"James A. Donald" writes:
>This, however, requires both client UI software, and an api to server side
>scripts such as PHP, Perl, or Python (the P in LAMP). On the server side, we
>need a request object in the script language that tells the script that this
>request comes from an entity that est
Just spotted this on one of the tech news aggregators -
http://www.entropykey.co.uk
The Entropy Key, or eKey, is a small, unobtrusive and easily
installed USB stick that generates high-quality random numbers,
or entropy, which can improve the performance, security and
reliability of
[Moderator's note: top posting considered harmful:
http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg09287.html
--Perry]
Just to complicate things a little... we're working with a number of
groups now who are using onlineCAs that issue short-lived x509 certs
derived from a prim
--
> "James A. Donald" writes:
>> For password-authenticated key agreement such as
>> TLS-SRP or TLS-PSK to work, login has to be in the
>> chrome.
Peter Gutmann wrote:
> Sure, but that's a relatively tractable UI problem
Indeed. You know how to solve it, and I know how to
solve it, yet th
Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
>
> [dropping tahoe-dev from Cc:]
>
> On Thursday,2009-08-06, at 2:52 , Ben Laurie wrote:
>
> > Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
> >> I don't think there is any basis to the claims that Cleversafe
> >> makes that their erasure-coding ("Information Dispersal")-based
> >> sys
On Monday,2009-08-10, at 13:47 , Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
This conversation has bifurcated,
Oh, and while I don't mind if people want to talk about this on the
tahoe-dev list, it doesn't have that much to do with tahoe-lafs
anymore, now that we're done comparing Tahoe-LAFS to Cleversafe
This conversation has bifurcated, since I replied and removed tahoe-
dev from the Cc: line, sending just to the cryptography list, and
David-Sarah Hopwood has replied and removed cryptography, leaving
just the tahoe-dev list.
Here is the root of the thread on the cryptography mailing list ar
Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
>
> [cross-posted to tahoe-...@allmydata.org and cryptogra...@metzdowd.com]
>
> Folks:
>
> It doesn't look like I'm going to get time to write a long post about
> this bundle of issues, comparing Cleversafe with Tahoe-LAFS (both use
> erasure coding and encryption, and
"James A. Donald" writes:
>For password-authenticated key agreement such as TLS-SRP or TLS-PSK to work,
>login has to be in the chrome.
Sure, but that's a relatively tractable UI problem (and see the comment below
on Camino). Certificates on the other hand are an apparently intractable
busin
Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
>
> [dropping tahoe-dev from Cc:]
>
> On Thursday,2009-08-06, at 2:52 , Ben Laurie wrote:
>
> > Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
> >> I don't think there is any basis to the claims that Cleversafe
> >> makes that their erasure-coding ("Information Dispersal")-based
> >> sys
james hughes wrote:
>
> On Aug 6, 2009, at 1:52 AM, Ben Laurie wrote:
>
> > Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn wrote:
> >> I don't think there is any basis to the claims that Cleversafe makes
> >> that their erasure-coding ("Information Dispersal")-based system is
> >> fundamentally safer, e.g. these claims from
On Sun, 9 Aug 2009, Jerry Leichter wrote:
> Since people do keep bringing up Moore's Law in an attempt to justify
> larger keys our systems "stronger than cryptography," it's worth
> keeping in mind that we are approaching fairly deep physical limits.
> I wrote about this on this list quite a while
12 matches
Mail list logo
