established, the messages exchanged
 between the two computers are encrypted.

This is absolutely true for ssh, and *optionally* true for many kerberised
telnet implementations. It is not a property of kerberos itself *at all*.
Kerberos provides AAA support only.

 I do now believe you do not know what Kerberos is, what it does, what it
 can do, and why people love it.

Oscar, you're better off listening and learning that biting the hand that
feeds you.

- Jeff

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Re: [SLUG] SELinux stuff [Was: Building kernels]

2004-11-08 Thread Robert Collins
On Mon, 2004-11-08 at 21:10 +1100, Jeff Waugh wrote:

 SELinux, when configured properly, would have made it inordinately hard for
 an unprivileged [1] user to escalate their privileges to the equivalent of
 root (because, with SELinux, you can make 'root' or uid 0 entirely useless).
 So that common program may not have the capabilities to intrude on the
 kernel as it might on other systems.

Still doesn't fix bugs :).

Rob

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[SLUG] Re: Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Matthew Palmer
[Don't Cc me, I'm the list FFS]

On Mon, Nov 08, 2004 at 09:08:23PM +1100, O Plameras wrote:
 Matthew Palmer wrote:
 On Mon, Nov 08, 2004 at 01:31:51PM +1100, O Plameras wrote:
 Ken Foskey wrote:
 I am unsure how this would have prevented the attack on the kernel that
 was applied?  Please explain.
 
 With the intruder having acquired unprivileged access to system,  he/she 
 could
 have been confined to limited sets of functions because that is one of 
 the things
 that SELinux does. Because he/she is restricted in what can be done it 
 will
 take a bit longer to figure out ( I assume ) how to escalate privileges 
 to root. In
 
 Only if the set of privileges granted to the program didn't include access
 to the flawed function.  It was ptrace(), so an allow only that which is
 really required policy would have probably blocked the access, there's no
 guarantee.

 I cannot comment on this because I do not know what you are talking about.
 If you can be clearer.

SELinux works by by restricting access to what can be done by a program.  If
the exploit program couldn't run the flawed code, then no exploit would be
possible.  If SELinux allows access to the flawed code, then the flaw can
still be exploited to obtain elevated privileges.

 2. Would 'kerberos' have prevented this sort of break-in ?

 
 The initial attack was by social engineering.  One developers key was
 compromised due to their lack of security thought. With one weak link in
 the chain then it all comes down.
  
 
 Now, I posed the problem without really knowing  the complete details of 
 the circumstances
 because 'kerberos' is meant to be the strongest security protection 
 against this sort of
 attacks.

 
 
 Where the hell did you pick that up from?  This sort of attacks could be
 one of:

 I got it from people who should know.

Care to name names?  Voices in Oscar's Head don't count, by the way.

 1) Sniff the entry of a password on a previously compromised host: hmm, no,
 Kerberos doesn't protect against r00ted boxen.
 
  
 
 Can you elaborate how kerberos and r00ted boxen works and where the 
 latter will be
 able to trick kerberos ?

Does that sound like something from Eliza to anyone else?

tricking Kerberos has nothing to do with it.  If I've got a keylogger on
your computer, logging every keystroke you type, whether you type the
password into a Kerberised application or not, you're toast.

Kerberos is nothing, and I do mean *nothing*, more than a heavily
overengineered (though still probably the best-of-breed) untrusted-network
authentication system.

 2) Exploitation of a kernel vulnerability to obtain escalated privileges:
 riiight.
 
 I do not quite follow this. You probably did not read the circumstance 
 surrounding
 the Debian Break-In. (http://www.wiggy.net/debian/explanation/)

ptrace vulnerability -- ring any bells?  And yes, I read the circumstances
surrounding the Debian Break-in.  Quite closely.

 3) Use of a stored authentication credential to gain access to a system
 account on another system: probably not, and Kerberos is a real pest in 
 this
 situation.

 You are saying things about kerberos without knowing what kerberos is, 
 what it is not,
 and what it can do.

I did the initial setup and 3 years of ongoing maintenance of a 400 user
Kerberos realm.  Whilst I will profess to not be an almighty god on the
issue, I think it's fair to say I've got some degree of experience with it.

 I note here some differences between ssh and kerberos:
 
 1. SSH needs local identity files whilst kerberos does not

 
 
 You mean known_hosts?  No, kerberos just restricts you to a small set of
 hosts which you can access (without setting up cross-domain trust
 relationships).  And after all, if an attacker has just sniffed your
 password, he'd be very, very unlucky not to get the hast you connected as
 well.
 
  
 
 Everything in ~/.ssh directory.

Which is, in the basic case, just known_hosts.  That keystroke logger got
the login command as well as the password, you know.

 2. SSH does not impose time restrictions on a session whilst kerberos 
 does (Prevents
 replay attacks)

 
 
 From memory, SSH uses some form of challenge/response to set things up, so 
 a
 replay attack wouldn't be feasible.
 
  
 
 From this response, it appears you do not understand what is a 'replay 
 attack'. If
 you can explain perhaps. Your not as clear as can be.

Replay attack: a means of doing unpleasant things by resending previously
captured information in the hope it will continue to elicit the same
response as the initial transmission of the captured information.

 3. In SSH the client decides what tools and application to run on the 
 server
 
 I call 'horseshit'.  Should have done it two days ago, but there you are.
 
 What you have above is the real 'horseshit' because in SSH once a client 
 connects there
 is no mechanism to restrict the user to a subset of commands or functions.
 
 Whereas with Kerberos, there is a 

Re: [SLUG] SELinux stuff [Was: Building kernels]

2004-11-08 Thread Jeff Waugh
quote who=Robert Collins

 On Mon, 2004-11-08 at 21:10 +1100, Jeff Waugh wrote:
 
  SELinux, when configured properly, would have made it inordinately hard
  for an unprivileged [1] user to escalate their privileges to the
  equivalent of root (because, with SELinux, you can make 'root' or uid 0
  entirely useless).  So that common program may not have the capabilities
  to intrude on the kernel as it might on other systems.
 
 Still doesn't fix bugs :).

You're absolutely right. To do that, you must Rebuild Kernel to Secure
Servers.

- Jeff

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The doctor said so.
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Re: [SLUG] Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Ken Foskey
On Mon, 2004-11-08 at 15:59 +1100, Robert Collins wrote:

 kerberos does not provide remote access, only AAA.
 
 kerberised telnet is still plaintext, so anything such as sudo being run
 via it will allow password sniffing, which in combination with a session
 hijack provide a gaping hole into the system that ssh doesn't.

This is not altogether correct, I did some research (and along with a
lot of security notifications) and found:

--
Using Kerberos telnet

To use the telnet program without having to type your password, you need
to use it with the '-a' option. Otherwise you will be prompted for your
password when you try to connection. Do not type your password. Any
password you type will not be encrypted and will go over the network in
the clear.

If you use the '-a' option and it fails to log you in, this is normally
becuase your Kerberos ticket has expired and you need to run kinit
again. If this still fails please contact [EMAIL PROTECTED] and let
us know about the problem.

telnet also supports the '-x' option to encrypt your session and protect
it's privacy. 
--

If you SPECIFICALLY request it (and I assume telnetd that you have
installed allows it) then you get full encryption.  I am still unsure
whether this is better encryption than ssh however.

-- 
Ken Foskey

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[SLUG] Re: Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Matthew Palmer
On Mon, Nov 08, 2004 at 09:19:32PM +1100, O Plameras wrote:
 Matthew Palmer wrote:
 
 But that's not Kerberos doing that, it's whatever application has been 
 taken
 to with a bandsaw to make it do the Kerberos Dance.

 The point here is having a connection ( established through kerberised 
 telnet), and once
 that connection is established, the messages exchanged between the two 
 computers are
 encrypted.

Not necessarily.  Only if both ends of the connection negotiated some sort
of stream encryption after the authentication has taken place.

 Please feel free to use your sexy Kerberized telnet service to connect to
 your server next time I'm nearby with dsniff.
 
 I do now believe you do not know what Kerberos is, what it does, what it 
 can do,
 and why people love it.

I do know what Kerberos is, I know what it does, I certainly know what it
can do.  However, I have a bit of a hard time working out why people love
it.

- Matt


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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Dave Airlie

 
 I do now believe you do not know what Kerberos is, what it does, what it can
 do,
 and why people love it.

http://www.isi.edu/gost/brian/security/kerberos.html

might be worth reading for anyone who a) wonders what all the fuss is
about, b) may not totally understand what kerberos is...(despite saying
lots about it...)

and as far as I remember I don't think anyone has ever professed any
great love for it,

Dave.

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Re: [SLUG] Re: Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Robert Collins
On Mon, 2004-11-08 at 21:39 +1100, Matthew Palmer wrote:
 
 Care to name names?  Voices in Oscar's Head don't count, by the way.
 

Matt, I think this is a little over the top.

Rob

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Re: [SLUG] Re: Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread O Plameras
Matthew Palmer wrote:
The point here is having a connection ( established through kerberised 
telnet), and once
that connection is established, the messages exchanged between the two 
computers are
encrypted.
   

Not necessarily.  Only if both ends of the connection negotiated some sort
of stream encryption after the authentication has taken place.
 

This is certainly wrong. Once connection is established in the Kerberos 
Realm
all communications and messages exchanges are encrypted in accordance with
the rules as specified in Kerberos.

I do know what Kerberos is, I know what it does, I certainly know what it
can do.  However, I have a bit of a hard time working out why people love
it.
 

You are just saying without elaborating. It is one thing to say for you 
someone is wrong
but you have not been forthcoming why you are right; no logical 
explanation.


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Re: [SLUG] Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread O Plameras
Ken Foskey wrote:
On Mon, 2004-11-08 at 15:59 +1100, Robert Collins wrote:
 

kerberos does not provide remote access, only AAA.
kerberised telnet is still plaintext, so anything such as sudo being run
via it will allow password sniffing, which in combination with a session
hijack provide a gaping hole into the system that ssh doesn't.
   

This is not altogether correct, I did some research (and along with a
lot of security notifications) and found:
--
Using Kerberos telnet
To use the telnet program without having to type your password, you need
to use it with the '-a' option. Otherwise you will be prompted for your
password when you try to connection. Do not type your password. Any
password you type will not be encrypted and will go over the network in
the clear.
If you use the '-a' option and it fails to log you in, this is normally
becuase your Kerberos ticket has expired and you need to run kinit
again. If this still fails please contact [EMAIL PROTECTED] and let
us know about the problem.
telnet also supports the '-x' option to encrypt your session and protect
it's privacy. 
--

If you SPECIFICALLY request it (and I assume telnetd that you have
installed allows it) then you get full encryption.  I am still unsure
whether this is better encryption than ssh however.
 

The only way to know is set up two computers; run tcpdump or ethereal; and
connect plain telnet.
Then, set up two computers; set up kerberos; run tcpdump or ethereal; and
connect kerberised telnet.
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Re: [SLUG] Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Jeff Waugh
quote who=O Plameras

 The only way to know is set up two computers; run tcpdump or ethereal; and
 connect plain telnet.
 
 Then, set up two computers; set up kerberos; run tcpdump or ethereal; and
 connect kerberised telnet.

Oscar, Ken and I have both explained that it's optional. You could test if
you wanted to waste time setting up kerberos, but you could also infer the
functionality of the software from the documentation (as Ken has done).

- Jeff

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Re: [SLUG] Re: Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Robert Collins
On Mon, 2004-11-08 at 21:55 +1100, O Plameras wrote:
 Matthew Palmer wrote:
 
 The point here is having a connection ( established through kerberised 
 telnet), and once
 that connection is established, the messages exchanged between the two 
 computers are
 encrypted.
 
 
 
 Not necessarily.  Only if both ends of the connection negotiated some sort
 of stream encryption after the authentication has taken place.
   
 
 
 This is certainly wrong. Once connection is established in the Kerberos 
 Realm
 all communications and messages exchanges are encrypted in accordance with
 the rules as specified in Kerberos.

Actually, you are wrong, according to my Kerberos the definitive guide
book here.

The exact things that are encrypted, and how, depend on which kerberos
implementation and version you are using, but regardless of that,
kerberos itself only specifies the encryption for the AS handshake to
get a TGT, and the TGS handshake for getting a ticket for a specific
service. 

Rob

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Re: [SLUG] Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Dave Airlie

 The only way to know is set up two computers; run tcpdump or ethereal; and
 connect plain telnet.

 Then, set up two computers; set up kerberos; run tcpdump or ethereal; and
 connect kerberised telnet.


I'm waay to lazy to do anything like that so I'll go read the FAQ:
in summary, some apps encrypt some don't , ktelnet from MIT does... but
krandomapp may not and it isn't guaranteeded, as they say below
Unfortunately, relatively few applications support Kerberos to this
degree.

From http://www.faqs.org/faqs/kerberos-faq/general/
Subject: 1.15. I use software package foo, and it claims it supports
Kerberos. What does that mean?

Unfortunately, supporting Kerberos can mean a number of things.

The most basic level of Kerberos support is verifying a plaintext password
against the Kerberos database. Depending on the application, this may or
may
not be secure. For example, since the Unix xlock application is designed
to
verify passwords and (hopefully) is only run from on your local
workstation,
verifying passwords against a Kerberos database is perfectly adequate.
However, if you have a POP server that verifies the PASS command by
checking
the password against a Kerberos database, that is NOT secure, because the
password will travel over the network in the clear.

There are different levels of password verification, however. Unless a
program that does plaintext password verification uses the acquired TGT to
get a service ticket for a locally trusted service (that is, with the key
in
a keytab on local disk), then an attacker can spoof the client with a TGT
encrypted in a known password.

The next level of Kerberos support is a true Kerberized application that
uses Kerberos tickets to verify identity and/or encrypt data. This is the
way that Kerberos was designed to function, and it provides the highest
level of security that Kerberos has to offer. Unfortunately, relatively
few
applications support Kerberos to this degree.

If you use an application that claims to support Kerberos, you should find
out exactly what this means and determine if that is appropriate for your
environment. If you use Kerberos primarily as a single-signon system, then
having a POP server that verifies plaintext passwords against a Kerberos
database may be acceptable to you.

All of the Unix replacement commands that come with the MIT Kerberos
distributions (telnet, ftp, rlogin, rsh, etc), are true Kerberized
applications.

Dave.

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Re: [SLUG] Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread O Plameras
Jeff Waugh wrote:
Oscar, Ken and I have both explained that it's optional. You could test if
you wanted to waste time setting up kerberos, but you could also infer the
functionality of the software from the documentation (as Ken has done).
 

I do not have to waste time testing this because I have a kerberos setup 
at this very
moment and I have tested it.

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Re: [SLUG] Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread David Kempe
O Plameras wrote:
I do not have to waste time testing this because I have a kerberos setup 
at this very
moment and I have tested it.

lets just hope you haven't wasted time with an actually plaintext 
version of kerberos, when you could be keeping all those redhat 9 boxes 
of your with slightly old versions of ssh up to date :)

dave
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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread O Plameras
Jeff Waugh wrote:
 

Oscar, you're better off listening and learning that biting the hand that
feeds you.
 

A bit arrogant to say others should listen and learn from you and I 
should keep quiet
and drop my point.

I'm always learning, what about you ?

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[SLUG] Re: [Fwd: Re: Building kernels [Was: Maybe trying out gentoo again]]

2004-11-08 Thread Chris Deigan
On Fri, 05 Nov 2004 16:46:21 +1100, O Plameras wrote:
 But I'm not going to allow anyone abusing this list  with impunity to
 tell tall stories without correcting it.

List abuse is a issue for SLUG's managing committee or the financial
member base to decide on.

Free speech is fine, but any irrelevant argument I encourage you to keep
to private emails rather than a public, archived, list with a subscriber
base of over 700 people.

Cheers,
Chris

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[SLUG] Code Fest!

2004-11-08 Thread Craige McWhirter
When:
Saturday, November 27, 10:00am - 10:00pm
Where:
CSE/UNSW Kensington, Seminar Room 
Map / Transport: http://slug.org.au/events/cse.html

We're holding a Debian RC Bug Squish and general Code Fest. The idea of
of the day is to have a social, coding day, learn a few things, close
some Debian RC Bugs or just hack the day away on what ever takes your
fancy. For those with a punting itch or a taste for bloodsports, we'll
be running a book on whether this boast
http://lists.slug.org.au/archives/slug/2004/11/msg00231.html will be
fulfilled. Get in early for ring side seats. There'll be a 22:00 til
late kick-on at a nearby house with plenty of room and net access for
those with a need for it.

Food and drink will be organised throughout the day and dinner be held
afterwards at a venue decided on by the participants. There's also ample
on-site parking. 

See you there!

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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Jeff Waugh
quote who=O Plameras

 Jeff Waugh wrote:
 Oscar, you're better off listening and learning that biting the hand that
 feeds you.

 A bit arrogant to say others should listen and learn from you and I should
 keep quiet and drop my point.

Note that I haven't asked you to keep quiet, Oscar. But there seems to be a
few people on the list who are concerned by the inaccurate comments you've
made recently, and would like to help to address them, both for yourself and
other members of the list. Your sometimes inappropriate pushback makes this
process difficult, so you get some rough responses at times... No one's
asking you to be quiet, they're asking you to be reasonable and *listen*.

- Jeff

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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread O Plameras
Jeff Waugh wrote:
quote who=O Plameras
 

Jeff Waugh wrote:
   

Oscar, you're better off listening and learning that biting the hand that
feeds you.
 

A bit arrogant to say others should listen and learn from you and I should
keep quiet and drop my point.
   

Note that I haven't asked you to keep quiet, Oscar. But there seems to be a
few people on the list who are concerned by the inaccurate comments you've
made recently, and would like to help to address them, both for yourself and
other members of the list. Your sometimes inappropriate pushback makes this
process difficult, so you get some rough responses at times... No one's
asking you to be quiet, they're asking you to be reasonable and *listen*.
 

That is what you are insinuating that I shut up. In so far as inaccurate 
comments, I
probably did a few but what about you ?

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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Jeff Waugh
quote who=O Plameras

 Note that I haven't asked you to keep quiet, Oscar. But there seems to be
 a few people on the list who are concerned by the inaccurate comments
 you've made recently, and would like to help to address them, both for
 yourself and other members of the list. Your sometimes inappropriate
 pushback makes this process difficult, so you get some rough responses at
 times... No one's asking you to be quiet, they're asking you to be
 reasonable and *listen*.

 That is what you are insinuating that I shut up.

You'll see above that I've specifically noted that no one's asking you to
shut up. I said it twice, just in case you missed it.

 In so far as inaccurate comments, I probably did a few but what about you
 ?

Historically, Oscar, heaps - and I've learnt from them. However, no one's
pointed out any deep seated misunderstanding that I've communicated on these
threads.

Again, it's this pushback from you that is concerning. This means you're not
listening or learning from *anyone*.

- Jeff

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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread James Gregory
On Mon, Nov 08, 2004 at 07:16:01PM +1100, Someone wrote:
  2. SSH does not impose time restrictions on a session whilst kerberos 
  does (Prevents
  replay attacks)
 
 From memory, SSH uses some form of challenge/response to set things up, so a
 replay attack wouldn't be feasible.

And it's fascinating stuff. Successful replay attempts are an extreme
improbability with SSH, because before anything at all gets sent over
the wire, a key exchange* occurs to establish a key for one of the
faster (and just as secure) block cipher algorithms like DES or Blowfish
(btw, DES and Blowfish are both very similar algorithms. In essence
they're both Feistel ciphers. For some reason though, Blowfish is
substantially faster in practice, even though at first glance its
round function seems more complex). This key will be different on each
connection attempt, and is dependent on the entropy pools on *both* ends
of the connection. On Linux, entropy pools are quite good these days,
and you don't get inferior random data if the kernel figures it can't
guarantee randomness -- instead it tells you that the entropy pool is
empty. If you don't believe me, try running md5sum /dev/urandom. It'll
take a while but it will terminate.

[*] a secure key exchange. The one that is traditionally taught in
crypto courses is Diffie-Hellman. I don't know if Diffie-Hellman is
still used though. The difficulty of breaking Diffie-Hellman is in
solving the discrete logarithm problem (which is a pretty hard
problem). The problem with Diffie-Hellman is that it's susceptible to
man-in-the-middle attacks.  SSH gets around this by storing the
digital finger-print of servers you connect to. If the finger-print
doesn't match when you re-connect, you know something's up (that's what
those errors mean that require you to edit .ssh/known_hosts).

Sorry, I may have taken this a little off-topic. I find the maths behind
it fascinating. I hope I've helped in evaluating the real security of
SSH though and haven't provided too much erroneous information.

James.

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[SLUG] Apache, CSS PHP

2004-11-08 Thread Howard Lowndes
I have a CSS file which has to be named *.css so that Apache knows to
send it as a text/css mime type but I want to do some PHP processing on
before it goes out; unfortunately Apache appears not to know to pass it
through the PHP handler as it not named *.php so the embedded PHP code
doesn't get processed.

I assume I have to do something with Action, AddHandler and SetHandler
directives, but just what exactly.

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Re: [SLUG] Apache, CSS PHP

2004-11-08 Thread amos
I don't know PHP that well but how about naming it .php and set
the content-type to text/css from inside PHP?
Or how about putting all your .css files under directory css/
(I think it's considered generally a good idea, like concentrating
all your images under images/) and telling apache to set text/css
for all files under this dir while still the .php suffix tells apache
to pass the files through PHP?
Just ideas I'd explore if I were you, nothing testted.
Cheers,
--Amos
Howard Lowndes wrote:
I have a CSS file which has to be named *.css so that Apache knows to
send it as a text/css mime type but I want to do some PHP processing on
before it goes out; unfortunately Apache appears not to know to pass it
through the PHP handler as it not named *.php so the embedded PHP code
doesn't get processed.
I assume I have to do something with Action, AddHandler and SetHandler
directives, but just what exactly.
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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Ken Foskey
On Mon, 2004-11-08 at 23:27 +1100, James Gregory wrote:

 faster (and just as secure) block cipher algorithms like DES or Blowfish

Foes anyone know the ciphers that kerberos uses?  I was going to ask the
person that did cryptography in Uni recently :-)

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[SLUG] Re: Debain stable; MySQL 4.1 backport?

2004-11-08 Thread Chris Deigan
On Mon, 08 Nov 2004 14:25:09 +1000, Jon Austin wrote:

 Does anyone know if such a beast exists?
 
 I need subquery support which is only present (I believe) in 4.1..

By this point in time, you might as well think about upgrading to sarge
(the next debian stable). It will go stable soon, so it might be worth
considering before going to the effort of compiling from source or using
an unknown/trusted backport.

Chris.

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Re: [SLUG] Security adding another 'user' to a web site.

2004-11-08 Thread Michael Lake
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Michael Lake wrote:
4. Other ways ?
What's the easist way to allow the new user to use windows scp but not 
browse the filesystem. Reading up on chroot jails it seems that they 
are not trivial to setup.

How about webmin-updown module, for instance?
In general, webmin might allow you to give limited access
to certain operations over the web and without giving away shell
access at all.
Not keen on webmin as were exploits for it when I looked at it last 
year. Maybe I should look at it again.

Another option might be to use a restricting ftp server over
ssh.
Not familiar with that at all.
BTW - I've just learned about winscp -
http://winscp.sourceforge.net/eng/, it's so much more friendly
than window's command line.
Yes that's what I have given to the user that uploads files. Before I 
used the virtual server the hosting co provided ftp. With the virt 
server I didnt put on any ftpd and its ssh or scp only for access.
I sleep better at night now.

Mike
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Re: [SLUG] Re: Debain stable; MySQL 4.1 backport?

2004-11-08 Thread Michael Lake
Chris Deigan wrote:
On Mon, 08 Nov 2004 14:25:09 +1000, Jon Austin wrote:
Does anyone know if such a beast exists?
I need subquery support which is only present (I believe) in 4.1..

By this point in time, you might as well think about upgrading to sarge
(the next debian stable). It will go stable soon, so it might be worth
considering before going to the effort of compiling from source or using
an unknown/trusted backport.
What happens with a stable system when testing becomes stable? I have a 
server with MySQL 3-something and my testing laptop is MySQL 4.1 so I 
gather that soon, when I do an apt-get update, the stable system will 
report that that it will upgrade from 3 to 4. I know the mysql tables 
changed structure from 3 to 4. I presume it will do a conversion seamlessly?

Mike
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Re: [SLUG] Re: Debain stable; MySQL 4.1 backport?

2004-11-08 Thread Jon Austin
FWIW, I just ended up using the binary distribution of 4.1 from MySQL.
This was replacing a backdated port of 4.0

It used the existing configuration and data fine (from my limited testing).

There is a 4.1 debain package in the experimental branch, but I did
not have much joy.

Regards,

Jon

On Tue, 09 Nov 2004 10:11:55 +1100, Michael Lake [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Chris Deigan wrote:
 
  On Mon, 08 Nov 2004 14:25:09 +1000, Jon Austin wrote:
 Does anyone know if such a beast exists?
 I need subquery support which is only present (I believe) in 4.1..
 
  By this point in time, you might as well think about upgrading to sarge
  (the next debian stable). It will go stable soon, so it might be worth
  considering before going to the effort of compiling from source or using
  an unknown/trusted backport.
 
 What happens with a stable system when testing becomes stable? I have a
 server with MySQL 3-something and my testing laptop is MySQL 4.1 so I
 gather that soon, when I do an apt-get update, the stable system will
 report that that it will upgrade from 3 to 4. I know the mysql tables
 changed structure from 3 to 4. I presume it will do a conversion seamlessly?
 
 Mike
 --
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 Chemistry, Materials  Forensic Science, UTS
 Ph: 9514 1725 Fx: 9514 1460
 
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[SLUG] Remote scp access

2004-11-08 Thread Ian Wienand
On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 10:07:20AM +1100, Michael Lake wrote:
 Michael Lake wrote:
 4. Other ways ?
 What's the easist way to allow the new user to use windows scp but not 
 browse the filesystem. Reading up on chroot jails it seems that they 
 are not trivial to setup.

I deleted the previous parts of this thread but this question got me
interested; it is not hard to do this with scponly.

http://www.sublimation.org/scponly/

I run it inside a separate chroot, although it has its own options to
chroot itself.  It's not that hard to setup.  If you setup a ssh
chroot following some vague instructions like

http://www.gelato.unsw.edu.au/IA64wiki/DebianSSHChroot

you can make each users shell scponly and feel just about as secure as
you ever can having a publicly accessible box that allows uploading.

-i
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.gelato.unsw.edu.au


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Re: [SLUG] Re: Apache, CSS PHP

2004-11-08 Thread Howard Lowndes
On Tue, 2004-11-09 at 10:37, Matthew Palmer wrote:
 On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 02:30:16AM +1100, Howard Lowndes wrote:
  I have a CSS file which has to be named *.css so that Apache knows to
  send it as a text/css mime type but I want to do some PHP processing on
  before it goes out; unfortunately Apache appears not to know to pass it
  through the PHP handler as it not named *.php so the embedded PHP code
  doesn't get processed.
  
  I assume I have to do something with Action, AddHandler and SetHandler
  directives, but just what exactly.
 
 When I want to add PHP processing to a file type, I just add the file
 extension to the AddType application/x-httpd-php line in my httpd.conf.  You
 could do a similar thing with your .css files, but there's a problem -- I
 think, by default, any request that gets passed through PHP ends up with a
 content-type of text/html no matter what.  Basically, at the time you
 delegate responsibility for a file to PHP, Apache says not my problem any
 more and lets PHP specify the content type.
 
 So, in your PHPified CSS files, you'll need to run something like
 header('Content-Type: text/css'); to specify the content-type of the file. 
 By the time you do this to all of your CSS files, you're better off (as has
 been explained already) putting your dynamic CSS stuff into a .php file,
 referencing it in your LINK tags as such, and just telling the file to
 announce to the world (via the aforementioned header) that it's a CSS file,
 and proud!

I can see what you are saying here, and I have the line in my
head/head block that reads:
link rel=stylesheet type=text/css name=cssname.php/link
which is what I think you are saying but when the file name ends in .php
it seemingly ignores the type statement so I guess PHP must be sending
out different mime type headers, and it looks like I will have to do as
Amos suggests.

 
 - Matt
 
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[SLUG] Re: Remote scp access

2004-11-08 Thread Michael Lake
Ian Wienand wrote:
On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 10:07:20AM +1100, Michael Lake wrote:
4. Other ways ?
What's the easist way to allow the new user to use windows scp but not 
browse the filesystem. Reading up on chroot jails it seems that they 
are not trivial to setup.

I deleted the previous parts of this thread but this question got me
interested; it is not hard to do this with scponly.
http://www.sublimation.org/scponly/
I run it inside a separate chroot, although it has its own options to
chroot itself.  It's not that hard to setup.  If you setup a ssh
chroot following some vague instructions like
http://www.gelato.unsw.edu.au/IA64wiki/DebianSSHChroot
Thanks, I just had a look at scponly and it seems like it's just what I 
need. Also looked at the summary for chroot jail on debian at gelato. I 
think the scponly is easiest and simplest and I'll test that out first.

Mike
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[SLUG] /etc/dhcpd.conf

2004-11-08 Thread Adam Bogacki
Thanks, when I try that I get the message
No subnet declaration for start (0.0.0.0).
Please write a subnet declaration in your dhcpd.conf file for the
network segment to which interface start is attached.
exiting.

and when I try the network calculator it gives a netmask of 
255.255.255.24 ...

My /etc/dhcp.conf currently looks like that below; everything else 
commented out.

When I write a subnet declaration for 192.168.0.0 and for 192.168.0.1 
(server -
presumably the network segment to which interface start is attached) I 
get the
message that the two conflict.

Any ideas ?
Adam
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
subnet 192.168.0.0 netmask 255.255.255.252 {
  option domain-name paradise.net.nz;
  option broadcast-address 192.168.0.1;
  option routers 192.168.0.1;
  option subnet-mask 255.255.255.224;
  range 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.2;
  default-lease-time 21600;
  max-lease-time 21600;
}
#subnet 192.168.0.1 netmask 255.255.255.24 {
#  option domain-name paradise.net.nz;
#  option broadcast-address 192.168.0.1;
#  option routers 192.168.0.1;
#  option subnet-mask 255.255.255.24;
#  range 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.2;
#  default-lease-time 21600;
#  max-lease-time 21600;
#}
host tux
{ fixed-address tux.paradise.net.nz ; }
# The other subnet that shares this physical network
#subnet 192.168.0.1 netmask 255.255.255.224 {


John A. Smith wrote:
Adam,
Your subnet should be 192.168.0.0/255.255.255.252 for one client, with 
range 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.2. Change the following lines

 

subnet 192.168.0.2 netmask 255.255.255.224 {
 range 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.10;


Anyone feel free to correct me if wrong. . . This isn't my strong 
suit. Also, here's a link to a network calculator

http://www.telusplanet.net/public/sparkman/netcalc.htm
-john smith
- Original Message -
Adam Bogacki wrote:
 

I can  boot from eb*zdsk with CONFIG_PCI_DIRECT but can't find dhcpd,
probably because it is not correctly configured.
I am currently getting the error message
  

Address range 192.168.0.3 to 192.168.0.10 not on net
192.168.0.2/255.255.255.224!
exiting.

My current /etc/dhcpd.conf file is below. The server is 192.168.0.1 and
the client is 192.168.0.2 What am I missing here ?
Adam Bogacki.
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
  

option domain-name paradise.net.nz;
option domain-name-servers tux.paradise.net.nz;
option subnet-mask 255.255.255.224;
default-lease-time 21600;
max-lease-time 21600;
subnet 192.168.0.2 netmask 255.255.255.224 {
 range 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.10;
#  option broadcast-address 204.254.239.31;
#  option routers prelude.fugue.com;
#}
# The other subnet that shares this physical network
#subnet 192.168.0.1 netmask 255.255.255.224 {
#  range dynamic-bootp 204.254.239.10 204.254.239.20;
#  option broadcast-address 204.254.239.31;
#  option routers snarg.fugue.com;
#subnet 192.168.0.2 netmask 255.255.255.224 {
#  range 192.5.5.26 192.5.5.30;
#  option name-servers bb.home.vix.com, gw.home.vix.com;
 option domain-name paradise.net.nz;
 option routers 192.168.0.1;
 option subnet-mask 255.255.255.224;
 option broadcast-address 192.168.0.1;
 range 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.10;
 default-lease-time 600;
 max-lease-time 7200;
#}



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[SLUG] Re: /etc/dhcpd.conf

2004-11-08 Thread Matthew Palmer
On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 02:20:03PM +1300, Adam Bogacki wrote:
 My /etc/dhcp.conf currently looks like that below; everything else 
 commented out.
 
 When I write a subnet declaration for 192.168.0.0 and for 192.168.0.1 
 (server -
 presumably the network segment to which interface start is attached) I 
 get the
 message that the two conflict.
 
 Any ideas ?
 
 Adam
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 
 subnet 192.168.0.0 netmask 255.255.255.252 {
   option domain-name paradise.net.nz;
   option broadcast-address 192.168.0.1;
   option routers 192.168.0.1;
   option subnet-mask 255.255.255.224;
   range 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.2;
   default-lease-time 21600;
   max-lease-time 21600;
 }
 #subnet 192.168.0.1 netmask 255.255.255.24 {

Whoa!  The specification should be 'subnet network address netmask
mask'.  First rule: network addresses always end in even numbers.

I think you need to redescribe your problem, because I'm getting a bit of a
mixed messsage from the random-quoted stuff at the bottom of your message.

- Matt


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Re: [SLUG] Re: Remote scp access

2004-11-08 Thread mlh
On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 11:11:08AM +1100, Michael Lake wrote:
 Thanks, I just had a look at scponly and it seems like it's just what I 
 need. Also looked at the summary for chroot jail on debian at gelato. I 
 think the scponly is easiest and simplest and I'll test that out first.

Just for completeness you might look at

http://rssh.sourceforge.net/

and while you're at it, perhaps log everything as well:

http://sftplogging.sourceforge.net/

Matt

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[SLUG] Re: [linux-elitists] heidelberg

2004-11-08 Thread Mike MacCana
Jeff Waugh wrote:
quote who=Mike MacCana
 

Jeff, I'm a little dissappointed: I was hoping to chat with a cool guy who
does interesting stuff you about the similar major attributes of the
distributions
   

blah blah passive aggressive blah blah
 

Actually I was being serious. And trying to be pleasant. Just cause the 
other guy wants to have an argument with you doesn't mean I do. If I was 
being aggressive, I'd be more of the active kind.

Be nice. I am. :^)
rather than get into a pissing contest about how many disks are required.
   

Where pissing contest for you and Matt may mean ignore point, repeat. I
pointed out a point of difference (which didn't seem to be understood).
 

I understand your wanting to have the packages for a server install 
that's not minimal on the first disc, I have responded with the fact 
that not filling the first disc allows RH to add errata and drivers to 
the install program, which is useful. Some people want a lot of software 
on CD. That way they can carry it round with them (personally I think 
the world needs DVD burners). But when updates come out, they don't want 
their however many ISOS to suddenly become useless.

Ubuntu doesn't do CD re-releases (so far), 


and if we did, it'd still be...
one CD. *da-da*! :-)
 

Great. My mate doesn't have a fast ADSL connection. Does it have a multi 
CD version I can download and pass to him?

If so, do you think, three years down the track on the same stable 
release, it's be nice if he could use most of those CDs to do another 
install and still be relatively up to date, out of the box, with errata 
and updated drivers for all the storage devices he's likely to use?

Mike
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Re: [SLUG] Re: [linux-elitists] heidelberg

2004-11-08 Thread Jeff Waugh
quote who=Mike MacCana

 Great. My mate doesn't have a fast ADSL connection. Does it have a multi
 CD version I can download and pass to him?

The single CD is the full desktop install - other stuff you'll need on the
average desktop is minimal at best. There's a new release every six months,
and each release is supported for 18 months (at the minimum).

- Jeff

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Re: [SLUG] Re: [linux-elitists] heidelberg

2004-11-08 Thread Jamie Wilkinson
This one time, at band camp, Jeff Waugh wrote:
quote who=Jeff Waugh

 quote who=Mike MacCana
 
  Great. My mate doesn't have a fast ADSL connection. Does it have a multi
  CD version I can download and pass to him?
 
 The single CD is the full desktop install - other stuff you'll need on the
 average desktop is minimal at best. There's a new release every six months,
 and each release is supported for 18 months (at the minimum).

Somehow Mike managed to mail the wrong mailing list...

Don't worry, everyone else has already left.
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[SLUG] Re: [SLUG-ANNOUNCE] Code Fest!

2004-11-08 Thread Horms
On Mon, Nov 08, 2004 at 10:11:40PM +1100, Craige McWhirter wrote:
 When:
 Saturday, November 27, 10:00am - 10:00pm
 Where:
 CSE/UNSW Kensington, Seminar Room 
 Map / Transport: http://slug.org.au/events/cse.html
 
 We're holding a Debian RC Bug Squish and general Code Fest. The idea of
 of the day is to have a social, coding day, learn a few things, close
 some Debian RC Bugs or just hack the day away on what ever takes your
 fancy. For those with a punting itch or a taste for bloodsports, we'll
 be running a book on whether this boast
 http://lists.slug.org.au/archives/slug/2004/11/msg00231.html will be
 fulfilled. Get in early for ring side seats. There'll be a 22:00 til
 late kick-on at a nearby house with plenty of room and net access for
 those with a need for it.
 
 Food and drink will be organised throughout the day and dinner be held
 afterwards at a venue decided on by the participants. There's also ample
 on-site parking. 

Hi Craig, Hi Sluggers,

Unfortunately I will be unable to make this worthy event on account of
a) not being in Sydney on the day and b) it being my birthday (though
that doesn't imply that I don't hack on such occasions).

If any one wants to take a look at the small mountain of bugs
logged against the various kernel packages then happiness will
instantly become Debian users all over the world. You can find (most) 
of these by looking for bugs logged against [EMAIL PROTECTED]
in the BTS.

http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/pkgreport.cgi?which=maintdata=debian-kernel%40lists.debian.orgarchive=no

2.4.27 and 2.6.8 are both slated for inclusion with Sarge, so please
focus on them. 2.4.26 and 2.6.7 are _old_ and no longer maintained and
should be removed from d.o before Sarge. Bugs against those kernels
should either be closed or moved to 2.4.27 or 2.6.8 respectively. 2.6.9
is _new_ and at this stage there are no plans to include this in Sarge,
however bugs in 2.6.9 usually effect 2.6.8 as well, so backports are
welcome.

In particular if people happen to have the particular hardware that
a bug is logged against and are able to test out patches from
the BTS or elsewhere this would be imensely useful.

If you log any discoveries/fixes/whatever in the BTS, send them to
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (BTS messages go to this list anyway), or
for the somewhat bashful send them to me directly, I will try and make
sure your contributions get included, and more importantly help more
people to be able to use debian on more systems.

Hooray!

-- 
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[EMAIL PROTECTED] / [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Debian Kernel Team Member, amongst other things

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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Toliman
Ken Foskey wrote:
On Mon, 2004-11-08 at 23:27 +1100, James Gregory wrote:
 

faster (and just as secure) block cipher algorithms like DES or Blowfish
   

Foes anyone know the ciphers that kerberos uses?  I was going to ask the
person that did cryptography in Uni recently :-)
 

i suppose its a good engough reason to break out the Applied 
Cryptography Book i havent even loked at in oh, 3 years.

i had a look for the protocol data, the RFC is woeful but extreme, and 
complete ...
http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1510.html
http://www.cmf.nrl.navy.mil/CCS/people/kenh/kerberos-faq.html
http://www.nata2.info/misc/Wireless/A_Real-World_Analysis_of_Kerberos_Password_Security-MIRROR.html

Kerberos uses DES, but the encryption method can be negotiated in 
versions v4. DES is still used in a lot of operational cryptographic 
applications,and it is 'relatively' secure, in that it would hopefully 
take a p4 a few hours to brute force... more likely in minutes. Which is 
why DES has been phased out for at least 5 years, replaced by AES in 
secure applications.

The major thing is, in Krb v5, you can specify the salt, the algorithm 
and a few other variables to make the TGS/KDC give out more secure keys 
if you have a need for it. it depends on your KDC, the machine you get 
your ticket from, so its not something easily modified unless you can 
replace a working Kerberos system.

Suffice to say, Krb is relatively secure for a large scale network. more 
secure methods are available now, but they all have their inconvenient 
security-based provisions and features that will make client adoption 
difficult. there's always the addition of biometric data and variable 
challenge authentication methods, etc. but its still relying on making 
the process visibly painful as a reminder of the need for security, etc.

Toliman
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[SLUG] Alpen-Antique recruitment (Australian job opportunities)

2004-11-08 Thread Alpen-Antique recruitment (Australian job opportunities)
Dear Mr/Mrs,

Alpen-Antique GmbH was founded in 1896 year and since that time our company
successfully participated in antique items distribution all over the Central
Europe. After opening our website our goods became subject of new customers?
interest from all over the world, especially from Australia and New Zealand.

We started new campaign selling our goods on-line, but we faced new difficulties
connected with payment delivery delays to our account, because of international
wire transfers usual 5 business days delay. A decision was made to hire sales
representatives capable to receiving payments from the same area where are
the customers located.
At this moment we run sales representatives hiring campaign and are glad
to propose you this position. You?re welcome to be our representative. Please
visit our webpage www.alpenantique.com/partner.htm describing all aspects
of this opportunity and if you?re interested - please send us an email to
[EMAIL PROTECTED] and you will be sent an application form. If you have
any additional questions - don?t hesitate to contact us at [EMAIL PROTECTED]
and we?ll try to help you for sure.

Best regards,
Karl Schallmeiner,
Alpen-Antique GmbH
[EMAIL PROTECTED]


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[SLUG] Writing Mozilla extensions to handle a MIME type

2004-11-08 Thread André Pang
Hi guys,
If any of you have experience writing Mozilla extensions 
(XUL/JavaScript/XBL/XPCOM and all that), I'd be grateful for a bit of 
help -- I'm wondering if it's possible write an extension which can be 
registered as the main way to interpret a particular MIME type 
downloaded from a web server.

An example scenario: say I have a new MIME type, text/x-rot13-html, 
(with an extension of .htmlr13 or something).  What I'd like is to be 
able to write a Mozilla extension whose, say, JavaScript gets triggered 
when the browser detects that particular MIME type, and perhaps the 
JavaScript can un-rot13 the HTML and display it to the screen.  It's 
very much similar to a classic Netscape plugin in that the extension is 
designed to work on particular MIME types, except that I really don't 
want to dive into writing native-code in C or C++, since it's orders of 
magnitude harder than it needs to be.

Does anyone know if this is possible to do with a Mozilla extension?  
All the research I've done so far looks like I'll have to go the 
native-code route with a proper plugin, rather than a lightweight 
extension.

--
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Re: [SLUG] Re: Remote scp access

2004-11-08 Thread Michael Lake
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 11:11:08AM +1100, Michael Lake wrote:
Thanks, I just had a look at scponly and it seems like it's just what I 
need. Also looked at the summary for chroot jail on debian at gelato. I 
think the scponly is easiest and simplest and I'll test that out first.

Just for completeness you might look at
http://rssh.sourceforge.net/
I had a look at rssh. Apparently it does not handle WinSCP.
To get a GUI win client for rssh the above site suggests
using FileZilla which I have downloaded and will try.
Also one problem with scponly is that to use the chroot features you 
have to make it suid and the authors warns of this.

Mike
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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread James Gregory
On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 03:31:50PM +1100, Toliman wrote:
 and it is 'relatively' secure, in that it would hopefully 
 take a p4 a few hours to brute force... more likely in minutes.

How long is 'a few hours'? I didn't think things were that dire. Are you
talking about a straight brute force or some kind of known-plaintext
attack or what?

James.

-- 
Now, there are no problems  only opportunities. However, this seemed to be an
insurmountable opportunity.
 - http://www.surfare.net/~toolman/temp/diagram.html
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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Brett Fenton
i think a few hours is a stretch (on a p4 in any event)

http://www.cryptography.com/resources/whitepapers/DES.html

high end gear ... not really, but purpose built and using inadequacies in the 
standard to optimize the cryptanalysis routine

regards, brett

On Tuesday 09 November 2004 14:25, James Gregory wrote:
 On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 03:31:50PM +1100, Toliman wrote:
  and it is 'relatively' secure, in that it would hopefully
  take a p4 a few hours to brute force... more likely in minutes.

 How long is 'a few hours'? I didn't think things were that dire. Are you
 talking about a straight brute force or some kind of known-plaintext
 attack or what?

 James.

 --
 Now, there are no problems  only opportunities. However, this seemed to be
 an insurmountable opportunity.
  - http://www.surfare.net/~toolman/temp/diagram.html

-- 
Brett Fenton
NetRegistry Pty Ltd
___

http://www.netregistry.com.au/

Tel: +61 2 96996099  |  Fax: +61 2 96996088
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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread Mike MacCana
Ken Foskey wrote:
On Mon, 2004-11-08 at 23:27 +1100, James Gregory wrote:
 

faster (and just as secure) block cipher algorithms like DES or Blowfish
   

Foes anyone know the ciphers that kerberos uses?  I was going to ask the
person that did cryptography in Uni recently :-)
 

Triple DES, chances are.
Mike
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Re: [SLUG] Writing Mozilla extensions to handle a MIME type

2004-11-08 Thread Michael Lake
André Pang wrote:
If any of you have experience writing Mozilla extensions 
(XUL/JavaScript/XBL/XPCOM and all that), I'd be grateful for a bit of 
help -- 
Interestingly I was just reading this at lunchtime:
http://extensions.roachfiend.com/howto.php
What I wanted to do was to hook into the save-as and automatically 
replace all the blank spaces in a filename with say underscores. I get 
sick of having to replace the spaces manually before I save the pages.
An extension for that would be small and useful to me.

Mike
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Mike Lake
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[SLUG] OpenSkills social evening

2004-11-08 Thread Bruce Badger
There will be an OpenSkills social evening at the James Squire Brewhouse
tomorrow (Wednesday 10th) evening at 20:00.

http://www.malt-shovel.com.au/brewhouse.asp?Sydney=true

People (and wireless Internet access) will be there quite a bit earlier
as we'll be having some more formal meetings  20:00 (a ctte meeting and
an SGM).

Anyway, if you'd like to find out more about OpenSkills and perhaps have
a look at the systems available for members, and ones in the works too,
please come along.

Please also come along if you just want to chat about making a living as
a skilled individual in the IT industry.

I hope to see you there.

All the best,
Bruce
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Make the most of your skills - with OpenSkills
http://www.openskills.com



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Re: [SLUG] Re: Remote scp access

2004-11-08 Thread Ian Wienand
On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 04:13:11PM +1100, Michael Lake wrote:
 Also one problem with scponly is that to use the chroot features you 
 have to make it suid and the authors warns of this.

Which is why I installed it in a separate ssh chroot; but I have the
luxury of having full access and carte-blanche control over what I do
to the box.

FWIW, I've even done some hacking on it and I didn't see anything that
raised my alarm bells, and with a known, generally trusted user base
(like people you work with) I'd be happy to run it suid.  If you trust
your users enough that you'd give them shell access if they asked, but
are limiting them to scp more to protect themselves, you'd probably be
fine running it with it's internal chroot too.  If you're giving out a
key to anyone who asks, wrap up ssh in an extra chroot to be sure.

As has been mentioned far too often in the last few days, security is
not a one-fits-all solution.

-i


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Re: [SLUG] Re: Preventing attacks

2004-11-08 Thread mlh
On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 02:25:22PM +1100, James Gregory wrote:
 On Tue, Nov 09, 2004 at 03:31:50PM +1100, Toliman wrote:
  and it is 'relatively' secure, in that it would hopefully 
  take a p4 a few hours to brute force... more likely in minutes.
 
 How long is 'a few hours'? I didn't think things were that dire. Are you
 talking about a straight brute force or some kind of known-plaintext
 attack or what?

Isn't the kerberos ticket only valid for a few minutes anyway?

So 1 hour, few hours ... doesn't matter at the moment.

Matt

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