Identity Based Encryption

2003-12-26 Thread Al
Hello, I have had a look at Identity Based Encryption but I have not been able to find out whether there are any protecting patents. It appears that the breakthrough happend just two years ago with the work of Beneh and Franklin [1] and there exist an open source implementation of their scheme

Re: Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card (was: example: secure computing kernel needed)

2003-12-26 Thread Rick Wash
On Sun, Dec 21, 2003 at 08:55:16PM -0800, Carl Ellison wrote: IBM has started rolling out machines that have a TPM installed. [snip ...] Then again, TPMs cost money and I don't know any private individuals who are willing to pay extra for a machine with one. Given that, it is unlikely

Re: example: secure computing kernel needed

2003-12-26 Thread Seth David Schoen
William Arbaugh writes: If that is the case, then strong authentication provides the same degree of control over your computer. With remote attestation, the distant end determines if they wish to communicate with you based on the fingerprint of your configuration. With strong

Re: Non-repudiation (was RE: The PAIN mnemonic)

2003-12-26 Thread Ian Grigg
Amir Herzberg wrote: Ben, Carl and others, At 18:23 21/12/2003, Carl Ellison wrote: and it included non-repudiation which is an unachievable, nonsense concept. Any alternative definition or concept to cover what protocol designers usually refer to as non-repudiation

Re: Ousourced Trust (was Re: Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card and something else before

2003-12-26 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
At 02:01 PM 12/23/2003 -0500, Rich Salz wrote: If so, then I believe that we need a federated identity and management infrastructure. The difference is that the third-party PKI enrollment model still doesn't make sense, and organizations will take over their own identity issues, as with SAML

Re: Non-repudiation (was RE: The PAIN mnemonic)

2003-12-26 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
At 11:18 AM 12/23/2003 +0200, Amir Herzberg wrote: Any alternative definition or concept to cover what protocol designers usually refer to as non-repudiation specifications? For example non-repudiation of origin, i.e. the ability of recipient to convince a third party that a message was sent

Re: Ousourced Trust (was Re: Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card and something else before

2003-12-26 Thread Rich Salz
2) certificates were fundamentally designed to address a trust issue in offline environments where a modicum of static, stale data was better than nothing How many years have you been saying this, now? :) How do those modern online environments achieve end-to-end content integrity and privacy?