Ted Lemon wrote:
> Ed Gerck wrote [reinserted for context]:
>
> >In fact, if there would be a pre-defined reward for those that find holes
> >in today's increasing electronic and "secure" systems then companies
> >could rely in that reward both as a payment cap and as way to separate
> >rewar
> Comments?
I think your proposal is not entirely unreasonable, although I wonder
if the people who have the most interest in a secure system are not
the banks, but the insurance companies and the customers. My
impression of banks is that as long as they can quantify the potential
loss, they c
Ted Lemon wrote:
> Amateurs in the crypto world seem to get bitten by this fairly
> frequently - read the recent transcripts to the New York preliminary
> injunction on the DeCSS case for supporting evidence. If you're out
> to prove a point, and you're riding the fine edge of legality and
> ci
At 05:14 PM 1/26/00 -0500, John Young wrote:
>This is becoming picayune but:
>
>I'm told that the court has now sealed Exhibits A and B of Hoy's
>declaration. These are the DeCSS notes and the CSS scramble
>code. However, the sealing applies only to the paper versions
>and will prevent hardcopyin
> It is fun to read http://www.msnbc.com/msn/361936.asp especially at
> the end, because if "This isn't even small potatoes; it's no more
> than sprouts." -- then, while the hassle, prison and fine?
Well, he did try to extort money from the banks. I think this was
really the problem with what
Arnold G. Reinhold writes:
> Closely matching the statistical properties of a physical device
> could be difficult.
Unless you xor'ed them with a different, published sample from the
same device. white x color1 = color2. But again, which sample you're
using has to be a computationally diffic
At 12:12 AM 01/27/2000 +, Ben Laurie wrote:
>I can't quite see the point of forward stego.
I'll leave it to Russ to explain his application if he wants to.
> Why not publish something
>public key encrypted and publish the private key later?
Symmetric cryptography has two advantages in this
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Marc Horowitz writes:
>
> >> In short, is steganography the ultimate surveillance tool?
>
> Like most surveillance technologies, this is a game of constant
> incremental improvements. You watch me through a window, I put up
> curtains. You listen through a hidd
Vin McLellan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I suspect that RSA did send out more than a few nastygrams to OEMs
> or other mass marketeers about "illicit use" of RC4, but -- at least in
> recent years -- its complaints probably went to commercial enterprises which
> both (a) sought to resell
> question becomes, without identifying the location of the ciphertext in a
> prior agreement or on some outside channel, can a person communicate with
> friends without alerting enemies to the existance of secret communications?
In this case you are entering the realm of psychology. There may be
On Tue, Jan 25, 2000 at 04:51:12PM -0800, Nelson Minar wrote:
> Of course, this isn't easy to do - "matching statistical properties"
> isn't a simple closed problem. But I bet you could do fairly well in
> certain circumstances. For instance, Linux uses a strong random number
> when starting a TCP
>Sometimes it's important to hide the fact that a secret message exists. A
>good guy in enemy territory may wish to communicate with friends outside.
>Discovery of the ciphertext would alert the enemy to his presence. So the
>question becomes, without identifying the location of the ciphertext i
"The Ultimate Spy" book (by Keith Melton, published by Dorling Kindersley)
describes "the thing", a russian spying device in the 1950's, it also
features a lot of radio equipment and a non-contact (induction) spying
device for telephones (based on the Hall phenomenon).
regards,
Alexandre Alvarez
List:
It is fun to read http://www.msnbc.com/msn/361936.asp
especially at the end, because if "This isn't even small
potatoes; it's no more than sprouts." -- then, while the
hassle, prison and fine?
The conclusion seems to be ... prove me wrong, go
to jail. Of course, one may question a guy'
Okay, here's something I've been thinking of for a while. Run a
political discussion mailing list which mails audio files back and
forth. This list, at least in the US, would enjoy the highest
Constitutional protection. However, you'd never know if the low bits
of the audio stream have been tam
At 1:34 AM -0500 1/26/2000, Marc Horowitz wrote:
>Rick Smith <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
>>> The basic notion of stego is that one replaces 'noise' in a document with
>>> the stego'ed information. Thus, a 'good' stego system must use a crypto
>>> strategy whose statistical properties mimic the n
Ben Laurie writes:
> If you want a lot of people to see it, you can't keep it secret. If you
> can't keep it secret, you may as well just come out with it and publish
> the bits without stego.
>
> What did I miss?
It depends on how hostile the regime is. If you want to publish
something bu
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