Lynn and John Saylior have raised an important point.
Who at Baltimore, or was once there, is likely to be able to
account for the security of the certs for customers who
still rely upon them? Not somebody to spin a fairy tale, but to
truthfully explain what Baltimore has done to avoid
Instant Ciphertext-Only Cryptanalysis of GSM Encrypted
Communications, by Elad Barkan, Eli Biham, Nathan Keller
http://cryptome.org/gsm-crack-bbk.pdf (18 Pages, 234KB)
Abstract. In this paper we present a very practical cipher-text only
cryptanalysis of GSM encrypted communications, and
We offer a recent South African government statement
on encryption import and export regulation:
http://cryptome.org/za-crypto.htm
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James Ellis, GCHQ, in his account of the development of non-secret
encryption credits a Bell Laboratories 1944 report on Project
C-43 for stimulating his conception:
http://www.cesg.gov.uk/publications/media/nsecret/possnse.pdf
The Possibility of Secure Non-Secret Digital Encryption
J. H.
New book by Joel McNamara who runs the Tempest website:
http://www.eskimo.com/~joel/tempest.html
http://www.wiley.com/legacy/compbooks/mcnamara/
Secrets of Computer Espionage: Tactics and Countermeasures
by Joel McNamara
Covers electronic and wireless eavesdropping, computer surveillance,
If the FBI cannot crack PGP that does not mean other
agencies with greater prowess cannot. It is unlikely that
the capability to crack PGP would be publicly revealed
for that would close an invaluable source of information.
Intel crackers hardly ever reveal their most essential
tools, though
