2) certificates were fundamentally designed to address a trust issue in
offline environments where a modicum of static, stale data was better
than nothing
How many years have you been saying this, now? :) How do those modern
online environments achieve end-to-end content integrity and privacy?
At 11:18 AM 12/23/2003 +0200, Amir Herzberg wrote:
Any alternative definition or concept to cover what protocol designers
usually refer to as non-repudiation specifications? For example
non-repudiation of origin, i.e. the ability of recipient to convince a
third party that a message was sent (to
At 02:01 PM 12/23/2003 -0500, Rich Salz wrote:
If so, then I believe that we need a federated identity and management
infrastructure. The difference is that the third-party PKI enrollment
model still doesn't make sense, and organizations will take over their own
identity issues, as with SAML and
Amir Herzberg wrote:
>
> Ben, Carl and others,
>
> At 18:23 21/12/2003, Carl Ellison wrote:
>
> > > >and it included non-repudiation which is an unachievable,
> > > nonsense concept.
>
> Any alternative definition or concept to cover what protocol designers
> usually refer to as non-repudiation
William Arbaugh writes:
> If that is the case, then strong authentication provides the same
> degree of control over your computer. With remote attestation, the
> distant end determines if they wish to communicate with you based on
> the fingerprint of your configuration. With strong authentica
On Sun, Dec 21, 2003 at 08:55:16PM -0800, Carl Ellison wrote:
>
> IBM has started rolling out machines that have a TPM installed.
> [snip ...]
> Then again, TPMs cost money and I don't know any private individuals who are
> willing to pay extra for a machine with one. Given that, it is unli
Hello,
I have had a look at Identity Based Encryption but I have not been able to
find out whether there are any protecting patents. It appears that the
breakthrough happend just two years ago with the work of Beneh and Franklin
[1] and there exist an open source implementation of their scheme (no
