[tor-bugs] #25797 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Change zwiebelbot to link prop#nnn to spec.torproject.org/proposals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25797: Change zwiebelbot to link prop#nnn to spec.torproject.org/proposals
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 This would be a really useful feature. But it probably depends on #25796.

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[tor-bugs] #25796 [Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team]: Update spec.torproject.org for new specs

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25796: Update spec.torproject.org for new specs
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  tpa
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Tor Sysadmin Team  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 There are 4 new specs, and one has moved.
 It would also be nice to map proposals/

 Is this an automated process, or does it need a manual patch?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21952 [Webpages]: .Onion everywhere?: increasing the use of onion services through automatic redirects and aliasing

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21952: .Onion everywhere?: increasing the use of onion services through 
automatic
redirects and aliasing
--+--
 Reporter:  linda |  Owner:  linda
 Type:  project   | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by antonela):

 * Attachment "21952 - 1.png" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24797 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an option that makes Tor use fewer connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24797: Add an option that makes Tor use fewer connections
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-dos,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 You should replace ConnLimit_ before the thresholds are calculated.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24797 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an option that makes Tor use fewer connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24797: Add an option that makes Tor use fewer connections
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-dos,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Replying to [comment:12 neel]:
 > I am still interested in this ticket.
 >
 > I noticed the following options in `connection_check_oos()`:
 >
 > {{{
 > get_options()->ConnLimit_high_thresh
 > get_options()->ConnLimit_
 > get_options()->ConnLimit_low_thresh
 > }}}
 >
 > It seems that the threshold is determined from these values. Should I
 modify these values directly should my proposed option (connection limit)
 be set, and calculates a threshold based on the set value rather than the
 number of file descriptors?
 > …

 If you add another torrc option MaxSockets, then use min(MaxSockets,
 ConnLimit_) instead of ConnLimit_, all the rest of the code should just
 work.

 Using min(MaxSockets, ConnLimit_) allows us to override the OS when its
 limit is too high, and it makes sure we don't ever go over the OS limit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24797 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add an option that makes Tor use fewer connections

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24797: Add an option that makes Tor use fewer connections
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  neel
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  unspecified
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-relay, tor-dos,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-removed-20180328  |
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by neel):

 I am still interested in this ticket.

 I noticed the following options in `connection_check_oos()`:

 {{{
 get_options()->ConnLimit_high_thresh
 get_options()->ConnLimit_
 get_options()->ConnLimit_low_thresh
 }}}

 It seems that the threshold is determined from these values. Should I
 modify these values directly should my proposed option (connection limit)
 be set, and calculates a threshold based on the set value rather than the
 number of file descriptors?

 Or should I add new values to the `or_options_t` structure, fill them if
 my proposed option is set, and make `connection_check_oos()` use the new
 options instead if the proposed option is set.

 I prefer the former as it is far simpler, since the latter adds some
 complexity but the latter is also less destructive.

 Which approach do you prefer?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21537 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider ignoring secure cookies for .onion addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21537: Consider ignoring secure cookies for .onion addresses
-+-
 Reporter:  micah|  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201804R, GeorgKoppen201804   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks! Applied to `tor-browser-57.3.0esr-8.0-1` (commits
 c70454fd10efeb9f4cabc69f94a9a7a633c10174 and
 82cd8ae9a5de7c9f9fde591c29b0ccfa8b59d42f).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25668 [Core Tor/Tor]: Write a proposal for using two guards, not one

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25668: Write a proposal for using two guards, not one
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-master,  |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Can we close this ticket? I think the proposal is written, and people are
 discussing it. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25793 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25793: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 squashed and merged to master.  Now the real #25373 fun can begin. :)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25793 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25793: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25793 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25793: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm with latest branch on GH.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25735 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser stalls while loading Facebook login page (Waiting for static.xx.fbcdn.net)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25735: Tor Browser stalls while loading Facebook login page (Waiting for
static.xx.fbcdn.net)
--+--
 Reporter:  uzi   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  needs_information => new


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25735 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser stalls while loading Facebook login page (Waiting for static.xx.fbcdn.net)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25735: Tor Browser stalls while loading Facebook login page (Waiting for
static.xx.fbcdn.net)
--+---
 Reporter:  uzi   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability-website |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by uzi):

 Replying to [comment:11 gk]:
 > OP: does it help if you flip `network.http.spdy.enabled` and
 `network.http.spdy.enabled.http2` to `true` (just for testing purposes)?

 It indeed **does help** - facebook loads instantly.

 Important remark reiterated: the **problem also happens when not
 connecting via Tor** (reconfigured Tor Browser to just use a plain proxy
 or no proxy at all).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25768 [Core Tor/DocTor]: doctor should check for clock skew on dir auths

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25768: doctor should check for clock skew on dir auths
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DocTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Good idea, Roger. Pushed a little Stem change to surface response
 headers...

 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/stem.git/commit/?id=187d37661f06ed0db754d43f299be68ce1e78f7b

 ... and added a notification when clocks are off by at least ten
 seconds...

 
https://gitweb.torproject.org/doctor.git/commit/?id=5399092235e6d1f74841347b01adddaf9df63d3a

 Presently this is generating notices for dizum...

 {{{
 maatuska: 0.406214 seconds
 tor26: 0.03344 seconds
 Bifroest: 0.369906 seconds
 longclaw: 0.779489 seconds
 dizum: 68.061756 seconds
 bastet: 0.290902 seconds
 gabelmoo: 0.348548 seconds
 moria1: 0.801659 seconds
 dannenberg: 0.002416 seconds
 Faravahar: 0.411186 seconds
 }}}

 > Also note that I filed nearly the same ticket for consensus-health in
 #25767 -- I wonder if there is some better way to handle overlapping
 functionality in the future.

 Consensus-health provides a dashboard whereas DocTor is a notification
 framework. In this case I think DocTor is a better fit since there's
 really not much to visualize. But if having a website that displays clock
 deltas of all the authorities would be helpful then Tom can copy what I
 did in DocTor. It's not much code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25795 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Decide which settings to hide in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25795: Decide which settings to hide in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-security, tbb-  |  Actual Points:
  fingerprinting |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Somewhat related: #25438

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25793 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25793: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Replying to [comment:4 dgoulet]:
 > So hmmm, for anyone to implement a token bucket, they would need to
 create a specialized version? The `token_bucket_raw_reset()` API function
 has the `token_bucket_timestamp_t` as a param which means any specialized
 token object will kind of need to use that timestamp struct? Or not use
 the raw reset?

 This changed in d0769156a67873e98ff08f6ab5e7d37e4b4866a6 -- it doesn't
 take a timestamp any more.

 > Where `token_bucket_raw_refill_steps()` only takes "steps" which means
 that if one would use the token bucket API without creating a new object,
 it would need to compute that steps value on its side instead of within a
 `token_bucket_t` API?

 Right.  It needs to pass the time elapsed.

 > In other words, the implementation using the token bucket will always
 need to keep the last refilled time or create a specialized object?

 Yes, that's right.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25793 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25793: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+

Comment (by dgoulet):

 So hmmm, for anyone to implement a token bucket, they would need to create
 a specialized version? The `token_bucket_raw_reset()` API function has the
 `token_bucket_timestamp_t` as a param which means any specialized token
 object will kind of need to use that timestamp struct? Or not use the raw
 reset?

 Where `token_bucket_raw_refill_steps()` only takes "steps" which means
 that if one would use the token bucket API without creating a new object,
 it would need to compute that steps value on its side instead of within a
 `token_bucket_t` API?

 In other words, the implementation using the token bucket will always need
 to keep the last refilled time or create a specialized object?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21537 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider ignoring secure cookies for .onion addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21537: Consider ignoring secure cookies for .onion addresses
-+-
 Reporter:  micah|  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201804R, GeorgKoppen201804   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:19 pospeselr]:
 > Looks good to me!

 Me too!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21537 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider ignoring secure cookies for .onion addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21537: Consider ignoring secure cookies for .onion addresses
-+-
 Reporter:  micah|  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201804R, GeorgKoppen201804   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pospeselr):

 Looks good to me!

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[tor-bugs] #25795 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Decide which settings to hide in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25795: Decide which settings to hide in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  ux-team, tbb-security,
 Severity:  Normal   |  tbb-fingerprinting
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Tor Browser exposes a lot of settings and menu items in Firefox, some of
 which are dangerous for users to change.

 So which settings should we be hiding from users? I have in mind
 about:preferences and various menu items. I would propose going through
 each item for ESR60 and deciding which ones to keep and which ones to
 hide.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25793 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25793: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Thanks! I've answered on the PR, fixing one issue and discussing another.

 Note that the 32-bit timestamp only remains in the token_bucket_rw_t
 layer: everything else is abstracted to not use it now.  The only thing in
 the "raw" layer that uses time is the refill_steps() function, which takes
 a number of elapsed time units as an input.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25248 [Core Tor/Tor]: DoS mitgation: improve documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25248: DoS mitgation: improve documentation
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, manpage, tor-doc,   |  implemented
  033-triage-20180320, fast-fix, |  Actual Points:
  033-included-20180326  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Thanks, David!  Merged it to 0.3.3 and forward.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21537 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider ignoring secure cookies for .onion addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21537: Consider ignoring secure cookies for .onion addresses
-+-
 Reporter:  micah|  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201804R, GeorgKoppen201804   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: tbb-team (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #21537 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Consider ignoring secure cookies for .onion addresses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21537: Consider ignoring secure cookies for .onion addresses
-+-
 Reporter:  micah|  Owner:  gk
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability,   |  Actual Points:
  TorBrowserTeam201804R, GeorgKoppen201804   |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  tbb-usability, TorBrowserTeam201804, GeorgKoppen201804 => tbb-
 usability, TorBrowserTeam201804R, GeorgKoppen201804


Comment:

 Okay, how is `bug_21537_v4` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-
 browser.git/log/?h=bug_21537_v4)? Returning a boolean value made this
 slightly more complicated as we actually have more than two values to
 consider due to the telemtry part. But as we don't want to have the latter
 anyway, I just ripped it out. We can revisit that when we think we want to
 upstream that patch but that's a bit in the future as I am not sure
 whether Mozilla would take it right now anyway. There is no easy way
 around the HTTPS = secure equation for cookies I am afraid...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25400 [Core Tor/Tor]: CIRC_BW event miscounts, should count all circ data

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25400: CIRC_BW event miscounts, should count all circ data
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:
 |  mikeperry
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-stats, review-group-34, 034  |  Actual Points:
  -roadmap-subtask, 034-triage-20180328, |
  034-included-20180328  |
Parent ID:  #25546   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Good stuff!

 Your top fixup commit that uses `tor_add_u32_nowrap()` won't squash
 cleanly since that function is added in its own commit so you might want
 to either do a new commit or base it on that helper function commit.

 Happy with the fixups! lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25793 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25793: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_revision
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Review on the PR.

 I like it very much. I'm mostly concerned about the 32 bit "timestamp"
 which might not be ideal for Unix timestamp use case.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+--
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:39 cypherpunks]:
 > The circuit display was removed from `popup.xul` but the menu item for
 New Tor Circuit wasn't, is that intentional
 
https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/blob/cd52c9587d38d2935f2cc789a033c552a3ceacab/src/chrome/content/popup.xul#L24-L29
 ?
 >
 > Also a quick look at the code shows no sign of any mention of the
 shortcut `Ctrl+Shift+L` as suggested in comment:12, is that by design?

 These are good questions. I'm not sure what the right design decision is.
 For now, retaining the original menu item means the Ctrl+Shift+L still
 works and is still indicated. But do we want to remove the menu item and
 show the keyboard shortcut on the button instead?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25248 [Core Tor/Tor]: DoS mitgation: improve documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25248: DoS mitgation: improve documentation
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, manpage, tor-doc,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, fast-fix, |
  033-included-20180326  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Replying to [comment:12 nickm]:
 > This doesn't squash cleanly -- I get rebase conflicts.  Would one of you
 be able to squash it for me so I don't mess it up?

 Yes, fixup commit from Mike wasn't squashing cleanly so I made an extra
 commit for his fixes:

 See branch in my repo: `ticket25248_033_02` (which I rebased on latest
 maint-0.3.3).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 I posted an .xpi with the correct version to test. Same instructions as in
 comment:40. Sorry for the confusion!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * Attachment "torbutton-1.9.9.1.xpi" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 It seems somehow I failed to correctly push the latest version. Here's the
 current version:

 htts://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/commit/24309+2
 (cd52c9587d38d2935f2cc789a033c552a3ceacab)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bridges don't work: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in onion_pick_cpath_exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25691: Bridges don't work: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in
onion_pick_cpath_exit
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression, 034-must 033-backport|  Actual Points:
  033-maybe-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final => Tor: 0.3.3.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25691 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bridges don't work: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in onion_pick_cpath_exit

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25691: Bridges don't work: Non-fatal assertion !(exit_ei == NULL) failed in
onion_pick_cpath_exit
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  regression, 034-must 033-backport|  Actual Points:
  033-maybe-must |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Okay; merged to 0.3.3 and forward.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24544 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix more prop224 spec inconsistencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24544: Fix more prop224 spec inconsistencies
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-spec, prop224,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, fast-fix, |
  033-included-20180326, post-stable |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 merged it!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25248 [Core Tor/Tor]: DoS mitgation: improve documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25248: DoS mitgation: improve documentation
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, manpage, tor-doc,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, fast-fix, |
  033-included-20180326  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 This doesn't squash cleanly -- I get rebase conflicts.  Would one of you
 be able to squash it for me so I don't mess it up?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25374 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a better-designed system for handling computation outside the event loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25374: Create a better-designed system for handling computation outside the 
event
loop
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  implemented
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 Resolved issue; merging now!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25793 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25793: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * reviewer:   => dgoulet


Comment:

 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/47 is a github pull request here;
 the name is `token_bucket_once_again`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25763 [Webpages/Styleguide]: Design a .onion icon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25763: Design a .onion icon
-+--
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  < antonela >
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Styleguide  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Another thing that came to my mind is the Perl Foundation onion icon.
 http://www.perlfoundation.org/perl_trademark

 We already have another color palette which identifies us, but we should
 be sure that we are taking distance from it and not getting closer.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25763 [Webpages/Styleguide]: Design a .onion icon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25763: Design a .onion icon
-+--
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  < antonela >
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Styleguide  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by antonela):

 > These are the onions I designed from scratch.
 > https://presentator.ura.design/en/iZZBur31 (you can comment on there
 like in InVision)
 >
 The stylised icon version works better at small sizes than the current
 one. And, we are still having a recognizable onion icon. That is cool! The
 container form is something that could be nice to explore: different
 fills, divider lines, a dot pattern? Do you want to play with it?

 > Something we need to keep it mind is that the onion should be as short
 as possible, as >icons would ideally fit well into a square (1:1
 proportions), yet it still need to look like >an onion. I shortened the
 leaves a bit to accommodate for that.
 >
 +1. It is hard but agreed we should try to have a 1:1 aspect radio
 solution for the icon.

 > I like the 2nd exploration Antonela! They seem like material for GUI
 elements as status indicators. Maybe we can design a proper onion and have
 more abstract shapes like these to indicate onion services?
 >
 I think we are going in the right direction. I don't think we are ready
 for a drastic change like I explored in option 2, yet.
 > Feedback is welcome
 hey, thanks Elio for working on it! I'd like to play with your icon a
 little bit too, do you want to share your .svg?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25374 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a better-designed system for handling computation outside the event loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25374: Create a better-designed system for handling computation outside the 
event
loop
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 Let a comment on the PR:
 https://github.com/torproject/tor/pull/41#issuecomment-381180728

 This is merge_ready after that imo.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25763 [Webpages/Styleguide]: Design a .onion icon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25763: Design a .onion icon
-+--
 Reporter:  antonela |  Owner:  < antonela >
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Webpages/Styleguide  |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by antonela):

 Replying to [comment:7 arma]:
 > Replying to [ticket:25763 antonela]:
 > > We should support a way to identify v1, v2, and v3 onion services.
 >
 > A small mercy: v1 onion services disappeared long long ago. So now there
 are only "legacy" (v2) and "new" (v3).

 Cool, thanks Arma!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25794 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Sanitize PointerEvent

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25794: Sanitize PointerEvent
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-fingerprinting  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Bugzilla bug: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1363508

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[tor-bugs] #25794 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Sanitize PointerEvent

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25794: Sanitize PointerEvent
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  ff60-esr
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Simon alerted me to the fact that
  PointerEvents have been enabled in Firefox 59
 (ttps://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411467). We should sanitize
 events these under privacy.resistFingerprinting = true.

 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Pointer_events

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25794 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Sanitize PointerEvent

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25794: Sanitize PointerEvent
--+--
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  ff60-esr, tbb-fingerprinting  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * keywords:  ff60-esr => ff60-esr, tbb-fingerprinting


Old description:

> Simon alerted me to the fact that
>  PointerEvents have been enabled in Firefox 59
> (ttps://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411467). We should sanitize
> events these under privacy.resistFingerprinting = true.
>
> https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Pointer_events

New description:

 Simon alerted me to the fact that PointerEvents have been enabled in
 Firefox 59 (ttps://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1411467). We
 should sanitize events these under privacy.resistFingerprinting = true.

 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Pointer_events

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25481 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds on Linux with Rust enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25481: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds on Linux with Rust enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201804,  |  Actual Points:
  boklm201804, TorBrowserTeam201804R |
Parent ID:  #25220   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This looks good. This is now commit
 `5be41831b52795ee87c57cdbd18da68bf73fe1cc` in master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25766 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor token buckets to meet current coding standards

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25766: Refactor token buckets to meet current coding standards
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  implemented
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8-can
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


Comment:

 squashed and merged to master, per discussion on ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25760 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent if it is no longer used

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25760: Remove TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent if it is no longer used
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  implemented
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => implemented


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25760 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent if it is no longer used

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25760: Remove TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent if it is no longer used
-+
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #25373   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can
-+

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, we've run out of time on merging the parent, so we're going to merge
 this removal and hope for the best.  If it turns out we do need this
 feature, we'll have to restore it and refactor it to use the new token
 buffer code.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25374 [Core Tor/Tor]: Create a better-designed system for handling computation outside the event loop

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25374: Create a better-designed system for handling computation outside the 
event
loop
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, |  Actual Points:
  034-triage-20180328, 034-included-20180328 |
Parent ID:  #25500   | Points:
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor8
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 per dgoulet's request, I've rebased the branch onto master, and force-
 pushed it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25481 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds on Linux with Rust enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25481: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds on Linux with Rust enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201804,  |  Actual Points:
  boklm201804, TorBrowserTeam201804R |
Parent ID:  #25220   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Alright! How does `bug_25481_v5` (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk
 /tor-browser-build.git/commit/?h=bug_25481_v5) look like?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23231 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error in STL wrappers when building Firefox 64-bit for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23231: Error in STL wrappers when building Firefox 64-bit for Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804, ff60-esr-  |  Actual Points:
  will-have  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-

Comment (by tom):

 Sorry, no insight. I kept the tab open expecting to eventually need this
 but never did.

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[tor-bugs] #25793 [Core Tor/Tor]: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25793: Refactor refactored token bucket API to be more generic
--+-
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:  #25373
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:  Sponsor8-can  |
--+-
 The #25766 work makes us have a clean token bucket API.  But that API
 isn't reusable yet.  Let's fix it so we can use it for all the other
 places in our code that we want a token bucket.

 The two main things to do here are:
  * decouple "read bucket" from "write bucket".
  * decouple "parameters" from "bucket value".
  * make time generic.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24544 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix more prop224 spec inconsistencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24544: Fix more prop224 spec inconsistencies
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, prop224,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, fast-fix, |
  033-included-20180326, post-stable |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 lgtm;

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25248 [Core Tor/Tor]: DoS mitgation: improve documentation

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25248: DoS mitgation: improve documentation
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  dgoulet
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.3.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-dos, manpage, tor-doc,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, fast-fix, |
  033-included-20180326  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Neat. Thanks mike for the fixups!

 lgtm;

 Branch to squash and merge: `mikeperry/ticket25248_033_01`

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25786 [Core Tor/Tor]: Policies for HTTPTunnelPort

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25786: Policies for HTTPTunnelPort
--+
 Reporter:  pyhedgehog|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by pyhedgehog):

 I'd prefer to have several policies for different ports.
 I.e. I want to configure:

 {{{
 HTTPTunnelPort 0.0.0.0:3128 NoOnionTraffic
 HTTPTunnelPort 0.0.0.0:8118 OnionTrafficOnly
 SocksPort 127.0.0.1:9050
 }}}
 And want to have different policies for different ports.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24544 [Core Tor/Tor]: Fix more prop224 spec inconsistencies

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24544: Fix more prop224 spec inconsistencies
-+-
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  asn
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-spec, prop224,   |  Actual Points:
  033-triage-20180320, fast-fix, |
  033-included-20180326, post-stable |
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.3
 Reviewer:  dgoulet  |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Pushed branch `bug24544` in my github repo with a potential patch for the
 issues pointed out in ​https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-
 dev/2017-October/012527.html.

 See https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/3

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25481 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds on Linux with Rust enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25481: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds on Linux with Rust enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201804,  |  Actual Points:
  boklm201804, TorBrowserTeam201804R |
Parent ID:  #25220   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by boklm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 One small thing: the `prev_version` variable in `projects/rust/config`
 should be named `var/prev_version` instead, as it is not a variable that
 has a specific meaning for rbm.

 Other than this the patch looks good to me.

 I tried a 32bit build of Tor, ran checksec on it, and have been able to
 bootstrap with it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23247 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about different padlock states for .onion services

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion: what to say about 
different
padlock states for .onion services
---+--
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project| Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [comment:34 tom]:
 > Replying to [comment:32 brade]:
 > > Replying to [comment:31 isabela]:
 > > > Cleaned up and updated all stated with icon and copy:
 > > >
 > > > https://docs.google.com/document/d/1bPrNLIl7Qy-
 sA7aTfElu80Xk2eXzTfH_5BGTOUDK8XU/edit#
 > >
 > > In looking over the above document, the only scenario that surprised
 me was "HTTPS Site with HTTPS Self-Signed Onion Subresources" which has an
 onion icon (I expected a padlock).
 >
 > Yes, I think it should have a padlock. I think isa may have missed this
 case when e updated the other ones in this section?

 Seems to me this is fixed now in the doc. I think the doc Looks Good To Me
 right now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23231 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error in STL wrappers when building Firefox 64-bit for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23231: Error in STL wrappers when building Firefox 64-bit for Windows
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804, ff60-esr-  |  Actual Points:
  will-have  |
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  Sponsor4
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804 => TorBrowserTeam201804, ff60-esr-will-
   have


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Re: [tor-bugs] #25754 [Core Tor/Tor]: Make Prop#291 choices

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25754: Make Prop#291 choices
-+-
 Reporter:  mikeperry|  Owner:  (none)
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
 |  0.3.4.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  034-roadmap-subtask, tor-guard,  |  Actual Points:
  guard-discovery|
Parent ID:  #25546   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorV-can
-+-

Comment (by asn):

 Replying to [ticket:25754 mikeperry]:
 >
 > At a high level, the choices are:
 >  0. Do nothing. (If we choose this, I want us to do it for specific
 reasons, rather than default to it).
 >  1. Use two guards, and ensure one is from a different /16 and node
 family (Section 1.1 and 1.2).
 >  2. Abandon all of Tor's path restrictions (Section 3.1)

 This '''"all of Tor's path restrictions"''' phrasing is scary. First of
 all, we only need to relax the path restrictions on HS-related circuits
 right (particularly HSDir, IP and RP circs)? And in particular we need to
 relax the single restriction of disallowing guard and final hop being the
 same node (or in the same family or /16). No other path restrictions
 should be edited IIUC.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #23231 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Error in STL wrappers when building Firefox 64-bit for Windows

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#23231: Error in STL wrappers when building Firefox 64-bit for Windows
--+--
 Reporter:  boklm |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  Sponsor4
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: tom (added)


Comment:

 Note, that Tom does not seem to have a problem with this issue while
 building for 64bit. I am not sure why that's the case but we should figure
 it out and close https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1392604 once
 we know what's up. Marking this tentatively as `ff60-esr-will-have`.

 Interestingly, I recall that I still needed that when I worked on the
 Stylo bug, which means with a pretty recent m-c tree. Adding Tom as he
 might have some insight in this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 I can confirm what gk said with the xpi above, the icon and the grey box
 don't showup for me.

 In addition there's a discrepancy in behavior with the earlier Torbutton,
 with `meek-amazon` it shows up `meek 0.0.2.0`, the `0.0.2.0` isn't
 supposed to be shown.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Nice work, Arthur! I just gave it a quick look for now: the circuit icon
 is not showing up for me on my Linux 64 box, not sure why. The display
 looks in that regard as the ones you added to comment:26.

 I've added the .xpi for others to test, so they don't have to compile it
 themselves. Copying it over the one shipped in Tor Browser (but keep the
 name of the one shipped in Tor Browser!) should do it.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+---
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:
   |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * Attachment "torbutton-1.9.9.xpi" added.


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Re: [tor-bugs] #24309 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24309: Activity 4.1: Improve how circuits are displayed to the user
---+--
 Reporter:  isabela|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ux-team, TorBrowserTeam201804  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer:  antonela   |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The circuit display was removed from `popup.xul` but the menu item for New
 Tor Circuit wasn't, is that intentional
 
https://github.com/arthuredelstein/torbutton/blob/cd52c9587d38d2935f2cc789a033c552a3ceacab/src/chrome/content/popup.xul#L24-L29
 ?

 Also a quick look at the code shows no sign of any mention of the shortcut
 `Ctrl+Shift+L` as suggested in comment:12, is that by design?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25481 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds on Linux with Rust enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25481: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds on Linux with Rust enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_review
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201804,  |  Actual Points:
  boklm201804, TorBrowserTeam201804R |
Parent ID:  #25220   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201804, boklm201804, TorBrowserTeam201804
 => tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201804, boklm201804, TorBrowserTeam201804R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:9 boklm]:
 > Replying to [comment:6 gk]:
 > > So, I worked around that by building LLVM during the rust compilation
 (which make the whole process taking significantly more time) using that
 version in turn.
 >
 > I don't see LLVM being built in your patch. Is it done internally by the
 rust build system?

 Yes, it uses the LLVM code that is shipped with the Rust source.

 > The extracting of gcc and update of the PATH/LD_LIBRARY_PATH could be
 replaced by:
 > {{{
 > [% pc('gcc', 'var/setup', { compiler_tarfile =>
 c('input_files_by_name/gcc') }) %]
 > }}}
 > However it will also set hardened-cc links. Is it because the build
 doesn't work with hardened-cc that you didn't use it?

 No, I originally wanted to avoid using our own GCC as this adds complexity
 but piece by piece I realized that this is not realistic and added
 workaounds which resulted in the final patch, forgetting about this macro.
 This is fixed now.

 > For the `ln -s gcc cc` link, I am wondering if we should add it directly
 in `projects/gcc/build`, or if there are cases where we might not want
 this link.

 I can avoid this clumsy symlink by using a configure option which seems
 neat and which we probably need to use anyway when actually cross-
 compiling. So, I think we should go with that.

 > In `projects/tor/build`, I think the lines after the `IF c("var/linux")
 && c("var/nightly")` can be indented.

 Fixed.

 The updated patch is at `bug_25481_v4`
 (https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/gk/tor-browser-
 build.git/commit/?h=bug_25481_v4=fde93d07ca425ee884930cf01fd435b31ace48b8)
 in my public `tor-browser-build` repo. Note: I tested the x86_64 tor and
 it is running fine for me. I even checked whether tor built from the same
 revision twice is identical, and it is! Moreover, I verified that the
 hardening properties on the tor binary are still the ones we want to have
 (with the checksec script). So, we are good here. I guess the 32bit tor
 could get tested, though, which I did not do yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #25481 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds on Linux with Rust enabled

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#25481: Ship tor in Tor Browser nightly builds on Linux with Rust enabled
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  task | Status:
 |  needs_revision
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-rbm, GeorgKoppen201804,  |  Actual Points:
  boklm201804, TorBrowserTeam201804  |
Parent ID:  #25220   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:10 boklm]:
 > Replying to [comment:9 boklm]:
 > > For the `ln -s gcc cc` link, I am wondering if we should add it
 directly in `projects/gcc/build`, or if there are cases where we might not
 want this link.
 >
 > If we add the `cc -> gcc` link directly in `projects/gcc/build`, we can
 remove the same link created in the windows build in
 `projects/firefox/build`.

 I have not looked at the Windows part for the Firefox build but I have a
 better fix for the Rust build and think we should use that one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1000 light years
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://github.com/themusicgod1/cloudflare-tor/blob/master/cloudflare-
 philosophy.txt

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Re: [tor-bugs] #24351 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#24351: Block Global Active Adversary Cloudflare
-+-
 Reporter:  nullius  |  Owner:  tbb-
 |  team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 |  reopened
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, privacy, anonymity, mitm,  |  Actual Points:
  cloudflare |
Parent ID:  #18361   | Points:  1000
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 https://github.com/themusicgod1/cloudflare-tor/blob/master/cloudflare-
 philosophy.txt

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