Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[Jeremy via bitcoin-dev]

I've updated the BIP to no longer be based on Taproot, and instead based on
a OP_NOP upgrade. The example implementation and tests have also been
updated.

BIP:
https://github.com/JeremyRubin/bips/blob/op-secure-the-bag/bip-secure-the-bag.mediawiki
Implementation:
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/compare/master...JeremyRubin:securethebag_master

The BIP defines OP_NOP4 with the same semantics as previously presented.
This enables OP_SECURETHEBAG for segwit and bare script, but not p2sh
(because of hash cycle, it's impossible to put the redeemscript on the
scriptSig without changing the bag hash). The implementation also makes a
bare OP_SECURETHEBAG script standard as that is a common use case.

To address Russel's feedback, once Tapscript is fully prepared (with more
thorough script parsing improvements), multibyte opcodes can be more
cleanly specified.

Best,

Jeremy

n.b. the prior BIP version remains at
https://github.com/JeremyRubin/bips/blob/op-secure-the-bag-taproot/bip-secure-the-bag.mediawiki
--
@JeremyRubin 



On Mon, Jul 8, 2019 at 3:25 AM Dmitry Petukhov  wrote:

> If you make ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT signature not the only signature that
> controls this UTXO, but use it solely for restricting the spending
> conditions such as the set of outputs, and require another signature
> that would commit to the whole transaction, you can eliminate
> malleability, for the price of additional signature, of course.
>
>   CHECKSIG  CHECKSIG
>
> (CHECKMULTISIG/CHECKSIGADD might be used instead)
>
> where control-P can even be a pubkey of a key that is publicly known,
> and the whole purpose of control-sig would be to restrict the outputs
> (control-sig would be created with flags meaning ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT).
> Because control-sig does not depend on the script and on the current
> input, there should be no circular dependency, and it can be part of
> the redeem script.
>
> P would be the pubkey of the actual key that is needed to spend this
> UTXO, and the signature of P can commit to all the inputs and outputs,
> preventing malleability.
>
> I would like to add that it may make sense to just have 2 additional
> flags for sighash: NOPREVOUT and NOSCRIPT.
>
> NOPREVOUT would mean that previous output is not committed to, and when
> combined with ANYONECANPAY, this will mean ANYPREVOUT/NOINPUT:
> ANYONECANPAY means exclude all inputs except the current, and NOPREVOUT
> means exclude the current input. Thus NOPREVOUT|ANYONECANPAY = NOINPUT
>
> With NOPREVOUT|ANYONECANPAY|NOSCRIPT you would have ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT
>
> with NOPREVOUT|NOSCRIPT you can commit to "all the inputs beside the
> current one", which would allow to create a spending restriction like
> "this UTXO, and also one (or more) other UTXO", which might be useful
> to retroactively revoke or transfer the rights to spend certain UTXO
> without actually moving it:
>
> think 'vault' UTXO that is controlled by Alice, but requires additional
> 'control' UTXO to spend. Alice have keys for both 'vault' UTXO, and
> 'control' UTXO, but Bob have only key for 'control' UTXO.
>
> If Bob learnsthat Alice's vault UTXO key is at risk of compromize,
> he spends the control UTXO, and then Alice's ability to spend vault
> UTXO vanishes.
>
> You can use this mechanism to transfer this right to spend if you
> prepare a number of taproot branches with different pairs of (vault,
> control) keys and a chain of transactions that each spend the previous
> control UTXO such that the newly created UTXO becomes controlled by the
> control key of the next pair, together with vault key in that pair.
>
> В Sat, 22 Jun 2019 23:43:22 -0700
> Jeremy via bitcoin-dev  wrote:
>
> > This is insufficient: sequences must be committed to because they
> > affect TXID. As with scriptsigs (witness data fine to ignore). NUM_IN
> > too.
> >
> > Any malleability makes this much less useful.
> > --
> > @JeremyRubin 
> > 
> >
> >
> > On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 10:31 AM Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev <
> > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > > On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 04:57:34PM -0400, Russell O'Connor wrote:
> > > > So with regards to OP_SECURETHEBAG, I am also "not really seeing
> > > > any
> > > reason to
> > > > complicate the spec to ensure the digest is precommitted as part
> > > > of the opcode."
> > >
> > > Also, I think you can simulate OP_SECURETHEBAG with an ANYPREVOUT
> > > (NOINPUT) sighash (Johnson Lau's mentioned this before, but not
> > > sure if it's been spelled out anywhere); ie instead of constructing
> > >
> > >   X = Hash_BagHash( version, locktime, [outputs], [sequences],
> > > num_in )
> > >
> > > and having the script be " OP_SECURETHEBAG" you calculate an
> > > ANYPREVOUT sighash for SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT | SIGHASH_ALL:
> > >
> > >   Y = Hash_TapSighash( 0, 0xc1, version, locktime, [outputs], 0,
> > >

Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[Dmitry Petukhov via bitcoin-dev]

If you make ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT signature not the only signature that
controls this UTXO, but use it solely for restricting the spending
conditions such as the set of outputs, and require another signature
that would commit to the whole transaction, you can eliminate
malleability, for the price of additional signature, of course.

  CHECKSIG  CHECKSIG

(CHECKMULTISIG/CHECKSIGADD might be used instead)

where control-P can even be a pubkey of a key that is publicly known,
and the whole purpose of control-sig would be to restrict the outputs
(control-sig would be created with flags meaning ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT).
Because control-sig does not depend on the script and on the current
input, there should be no circular dependency, and it can be part of
the redeem script.

P would be the pubkey of the actual key that is needed to spend this
UTXO, and the signature of P can commit to all the inputs and outputs,
preventing malleability.

I would like to add that it may make sense to just have 2 additional
flags for sighash: NOPREVOUT and NOSCRIPT.

NOPREVOUT would mean that previous output is not committed to, and when
combined with ANYONECANPAY, this will mean ANYPREVOUT/NOINPUT:
ANYONECANPAY means exclude all inputs except the current, and NOPREVOUT
means exclude the current input. Thus NOPREVOUT|ANYONECANPAY = NOINPUT

With NOPREVOUT|ANYONECANPAY|NOSCRIPT you would have ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT

with NOPREVOUT|NOSCRIPT you can commit to "all the inputs beside the
current one", which would allow to create a spending restriction like
"this UTXO, and also one (or more) other UTXO", which might be useful
to retroactively revoke or transfer the rights to spend certain UTXO
without actually moving it:

think 'vault' UTXO that is controlled by Alice, but requires additional
'control' UTXO to spend. Alice have keys for both 'vault' UTXO, and
'control' UTXO, but Bob have only key for 'control' UTXO.

If Bob learnsthat Alice's vault UTXO key is at risk of compromize,
he spends the control UTXO, and then Alice's ability to spend vault
UTXO vanishes.

You can use this mechanism to transfer this right to spend if you
prepare a number of taproot branches with different pairs of (vault,
control) keys and a chain of transactions that each spend the previous
control UTXO such that the newly created UTXO becomes controlled by the
control key of the next pair, together with vault key in that pair.

В Sat, 22 Jun 2019 23:43:22 -0700
Jeremy via bitcoin-dev  wrote:

> This is insufficient: sequences must be committed to because they
> affect TXID. As with scriptsigs (witness data fine to ignore). NUM_IN
> too.
> 
> Any malleability makes this much less useful.
> --
> @JeremyRubin 
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 10:31 AM Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> 
> > On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 04:57:34PM -0400, Russell O'Connor wrote:  
> > > So with regards to OP_SECURETHEBAG, I am also "not really seeing
> > > any  
> > reason to  
> > > complicate the spec to ensure the digest is precommitted as part
> > > of the opcode."  
> >
> > Also, I think you can simulate OP_SECURETHEBAG with an ANYPREVOUT
> > (NOINPUT) sighash (Johnson Lau's mentioned this before, but not
> > sure if it's been spelled out anywhere); ie instead of constructing
> >
> >   X = Hash_BagHash( version, locktime, [outputs], [sequences],
> > num_in )
> >
> > and having the script be " OP_SECURETHEBAG" you calculate an
> > ANYPREVOUT sighash for SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT | SIGHASH_ALL:
> >
> >   Y = Hash_TapSighash( 0, 0xc1, version, locktime, [outputs], 0,
> >amount, sequence)
> >
> > and calculate a signature sig = Schnorr(P,m) for some pubkey P, and
> > make your script be "  CHECKSIG".
> >
> > That loses the ability to commit to the number of inputs or restrict
> > the nsequence of other inputs, and requires a bigger script (sig
> > and P are ~96 bytes instead of X's 32 bytes), but is otherwise
> > pretty much the same as far as I can tell. Both scripts are
> > automatically satisfied when revealed (with the correct set of
> > outputs), and don't need any additional witness data.
> >
> > If you wanted to construct "X" via script instead of hardcoding a
> > value because it got you generalised covenants or whatever; I think
> > you could get the same effect with CAT,LEFT, and RIGHT: you'd
> > construct Y in much the same way you construct X, but you'd then
> > need to turn that into a signature. You could do so by using pubkey
> > P=G and nonce R=G, which means you need to calculate
> > s=1+hash(G,G,Y)*1 -- calculating the hash part is easy, multiplying
> > it by 1 is easy, and to add 1 you can probably do something along
> > the lines of:
> >
> > OP_DUP 4 OP_RIGHT 1 OP_ADD OP_SWAP 28 OP_LEFT OP_SWAP OP_CAT
> >
> > (ie, take the last 4 bytes, increment it using 4-byte arithmetic,
> > then cat the first 28 bytes and the result. There's 

Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev]

Bitcoin Core is somewhat outside my core competence, but the various
OP_PUSHDATA are already multi-byte opcodes and GetOp already has a data
return parameter that is suitable for returning the payload of an immediate
32-byte data variant of OP_SECURETHEBAG.  All that I expect is needed is to
ensure that nowhere else is using a non-empty data-field as a proxy for a
non-empty push operation and fixing any such occurrences if they exist.
(AFAIKT there are only a handful of calls to GetOp).

It is probably worth updating the tapscript implementation to better
prepare it for new uses of OP_SUCCESSx.  Parsing should halt when an
OP_SUCCESSx is encountered, by having GetScriptOp advance the pc to end
after encountering such a code (decoding Script is no longer meaningful
after an OP_SUCCESS is encountered).  However, that means that GetScriptOp
needs to know what version of script it is expected to be parsing.  This
could be done by sending down some versioning flags, possibly by adding a
versioning field to CScript that can be initialized @
https://github.com/sipa/bitcoin/blob/7ddc7027b2cbdd11416809400c588e585a8b44ed/src/script/interpreter.cpp#L1679
or some other mechanism (and at the same time perhaps having GetSigOpCount
return 0 for tapscript, since counting sigops is not really meaningful in
tapscript). There are probably other reasonable approaches too (e.g your
option 2 below).  I could write some code to illustrate what I'm thinking
if you feel that would be helpful and I do think such changes around
OP_SUCCESS should be implemented regardless of whether we move forward with
OP_SECURETHEBAG or not.

It is probably worth doing this properly the first time around if we are
going to do it at all.

P.S. OP_RESERVED1 has been renamed to OP_SUCCESS137 in bip-tapscript.


>
> On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 6:47 PM Jeremy  wrote:

> I agree in principal, but I think that's just a bit of 'how things are'
> versus how they should be.
>
> I disagree that we get composability semantics because of OP_IF. E.g., the
> script "OP_IF  " and "OP_END" are two scripts that separately are
> invalid as parsed, but together are valid. OP_IF already imposes some
> lookahead functionality... but as I understand it, it may be feasible to
> get rid of OP_IF for tapscripts anyways. Also in this bucket are P2SH and
> segwit, which I think breaks this because the concat of two p2sh scripts or
> segwit scripts is not the same as them severally.
>
> I also think that the OP_SECURETHEBAG use of pushdata is a backwards
> compatible hack: we can always later redefine the parser to parse
> OP_SECURETHEBAG as the 34 byte opcode, recapturing the purity of the
> semantics. We can also fix it to not use an extra byte in a future tapleaf
> version.
>

> In any case, I don't disagree with figuring out what patching the parser
> to handle multibyte opcodes would look like. If that sort of upgrade-path
> were readily available when I wrote this, it's how I would have done it.
> There are two approaches I looked at mostly:
>
> 1) Adding flags to GetOp to change how it parses
>   a) Most of the same code paths used for new and old script
>   b) Higher risk of breaking something in old script style/downstream
>   c) Cleans up only one issue (multibyte opcodes) leaves other warts in
> place
>   d) less bikesheddable design (mostly same as old script)
>   e) code not increased in size
> 2) Adding a completely new interpreter for Tapscript
>   a) Fork the existing interpreter code
>   b) For all places where scripts are run, switch based on if it is
> tapscript or not
>   c) Can clean up various semantics, can even do fancier things like
> huffman encode opcodes to less than a byte
>   d) Can clearly separate parsing the script from executing it
>   e) Can improve versioning techniques
>   f) Low risk of breaking something in old script style/downstream
>   g) Increases amount of code substantially
>   h) Bikesheddable design (everything is on the table).
>   i) probably a better general mechanism for future changes to script
> parsing, less consensus risk
>   j) More compatible with templated script as well.
>
> If not clear, I think that 2 is probably a better approach, but I'm
> worried that 2.h means this would take a much longer time to implement.
>
> 2 can be segmented into two components:
>
> 1) the architecture of script parser versioning
> 2) the actual new script version
>
> I think that component 1 can be relatively non controversial, thankfully,
> using tapleaf versions (the architecture question is more around code
> structure). A proof of concept of this would be to have a fork that uses
> two independent, but identical, script parsers.
>
> Part two of this plan would be to modify one of the versions
> substantially. I'm not sure what exists on the laundry list, but I think it
> would be possible to pick a few worthwhile cleanups. E.g.:
>
> 1) Multibyte opcodes
> 2) Templated scripts
> 3) Huffman Encoding opcodes
> 4) OP_IF handling (maybe 

Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[Jeremy via bitcoin-dev]

I agree in principal, but I think that's just a bit of 'how things are'
versus how they should be.

I disagree that we get composability semantics because of OP_IF. E.g., the
script "OP_IF  " and "OP_END" are two scripts that separately are
invalid as parsed, but together are valid. OP_IF already imposes some
lookahead functionality... but as I understand it, it may be feasible to
get rid of OP_IF for tapscripts anyways. Also in this bucket are P2SH and
segwit, which I think breaks this because the concat of two p2sh scripts or
segwit scripts is not the same as them severally.

I also think that the OP_SECURETHEBAG use of pushdata is a backwards
compatible hack: we can always later redefine the parser to parse
OP_SECURETHEBAG as the 34 byte opcode, recapturing the purity of the
semantics. We can also fix it to not use an extra byte in a future tapleaf
version.



In any case, I don't disagree with figuring out what patching the parser to
handle multibyte opcodes would look like. If that sort of upgrade-path were
readily available when I wrote this, it's how I would have done it. There
are two approaches I looked at mostly:

1) Adding flags to GetOp to change how it parses
  a) Most of the same code paths used for new and old script
  b) Higher risk of breaking something in old script style/downstream
  c) Cleans up only one issue (multibyte opcodes) leaves other warts in
place
  d) less bikesheddable design (mostly same as old script)
  e) code not increased in size
2) Adding a completely new interpreter for Tapscript
  a) Fork the existing interpreter code
  b) For all places where scripts are run, switch based on if it is
tapscript or not
  c) Can clean up various semantics, can even do fancier things like
huffman encode opcodes to less than a byte
  d) Can clearly separate parsing the script from executing it
  e) Can improve versioning techniques
  f) Low risk of breaking something in old script style/downstream
  g) Increases amount of code substantially
  h) Bikesheddable design (everything is on the table).
  i) probably a better general mechanism for future changes to script
parsing, less consensus risk
  j) More compatible with templated script as well.

If not clear, I think that 2 is probably a better approach, but I'm worried
that 2.h means this would take a much longer time to implement.

2 can be segmented into two components:

1) the architecture of script parser versioning
2) the actual new script version

I think that component 1 can be relatively non controversial, thankfully,
using tapleaf versions (the architecture question is more around code
structure). A proof of concept of this would be to have a fork that uses
two independent, but identical, script parsers.

Part two of this plan would be to modify one of the versions substantially.
I'm not sure what exists on the laundry list, but I think it would be
possible to pick a few worthwhile cleanups. E.g.:

1) Multibyte opcodes
2) Templated scripts
3) Huffman Encoding opcodes
4) OP_IF handling (maybe just get rid of it in favor of conditional Verify
semantics)

And make it clear that because we can add future script versions fairly
easily, this is a sufficient step.


Does that seem in line with your understanding of how this might be done?
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Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev]

I suspect that your conjecture is true.  And given that it is plausible
that we would want to add an opcode to tweak public keys, it seems like a
reason design to avoid accidental covenants.
(That said, I strongly prefer that the SECURETHEBAG data be the 32-bytes
immediately following the opcode rather than a OP_PUSHDATA, and I'd be
willing to help code this up (see below)).

On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 2:07 PM Jeremy  wrote:

> Do you think the following hypothesis is more or less true:
>
> H: There is no set of pure extensions* to script E such that enabling E
> and OP_SECURETHEBAG as proposed enables recursive covenants, but E alone
> does not enable recursive covenants?
>
> * Of course there are things that specifically are specifically designed
> to switch on if OP_SECURETHEBAG, so pure means normal things like OP_CAT
> that are a function of the arguments on the stack or hashed txn data.
>
> This is the main draw of the design I proposed, it should be highly
> improbable or impossible to accidentally introduce more behavior than
> intended with a new opcode.
>
> I think that given that H is not true for the stack reading version of the
> opcode, we should avoid doing it unless strongly motivated, so as to permit
> more flexibility for which opcodes we can add in the future without
> introducing recursion unless it is explicitly intended.
>

On Sat, Jun 1, 2019 at 12:47 PM Jeremy via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> A particularly useful topic of discussion is how best to eliminate the
> PUSHDATA and treat OP_SECURETHEBAG like a pushdata directly. I thought
> about how the interpreter works and is implemented and couldn't come up
> with something noninvasive.
>

We shouldn't be using the complexity of the changes to the Bitcoin Core a
measure of the complexity of a proposal.  That is looking the issue from
the wrong side.  If we measure the complexity of Script proposals by how
hard it is to change Bitcoin Core, what will happen is more and more of the
incidental details of Bitcoin Core's implementation will be pulled into the
semantics of Script (e.g. the fact that surrounding opcode values are
readily available in Bitcoin Core's particular implementation of its Script
interpreter).  Instead we should use the complexity of how hard it is to
reason about the new Script semantics.

The peeking semantics of OP_SECURETHEBAG is particularly awful because it
more-or-less breaks the fact that Bitcoin Script can be decomposed into
individual units of "opcodes" whose semantics and be individually
described, and it harms the composability of Bitcoin Script where you can
divide the script between any opcodes and the semantics of the
concatenation of those two scripts is simply the composition of the
semantics of the two halves.  (For those interested in formal semantics,
what we have here is a monoid homomorphism from list of opcodes (syntax) to
stack transformation functions (with side-effects) under (Kleisli)
composition (semantics).) Being able to decompose a Bitcoin Script this way
and reasoning about components is how one would reason about Bitcoin Script
in practice.  (Technically the structure is more involved than a list of
opcodes due to OP_IF, and instead you get a railroad diagram
).

Putting the 32 bytes of data required by OP_SECURETHEBAG immediately after
the opcode, like how OP_PUSHDATA* works, is a superior design choice.  It
lets us treat the opcodes and its immediate data as an atomic unit when
reasoning about Script and removes the need to define what happens when
OP_SECURETHEBAG is not followed by an OP_PUSDATA.
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Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[Jeremy via bitcoin-dev]

Do you think the following hypothesis is more or less true:

H: There is no set of pure extensions* to script E such that enabling E and
OP_SECURETHEBAG as proposed enables recursive covenants, but E alone does
not enable recursive covenants?

* Of course there are things that specifically are specifically designed to
switch on if OP_SECURETHEBAG, so pure means normal things like OP_CAT that
are a function of the arguments on the stack or hashed txn data.

This is the main draw of the design I proposed, it should be highly
improbable or impossible to accidentally introduce more behavior than
intended with a new opcode.

I think that given that H is not true for the stack reading version of the
opcode, we should avoid doing it unless strongly motivated, so as to permit
more flexibility for which opcodes we can add in the future without
introducing recursion unless it is explicitly intended.



On Mon, Jun 24, 2019, 7:35 AM Russell O'Connor 
wrote:

> OP_SECURETHEBAG doesn't include the script being executed (i.e the
> scriptPubKey specified in the output that is redeemed by this input) in its
> hash like ordinary signatures do
> .
> Of course, this ScriptPubKey is indirectly committed to through the input's
> prevoutpoint.  However Script isn't able to reconstruct this script being
> executed from the prevoutpoint in tapscript without an implementation of
> public key tweeking in Bitcoin Script.
>
> On Sun, Jun 23, 2019 at 2:41 AM Jeremy Rubin 
> wrote:
>
>> Can you clarify this comment?
>>
>> We do in fact commit to the script and scriptsig itself (not the witness
>> stack) in OP_SECURETHEBAG (unless I'm missing what you meant)?
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 20, 2019, 10:59 AM Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev <
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Just to be clear, while OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY would enable this style
>>> of covenants if it pulled data from the stack, the OP_SECURETHEBAG
>>> probably cannot create covenants even if it were to pull the data from the
>>> stack unless some OP_TWEEKPUBKEY operation is added to Script because the
>>> "commitment of the script itself" isn't part of the OP_SECURETHEBAG.
>>>
>>> So with regards to OP_SECURETHEBAG, I am also "not really seeing any
>>> reason to complicate the spec to ensure the digest is precommitted as part
>>> of the opcode."
>>>
>>> On Thu, Jun 6, 2019 at 3:33 AM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <
>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>
 Good morning aj,


 Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.

 ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
 On Wednesday, June 5, 2019 5:30 PM, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev <
 bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

 > On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 10:35:45PM -0700, Jeremy via bitcoin-dev
 wrote:
 >
 > > OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY is retracted in favor of OP_SECURETHEBAG*.
 >
 > I think you could generalise that slightly and make it fit in
 > with the existing opcode naming by calling it something like
 > "OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY" and pull a 33-byte value from the stack,
 > consisting of a sha256 hash and a sighash-byte, and adding a new
 sighash
 > value corresponding to the set of info you want to include in the
 hash,
 > which I think sounds a bit like "SIGHASH_EXACTLY_ONE_INPUT |
 SIGHASH_ALL"
 >
 > FWIW, I'm not really seeing any reason to complicate the spec to
 ensure
 > the digest is precommitted as part of the opcode.
 >

 I believe in combination with `OP_LEFT` and `OP_CAT` this allows
 Turing-complete smart contracts, in much the same way as
 `OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK`?

 Pass in the spent transaction (serialised for txid) and the spending
 transaction (serialised for sighash) as part of the witness of the spending
 transaction.

 Script verifies that the spending transaction witness value is indeed
 the spending transaction by `OP_SHA256  OP_SWAP OP_CAT
 OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY`.
 Script verifies the spent transaction witness value is indeed the spent
 transaction by hashing it, then splitting up the hash with `OP_LEFT` into
 bytes, and comparing the bytes to the bytes in the input of the spending
 transaction witness value (txid being the bytes in reversed order).

 Then the Script can extract a commitment of itself by extracting the
 output of the spent transaction.
 This lets the Script check that the spending transaction also pays to
 the same script.

 The Script can then access a state value, for example from an
 `OP_RETURN` output of the spent transaction, and enforce that a correct
 next-state is used in the spending transaction.
 If the state is too large to fit in a standard `OP_RETURN`, then the
 current state can be passed in as a witness and validated against a hash
 commitment in an `OP_RETURN` 

Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev]

OP_SECURETHEBAG doesn't include the script being executed (i.e the
scriptPubKey specified in the output that is redeemed by this input) in its
hash like ordinary signatures do
.
Of course, this ScriptPubKey is indirectly committed to through the input's
prevoutpoint.  However Script isn't able to reconstruct this script being
executed from the prevoutpoint in tapscript without an implementation of
public key tweeking in Bitcoin Script.

On Sun, Jun 23, 2019 at 2:41 AM Jeremy Rubin 
wrote:

> Can you clarify this comment?
>
> We do in fact commit to the script and scriptsig itself (not the witness
> stack) in OP_SECURETHEBAG (unless I'm missing what you meant)?
>
> On Thu, Jun 20, 2019, 10:59 AM Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Just to be clear, while OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY would enable this style
>> of covenants if it pulled data from the stack, the OP_SECURETHEBAG
>> probably cannot create covenants even if it were to pull the data from the
>> stack unless some OP_TWEEKPUBKEY operation is added to Script because the
>> "commitment of the script itself" isn't part of the OP_SECURETHEBAG.
>>
>> So with regards to OP_SECURETHEBAG, I am also "not really seeing any
>> reason to complicate the spec to ensure the digest is precommitted as part
>> of the opcode."
>>
>> On Thu, Jun 6, 2019 at 3:33 AM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Good morning aj,
>>>
>>>
>>> Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.
>>>
>>> ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
>>> On Wednesday, June 5, 2019 5:30 PM, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev <
>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> > On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 10:35:45PM -0700, Jeremy via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>>> >
>>> > > OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY is retracted in favor of OP_SECURETHEBAG*.
>>> >
>>> > I think you could generalise that slightly and make it fit in
>>> > with the existing opcode naming by calling it something like
>>> > "OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY" and pull a 33-byte value from the stack,
>>> > consisting of a sha256 hash and a sighash-byte, and adding a new
>>> sighash
>>> > value corresponding to the set of info you want to include in the hash,
>>> > which I think sounds a bit like "SIGHASH_EXACTLY_ONE_INPUT |
>>> SIGHASH_ALL"
>>> >
>>> > FWIW, I'm not really seeing any reason to complicate the spec to ensure
>>> > the digest is precommitted as part of the opcode.
>>> >
>>>
>>> I believe in combination with `OP_LEFT` and `OP_CAT` this allows
>>> Turing-complete smart contracts, in much the same way as
>>> `OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK`?
>>>
>>> Pass in the spent transaction (serialised for txid) and the spending
>>> transaction (serialised for sighash) as part of the witness of the spending
>>> transaction.
>>>
>>> Script verifies that the spending transaction witness value is indeed
>>> the spending transaction by `OP_SHA256  OP_SWAP OP_CAT
>>> OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY`.
>>> Script verifies the spent transaction witness value is indeed the spent
>>> transaction by hashing it, then splitting up the hash with `OP_LEFT` into
>>> bytes, and comparing the bytes to the bytes in the input of the spending
>>> transaction witness value (txid being the bytes in reversed order).
>>>
>>> Then the Script can extract a commitment of itself by extracting the
>>> output of the spent transaction.
>>> This lets the Script check that the spending transaction also pays to
>>> the same script.
>>>
>>> The Script can then access a state value, for example from an
>>> `OP_RETURN` output of the spent transaction, and enforce that a correct
>>> next-state is used in the spending transaction.
>>> If the state is too large to fit in a standard `OP_RETURN`, then the
>>> current state can be passed in as a witness and validated against a hash
>>> commitment in an `OP_RETURN` output.
>>>
>>> I believe this is the primary reason against not pulling data from the
>>> stack.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> ZmnSCPxj
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>>>
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Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev]

Good morning Jeremy,

While `OP_SECURETHEBAG` commits to the desired output script of the spending 
TX, what is being referred to here is the ability to verify the output script 
being spent, i.e. the script that actually contains the `OP_SECURETHEBAG`.
By this, we are able to create a contract that ensures that it is paid again 
(covenants), which in combination with a little more introspection of TX data, 
allows us to verify the execution of steps of a Turing-complete program.

It is surprisingly easy to make a language inadvertently Turing-complete, which 
is basically the argument here,
That is, with just a little more power and some additional operations that 
would appear reasonable to add by themselves (`OP_CAT`, `OP_LEFT`, 
`OP_TWEAKPUBKEY`) on top of some form of requiring a particular output script, 
it is possible to validate the execution of Turing-complete programs on the 
Bitcoin blockchain.

Thus, with quining (a script which gets the text of its own code as part of the 
static data it has), `OP_TWEAKPUBKEY`, and a `OP_SECURETHEBAG` that gets its 
argument from the stack, it will be possible to make Turing-complete Bitcoin 
SCRIPT.

I would mildly suggest that we might very well want to consider creating a 
well-designed way of injecting Turing-completeness into Bitcoin SCRIPT 
(requiring it to be behind a Taproot, so that bugs in Turing-complete code at 
least have a chance to be bugfixed by agreement of the Taproot signing set) 
since we might eventually find ourselves introducing it inadvertently later in 
any case.

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj


Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.

‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
On Sunday, June 23, 2019 6:41 AM, Jeremy Rubin  wrote:

> Can you clarify this comment?
>
> We do in fact commit to the script and scriptsig itself (not the witness 
> stack) in OP_SECURETHEBAG (unless I'm missing what you meant)?
>
> On Thu, Jun 20, 2019, 10:59 AM Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev 
>  wrote:
>
> > Just to be clear, while OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY would enable this style of 
> > covenants if it pulled data from the stack, the OP_SECURETHEBAG probably 
> > cannot create covenants even if it were to pull the data from the stack 
> > unless some OP_TWEEKPUBKEY operation is added to Script because the 
> > "commitment of the script itself" isn't part of the OP_SECURETHEBAG.
> >
> > So with regards to OP_SECURETHEBAG, I am also "not really seeing any reason 
> > to complicate the spec to ensure the digest is precommitted as part of the 
> > opcode."
> >
> > On Thu, Jun 6, 2019 at 3:33 AM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev 
> >  wrote:
> >
> > > Good morning aj,
> > >
> > > Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.
> > >
> > > ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
> > > On Wednesday, June 5, 2019 5:30 PM, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev 
> > >  wrote:
> > >
> > > > On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 10:35:45PM -0700, Jeremy via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY is retracted in favor of OP_SECURETHEBAG*.
> > > >
> > > > I think you could generalise that slightly and make it fit in
> > > > with the existing opcode naming by calling it something like
> > > > "OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY" and pull a 33-byte value from the stack,
> > > > consisting of a sha256 hash and a sighash-byte, and adding a new sighash
> > > > value corresponding to the set of info you want to include in the hash,
> > > > which I think sounds a bit like "SIGHASH_EXACTLY_ONE_INPUT | 
> > > > SIGHASH_ALL"
> > > >
> > > > FWIW, I'm not really seeing any reason to complicate the spec to ensure
> > > > the digest is precommitted as part of the opcode.
> > > >
> > >
> > > I believe in combination with `OP_LEFT` and `OP_CAT` this allows 
> > > Turing-complete smart contracts, in much the same way as 
> > > `OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK`?
> > >
> > > Pass in the spent transaction (serialised for txid) and the spending 
> > > transaction (serialised for sighash) as part of the witness of the 
> > > spending transaction.
> > >
> > > Script verifies that the spending transaction witness value is indeed the 
> > > spending transaction by `OP_SHA256  OP_SWAP OP_CAT 
> > > OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY`.
> > > Script verifies the spent transaction witness value is indeed the spent 
> > > transaction by hashing it, then splitting up the hash with `OP_LEFT` into 
> > > bytes, and comparing the bytes to the bytes in the input of the spending 
> > > transaction witness value (txid being the bytes in reversed order).
> > >
> > > Then the Script can extract a commitment of itself by extracting the 
> > > output of the spent transaction.
> > > This lets the Script check that the spending transaction also pays to the 
> > > same script.
> > >
> > > The Script can then access a state value, for example from an `OP_RETURN` 
> > > output of the spent transaction, and enforce that a correct next-state is 
> > > used in the spending transaction.
> > > If the state is too large to fit in a standard `OP_RETURN`, then the 
> > > current state can be passed in as a 

Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[Jeremy via bitcoin-dev]

This is insufficient: sequences must be committed to because they affect
TXID. As with scriptsigs (witness data fine to ignore). NUM_IN too.

Any malleability makes this much less useful.
--
@JeremyRubin 



On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 10:31 AM Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 04:57:34PM -0400, Russell O'Connor wrote:
> > So with regards to OP_SECURETHEBAG, I am also "not really seeing any
> reason to
> > complicate the spec to ensure the digest is precommitted as part of the
> > opcode."
>
> Also, I think you can simulate OP_SECURETHEBAG with an ANYPREVOUT
> (NOINPUT) sighash (Johnson Lau's mentioned this before, but not sure if
> it's been spelled out anywhere); ie instead of constructing
>
>   X = Hash_BagHash( version, locktime, [outputs], [sequences], num_in )
>
> and having the script be " OP_SECURETHEBAG" you calculate an
> ANYPREVOUT sighash for SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT | SIGHASH_ALL:
>
>   Y = Hash_TapSighash( 0, 0xc1, version, locktime, [outputs], 0,
>amount, sequence)
>
> and calculate a signature sig = Schnorr(P,m) for some pubkey P, and
> make your script be "  CHECKSIG".
>
> That loses the ability to commit to the number of inputs or restrict
> the nsequence of other inputs, and requires a bigger script (sig and P
> are ~96 bytes instead of X's 32 bytes), but is otherwise pretty much the
> same as far as I can tell. Both scripts are automatically satisfied when
> revealed (with the correct set of outputs), and don't need any additional
> witness data.
>
> If you wanted to construct "X" via script instead of hardcoding a value
> because it got you generalised covenants or whatever; I think you could
> get the same effect with CAT,LEFT, and RIGHT: you'd construct Y in much
> the same way you construct X, but you'd then need to turn that into a
> signature. You could do so by using pubkey P=G and nonce R=G, which
> means you need to calculate s=1+hash(G,G,Y)*1 -- calculating the hash
> part is easy, multiplying it by 1 is easy, and to add 1 you can probably
> do something along the lines of:
>
> OP_DUP 4 OP_RIGHT 1 OP_ADD OP_SWAP 28 OP_LEFT OP_SWAP OP_CAT
>
> (ie, take the last 4 bytes, increment it using 4-byte arithmetic,
> then cat the first 28 bytes and the result. There's overflow issues,
> but I think they can be worked around either by allowing you to choose
> different locktimes, or by more complicated script)
>
> Cheers,
> aj
>
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Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev]

On Tue, Jun 18, 2019 at 04:57:34PM -0400, Russell O'Connor wrote:
> So with regards to OP_SECURETHEBAG, I am also "not really seeing any reason to
> complicate the spec to ensure the digest is precommitted as part of the
> opcode."

Also, I think you can simulate OP_SECURETHEBAG with an ANYPREVOUT
(NOINPUT) sighash (Johnson Lau's mentioned this before, but not sure if
it's been spelled out anywhere); ie instead of constructing

  X = Hash_BagHash( version, locktime, [outputs], [sequences], num_in )

and having the script be " OP_SECURETHEBAG" you calculate an
ANYPREVOUT sighash for SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUTANYSCRIPT | SIGHASH_ALL:

  Y = Hash_TapSighash( 0, 0xc1, version, locktime, [outputs], 0,
   amount, sequence)

and calculate a signature sig = Schnorr(P,m) for some pubkey P, and
make your script be "  CHECKSIG".

That loses the ability to commit to the number of inputs or restrict
the nsequence of other inputs, and requires a bigger script (sig and P
are ~96 bytes instead of X's 32 bytes), but is otherwise pretty much the
same as far as I can tell. Both scripts are automatically satisfied when
revealed (with the correct set of outputs), and don't need any additional
witness data.

If you wanted to construct "X" via script instead of hardcoding a value
because it got you generalised covenants or whatever; I think you could
get the same effect with CAT,LEFT, and RIGHT: you'd construct Y in much
the same way you construct X, but you'd then need to turn that into a
signature. You could do so by using pubkey P=G and nonce R=G, which
means you need to calculate s=1+hash(G,G,Y)*1 -- calculating the hash
part is easy, multiplying it by 1 is easy, and to add 1 you can probably
do something along the lines of:

OP_DUP 4 OP_RIGHT 1 OP_ADD OP_SWAP 28 OP_LEFT OP_SWAP OP_CAT

(ie, take the last 4 bytes, increment it using 4-byte arithmetic,
then cat the first 28 bytes and the result. There's overflow issues,
but I think they can be worked around either by allowing you to choose
different locktimes, or by more complicated script)

Cheers,
aj

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Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev]

Just to be clear, while OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY would enable this style of
covenants if it pulled data from the stack, the OP_SECURETHEBAG probably
cannot create covenants even if it were to pull the data from the stack
unless some OP_TWEEKPUBKEY operation is added to Script because the
"commitment of the script itself" isn't part of the OP_SECURETHEBAG.

So with regards to OP_SECURETHEBAG, I am also "not really seeing any reason
to complicate the spec to ensure the digest is precommitted as part of the
opcode."

On Thu, Jun 6, 2019 at 3:33 AM ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Good morning aj,
>
>
> Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.
>
> ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
> On Wednesday, June 5, 2019 5:30 PM, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> > On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 10:35:45PM -0700, Jeremy via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> >
> > > OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY is retracted in favor of OP_SECURETHEBAG*.
> >
> > I think you could generalise that slightly and make it fit in
> > with the existing opcode naming by calling it something like
> > "OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY" and pull a 33-byte value from the stack,
> > consisting of a sha256 hash and a sighash-byte, and adding a new sighash
> > value corresponding to the set of info you want to include in the hash,
> > which I think sounds a bit like "SIGHASH_EXACTLY_ONE_INPUT | SIGHASH_ALL"
> >
> > FWIW, I'm not really seeing any reason to complicate the spec to ensure
> > the digest is precommitted as part of the opcode.
> >
>
> I believe in combination with `OP_LEFT` and `OP_CAT` this allows
> Turing-complete smart contracts, in much the same way as
> `OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK`?
>
> Pass in the spent transaction (serialised for txid) and the spending
> transaction (serialised for sighash) as part of the witness of the spending
> transaction.
>
> Script verifies that the spending transaction witness value is indeed the
> spending transaction by `OP_SHA256  OP_SWAP OP_CAT
> OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY`.
> Script verifies the spent transaction witness value is indeed the spent
> transaction by hashing it, then splitting up the hash with `OP_LEFT` into
> bytes, and comparing the bytes to the bytes in the input of the spending
> transaction witness value (txid being the bytes in reversed order).
>
> Then the Script can extract a commitment of itself by extracting the
> output of the spent transaction.
> This lets the Script check that the spending transaction also pays to the
> same script.
>
> The Script can then access a state value, for example from an `OP_RETURN`
> output of the spent transaction, and enforce that a correct next-state is
> used in the spending transaction.
> If the state is too large to fit in a standard `OP_RETURN`, then the
> current state can be passed in as a witness and validated against a hash
> commitment in an `OP_RETURN` output.
>
> I believe this is the primary reason against not pulling data from the
> stack.
>
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
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Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev]

Good morning aj,


Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.

‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
On Wednesday, June 5, 2019 5:30 PM, Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev 
 wrote:

> On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 10:35:45PM -0700, Jeremy via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>
> > OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY is retracted in favor of OP_SECURETHEBAG*.
>
> I think you could generalise that slightly and make it fit in
> with the existing opcode naming by calling it something like
> "OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY" and pull a 33-byte value from the stack,
> consisting of a sha256 hash and a sighash-byte, and adding a new sighash
> value corresponding to the set of info you want to include in the hash,
> which I think sounds a bit like "SIGHASH_EXACTLY_ONE_INPUT | SIGHASH_ALL"
>
> FWIW, I'm not really seeing any reason to complicate the spec to ensure
> the digest is precommitted as part of the opcode.
>

I believe in combination with `OP_LEFT` and `OP_CAT` this allows 
Turing-complete smart contracts, in much the same way as `OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK`?

Pass in the spent transaction (serialised for txid) and the spending 
transaction (serialised for sighash) as part of the witness of the spending 
transaction.

Script verifies that the spending transaction witness value is indeed the 
spending transaction by `OP_SHA256  OP_SWAP OP_CAT 
OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY`.
Script verifies the spent transaction witness value is indeed the spent 
transaction by hashing it, then splitting up the hash with `OP_LEFT` into 
bytes, and comparing the bytes to the bytes in the input of the spending 
transaction witness value (txid being the bytes in reversed order).

Then the Script can extract a commitment of itself by extracting the output of 
the spent transaction.
This lets the Script check that the spending transaction also pays to the same 
script.

The Script can then access a state value, for example from an `OP_RETURN` 
output of the spent transaction, and enforce that a correct next-state is used 
in the spending transaction.
If the state is too large to fit in a standard `OP_RETURN`, then the current 
state can be passed in as a witness and validated against a hash commitment in 
an `OP_RETURN` output.

I believe this is the primary reason against not pulling data from the stack.

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
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Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev]

On Fri, May 31, 2019 at 10:35:45PM -0700, Jeremy via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY is retracted in favor of OP_SECURETHEBAG*.

I think you could generalise that slightly and make it fit in
with the existing opcode naming by calling it something like
"OP_CHECKTXDIGESTVERIFY" and pull a 33-byte value from the stack,
consisting of a sha256 hash and a sighash-byte, and adding a new sighash
value corresponding to the set of info you want to include in the hash,
which I think sounds a bit like "SIGHASH_EXACTLY_ONE_INPUT | SIGHASH_ALL"

FWIW, I'm not really seeing any reason to complicate the spec to ensure
the digest is precommitted as part of the opcode.

Cheers,
aj

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Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[Jeremy via bitcoin-dev]

Hi Russell,

Thanks for the response. I double checked my work in drafting my response
and realized I didn't address all the malleability concerns, I believe I
have now (fingers crossed) addressed all points of malleability.

*The malleability concerns are as follows:*

A TXID is computed as:

def txid(self):
 r = b""
 r += struct.pack("___
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Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[Russell O'Connor via bitcoin-dev]

On Sat, Jun 1, 2019 at 12:47 PM Jeremy via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Hi All,
>
> OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY is retracted in favor of OP_SECURETHEBAG*.
> OP_SECURETHEBAG does more or less the same thing, but fixes malleability
> issues and lifts the single output restriction to a known number of inputs
> restriction.
>
> OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY had some issues with malleability of version and
> locktime. OP_SECURETHEBAG commits to both of these values.
>

Can you elaborate a bit more on what the issues were?


> OP_SECURETHEBAG also lifts the restriction that OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY had
> to be spent as only a single input, and instead just commits to the number
> of inputs. This allows for more flexibility, but keeps it easy to get the
> same single output restriction.
>
> BIP:
> https://github.com/JeremyRubin/bips/blob/op-secure-the-bag/bip-secure-the-bag.mediawiki
> Implementation: https://github.com/JeremyRubin/bitcoin/tree/secure_the_bag
>
> A particularly useful topic of discussion is how best to eliminate the
> PUSHDATA and treat OP_SECURETHEBAG like a pushdata directly. I thought
> about how the interpreter works and is implemented and couldn't come up
> with something noninvasive.
>

I'm not a Core developer but from what I understand, I'd be inclined to to
treat OP_SECURETHEBAG as with an immediate 32-byte parameter by modifying
GetScriptOp to return the 32-byte parameter through pvchRet.

bool GetScriptOp(CScriptBase::const_iterator& pc,
CScriptBase::const_iterator end, opcodetype& opcodeRet,
std::vector* pvchRet)
{
opcodeRet = OP_INVALIDOPCODE;
if (pvchRet)
pvchRet->clear();
if (pc >= end)
return false;

// Read instruction
if (end - pc < 1)
return false;
unsigned int opcode = *pc++;

// Immediate operand
if (opcode <= OP_PUSHDATA4)
{
// ...
}

if (opcode == OP_SECURETHEBAG) {
if (end - pc < 0 || (unsigned int)(end - pc) < 32)
return false;
if (pvchRet)
pvchRet->assign(pc, pc + 32);
pc += 32;
}

opcodeRet = static_cast(opcode);
return true;
}

and go from there.

Thank you for your review and discussion,
>
> Jeremy
>
> * Plus the name is better
>
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Re: [bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev]

> Using an OP_SECURETHEBAG Taproot, the recipient may even give the sender an 
> address which makes a channel unbeknownst to them.


This requires special design to be safe.

Every offchain protocol requires a backout transaction to be created before the 
funding transaction output is committed onchain.
This backout transaction ensures that the funder of the channel can back out if 
the other side aborts the protocol.

For Poon-Dryja channels this is the initial commitment transaction.
The continued operation of the protocol requires the initial commitment to be 
revoked at the next update.

So we need a plausible backout for the receiver first.

To do so, we make the funding transaction address a Taproot with internal 
pubkey 2-of-2 of the receiver and its channel counterparty.
The Taproot hides a single script alternative, a `OP_SECURETHEBAG` that ensures 
it is paid out to a pure script (i.e. Taproot internal key is a NUMS point), 
the scripts forming a revocable output to the receiver (let receiver claim with 
`OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY`, or counterparty to revoke immediately if it knows 
revocation key).

This is essentially a walletless channel open, which I described before with 
`SIGHASH_NOINPUT`.

Channel factories using `OP_SECURETHEBAG` cannot be updated (i.e. not able to 
close channels and reuse funds to open new channels offchain), i.e. close-only 
factories.
The above revocation trick only works with two participants, and it would be 
largely pointless to have 2-participant factories (unless you were e.g. 
transporting HTLCs separately from DLCs in two channels of the same factory).

Channel factories based on the Decker-Russell-Osuntokun mechanism ("eltoo") 
allow reorganizing channels offchain, without hitting the chain at all.
These need `SIGHASH_NOINPUT`/`SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT`.

For channel factories, `SIGHASH_NOINPUT` is better.
`OP_SECURETHEBAG` requires the funding output to commit to a particular output 
set.
`SIGHASH_NOINPUT` lets the signatories introduce a new possible output set 
later.

One might compare `OP_SECURETHEBAG` to MAST, while `SIGHASH_NOINPUT` is 
comparable to Graftroot.
MAST has a fixed set of alternatives, while Graftroot allows signatories to add 
new alternatives later.



Regards,
ZmnSCPxj


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‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
On Saturday, June 1, 2019 1:35 PM, Jeremy via bitcoin-dev 
 wrote:

> Hi All,
>
> OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY is retracted in favor of OP_SECURETHEBAG*. 
> OP_SECURETHEBAG does more or less the same thing, but fixes malleability 
> issues and lifts the single output restriction to a known number of inputs 
> restriction.
>
> OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY had some issues with malleability of version and 
> locktime. OP_SECURETHEBAG commits to both of these values.
>
> OP_SECURETHEBAG also lifts the restriction that OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY had to 
> be spent as only a single input, and instead just commits to the number of 
> inputs. This allows for more flexibility, but keeps it easy to get the same 
> single output restriction.
>
> BIP: 
> https://github.com/JeremyRubin/bips/blob/op-secure-the-bag/bip-secure-the-bag.mediawiki
> Implementation: https://github.com/JeremyRubin/bitcoin/tree/secure_the_bag
>
> A particularly useful topic of discussion is how best to eliminate the 
> PUSHDATA and treat OP_SECURETHEBAG like a pushdata directly. I thought about 
> how the interpreter works and is implemented and couldn't come up with 
> something noninvasive.
>
> Thank you for your review and discussion,
>
> Jeremy
>
> * Plus the name is better


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[bitcoin-dev] OP_SECURETHEBAG (supersedes OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY)

[Jeremy via bitcoin-dev]

Hi All,

OP_CHECKOUTPUTSHASHVERIFY is retracted in favor of OP_SECURETHEBAG*.
OP_SECURETHEBAG does more or less the same thing, but fixes malleability
issues and lifts the single output restriction to a known number of inputs
restriction.

OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY had some issues with malleability of version and
locktime. OP_SECURETHEBAG commits to both of these values.

OP_SECURETHEBAG also lifts the restriction that OP_CHECKOUTPUTSVERIFY had
to be spent as only a single input, and instead just commits to the number
of inputs. This allows for more flexibility, but keeps it easy to get the
same single output restriction.

BIP:
https://github.com/JeremyRubin/bips/blob/op-secure-the-bag/bip-secure-the-bag.mediawiki
Implementation: https://github.com/JeremyRubin/bitcoin/tree/secure_the_bag

A particularly useful topic of discussion is how best to eliminate the
PUSHDATA and treat OP_SECURETHEBAG like a pushdata directly. I thought
about how the interpreter works and is implemented and couldn't come up
with something noninvasive.

Thank you for your review and discussion,

Jeremy

* Plus the name is better
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