On Thu, May 14, 2020 at 8:30 AM Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > It should be therefore a top priority to make the UX of connecting my
> mobile LN client to my home full node extremely easy, so that centralised
> services can't improve much on
> * At the same time, it retains your-keys-your-coins noncustodiality,
because every update of a Lightning channel requires your keys to sign off
on it.
Yes I agree, I can foresee an easier step where managing low-value channel
and get your familiar with smooth key management maybe a first step
Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos writes:
> ZmnSCPxj via Lightning-dev writes:
>> If everyone runs such a privately-owned server, on the other hand, this
>> is not so different from having a Lightning node you run at your home
>> that has a fullnode as well and which you access via a remote
> It should be therefore a top priority to make the UX of connecting my
mobile LN client to my home full node extremely easy, so that centralised
services can't improve much on that step. Especially if I already run a
full node.
For what it's worth, this is a main research area for us at Start9
Good morning Antoine,
> While approaching this question, I think you should consider economic weight
> of nodes in evaluating miner consensus-hijack success. Even if you expect a
> disproportionate ratio of full-nodes-vs-SPV, they may not have the same
> economic weight at all, therefore
Hi Chris,
While approaching this question, I think you should consider economic
weight of nodes in evaluating miner consensus-hijack success. Even if you
expect a disproportionate ratio of full-nodes-vs-SPV, they may not have the
same economic weight at all, therefore even if miners are able to
Good morning Richard,
> Thanks for sharing your thoughts ZmnSCPxj. I think I can summarize your
> concern as: A node without direct internet connectivity can not rely on an
> opportunistically incentivized local network peer for blockchain information
> because the off-grid node's direct LN
Thanks for sharing your thoughts ZmnSCPxj. I think I can summarize your
concern as: A node without direct internet connectivity can not rely on an
opportunistically incentivized local network peer for blockchain
information because the off-grid node's direct LN peers could collude to
not forward
Good morning Richard, and all,
> 2) a light client can query an ISP connected full node on the same unmetered
> local WiFi network and exchange differences in block headers
> opportunistically or pay for large missing ranges of headers, filters or full
> blocks using a payment channel. Cost
Hi Christopher,
Thanks for Blockchain Commons and Learning Bitcoin from the Command Line!
> If there are people interested in coordinating some proposals on how to
defining different sets of wallet functionality, Blockchain Commons would
be interested in hosting that collaboration. This could
Hi Igor,
Thanks for sharing about what it's technically possible to do for a
full-node on phone, specially with regards to lower grade devices.
I do see 2 limitations for sleeping nodes:
- a lightning specific one, i.e you need to process block data real-time in
case of incoming HTLC you need to
On Fri, May 8, 2020 at 2:00 PM Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Perhaps I wasn't explicit in my previous note but what I mean is that
> there seems to be a demand for something *in between* a peer interface,
> and an owner interface. I have
On 5/5/20 5:31 PM, Olaoluwa Osuntokun via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Hi Antoine,
>
>> Even with cheaper, more efficient protocols like BIP 157, you may have a
>> huge discrepancy between what is asked and what is offered. Assuming 10M
>> light clients [0] each of them consuming ~100MB/month for
> The RPC interface in Bitcoin Core, and others, is not great for this
> because it exposes a lot of functionality that isn't necessary and
> introduces risks.
This is actually somewhat my point. If the RPC interface was good for this
and *didn't* introduce risks, we could just use that and be
On 5/6/20 9:07 PM, Keagan McClelland wrote:
> I think that one of the solutions here is to have light clients choose
> their full node tethers explicitly. Even if you think it is unrealistic to
> have everyone run their own node (fwiw, I don’t), there is still a trust
> model where you can pick
On 5/8/20 1:01 PM, Keagan McClelland wrote:
>> The RPC interface in Bitcoin Core, and others, is not great for this
>> because it exposes a lot of functionality that isn't necessary and
>> introduces risks.
> This is actually somewhat my point. If the RPC interface was good for this
> and
Hi Antoine et al,
Maybe I'm completely wrong, missing some numbers, and it's maybe fine to
> just rely on few thousands of full-node operators being nice and servicing
> friendly millions of LN mobiles clients. But just in case it may be good to
> consider a reasonable alternative.
>
> So you
I think that one of the solutions here is to have light clients choose
their full node tethers explicitly. Even if you think it is unrealistic to
have everyone run their own node (fwiw, I don’t), there is still a trust
model where you can pick your trusted source.
This way you could have many
What I'm thinking more is if the costs of security are being too much
externalized from the light clients onto full nodes, nodes operators are
just going to stop servicing light clients `peercfilters=false`. The
backbone p2p network is going to be fine. But the massive LN light clients
network
Hi Antoine,
Consensus capture by miners isn't the only concern here. Consensus capture
by any subset of users whose interests diverge from the overall consensus
is equally damaging. The scenario I can imagine here is that the more light
clients outpace full nodes, the more the costs of security
> As a result, the entire protocol could be served over something like
HTTP, taking advantage of all the established CDNs and anycast serving
infrastructure,
Yes it's moving the issue of being a computation one to a distribution one.
But still you need the bandwidth capacities. What I'm concerned
> The choice between whether we offer them a light client technology that
is better or worse for privacy and scalability.
And offer them a solution which would scale in the long-term.
Again it's not an argumentation against BIP 157 protocol in itself, the
problem I'm interested in is how
I didn't trust myself and verify. In fact the [3] is the real [2].
Le mar. 5 mai 2020 à 06:28, Andrés G. Aragoneses a
écrit :
> Hey Antoine, just a small note, [3] is missing in your footnotes, can you
> add it? Thanks
>
> On Tue, 5 May 2020 at 18:17, Antoine Riard
> wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>>
Hi Antoine,
> Even with cheaper, more efficient protocols like BIP 157, you may have a
> huge discrepancy between what is asked and what is offered. Assuming 10M
> light clients [0] each of them consuming ~100MB/month for filters/headers,
> that means you're asking 1PB/month of traffic to the
There doesn't seem to be anything in the original email that's specific to
BIP 157. It's a restatement of the arguments against light clients:
- light clients are a burden on the full nodes that serve them
- if light clients become more popular, there won't be enough full nodes to
serve them
-
Good morning ariard and luke-jr
> > Trust-minimization of Bitcoin security model has always relied first and
> > above on running a full-node. This current paradigm may be shifted by LN
> > where fast, affordable, confidential, censorship-resistant payment services
> > may attract a lot of
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