If the FBI cannot crack PGP that does not mean other
agencies with greater prowess cannot. It is unlikely that
the capability to crack PGP would be publicly revealed
for that would close an invaluable source of information.

Intel crackers hardly ever reveal their most essential
tools, though there are orchestrated releases of
capability to mislead.

In the case of the VENONA decrypts, there have been
only partial public releases, along with misleading stories
about how the decrypts were done -- the official story they
were done only by dedicated cryptanalysts without help
of code books or other assists, that Russian carelessness
of OTP preparation provided the crib. Unofficial stories are 
that Russian codebooks were used, at least for some of the
decrypts -- Thomas Powers, for one, recounts this version
in several reprinted essays in "The Intelligence Wars." That
cover stories have been arranged for how the deciphering 
was actually done, some not privy to the hardworking NSA

An undisclosed amount of the VENONA messages remain
undeciphered, or at least not made public. Speculation is
that NSA and whomever do not want to tell the full story of
the decrypt capability, again, as with most intelligence 
agencies it is more beneficial to never reveal full capabilities,
in particular not to temporary allies with the understanding
that allies always spy on each other, whether those are US 
TLAs or foreign friends.

Ther recent opening of domestic cooperation among the intel
agencies and law enforcement will not likely get any of them
to share fully.

Still, it is impressive that PRZ valiantly argues that PGP is
algorithmically impregnable. That should satisfy its users as
well as its crackers. An uncracked code is the perfect spying
tool. Based on a mulitude of accounts of sophisticated 
espionage deceptions it might be suspected that is the origin 
of PK crypto, and why it was leaked, and leaked again, and
crypto export was eased, then greased again.

Presumably there will be periodic reports of cryptographic
impregnability to foster wider if not wiser use.

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