Ben Goertzel wrote:
Richard,
It might be more useful to discuss more recent papers by the same
authors regarding the same topic, such as the more accurately-titled
***
Sparse but not Grandmother-cell coding in the medial temporal lobe.
Quian Quiroga R, Kreiman G, Koch C and Fried I.
Trends in
http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/engineering/extranet/research-groups/neuroengineering-lab/
There are always more papers that can be discussed.
OK, sure, but this is a more recent paper **by the same authors,
discussing the same data***
and more recent similar data.
But that does not
Ben Goertzel wrote:
http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/engineering/extranet/research-groups/neuroengineering-lab/
There are always more papers that can be discussed.
OK, sure, but this is a more recent paper **by the same authors,
discussing the same data***
and more recent similar data.
But
Hi,
BTW, I just read this paper
For example, in Loosemore Harley (in press) you can find an analysis of a
paper by Quiroga, Reddy, Kreiman, Koch, and Fried (2005) in which the latter
try to claim they have evidence in favor of grandmother neurons (or sparse
collections of grandmother
Ben,
Thanks for this analysis. V interesting. A question:
Are these investigations all being framed along the lines of : are
invariant representations encoded in single neurons/sparse neuronal
populations/distributed neurons? IOW the *location* of the representation?
Is anyone actually
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Hi,
BTW, I just read this paper
For example, in Loosemore Harley (in press) you can find an analysis of a
paper by Quiroga, Reddy, Kreiman, Koch, and Fried (2005) in which the latter
try to claim they have evidence in favor of grandmother neurons (or sparse
collections
Richard,
It might be more useful to discuss more recent papers by the same
authors regarding the same topic, such as the more accurately-titled
***
Sparse but not Grandmother-cell coding in the medial temporal lobe.
Quian Quiroga R, Kreiman G, Koch C and Fried I.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
I stated a Ben's List challenge a while back that you apparently missed, so
here it is again.
You can ONLY learn how a system works by observation, to the extent that its
operation is imperfect. Where it is perfect, it represents a solution to the
environment in which it operates, and as
Steve Richfield wrote:
Richard,
On 11/20/08, *Richard Loosemore* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Steve Richfield wrote:
Richard,
Broad agreement, with one comment from the end of your posting...
On 11/20/08, *Richard Loosemore* [EMAIL
Richard,
My point was that there are essentially no neuroscientists out there
who believe that concepts are represented by single neurons. So you
are in vehement agreement with the neuroscience community on this
point.
The idea that concepts may be represented by cell assemblies, or
attractors
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 11:33 AM, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
RL:So, to clarify: yes, it is perfectly true that the very low level
perceptual and motor systems use simple coding techniques. We have
known for decades (since Hubel and Weisel) that retinal ganglion cells
use simple
Ben: The idea that concepts may be represented by cell assemblies, or
attractors within cell assemblies, are more prevalent.
Ben,
My question was whether the concepts - or, to be precise, the terms of the
concepts, e.g. the sounds/ letters/word ball - may not be neuronally
locatable (not
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Richard,
My point was that there are essentially no neuroscientists out there
who believe that concepts are represented by single neurons. So you
are in vehement agreement with the neuroscience community on this
point.
The idea that concepts may be represented by cell
And we don't yet know whether the assembly keeps reconfiguring its
reprsentation for conceptual knowledge ... though we know it's mainly
not true for percpetual and motor knowledge...
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 11:56 AM, Mike Tintner [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ben: The idea that concepts may be
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 8:09 PM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Richard,
My point was that there are essentially no neuroscientists out there
who believe that concepts are represented by single neurons. So you
are in vehement agreement with the neuroscience
Vladimir Nesov wrote:
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 8:09 PM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Richard,
My point was that there are essentially no neuroscientists out there
who believe that concepts are represented by single neurons. So you
are in vehement agreement
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 8:34 PM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
No, object-concepts and the like. Not place, motion or action 'concepts'.
For example, Quiroga et al showed their subjects pictures of famous places
and people, then made assertions about how those things were
I saw the main point of Richard's paper as being that the available
neuroscience data drastically underdetermines the nature of neural
knowledge representation ... so that drawing conclusions about neural
KR from available data involves loads of theoretical presuppositions
...
However, my view
Vladimir Nesov wrote:
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 8:34 PM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
No, object-concepts and the like. Not place, motion or action 'concepts'.
For example, Quiroga et al showed their subjects pictures of famous places
and people, then made assertions about how
Ben Goertzel wrote:
I saw the main point of Richard's paper as being that the available
neuroscience data drastically underdetermines the nature of neural
knowledge representation ... so that drawing conclusions about neural
KR from available data involves loads of theoretical presuppositions
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 4:44 PM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ben Goertzel wrote:
I saw the main point of Richard's paper as being that the available
neuroscience data drastically underdetermines the nature of neural
knowledge representation ... so that drawing conclusions
On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 12:30 AM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
They want some kind of mixture of sparse and multiply redundant and not
distributed. The whole point of what we wrote was that there is no
consistent interpretation of what they tried to give as their conclusion.
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 4:54 PM, Vladimir Nesov [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 12:30 AM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
They want some kind of mixture of sparse and multiply redundant and not
distributed. The whole point of what we wrote was that there is no
Ben Goertzel wrote:
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 4:44 PM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Ben Goertzel wrote:
I saw the main point of Richard's paper as being that the available
neuroscience data drastically underdetermines the nature of neural
knowledge representation ... so that
Bringing this back to the earlier discussion, What could be happening, not
to say that it is provably happening but there certainly is no evidence
(that I know of) against it, is the following, with probabilities
represented internally by voltages that are proportional to the logarithm of
the
Vladimir Nesov wrote:
On Sat, Nov 22, 2008 at 12:30 AM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
They want some kind of mixture of sparse and multiply redundant and not
distributed. The whole point of what we wrote was that there is no
consistent interpretation of what they tried to give as
I don't think Qiroga et al's statements are contradictory, just
irritatingly vague...
I agree w Richard that the distributed vs sparse dichotomy is poorly
framed and in large part a bogus dichotomy
I feel the same way about the symbolic vs subsymbolic dichotomy...
Many of the conceptual
Ben Goertzel wrote:
I don't think Qiroga et al's statements are contradictory, just
irritatingly vague...
I agree w Richard that the distributed vs sparse dichotomy is poorly
framed and in large part a bogus dichotomy
I feel the same way about the symbolic vs subsymbolic dichotomy...
Many of
The basic assumptions behind the project, from the webpage of its team
lead at http://www.modha.org/ :
The mind arises from the wetware of the brain. Thus, it would seem
that reverse engineering the computational function of the brain is
perhaps the cheapest and quickest way to engineer computers
Pei Wang: --- I have problem with each of these assumptions and beliefs,
though I don't think anyone can convince someone who just get a big grant
that they are moving in a wrong direction. ;-)
With his other posts about the Singularity Summit and his invention of the word
Synaptronics, Modha
Derek,
I have no doubt that their proposal contains interesting ideas and
will produce interesting and valuable results --- most AI projects do,
though the results and the values are often not what they targeted (or
they claimed to be targeting) initially.
Biologically inspired approaches are
Pei Wang wrote:
Derek,
I have no doubt that their proposal contains interesting ideas and
will produce interesting and valuable results --- most AI projects do,
though the results and the values are often not what they targeted (or
they claimed to be targeting) initially.
Biologically inspired
Richard,
The main problem is that if you interpret spike timing to be playing the
role that you (and they) imply above, then you are commiting yourself to a
whole raft of assumptions about how knowledge is generally represented and
processed. However, there are *huge* problems with that set
Steve Richfield wrote:
Richard,
Broad agreement, with one comment from the end of your posting...
On 11/20/08, *Richard Loosemore* [EMAIL PROTECTED]
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Another, closely related thing that they do is talk about low level
issues witout realizing just how
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 1:40 AM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The main problem is that if you interpret spike timing to be playing the
role that you (and they) imply above, then you are commiting yourself to a
whole raft of assumptions about how knowledge is generally represented
Ben Goertzel wrote:
Richard,
The main problem is that if you interpret spike timing to be playing the
role that you (and they) imply above, then you are commiting yourself to a
whole raft of assumptions about how knowledge is generally represented and
processed. However, there are *huge*
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 11:02 AM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Since such luminaries as Jerry Fodor have said much the same thing, I think
I stand in fairly solid company.
Wow, you said Fodor without being critical of his work. Is that legal?
Trent
Vladimir Nesov wrote:
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 1:40 AM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The main problem is that if you interpret spike timing to be playing the
role that you (and they) imply above, then you are commiting yourself to a
whole raft of assumptions about how knowledge is
Trent Waddington wrote:
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 11:02 AM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Since such luminaries as Jerry Fodor have said much the same thing, I think
I stand in fairly solid company.
Wow, you said Fodor without being critical of his work. Is that legal?
Trent
Referencing your own work is obviously not what I was asking for.
Still, something more substantial than neuron is not a concept, as
an example of cognitive theory?
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 4:35 AM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Vladimir Nesov wrote:
Could you give some references
Vladimir Nesov wrote:
Referencing your own work is obviously not what I was asking for.
Still, something more substantial than neuron is not a concept, as
an example of cognitive theory?
I don't understand your objection here: I referenced my own work
because I specifically described several
The neuron = concept
'theory' is extremely broken: it is so broken, that when neuroscientists
talk about bayesian contingencies being calculated or encoded by spike
timing mechanisms, that claim is incoherent.
This is not always true ... in some cases there are solidly demonstrated
Ben Goertzel wrote:
The neuron = concept
'theory' is extremely broken: it is so broken, that when neuroscientists
talk about bayesian contingencies being calculated or encoded by spike
timing mechanisms, that claim is incoherent.
This is not always true ... in some cases there are solidly
On Fri, Nov 21, 2008 at 5:14 AM, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Lastly, I did not say that the neuroscientists picked old, broken theories
AND that they could have picked a better, not-broken theory I only said
that they have gone back to old theories that are known to be
Richard,
On 11/20/08, Richard Loosemore [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Steve Richfield wrote:
Richard,
Broad agreement, with one comment from the end of your posting...
On 11/20/08, *Richard Loosemore* [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Another, closely related thing that
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