On Feb 2, 2005, at 1:32 PM, bear wrote:
On Mon, 31 Jan 2005, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
[Moderator's note: The quick answer is no. The person who claims
otherwise is seriously misinformed. I'm sure others will chime
in. --Perry]
[snip]
When using CBC mode, one should not encrypt more than 2^32 64-b
On Thu, Feb 03, 2005 at 11:51:57AM -0500, Trei, Peter wrote:
> It could easily be leveraged to make motherboards
> which will only run 'authorized' OSs, and OSs
> which will run only 'authorized' software.
[..]
> If you 'take ownership' as you put it, the internal
> keys and certs change, and a
Erwann ABALEA <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>I've read your objections. Maybe I wasn't clear. What's wrong in installing a
>cryptographic device by default on PC motherboards? I work for a PKI 'vendor',
>and for me, software private keys is a nonsense.
A simple crypto device controlled by the same
Uh, you *really* have no idea how much the black hat community is
looking forward to TCPA. For example, Office is going to have core
components running inside a protected environment totally immune to
antivirus.
How? TCPA is only a cryptographic device, and some BIOS code, nothing
else. Does
Amir Herzberg wrote:
We develop TrustBar, a simple extension to FireFox (& Mozilla), that
displays the name and logo of SSL protected sites, as well as of the CA
(so users can notice the use of untrusted CA). I think it is fair to say
that this extension fixes some glitches in the deployment of
Erwann ABALEA
> On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Trei, Peter wrote:
>
> > Seeing as it comes out of the TCG, this is almost certainly
> > the enabling hardware for Palladium/NGSCB. Its a part of
> > your computer which you may not have full control over.
>
> Please stop relaying FUD. You have full control
>
Michael H. Warfield wrote
What Amir and Ahmad are looking at is
showing the CA as part of the trust equation
when the user hits a site. Some CAs will
enter the user's consciousness via normal
branding methods, and new ones will
trigger care & caution. Which is what
we want - if something strange
>From: "Steven M. Bellovin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Sent: Feb 2, 2005 1:39 PM
>To: bear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Cc: Aram Perez <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Cryptography
>Subject: Re: Is 3DES Broken?
...
>>I think you meant ECB mode?
>No, I meant CBC -- there's a birthday paradox attack to watch out for.
Yep
On Thu, 2005-02-03 at 03:57 +, Ian G wrote:
> Daniel Carosone wrote:
> >On Wed, Feb 02, 2005 at 10:11:54PM +0200, Amir Herzberg wrote:
> >>We develop TrustBar, a simple extension to FireFox (& Mozilla), that
> >>displays the name and logo of SSL protected sites, as well as of the CA
> >>(so
CALL FOR PARTICIPATION**
*
DIMACS Workshop on Theft in E-Commerce: Content, Identity, and Service
April 14 - 15, 2005
DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Organizers:
Daniel Carosone responded to me:
We develop TrustBar, a simple extension to FireFox (& Mozilla), that
displays the name and logo of SSL protected sites, as well as of the CA
(so users can notice the use of untrusted CA).
Other merits of the idea aside, if the user knows the CA is untrusted,
what
On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Dan Kaminsky wrote:
> Uh, you *really* have no idea how much the black hat community is
> looking forward to TCPA. For example, Office is going to have core
> components running inside a protected environment totally immune to
> antivirus.
How? TCPA is only a cryptographic de
On Thu, 3 Feb 2005, Jay Sulzberger wrote:
> On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Erwann ABALEA wrote:
>
> > On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Trei, Peter wrote:
> >
> >> Seeing as it comes out of the TCG, this is almost certainly
> >> the enabling hardware for Palladium/NGSCB. Its a part of
> >> your computer which you may not
Bonjour,
On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Erwann ABALEA wrote:
> On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Trei, Peter wrote:
>
> > Seeing as it comes out of the TCG, this is almost certainly
> > the enabling hardware for Palladium/NGSCB. Its a part of
> > your computer which you may not have full control over.
>
> Please stop rel
>>> Ian G <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 2/2/2005 6:38:46 PM >>>
> I'm just curious on this point. I haven't seen much
> to indicate that Microsoft and others are ready
> for a nymous, tradeable software assets world.
No, and neither are corporate customers, to a large extent.
Accountability is, in fact, a
On Wed, Feb 02, 2005 at 05:30:33PM +0100, Erwann ABALEA wrote:
> Please stop relaying FUD. You have full control over your PC, even if this
Please stop relaying pro-DRM pabulum. The only reason for Nagscab is
restricting the user's rights to his own files.
Of course there are other reasons for h
On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Erwann ABALEA wrote:
On Wed, 2 Feb 2005, Trei, Peter wrote:
Seeing as it comes out of the TCG, this is almost certainly
the enabling hardware for Palladium/NGSCB. Its a part of
your computer which you may not have full control over.
Please stop relaying FUD. You have full contr
On Thu, Feb 03, 2005 at 03:57:06AM +, Ian G wrote:
> Daniel Carosone wrote:
>
> >Other merits of the idea aside, if the user knows the CA is untrusted,
> >what's it doing in the browser's trust path?
>
> The user doesn't select the trust path, the browser manufacturer
> does.
> [..]
> How do
"Tyler Durden" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>That "chip"...is it likely to be an ASIC or is there already such a thing as
>a security network processor? (ie, a cheaper network processor that only
>handles security apps, etc...)
>
>Or could it be an FPGA?
Neither. Currently they've typically bee
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