Daniel Bleichenbacher presented an implementation attack against DSA in
2001 titled On the generation of DSS one-time keys. I think it made
the rounds as a preprint, but I don't know if it was ever officially
published. It's cited frequently (e.g. in the SEC1 doc
The RSA algorithm gives security under the assumption that as long as
the private key is private, you can't break in unless you guess it.
We've shown that that's not true, said Valeria Bertacco, an associate
professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer
Science, in a
travis+ml-cryptogra...@subspacefield.org wrote:
http://www.matasano.com/log/1749/typing-the-letters-a-e-s-into-your-code-youre-doing-it-wrong/
Towards the end of this rather offbeat blog post they describe a
rather clever attack which is possible when the application provides
error messages
Alexander Klimov wrote:
On Tue, 26 May 2009, James Muir wrote:
There is some academic work on how to protect crypto in software from
reverse engineering. Look-up white-box cryptography.
Disclosure: the company I work for does white-box crypto.
Could you explain what is the point of white
Ray Dillinger wrote:
Does anyone feel that I have said anything untrue?
Can anyone point me at good information uses I can use to help prove
the case to a bunch of skeptics who are considering throwing away
their hard-earned money on a scheme that, in light of security
experience, seems
From today's (13 Feb 2009) National Post:
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1283120
excerpt:
An Ontario Superior Court ruling could open the door to police
routinely using Internet Protocol addresses to find out the names of
people online, without any need for a search warrant.
Paul Hoffman wrote:
At 11:08 AM -0700 8/21/08, Greg Rose wrote:
Adi mentioned that the slides and paper will go online around the
deadline for Eurocrypt submission; it will all become much clearer
than my wounded explanations then.
There now: http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/385
Given all the
Paul Hoffman wrote:
At 11:08 AM -0700 8/21/08, Greg Rose wrote:
Adi mentioned that the slides and paper will go online around the
deadline for Eurocrypt submission; it will all become much clearer
than my wounded explanations then.
There now: http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/385
Given all the
Paul Hoffman wrote:
At 11:08 AM -0700 8/21/08, Greg Rose wrote:
Adi mentioned that the slides and paper will go online around the
deadline for Eurocrypt submission; it will all become much clearer
than my wounded explanations then.
There now: http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/385
I just noticed
Marcos el Ruptor wrote:
I've just looked at the virus.
Just curious -- where were you able to download the virus from?
-James
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Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
According to
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasicarticleId=9094818intsrc=hm_list%3E%20articleId=9094818intsrc=hm_list
some new malware is encrypting files with a 1024-bit RSA key. Victims
are asked to pay a random to get their files
michael taylor wrote:
http://www.torontosun.com/News/TorontoAndGTA/2008/04/18/5320936-sun.html
The city is playing a $10M game of catchup to stymie thieves using
bogus credit cards to get free parking
An assuming read. The article mentions the Europark Card; you buy it
online for $15 (the
James A. Donald wrote:
James Muir wrote:
Can anyone think of a deployed implementation of RSA
signatures that would be vulnerable to the attack
Shamir mentions? Hashing and message blinding would
seem to thwart it.
As I said, public key encryption has long been known to
be weak against
' =JeffH ' wrote:
From: John Young [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Adi Shamir's microprocessor bug attack
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sat, 17 Nov 2007 09:50:31 -0500 (GMT-05:00)
Adi Shamir's note on a microprocessor bug attack on public key cryptography
featured in the NY Times today:
I thought this was an interesting security-related story:
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/nova-scotia/story/2007/05/25/decal-car.html
quoting from the article:
The black-and-yellow sticker, which only costs a loonie, is an
invitation for police to pull over your vehicle if it's on the road
after 1
I think the first people to consider i can find Waldo proofs were
Naor, Naor Reingold. You might want to add a reference to their paper
Applied Kid Cryptography in your write-up:
http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/PAPERS/waldo_abs.html
-James
Ben Laurie wrote:
I recently wrote a
Travis H. wrote:
- Stream ciphers (additive)
This reminds me, when people talk about linearity with regard to a
function, for example CRCs, exactly what sense of the word do they
mean? I can understand f(x) = ax + b being linear, but how exactly
does XOR get involved, and are there +-linear
bits generated by an orbiting satellite.
Quasar encryption is likely impractical, but there could be more to it
than you think. However, I did think web cam encryption was funny. :-)
-James
--
James Muir, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
School of Computer Science, Carleton University
http
Tom Shrimpton (http://www.cs.pdx.edu/~teshrim/) does research in this
area (ie. using block ciphers to build hash functions). See the papers
on his web site; in particular:
Black-Box Analysis of the Block-Cipher-Based Hash-Function Constructions
from PGV [pdf] [ps]
John Black, Phillip
There is an attack against this type of RSA signature scheme, although
cannot remember just now if it requires that the verfication exponent be
small (ie. e=3).
The attack I am trying to recall is a chosen-message attack and its
efficiency is related to the probability that a random 128-bit
Taral wrote:
On 6/20/05, James Muir [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The attack I am trying to recall is a chosen-message attack and its
efficiency is related to the probability that a random 128-bit integer can
be factorized over a small set of primes (ie. the prob that a uniformily
selected 128-bit
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