At 12:34 AM -0500 on 2/9/00, Adam Shostack wrote:
Anyway, has anyone taken a look at what the system offers? It looks
to us like its covered by Chaum's blinding patent. They even call the
functions in schemas 1 2 "B" and "U", apparently for blinding and
unblinding.
My understanding, at
--- begin forwarded text
Reply-To: "Victor Dostov" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: "Victor Dostov" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: "R. A. Hettinga" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: paycash: blind signature etc.
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2000 18:33:39 +0300
Status: U
it's our fault with Russian, I
Beijing slammed over encryption
---
A United States Congressman has criticised new encryption regulations
released by Beijing, calling them a major invasion of privacy against
computer users worldwide, including US citizens.
[I have sent to Declan, cypherpunks, and cryptography. Please
forward appropriately. -Shabbir]
ICIJ, a working network of the world's leading investigative
reporters, is seeking volunteers to help ICIJ members in Latin
America install PGP. Note that PGP training is provided by ICIJ
staff,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_638000/638041.stm
UK publishes 'impossible' decryption law
At issue is the burden of proof
The UK Government came under fire on Thursday from the internet community
after it published a Bill to regulate covert surveillance.
The critics say the
http://www.ft.com/hippocampus/q34646a.htm
Financial Times, Friday February 11 2000
BIG BROTHER: Government unveils e-mail surveillance law
By Jean Eaglesham, Legal Correspondent
The government will face an "inevitable" human rights challenge to a new law
unveiled yesterday allowing officials to
Caspar Bowden writes:
And, as a result, the Bill proposes that the police or the security services
should have the power to force someone to hand over decryption keys or the
plain text of specified materials, such as e-mails, and jail those who
refuse.
Nobody's mentioned the possibility
http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB2210S0005
E-Spying Bill Called 'Escrow By Intimidation'
(02/10/00, 12:58 p.m. ET) By Madeleine Acey, TechWeb
The British government published a bill Thursday to update law enforcement's
interception powers to include communications made via company
It's "deniable encryption." One link is:
http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/home/naor/public_html/PAPERS/deniable_abs.h
tml
-Original Message-
From: Russell Nelson [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Friday, February 11, 2000 10:31
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Coerced decryption?
Russell Nelson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Nobody's mentioned the possibility of an encryption system which
always encrypts two documents simultaneously, with two different keys:
one to retrieves the first (real) document, and the second one which
retrieves to the second (innocuous) document.
Late last year the Capstone spec ("CAPSTONE (MYK-80) Specifications",
R21-TECH-30-95) was partially declassified as the result of a FOIA lawsuit[0].
The document is stamped "TOP SECRET UMBRA" on every page. UMBRA is a SIGINT
codeword, not an INFOSEC one, so the people who designed the thing
Russell Nelson wrote:
Caspar Bowden writes:
And, as a result, the Bill proposes that the police or the security services
should have the power to force someone to hand over decryption keys or the
plain text of specified materials, such as e-mails, and jail those who
refuse.
At 8:02 AM -0500 2/12/2000, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Late last year the Capstone spec ("CAPSTONE (MYK-80) Specifications",
R21-TECH-30-95) was partially declassified as the result of a FOIA lawsuit[0].
The document is stamped "TOP SECRET UMBRA" on every page. UMBRA is a SIGINT
codeword, not an
In article v04210102b4ca1b7a641f@[24.218.56.92],
Arnold G. Reinhold [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Clipper/Capstone was always advertised to the public as providing a
higher level (80-bits) of security than DES while allowing access by
law enforcement agencies.
Law enforcement friendly is very
What is current thinking of the AES finalists on NSA review
of the proposals. Will there be (or has there been), say, overtures
made to the developers to cooperate with national security and/or
law enforcement requirements.
Or is an alternate, parallel successor to DES underway for that
dual-
Russell Nelson writes:
Nobody's mentioned the possibility of an encryption system which
always encrypts two documents simultaneously, with two different keys:
one to retrieves the first (real) document, and the second one which
retrieves to the second (innocuous) document.
This idea has been
previously sent to WSJ:
| To the Editor:
|
| As reported, the Chinese government has moved to restrict the use
| of privacy-enhancing technologies and to surveill use of the Internet
| generally. Any country that does that ensures that in the global
| economy the only role they can
I've always thought that the unique id built into each device and
available to Law Enforcement (LE) without court order would give LE
huge leap forward in traffic analyses.
In other-words, all the digital messages from various capstone devices
could work their way around the world and LE would
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Arnold G. Reinhold) writes:
I've always thought that the unique id built into each device and available
to Law Enforcement (LE) without court order would give LE huge leap forward
in traffic analyses.
That's not unique to Clipper though, I bet there are systems out there
At 12:38 PM -0800 2/11/2000, David Wagner wrote:
In article v04210102b4ca1b7a641f@[24.218.56.92],
Arnold G. Reinhold [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Clipper/Capstone was always advertised to the public as providing a
higher level (80-bits) of security than DES while allowing access by
law
I agree with Peter and Arnold; in fact, I am convinced that
as of this date, there are only two areas where national
agencies have a lead over the private/international sector,
namely one-time-pad deployment and traffic analysis. Of those,
I would place a bet that only traffic analysis will
Dan Geer wrote:
I would place a bet that only traffic analysis will remain an
area of sustainable lead, that traffic analysis is the only
area where commercial interests will not naturally marshall
the resources to threaten the lead of the national agencies.
This may well be. However, a writer
It seems that with digicash under new management the old papers archive has
melted away. Does anyone have a (postscript) copy of the "Security Without
Identification: Transaction Systems To Make Big Brother Obsolete" paper by
David Chaum? The postscript version had some illustrations which
On Thu, 10 Feb 2000, Jim McCoy wrote:
It seems that with digicash under new management the old papers archive has
melted away. Does anyone have a (postscript) copy of the "Security Without
Identification: Transaction Systems To Make Big Brother Obsolete" paper by
David Chaum? The
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