Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm

2009-09-08 Thread Jack Lloyd
On Wed, Sep 02, 2009 at 10:58:03AM +0530, priya yelgar wrote: Hi all, I have implemented RNG using AES algorithm in CTR mode. To test my implementation I needed some test vectors. How ever I searched on the CSRC site, but found the test vectors for AES_CBC not for AES CTR. Please?

Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome?

2009-09-08 Thread Nicolas Williams
On Thu, Sep 03, 2009 at 04:26:30PM +1200, Peter Gutmann wrote: Steven Bellovin s...@cs.columbia.edu writes: This returns us to the previously-unsolved UI problem: how -- with today's users, and with something more or less like today's browsers since that's what today's users know -- can a

Re: [cryptography] AES-GMAC as a hash

2009-09-08 Thread Eric Young
Darren J Moffat wrote: Ignoring performance for now what is the consensus on the suitabilty of using AES-GMAC not as MAC but as a hash ? Would it be safe ? The key input to AES-GMAC would be something well known to the data and/or software. The only reason I'm asking is assuming it can be

Re: RNG using AES CTR as encryption algorithm

2009-09-08 Thread David Johnston
NIST doesn't provide specific KAT vectors for AES-CTR because the results depend on your specific counter construction. When you interact with a FIPS test lab, you will provide them with your counter construction, they will provide you with the KATs and you will then test to those KATs. This

Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP

2009-09-08 Thread James A. Donald
Nicolas Williams wrote: One possible problem: streaming [real-time] content. Brian Warner wrote: Yeah, that's a very different problem space. You need the low-alacrity stuff from Tahoe, but also you don't generally know the full contents in advance. So you're talking about a mutable stream

Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome?

2009-09-08 Thread Peter Gutmann
Ian G i...@systemics.com writes: If one is trying to solve the whole thing, then using the much-commented secure-bookmarks model would do this. Within the secure bookmark, record the user's certificate and cache enough info on the server's cert to deal with replacements (like, cert, name, CA).

Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome?

2009-09-08 Thread Steven Bellovin
On Sep 3, 2009, at 12:26 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote: Steven Bellovin s...@cs.columbia.edu writes: This returns us to the previously-unsolved UI problem: how -- with today's users, and with something more or less like today's browsers since that's what today's users know -- can a spoof-proof

Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome?

2009-09-08 Thread Peter Gutmann
Steven Bellovin s...@cs.columbia.edu writes: Peter, I'm not sure what you mean by good enough to satisfy security geeks vs. good enough for most purposes. I'm not looking for theoretically good enough, for any value of theory; my metric -- as a card-carrying security geek -- is precisely good

Re: [tahoe-dev] Bringing Tahoe ideas to HTTP

2009-09-08 Thread Brian Warner
James A. Donald wrote: Nicolas Williams wrote: One possible problem: streaming [real-time] content. Brian Warner wrote: Yeah, that's a very different problem space. You need the low-alacrity stuff from Tahoe, but also you don't generally know the full contents in advance. So

Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome?

2009-09-08 Thread Jerry Leichter
On Sep 3, 2009, at 12:26 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote: This returns us to the previously-unsolved UI problem: how -- with today's users, and with something more or less like today's browsers since that's what today's users know -- can a spoof-proof password prompt be presented? Good enough to

Re: SHA-1 and Git (was Re: [tahoe-dev] Tahoe-LAFS key management, part 2: Tahoe-LAFS is like encrypted git)

2009-09-08 Thread Peter Gutmann
Thor Lancelot Simon t...@rek.tjls.com writes: I think we're largely talking past one another. As regards new horrible problems I meant simply that if there _are_ new horrible problems_ such that we need to switch away from SHA1 in the TLS PRF, the design mistakes made in TLS 1.1 will make it

Re: Source for Skype Trojan released

2009-09-08 Thread Dave Howe
Stephan Neuhaus wrote: On Aug 31, 2009, at 13:20, Jerry Leichter wrote: It can “...intercept all audio data coming and going to the Skype process.” Interesting, but is this a novel idea? As far as I can see, the process intercepts the audio before it reaches Skype and after it has left

Re: so how do *you* manage your keys, then? part 3

2009-09-08 Thread Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn
[added Cc: tahoe-...@allmydata.org, and I added ke...@guarana.org on the whitelist so his posts will go through to tahoe-dev even if he isn't subscribed] On Tuesday,2009-09-08, at 5:54 , Kevin Easton wrote: Possession of the read-cap to the mutable file gives you two things: it gives you

Re: Client Certificate UI for Chrome?

2009-09-08 Thread Jerry Leichter
On Sep 7, 2009, at 8:58 AM, Jerry Leichter wrote: ...standard Mac OS GUI element to prompt for passwords ... I should expand on that a bit: This GUI element is used for all kinds of things tied to a window, not just passwords. For example, if you try to close a window that contains stuff