Re: Hyperencryption by virtual satellite

2004-07-11 Thread John Denker
Way back on 05/20/2004 Ivan Krstic wrote: Michael O. Rabin lectures on hyper-encryption and provably everlasting secrets. ... View here: http://athome.harvard.edu/dh/hvs.html To my surprise, there has been no follow-up discussion on this list. (Hint: Most people on this list will want to sk

Re: EZ Pass and the fast lane ....

2004-07-11 Thread Ivan Krstic
Ian Grigg wrote: [...] I can make a call, and nobody can read my location without doing complicated tracking stuff with many cells. I understand usually no more than three are required, and even two are enough. The day that the cops get their dream of cell phones being able to signal location, that

Re: Using crypto against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming...

2004-07-11 Thread Amir Herzberg
Ian Grigg wrote: This indeed is the crux of the weakness of the SSL/secure browsing/CA system. The concept called for "all CAs are equal" which is an assumption that is easily shown to be nonsense. Exactly. Browsers simply require sites to have a certificate from any CA. Browswers can't even spec

Re: Using crypto against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming...

2004-07-11 Thread Amir Herzberg
There still remains the issue that you can provide a good visual approximation to any peace of software just by using JavaScript and HTML. I fear that too many users would fall for that. 8-( We think that the trusted credenatials and logo area will provide some protection against this as well, si

Re: EZ Pass and the fast lane ....

2004-07-11 Thread Amir Herzberg
If they could read the license plates reliably, then they wouldn't need the EZ Pass at all. They can't. It takes human effort, which is in short supply. The toll road that began operating here in Israel seems able to read your license plate number, without even requiring cars to slow down (and

Re: EZ Pass and the fast lane ....

2004-07-11 Thread David Alexander Molnar
On Sat, 10 Jul 2004, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > another purpose -- preserving the privacy of drivers by using more > complicated protocols. However, as the benefit of such systems is to > people who are unlikely to have much voice in the construction of the > system, and who are also unlikely to

Re: Using crypto against Phishing, Spoofing and Spamming...

2004-07-11 Thread Ian Grigg
Florian Weimer wrote: There are simply too many of them, and not all of them implement checks for conflicts. I'm pretty sure I could legally register "Metzdowd" in Germany for say, restaurant service. This indeed is the crux of the weakness of the SSL/secure browsing/CA system. The concept called