If the FBI cannot crack PGP that does not mean other agencies with greater prowess cannot. It is unlikely that the capability to crack PGP would be publicly revealed for that would close an invaluable source of information.
Intel crackers hardly ever reveal their most essential tools, though there are orchestrated releases of capability to mislead. In the case of the VENONA decrypts, there have been only partial public releases, along with misleading stories about how the decrypts were done -- the official story they were done only by dedicated cryptanalysts without help of code books or other assists, that Russian carelessness of OTP preparation provided the crib. Unofficial stories are that Russian codebooks were used, at least for some of the decrypts -- Thomas Powers, for one, recounts this version in several reprinted essays in "The Intelligence Wars." That cover stories have been arranged for how the deciphering was actually done, some not privy to the hardworking NSA crackers. An undisclosed amount of the VENONA messages remain undeciphered, or at least not made public. Speculation is that NSA and whomever do not want to tell the full story of the decrypt capability, again, as with most intelligence agencies it is more beneficial to never reveal full capabilities, in particular not to temporary allies with the understanding that allies always spy on each other, whether those are US TLAs or foreign friends. Ther recent opening of domestic cooperation among the intel agencies and law enforcement will not likely get any of them to share fully. Still, it is impressive that PRZ valiantly argues that PGP is algorithmically impregnable. That should satisfy its users as well as its crackers. An uncracked code is the perfect spying tool. Based on a mulitude of accounts of sophisticated espionage deceptions it might be suspected that is the origin of PK crypto, and why it was leaked, and leaked again, and crypto export was eased, then greased again. Presumably there will be periodic reports of cryptographic impregnability to foster wider if not wiser use. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]