become aware
of crypto when it averts trouble. They become aware of crypto when it
causes trouble.
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offhand.
Bear
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think Math is indispensable to crypto, and there
ought to be a secure mathematics library.
Bear
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are the
major targets for a DNS spoof.
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or subverted network
and it'll just work.
At the very least you've got to have a file of keys.
Bear
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it uses to print the reference on the
page.
IOW, if you go to Mallory's search engine, then no matter how many
references you find, they're all coming to you through the same
channel and you have to trust Mallory.
Bear
on...
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.
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, it's just going
to happen. Anything an intel service shares with anybody, it's
putting into the network, and it's going to get around to everybody.
Bear
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to send and recieve live code, so
that they could be effectively protected from live code at the outset
unless they really need it. Others, of course, disagree.
Bear
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it.
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can have open protocols that aren't anonymous be immune to
MITM. But you can't have both.
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the two contestants from making nonce transmissions twice a
move when it's not their turn.
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On Fri, 3 Oct 2003, Benja Fallenstein wrote:
bear wrote:
Why should this not be applicable to chess? There's nothing to
prevent the two contestants from making nonce transmissions twice a
move when it's not their turn.
I.e., you would need a protocol extension to verify the nonces somehow
the players an
I need more time to think move, but if they're not allowed to use it
more than one time in three, then mitch isn't going to be able to make
more than two moves.
Bear
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on my home machine.
A bit of lag is acceptable. Sending private mail via untrusted
SMTP servers is not.
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trustworthy place than a world
full of weasels who want to control their systems.
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by business
models I don't want to deal with. It makes the buy
decision complicated and fraught with risk.
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.
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to protect *other* users from their
stupidity.
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,
or whether the path has some reasonably small distance.
I have not yet seen an example of reputation favoring
one person over another in a web of trust model; it looks
like people can't be bothered to keep track of the trust
relationships or reputations within the web.
Bear
impositions.
Wouldn't it be a stitch if nations were forced to re-adopt the gold
standard (or adopt the chocolate standard) because all their bills
(and SmartCoins, and RFID tokens, and ) could be counterfeited?
Bear
(or
wherever) and took the money (or whatever) at gunpoint, directing
them to charge your account; an image I find more than a little
preposterous. There has to be some kind of fraud or subterfuge
for the proposed crime to even be credible.
Bear
in their new order.
Now the attack doesn't work; collisions against individual blocks
don't combine to produce a collision on the sequence because the
colliding values wouldn't have been fed into the hash function
in the same order as the actual blocks.
Bear
On Wed, 25 Aug 2004, Hal Finney wrote:
Bear writes:
One interesting idea which I came up with and haven't seen a way
past yet is to XOR each block with a value computed from its
sequence number, then compute the hash function on the blocks in
a nonsequential order based on the plaintext
generation of hash functions to be written.
Bear
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On Sun, 29 Aug 2004, John Denker wrote:
bear wrote:
H2(H1) = H1( H1(M) xor H1( TT( M)))
I think that was intended to be something like
H2(M) = H1( H1(M) xor H1( TT( M)))
^
Actually, it was intended to take a hash function
as an argument and define a new hash function
is
that a faculty is always right by definition.
That is inconsistent with the advancement of knowledge. Any
university relying on such a principle has abandoned its duty.
Bear
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-bit messages, there
must be at least 1024 distinct nine-bit messages which,
when the reversal is applied, result in these 1024
messages. There are exactly 512 distinct nine-bit
messages. Therefore 512 = 1024.
Bear
in this case because H1 is fixed.
The above construction is in fact secure against the Joux attack as
stated. 2^80 work will find, on average, one collision.
Bear
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failures of
marketability. But to the extent that they allow bypassing
filters, the spammers are the biggest customers.
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, but
on this list anonymous is a very strong claim. Anonymity is
*HARD* to do, not something that results from failing to check
a credential.
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modes available for using 3DES if you have a fat pipe to encrypt.
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- in the hopes that attackers couldn't
isolate which parts of the information were related to your
algorithm.
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human attention/intervention. This is treating key distribution
seriously, and possibly for the first time in the modern incarnation of the
industry.
Bear
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of the PRNG so
far has no strategy better than random guessing for determining the
next and subsequent outputs, and that may be random enough for your
bosses.)
Bear
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The Cryptography
algorithm, which requires n qbits)
won't work. Given that our knowledge of QC is nascent, our
ignorance of QC's practical limits is likely staggering, and
caution is to be advised.
Bear
to need, barring catastrophic medical advances,) of a very
secure low-bandwidth channel.
Of course, the obvious application for this OTP material,
other than text messaging itself, is to use it for key
distribution.
Bear
Bruce acknowleges this by saying [t
On Thu, 26 Jan 2006, Adam Fields wrote:
On Thu, Jan 26, 2006 at 06:09:52PM -0800, bear wrote:
[...]
Of course, the obvious application for this OTP material,
other than text messaging itself, is to use it for key
distribution.
Perhaps I missed something, but my impression
.
Bear
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cell traffic if you tuned, for example, to UHF TV
channel 78.44. But not if you tuned to channel 78 or channel 79.
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in the case of users who have perpetrated or permitted known
security abuses.
It should therefore be no surprise that SSL is nearly useless.
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