On Tue, 2018-02-13 at 08:32 +1100, Tristan Hoy wrote:
> In a post-quantum world, your second "d" type transaction is
> completely forgeable, which means it is vulnerable to front-running.
> An adversary capable of breaking ECDSA needs only listen for these
> transactions, obtain "classic_sk" and
On February 12, 2018 5:58 PM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> I don't actually see where the problem is here. First of all, suppose we have
> a
> transaction T_a that already pays Alice with a feerate sufficiently high that
> we expect it to get
When we worked on the extensions for RSK merge mining, I prepared an
internal document with the most up to date Straum protocol description I
could get.
This is the document:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ocEC8OdFYrvglyXbag1yi8WoskaZoYuR5HGhwf0hWAY/edit?usp=sharing
Regards
On Fri, Feb 9,
On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 6:42 PM, Peter Todd wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 06:19:40PM -0500, Russell O'Connor wrote:
> > On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 5:58 PM, Peter Todd wrote:
> >
> > >
> > > I don't actually see where the problem is here. First of all,
On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 06:19:40PM -0500, Russell O'Connor wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 5:58 PM, Peter Todd wrote:
>
> >
> > I don't actually see where the problem is here. First of all, suppose we
> > have a
> > transaction T_a that already pays Alice with a feerate
On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 5:58 PM, Peter Todd wrote:
>
> I don't actually see where the problem is here. First of all, suppose we
> have a
> transaction T_a that already pays Alice with a feerate sufficiently high
> that
> we expect it to get mined in the near future. If we
On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 10:52:30AM -0500, Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> I think it is worth revisiting BIP 125's replace-by-fee policy for when to
> replace transactions.
>
> The current policy can be problematic. As noted earlier by Rhavar,
> sometimes one's transaction becomes
Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev
writes:
> Does shabang.io say anywhere how it determines whether or not a transaction
> funded a Lightning channel?
My guess they simply collect the short_channel_ids which point to
on-chain outputs that funded a channel. This
On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 06:23:35PM +0100, Melvin Carvalho via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Finally, I came across this wonderful site that shows lightning network
> adoption on mainnet
>
> http://shabang.io/
>
> LN is increasing well. Some blocks are not far off 1% lightning funding,
> which I think
> This lead me to ponder whether the intuitive metric of satoshi/byte is, in
> fact, game
>theory optimal. Possibly over the short term it is, but over a longer period,
>those
> wishing to increase the longevity of proof of work in general might wish to
> consider
> more progressive fee
Thank you very much for writing this up. It's worth noting that there can be
multiple roots for the transactions that are getting replaced.
So for rule 3, you probably want a feeRate >= the max "package fee rate" of all
replaced roots.
I am very happy with this proposal in general, as it's
On 21 December 2017 at 22:30, Melvin Carvalho
wrote:
> I asked adam back at hcpp how the block chain would be secured in the long
> term, once the reward goes away. The base idea has always been that fees
> would replace the block reward.
>
> At that time fees were
I think it is worth revisiting BIP 125's replace-by-fee policy for when to
replace transactions.
The current policy can be problematic. As noted earlier by Rhavar,
sometimes one's transaction becomes pinned making it infeasible to fee bump
with RBF. This happens when one makes a normal payment
Hi Tristan,
Regarding the "Post-Quantum Address Recovery" part (I haven't read the
other parts), you may be interested in my message to the list from last
month and the rest of the thread:
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-January/015659.html
This is an approach which
Hi all,
Recently I've been exploring what a post-quantum attack on Bitcoin would
actually look like, and what options exist for mitigating it.
I've put up a draft of my research here:
https://medium.com/@tristanhoy/11271f430c41
In summary:
1) None of the recommended post-quantum DSAs (XMSS,
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