James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com writes:
For password-authenticated key agreement such as TLS-SRP or TLS-PSK to work,
login has to be in the chrome.
Sure, but that's a relatively tractable UI problem (and see the comment below
on Camino). Certificates on the other hand are an apparently
Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
[cross-posted to tahoe-...@allmydata.org and cryptogra...@metzdowd.com]
Folks:
It doesn't look like I'm going to get time to write a long post about
this bundle of issues, comparing Cleversafe with Tahoe-LAFS (both use
erasure coding and encryption, and the
Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
[dropping tahoe-dev from Cc:]
On Thursday,2009-08-06, at 2:52 , Ben Laurie wrote:
Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
I don't think there is any basis to the claims that Cleversafe
makes that their erasure-coding (Information Dispersal)-based
system is
On Sun, 9 Aug 2009, Jerry Leichter wrote:
Since people do keep bringing up Moore's Law in an attempt to justify
larger keys our systems stronger than cryptography, it's worth
keeping in mind that we are approaching fairly deep physical limits.
I wrote about this on this list quite a while
james hughes wrote:
On Aug 6, 2009, at 1:52 AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
I don't think there is any basis to the claims that Cleversafe makes
that their erasure-coding (Information Dispersal)-based system is
fundamentally safer, e.g. these claims from [3]: a
This conversation has bifurcated, since I replied and removed tahoe-
dev from the Cc: line, sending just to the cryptography list, and
David-Sarah Hopwood has replied and removed cryptography, leaving
just the tahoe-dev list.
Here is the root of the thread on the cryptography mailing list
On Monday,2009-08-10, at 13:47 , Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
This conversation has bifurcated,
Oh, and while I don't mind if people want to talk about this on the
tahoe-dev list, it doesn't have that much to do with tahoe-lafs
anymore, now that we're done comparing Tahoe-LAFS to
Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
[dropping tahoe-dev from Cc:]
On Thursday,2009-08-06, at 2:52 , Ben Laurie wrote:
Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
I don't think there is any basis to the claims that Cleversafe
makes that their erasure-coding (Information Dispersal)-based
system is
--
James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com writes:
For password-authenticated key agreement such as
TLS-SRP or TLS-PSK to work, login has to be in the
chrome.
Peter Gutmann wrote:
Sure, but that's a relatively tractable UI problem
Indeed. You know how to solve it, and I know how to
solve
[Moderator's note: top posting considered harmful:
http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg09287.html
--Perry]
Just to complicate things a little... we're working with a number of
groups now who are using onlineCAs that issue short-lived x509 certs
derived from a
Just spotted this on one of the tech news aggregators -
http://www.entropykey.co.uk
The Entropy Key, or eKey, is a small, unobtrusive and easily
installed USB stick that generates high-quality random numbers,
or entropy, which can improve the performance, security and
reliability of
James A. Donald jam...@echeque.com writes:
This, however, requires both client UI software, and an api to server side
scripts such as PHP, Perl, or Python (the P in LAMP). On the server side, we
need a request object in the script language that tells the script that this
request comes from an
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