The AP wire reports that the founder of Nullsoft, Justin Frankel, plans
to resign in the wake of WASTE being pulled.
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/technology/AP-AOL-Nullsoft.html
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb (me)
http://www.wilyhacker.com
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], John Young writes:
Related: We have a three-year-old FOIA request to NSA for
information on:
The invention, discovery and development of non-secret
encryption (NSE) and public key cryptography (PKC) by
United Kingdom, United States, or any other nation's
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], martin f krafft writes
:
As far as I can tell, IPsec's ESP has the functionality of
authentication and integrity built in:
RFC 2406:
2.7 Authentication Data
The Authentication Data is a variable-length field containing an
Integrity Check Value (ICV)
It's a toolbar for Mozilla (and related web browsers) that automatically
displays the SHA1 or MD5 fingerprint of the SSL certificate when you visit
an SSL secured web site. You could of course click the little padlock icon
and dig through a couple of dialogs to see it, but it's much easier
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ian Grigg writes:
Also, to impune the plug-in arrangement is to
impune all plug-ins, and to impune the download
from an unknown is to impune all downloads from
unknowns.
Sounds about right...
...
I.e., download this fantastic tool which
just so annoyingly
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Bill Stewart writes:
Somebody did an interesting attack on a cable network's customers.
They cracked the cable company's DHCP server, got it to provide a
Connection-specific DNS suffic pointing to a machine they owned,
and also told it to use their DNS server.
This
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Simon Josefsson writes:
Of course, everything fails if you ALSO get your DNSSEC root key from
the DHCP server, but in this case you shouldn't expect to be secure.
I wouldn't be surprised if some people suggest pushing the DNSSEC root
key via DHCP though, because
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Simon Josefsson writes:
Bill Stewart [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
* Your laptop see and uses the name yahoo.com.attackersdomain.com.
You may be able to verify this using your DNSSEC root key, if the
attackersdomain.com people have set up DNSSEC for their spoofed
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Perry E. Metzger writes:
Unfortunately, those parts are rather dangerous to omit.
0) If you omit the message authenticator, you will now be subject to a
range of fine and well documented cut and paste attacks. With some
ciphers, especially stream ciphers,
move.
You have to be careful how you apply it; sometimes, there are attacks.
See Steven M. Bellovin and Michael Merritt, An Attack on the Interlock
Protocol When Used for Authentication, in IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory 40:1, pp. 273-275, January 1994,
http://www.research.att.com/~smb
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Perry E.Metzger writes:
Hmm. You need a cipher such that given B(A(M)) and A you can get
B(M). I know of only one with that property -- XOR style stream
ciphers. Unfortunately that makes for a big flaw, so I'm not sure we
should throw out our Diffie-Hellman
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], J Harper writes:
SSLv3 protocol implementation
Simple ASN.1 parsing
Cipher suites:
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
I understand the need to conserve space; that said, I strongly urge you
to consider AES as
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Anton Stiglic writes
:
By the way, is the paper by Phong Q. Nguyen describing the vulnerability
available somewhere?
This note appeared on the IETF OpenPGP mailing list.
--
Subject: Re: Removing Elgamal signatures
From: David Shaw [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 1
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], bear writes:
But you should be sending mails via *your* SMTP server, and should be
connecting to that SMTP server using SSL and authentication. Open relays
encourage spam. People shouldn't be relaying mail via just any SMTP server.
This is generally how I work
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ian Grigg writes:
Security architects
will continue to do most of their work with
little or no crypto.
And rightly so, since most security problems have nothing to do with
the absence of crypto.
j. a cryptographic solution for spam and
viruses won't be found.
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Anton Stiglic writes:
- Original Message -
From: Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
j. a cryptographic solution for spam and
viruses won't be found.
This ties into the same thing: spam is *unwanted* email, but it's not
*unauthorized*. Crypto
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ben Laurie writes:
Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Anton Stiglic write
s:
- Original Message -
From: Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
j. a cryptographic solution for spam and
viruses won't be found.
This ties into the same
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ben Laurie writes:
What you _may_ have shown is that there's an infinite number of bugs in
any particularly piece of s/w. I find that hard to believe, too :-)
Or rather, that the patch process introduces new bugs. Let me quote
from Fred Brooks' Mythical
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Jason H
olt writes:
[...]
I had the same question about the NSA when some friends were interviewing
there. Apparently investigators will just show up at your house and want to
know all sorts of things about your friends, who you may or may not know to be
in the
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], John Gilmore writes:
If they could read the license plates reliably, then they wouldn't
need the EZ Pass at all. They can't. It takes human effort, which is
in short supply.
There are, in fact, toll roads that try to do that; see, for example,
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ian Grigg writes:
Don't be silly. It's not a threat because people generally use
SSL. Back in the old days, password capture was a very serious
threat. It went away with SSH. It seems to me quite likely that
it would be a problem with web browsing in the
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Peter Gutmann writes:
Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Maybe it's worth doing some sort of generic RFC for this security model to
avoid scattering the same thing over a pile of IETF WGs, things like the
general operational principles (store a hash of the
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Nicolai Moles
-Benfell writes:
Hi,
A number of sources state that the NSA changed the S-Boxes (and reduced the ke
y
size) of IBM's original DES submission, and that these change were made to
strengthen the cipher against differential/linear/?? cryptanalysis.
Does
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Steve Bellov
in writes:
Readers of this list may be interesting the the SRUTI -- Steps Towards
Reducing Unwanted Traffic on the Internet -- workshop. See
http://www.research.att.com/~bala/srut for details.
CORRECTION: it's http://www.research.att.com/~bala/sruti
of Yardley's success with women. I have no idea
if that's true, though moralistic revulsion may be closer. But I
wonder if the root of the personal antagonism may be more that of the
technocrat for the manager...
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
the purported escrow key
generation algorithm for Clipper? See
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Newin/Cypherpunks/930419.denning.protocol
for details. The algorithm was later disavowed, but I've never been
convinced that the disavowal was genuine.)
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http
in aluminum
foil. I suspect that a more practical form factor is a spring-loaded
conductive sleeve that normally surrounds the RFID chip, but is push
back either manually or on key insertion.
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
.
That's a Big Number of seconds.
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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of ways to tell, but you generally have to have some
idea what you're looking for. For two examples of how to do it, see
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/probtxt.ps (or .pdf) and
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/recog.ps (or .pdf)
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http
problems that aren't solvable with today's technology?
Other than protecting keys -- and, of course, DRM -- I'm very far from
convinced of it. The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars but in
ourselves.
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
Are there any commercial link-layer encryptors for Ethernet available?
I know that Xerox used to make them, way back when, but are there any
current ones, able to deal with current speeds (and connectors)?
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
box. At the least, their
Administrator's Guide talks about using IP Protocol 50.
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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and the circuits
rerouted to satellite.
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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that the certificate really was
issued to some string of Kanji, and instead sees the IDN encoding?
That's less than helpful -- he or she would have no way whatsoever of
verifying the certificate.
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
for. The KG-235, which your second URL took me to, is for
TS/SCI traffic -- *way* above what I need...
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Amir Herzberg writes:
Steve, my point was not the trivial fact that TrustBar would not display
the homograph; suppose it did... even then, the user is _asked_ about
the certificate, since it was signed by an unusual CA that the user did
not specify as `to be
parallel hash
function collision finders, but it's an impressive achievement
nevertheless -- especially since it comes just a week after NIST stated
that there were no successful attacks on SHA-1.
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Alexandre
Dulaunoy writes:
On Tue, 15 Feb 2005, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
According to Bruce Schneier's blog
(http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/sha1_broken.html), a
team has found collisions in full SHA-1. It's probably not a practical
threat
of epicycles.
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Thor Lancelot Simon writes:
On Thu, Mar 03, 2005 at 05:31:34PM +0100, Poul-Henning Kamp wrote:
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], ALeine writes:
Not necessarily, if one were to implement the ideas I proposed
I believe the performance could be kept at the same level as
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Spy-Agency-Documents.html
WASHINGTON (AP) -- The National Security Agency warned President
Bush in 2001 that monitoring U.S. adversaries would require a
``permanent presence'' on networks that also carry Americans'
messages that are protected from
be doing now? There's no emergency
on SHA1, but we do need to start, and soon.
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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A few days ago, I posted this:
WASHINGTON (AP) -- The National Security Agency warned President
Bush in 2001 that monitoring U.S. adversaries would require a
``permanent presence'' on networks that also carry Americans'
messages that are protected from government eavesdropping.
...
``Make no
, what you really need to watch out for is the transcript
files on your own machine...
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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it.
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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http://www.vnunet.com/news/1162433
Something like this cannot continue forever, he said.
The dimensions are small enough now that we're approaching
the size of atoms and that's a fundamental block. I think
the law has another 10-20 years before fundamental limits
in the subject line.
Elaine Barker
100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
Phone: 301-975-2911
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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a real threat, too.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ian G writes:
On Tuesday 31 May 2005 02:17, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], James A. Donald writes:
--
PKI was designed to defeat man in the middle attacks
based on network sniffing, or DNS hijacking, which
turned out to be less
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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that the authors could gather about network configurations at different
sites: as we all know, traffic analysis is a powerful technique.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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The Cryptography
were
fraudulent use of logins and passwords.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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verify the numbers; I know from experience that
he's competent and has his hear in the right place re security).
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Perry E. Metzger writes:
Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
They're still doing the wrong thing. Unless the page was transmitted
to you securely, you have no way to trust that your username and
password are going to them and not to someone who cleverly sent
and ps) and a slide
show are inaccessible, and are not in Google's cache.
Anyone saved a copy?
It's on Vern's web page:
http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/witty-draft.pdf or
http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/witty-draft.ps
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
warning people even against doing their own implementations.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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(the remote fingerprinting paper mentioned this one), etc.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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there
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to be answered about any such system before it's even possible to
discuss it intelligently.
And
whenever I enter the US, I have to give the fingerprints of my index
fingers and they take a picture of me. That's worse than an ID card.
Agreed.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nationworld/bal-te.nsa07jul07,1,6042171.story?coll=bal-home-headlinesamp;cset=truectrack=1cset=true
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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The Cryptography
to log int o E-Gold, checks
your balance, and drains your account except for .004 grams of gold.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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on my credit card has long since expired.
They've never asked me for an update. Maybe they're using a reputation
system?)
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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authenticated?
(I alluded to this in a 1997 panel session talk; see
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/talks/ncsc-97/index.htm )
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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customers.)
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Eric Rescorla and I have written a paper Deploying a New Hash Algorithm.
A draft is available at http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/new-hash.ps
and http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/new-hash.pdf .
Here's the abstract:
As a result of recent discoveries, the strength of hash
.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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the attack will get
even better. Shamir noted that 2^63 is within reach of a distributed
Internet effort to actually find one.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Florian Weimer writes:
* Steven M. Bellovin:
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Florian Weimer writes:
Can't you strip the certificates which have expired from the CRL? (I
know that with OpenPGP, you can't, but that's a different story.)
OTOH, I wouldn't be concerned
-- not the
computational cost; the management cost -- is quite high; you need to
get authentic public keys for all of your correspondents. That's
beyond the ability of most people.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Chris Kuethe writes:
On 8/26/05, Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
...
If you don't trust your (or your correspondents') IM servers, it may be
a different situation. I haven't read Google's privacy policies for
IM; if it's anything like gmail, they're
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Adam Back writes:
On Fri, Aug 26, 2005 at 11:41:42AM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Adam Back writes:
Thats broken, just like the WAP GAP ... for security you want
end2end security, not a secure channel to an UTP (untrusted third
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Ben Laurie writes:
I wrote some code to show the internal state of MD5 during a collision...
http://www.shmoo.com/md5-collision.html
Very nice, though you need to give a scale of rounds -- how many
horizontal lines per round?
--Steven M
(or licensed) by
Sun. For obvious reasons, it's remarkably hard to get someone to say
that they don't have a claim on some product.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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,
James Hughes and Paul Leyland.
--- End of Forwarded Message
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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at your account, which will display the last 5
digits of your credit cards.
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to seeing you there!
___
Colloquium mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/colloquium
--
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
,
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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against the law.
From Tony Hoare's 1980 Turing Award lecture.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-21-Rev1_September2005.pdf
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, and that's
far more than crypto. Sometimes, in fact, the two conflict.
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are doing the wrong
thing, the problem isn't the people, it's the mechanism they're being
asked to use.
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Have a look at http://www.nsa.gov/publications/publi00039.cfm . The
one-time pad was used to superencrypt a codebook; two different
codebooks were used. Most of the successful decryptions were done by
1952; there was some additional help from a partial codebook recovered
in 1953. Here's the
.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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value.
Non-random digits in such a setting are more or less irrelevant, unless
there is enough of a pattern that it helps you strip off the
superencipherment.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn8223feedId=online-news_rss091
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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. As for
the dictionary size -- they felt (probably correctly) that the size
expansion was already large enough that that wasn't a feasible path for
the attacker.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/news/2005-11-08/rsa-640/
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to
spend the money on legal fees to fight that claim, per a story I heard.
Have a look at
http://web.archive.org/web/20041018153649/integritysciences.com/history.html
for some history.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
I stumbled on the following link:http://cryptome.org/dprk/dprk-papers.htm
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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that stress parsers. So far, they've been extremely successful against
IKEv1, ASN.1, SNMP, and more. This should surprise no one and depress
everyone.
http://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/protos/index.html is the home page
for this project.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http
be implemented poorly, but complex ones have more places
to go wrong. (It's instructive, I might add, to read RFC 1025,
especially the part about dirty blows.)
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
Bruce Schneier's newsletter Cryptogram has the following fascinating
link: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/heath.pdf
It's the story of effects of a single spy who betrayed keys and
encryptor designs.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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The Quest For Cryptologic Centralization and the Establishment of NSA:
1940-1952
http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/quest.pdf
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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http://www.nsa.gov/vietnam/
These are the documents related to the claim that NSA suppressed many
of the intercepts relating to the so-called Gulf of Tonkin incident.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
, but it's *definitely* a much less attractive target
for malware writers.
Problems? I did have my credit card number stolen, but almost
certainly not that way. The bank believes it was a random card number
generator.
--Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Janusz A. Urbanowicz
writes:
Bank
statements come on paper or in S/MIME signed emails.
This is interesting -- the bank is using S/MIME? What mail readers are
common among its clientele? How is the bank's certificate checked?
--Steven M
of thermal noise, proper external noise generators
should be used when the communication is not aimed to be stealth.
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