@ Eric: Yes I forgot to mention that cost (in addition to price) also
determines the profitability of mining and thus the total hashpower. I
disagree with your assessment of merge mining as really what matters
is opportunity cost of honestly mining vs attacking, and one reason we
are currently
> I see what you say, however, since the proposal as I have read it says "And
> this will keep happening as long as hashrate keeps rising," - what actually
> happens in the case hashrate stagnates or falls?
In general, a target hashrate can be set by users (can be less or more
than the peak
The 51% problem is deep. Any discussion of a solution to it should
begin with a link to an article that shows a profound discovery has
been made. Selfish mining prevention and pollution should be on
bitcoin-discussion, but it appears that list is not active.
The problem with Andrew's idea below
> Once hashrate gets large enough, no new miners (additional
hashrate) will want to join since their share of the hashrate is too
small to make a profit.
The share (hash power) of a miner is proportional to capital investment, not
the newness of that investment. The efficiency of a new mine
> Also with merge mining and proof of space we can be quite efficient in the
> future.
Proof of memory (space) is just proof of work with extra steps. It does not
reduce energy consumption.
https://github.com/libbitcoin/libbitcoin/wiki/Proof-of-Memory-Facade
Merge mining is non-dedicated
I am PoW only and not PoS orientated.
>
> From: akarama...@gmail.com on behalf of Andrew
>
> Sent: Sunday, 16 September 2018 2:01:19 AM
> To: Damian Williamson
> Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention
>
> @Moral Agent:
To: Damian Williamson
Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention
@Moral Agent: No problem. I did ask in the first post what the current
plans are for selfish miner prevention. So if anyone has any other
relevant ideas (not just for selfish mining but for mak
> From: bitcoin-dev-boun...@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> on behalf of Andrew via
> bitcoin-dev
> Sent: Friday, 14 September 2018 9:19:37 AM
> To: Bitcoin Dev
> Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention
>
> I discussed this more at bitcointalk:
> https
bitcoin-dev
Sent: Friday, 14 September 2018 9:19:37 AM
To: Bitcoin Dev
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Selfish Mining Prevention
I discussed this more at bitcointalk:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4998410.0
The attacks I'm interested in preventing are not only selfish mining
and collusion,
(reposting to whole list instead of just him) @Moral Agent:
Interesting proposal though it introduces some elements
of proof of stake so it would be more controversial in my view. Also,
something needs to be explained about how this would not create an
attack where difficulty is frequently
Thank you, and my apologies. I should have sent that link just to you and
not put everyone on cc.
On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 1:30 PM Andrew wrote:
> (reposting to whole list instead of just him) @Moral Agent:
> Interesting proposal though it introduces some elements
> of proof of stake so it would
You might be interested in an idea I wrote about that is in a similar
spirit here:
https://medium.com/coinmonks/taming-large-miners-with-helper-blocks-6ae67ac242f6
>From the article:
When a block is solved, it randomly selects one satoshi from the utxo set
and gives whomever controls that
I discussed this more at bitcointalk:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4998410.0
The attacks I'm interested in preventing are not only selfish mining
and collusion, but also more subtle attacks like block withholding,
and in general anything that aims to drive out the competition in
order
13 matches
Mail list logo
