End of the line for Ireland's dotcom star

2003-09-23 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4759214-103676,00.html

Guardian |

End of the line for Ireland's dotcom star

Software firm saw boom and bust; now the core business is sold

Geoff Gibbs
Tuesday September 23, 2003
The Guardian

Baltimore Technologies, the Irish software concern whose spectacular rise
and fall epitomised the boom and bust of the dotcom era, reduced itself to
little more than a cash shell yesterday by selling off the core business on
which its fortunes were founded.

The internet security company, which failed to find a buyer after putting
itself up for sale this year, said it was selling its loss-making public
key infrastructure, or PKI, operation to the American-controlled business
beTRUSTed for £5m.

PKI is used to make e-business secure and was the core technology behind
Baltimore's heady but brief elevation to the ranks of FTSE 100 corporations
before the dotcom bubble burst two years ago.

At the height of its fortunes the Dublin company was valued at more than
£5bn and employed about 1,500 people.

The PKI sell-off marks the completion of a controlled programme of asset
sales that has raised almost £21m over the past couple of months and will
leave Baltimore with only a handful of employees in its head office and
legacy technology support functions.

It is the end of the story of Baltimore as a software company. This is the
final paragraph of the final chapter, chief executive Bijan Khezri
acknowledged yesterday.

Mr Khezri, who left Baltimore in 2000 and returned the following year to
oversee its restructuring, said shareholders would have the opportunity to
vote on what course the company should take by the end of this year -
possibly at an extraordinary meeting to approve the PKI sale in November.

Options included returning cash to shareholders, allowing another business
to reverse into the company, or making an acquisition.

This transaction is our last significant asset disposal and will deliver
on our commitment to eradicate operational cash burn and maximise
shareholder value, he told shareholders.

Baltimore shares fell 4.5p to 36.5p on news of the sale - a far cry from
the £13.50 peak scaled in March 2000.

The PKI business - which includes hundreds of customers in the government,
telecommunications and financial markets - generated revenues of £19.3m in
the year to last December but ran up losses of £11.1m before interest and
tax.

Mr Khezri said the need for scale in the global infrastructure software
market made the PKI disposal an obvious move. The long term
competitiveness of the PKI business requires critical mass, and beTRUSTed
has emerged as an excellent partner to take our PKI technology and customer
base to its next level.

Up to 80 of the PKI's 180 employees are expected to transfer with the
business to its new owners. A few more will be retained by Baltimore but
the company warned that about 60 staff face redundancy.

The new owner, beTRUSTed, said more than three quarters of its clients had
made significant investments in Baltimore's PKI technology, which it had
implemented and operated for many years.

We believe beTRUSTed's ownership will provide the necessary stability and
support for existing and prospective clients to build and deploy critical
business applications that leverage Baltimore's technology, said the
company's chief executive, John Garvey.


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Re: End of the line for Ireland's dotcom star

2003-09-23 Thread Anne Lynn Wheeler
At 01:06 PM 9/23/2003 -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4759214-103676,00.html
so ignore for the moment the little indiscretion
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#44 Proposal for a new PKI model (At 
least I hope it's new)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#50 Proposal for a new PKI model (At 
least I hope it's new)

and the part of turning a simple authentication problem into a 
significantly harder and error prone (along with exploits and 
vulnerabilities ... not to say expensive) problem:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#4 Is cryptography where security 
took the wrong branch?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#7 Is cryptography where security 
took the wrong branch?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#11 Resolving an identifier into a 
meaning

there has been the some past discussions of what happens to long term CA 
private key management over an extended period of time, possibly involving 
several corporate identities. Checking latest release browsers ... I find 
two CA certificates for GTE cybertrust ... one issued in 1996 and good for 
10 years and another issued in 1998 and good for 20 years.

so lets say as part of some audit ... is it still possible to show that 
there has been long term, continuous, non-stop, highest security custodial 
care of the GTE cybertrust CA private keys. If there hasn't ... would 
anybody even know? ... and is there any institutional memory as to who 
might be responsible for issuing a revokation for the keys? or responsible 
for notifying anybody that the certificates no longer need be included in 
future browsers?
--
Anne  Lynn Wheelerhttp://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
 

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Re: End of the line for Ireland's dotcom star

2003-09-23 Thread John Saylor
hi

( 03.09.23 13:45 -0600 ) Anne  Lynn Wheeler:
 is it still possible to show that there has been long term,
 continuous, non-stop, highest security custodial care of the GTE
 cybertrust CA private keys. If there hasn't ... would anybody even
 know?

i worked at cybertrust/baltimore up until about 3 years ago [like rats
leaving a sinking ship ...].and, as you might imagine i have no idea
what's going on with those keys.

there was a big institutional fight over how much money to spend on
putting those keys in the browsers, now pretty much meaningless.  the
keys were always well watched, at least while i was there. i had to work
in that room a few times, and i was watched then too. the guy who ran
the facility [like a tight ship] left shortly after i did, so i have
even less faith in the integrity of those certs now than i would have
otherwise because his replacement probably couldn't even tell you what
TCP stands for.

but as you imply, all bets are off now.

-- 
\js

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Re: End of the line for Ireland's dotcom star

2003-09-23 Thread John Young
Lynn and John Saylior have raised an important point. 

Who at Baltimore, or was once there, is likely to be able to
account for the security of the certs for customers who
still rely upon them? Not somebody to spin a fairy tale, but to 
truthfully explain what Baltimore has done to avoid betraying
the trust of its customers, or handing that trust over to others
who may not have Baltimore's scruples or be bound by its
promises.

Not that Baltimore's investors would give a hoot, but
customers might want to know who to challenge about
their private, once secure, data.

This matter is important for it is a bellweather of what's
to come with failure of other trusted parties or who or
bought by less scrupulous if more financially endowed
than always absolutely trustworthy crypto corporations.

The recent stink about betrayal of customer data with 
JetBlue, Acxiom and eBay is timely.


-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Re: End of the line for Ireland's dotcom star

2003-09-23 Thread Bill Frantz
At 12:45 PM -0700 9/23/03, Anne  Lynn Wheeler wrote:
At 01:06 PM 9/23/2003 -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4759214-103676,00.html

so ignore for the moment the little indiscretion
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#44 Proposal for a new PKI model (At
least I hope it's new)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003l.html#50 Proposal for a new PKI model (At
least I hope it's new)

and the part of turning a simple authentication problem into a
significantly harder and error prone (along with exploits and
vulnerabilities ... not to say expensive) problem:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#4 Is cryptography where security
took the wrong branch?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#7 Is cryptography where security
took the wrong branch?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#11 Resolving an identifier into a
meaning


there has been the some past discussions of what happens to long term CA
private key management over an extended period of time, possibly involving
several corporate identities. Checking latest release browsers ... I find
two CA certificates for GTE cybertrust ... one issued in 1996 and good for
10 years and another issued in 1998 and good for 20 years.

so lets say as part of some audit ... is it still possible to show that
there has been long term, continuous, non-stop, highest security custodial
care of the GTE cybertrust CA private keys. If there hasn't ... would
anybody even know? ... and is there any institutional memory as to who
might be responsible for issuing a revokation for the keys? or responsible
for notifying anybody that the certificates no longer need be included in
future browsers?
--
Anne  Lynn Wheelerhttp://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm

Note that proposals such as Tyler Close's YURL
http://www.waterken.com/dev/YURL/  avoid the issue of trust in the
TTP/CA.  As such, I find them attractive whenever they can be used.

Cheers - Bill


-
Bill Frantz| There's nothing so clear as   | Periwinkle
(408)356-8506  | vague idea you haven't written | 16345 Englewood Ave
www.pwpconsult.com | down yet. -- Dean Tribble | Los Gatos, CA 95032


-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Peppercoin Raises $4 Million in First Round Funding, Appoints CEO

2003-09-23 Thread R. A. Hettinga
Rivest and Micali's microcheque protocol gets a ducat-download.

Next stop an IPO -- and then an eBay buyout... ;-).

Cheers,
RAH
---

http://www.econtentmag.com/Articles/ArticlePrint.aspx?ArticleID=5506

EContentmag.com

Peppercoin Raises $4 Million in First Round Funding, Appoints CEO

Posted Sep 23, 2003
http://www.econtentmag.com/?ArticleID=5506
All Content Copyright ' 1998-2003 EContentmag.com - All Rights Reserved

Peppercoin, Inc. a micro-payment services company that enables online
merchants to sell low-priced digital goods, has raised $4 million in a
Series A round of financing from POD Holding and private investors. The
funding brings the total raised to date to $5.7 million, which includes a
seed round from private investors that was announced February this year.

Peppercoin has also announced the appointment of CEO, Robert Kiburz,
formerly VP and General Manager of the Billing and Customer Care unit at
Lucent Technologies. New appointments to the Peppercoin Board of Directors
include Johan Pontin and Peter S. Lawrence, managing director, both
respectively of POD Holding. Pontin is the founder of POD Holding, a
private equity partnership with offices in Stockholm, Sweden and Boston,
Mass. They join Peppercoin CEO Robert Kiburz and its two founders,
Professors Ronald L. Rivest and Silvio Micali, co-founders of the
Cryptography and Information Security Group at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology's Laboratory for Computer Science. Rivest is also a founder
of RSA Security and VeriSign.

The Peppercoin Payment Service is designed to allow music companies, online
game providers, newspaper and magazine publishers, and other digital
content providers to sell low-priced online content profitably. Newspapers,
magazines and other publishers will be able to add news stand pricing for
single-issue or article access, while game sites will be able to add
pay-per-play pricing to their subscription models.

(http://www.peppercoin.com ), ( http://www.podholding.com )

-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Re: End of the line for Ireland's dotcom star

2003-09-23 Thread Peter Gutmann
John Young [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:

Who at Baltimore, or was once there, is likely to be able to account for the
security of the certs for customers who still rely upon them? Not somebody to
spin a fairy tale, but to truthfully explain what Baltimore has done to avoid
betraying the trust of its customers, or handing that trust over to others who
may not have Baltimore's scruples or be bound by its promises.

Is it really that big a deal though?  You're only ever as secure as the *least
secure* of the 100+ CAs automatically trusted by MSIE/CryptoAPI and Mozilla,
and I suspect that a number of those (ones with 512-bit keys or moribund web
sites indicating that the owner has disappeared) are much more of a risk than
the GTE/Baltimore/beTRUSTed/whoever-will-follow-them succession.

The real lesson of this, I think, is the observation that The company would
have done better to concentrate on making its core PKI technology easier to
deploy, which applies to most other PKI vendors and products as well.
Baltimore had the bizarre business strategy of using revenue from its PKI
products as a means of driving/funding work in its other product branches,
which is a bit like a drowning man going for a boat anchor as his most likely
flotation device.

Peter (curently flooded with Linux VPN mail, please be patient).

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Re: Peppercoin Raises $4 Million in First Round Funding, Appoints CEO

2003-09-23 Thread R. A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Status:  U
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2003 16:32:22 -0500
To: R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Adam L Beberg [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: FoRK [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Peppercoin Raises $4 Million in First Round Funding,
Appoints CEO
List-Id: Friends of Rohit Khare  fork.xent.com
List-Archive: http://lair.xent.com/pipermail/fork
List-Post: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Help: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Subscribe: http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork,
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

On Tuesday, September 23, 2003, at 03:45  PM, R. A. Hettinga wrote:

 Rivest and Micali's microcheque protocol gets a ducat-download.

 Next stop an IPO -- and then an eBay buyout... ;-).

Hahaha... about 7 percent per transaction - NOT mentioned on the 
website anywhere, I had to look in a Wired article - we call that an 
F*** the merchant rate folks, even AMEX isn't that high.

Windows only. Interface software is NOT open source. Oh, and they are 
used by 6 merchants. VISA is soo scared, .

However, POD Holding is obviously a good source of sucker money, send 
in those business plans folks :)

- Adam L. Beberg - [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   http://www.mithral.com/~beberg/

___
FoRK mailing list
http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Re: [Mac_crypto] Re: Peppercoin Raises $4 Million in First Round Funding, Appoints CEO

2003-09-23 Thread Nicko van Someren
On Wednesday, Sep 24, 2003, at 02:18 Europe/London, Adam L Beberg wrote:

Rivest and Micali's microcheque protocol gets a ducat-download.

Next stop an IPO -- and then an eBay buyout... ;-).
Hahaha... about 7 percent per transaction - NOT mentioned on the
website anywhere, I had to look in a Wired article - we call that an
F*** the merchant rate folks, even AMEX isn't that high.
I think you'll find that when the transaction value is small the 
merchant rates from all the credit card companies are substantially 
higher than that.  It's common for the marginal merchant rate to be on 
the order of 2-4% for online transactions but there is usually a base 
charge of 25 cents or more as well as the marginal rate.  On a $2 
charge for a song the merchant could well be paying more than 30 cents 
in fees, which is more than double the rate for Peppercoin.

Windows only. Interface software is NOT open source.
This is a severe limitation if you're trying to sell to people on this 
mailing list but it covers a large fraction of the market by value.  I 
would expect to see a Mac client too soon, thereby covering more than 
99% by value of their target market.  I doubt you'll see open source 
interface software and I doubt that their market will care.

Oh, and they are used by 6 merchants. VISA is soo scared, 
.
To push a technology like this into even 6 merchants before you've got 
proper funding for your company is not bad.  That said, I have no doubt 
that they will ever scare Visa and I have no doubt they they never 
intended to.

	Nicko

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Peppercoin fee structure...

2003-09-23 Thread R. A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Status:  U
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2003 22:51:37 -0400
To: R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Ronald L. Rivest [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Peppercoin fee structure...
Cc: Adam L Beberg [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Hi Bob --

You forwarded a posting from some Adam L Beberg regarding
Peppercoin that needs correction.  Adam compares the percentage
fee charged by Peppercoin (e.g. 7-8 percent) against what the
credit card companies charge (e.g. 2-5 percent), and makes some
childish and rude comments about Peppercoin in conclusion.

What Adam failed to understand is that Peppercoin charges no
fixed fee whatsoever per transaction, whereas credit card
companies typically charge 25 cents or so per transaction.

Thus, for a nickel micropayment, Peppercoin charges 0.35 cents,
while Adam's favorite credit card company charges 25 cents or more
to process the transaction.  The credit card company is charging,
in effect, a fee of 400 percent (that's FOUR HUNDRED PERCENT),
compared to Peppercoin's 7 percent.

Adam, your apology is accepted.

 Cheers,
 Ron Rivest


Ronald L. Rivest
Room 324, 200 Technology Square, Cambridge MA 02139
Tel 617-253-5880, Fax 617-258-9738, Email [EMAIL PROTECTED]

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]