RE: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
Dave Korn wrote: Ian Farquhar wrote: Maybe I am showing my eternal optimist side here, but to me, this is how TPM's should be used, as opposed to the way their backers originally wanted them used. A removable module whose connection to a device I establish (and can de-establish, assuming the presence of a tamper-respondent barrier such as a sensor-enabled computer case to legitimize that activity) is a very useful thing to me, as it facilitates all sorts of useful applications. [...] If you can remove it, what's to stop you plugging it into another machine and copying all your DRM-encumbered material to that machine? It's supposed to identify the machine, not the user. Sounds to me like what you want is a personally identifying cert that you could carry around on a usb key... Nothing, but you missed my point. I'm not interested in the DRM functionality, or user-removability. My point was to look beyond that original remit. Specifically, a module which supports authenticated physical removal (with a programmed tamper response) *is* useful, especially for server applications. (*) Smartcards and secure USB devices might be useful for other applications, but not the one I was describing, because they lack a tamper response. Note I'm also saying programmable tamper response. Although I like the idea of wiping keys on tamper response, it's not necessarily the ideal response. A better possibility (in certain circumstances) is the device entering a lockdown mode with selected and modelled reduced functionality. Examples of such circumstances are where the tamper might be triggerable maliciously, thus facilitating a DoS attack against the service. Ian. (*) And isn't it interesting how so many desktop systems are now starting to run application mixes which really look like servers? - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
http://www.nvlabs.in/?q=node/32 Vipin Kumar of of NVLabs had announced a break of TPM and a demonstration of a break into Bitlocker, (presumably using TPM) to be presented at Black Hat 2007. The presentation has been pulled. Significance to the exchanges on cryptography under this subject stem from the abstract of the announcement. It references a paper on implementing Trusted Computing: https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/news/Industry_Data/Implementing_Trusted_Computing_RK.pdf From Which Kumar interpolates the graph shown in figure 4 to make the claim that through the end of 2007 there will be 150 million TPM devices shipped. The preceding paragraph to figure 4 makes a claim of 20 million TPM devices shipped in 2005. The paper is produced by Endpoint Technologies Associates, Inc., and doesn't give references for how the numbers were promulgated. The graph shows a number of TPM devices shipped per year to exceed 250 million by the years 2010. The point being that's a lot tchotchkes, even if the claimed numbers are inflated in a fashion reminiscent of how fast the internet was growing before the internet bubble burst. Even conservatively there is in the tens of millions of these devices sold, although we have no indication how many were actually used for Trusted Computing purposes. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
Looking for TPM enterprise adoption. The current version of TPM was adopted in March o f 2006, which should have limited TPM up take. There's an article in Network World http://www.networkworld.com/allstar/2006/092506-chip-security-papa-gino.html from September 2006 talking about a restaurant chain being a pioneer in the use of TPM, apparently a poster boy for Dell. There's also http://www.fcw.com/article95422-07-26-06-Web July 26, 2006, talking about the Army mandating TPM in all their small computers (PCs), a relatively large enterprise customer. A 10-Q filed by Wave Systems in May provides providence for the numbers quoted in NVLabs abstract on their TPM breaker: http://sec.edgar-online.com/2007/05/10/0001104659-07-038339/Section9.asp † Adoption of TPMs and Trusted Computing technology is also growing - according to industry analyst, IDC, shipments of TPMs are expected to grow from under 25 million units in 2005 to over 250 million units in 2010. More information is available from the IT Compliance Institute. (looking at the IT Compliance Institute doesn't seem to help) The IDC is the quoted source for TPM adoption, figuring prominently on the trudedcomputingroup.org web site and articles derived from publicity. There's an Executive Summary from IDC: https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/news/Industry_Data/IDC_448_Web.pdf Predicting TPM 75 percent penetration for world wide Desktop PCs in 2009, 85 percent for mobile computing, and 80 percent for servers. The only other data point is for 2005, showing a couple of percent for Desktop PC, three percent for Servers, and 37 percent for mobile PCs There's a claim the Bitlocker in Vista provided the tipping point for TPM uptake in: http://www.investors.com/editorial/IBDArticles.asp?artsec=17issue=20070306 The IDC reference is Worldwide PC Interface and Technologies 2007-2010 Forecast February 2007, Doc #205155, a Market Analysis http://idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=205155 At $4500, a bit steep for curiosity's sake. TPM is the focus of a chapter or section on Security, as seen in the table of contents The Papa Gino's Restaurants example for Network World,is indeed a Dell real world example, one of several mentioned: https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/news/Industry_Data/Endpoint_Technologies_Associates_TCG_report_Jan_29_2007.pdf The real world examples include a Japanese pharmaceutical company with 20,000 seats Papa Gino's Pizzas A US auto rental agency of indeterminate size using HP's security solution. Three projects underway in Japan, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry funded security initiatives for: Sendai Wellness Consortium (sounds like an HMO) IBM's Tokyo Research Laboratory Nagoya University Medical Center The size of these aren't known, but should qualify as respectably sized enterprises. This paper is from Endpoint Technologies, again and intended to allay naysayers of Trusted Computing adoption rates: Some market watchers may feel that the entire Trusted Computing movement, championed by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) with its Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and related security technologies, is just a straw man and that it will be years before large numbers of companies and even individuals adopt TPM based secure computing. For example, IDC cites, in Trusted Platform Module: Adoption Dynamics, August 30, 2006, a complex system dynamics model that shows that only the PC hardware OEMs and the smallest security vendors are fully engaged with the TPM, and that Microsoft and the major security players remain at best tepid in their support. Particularly, the authors cite a lack of user pull in TPM deployment. They conclude that, although many TPM modules will ship on client systems over the next few years, most will remain inactive. [There's also anecdotal evidence IDC hasn't always had their cheery outlook for TPM uptake.] There are other developments mentioned in the paper: The NSA uses TPM for encrypted disk drives The US Army is mentioned herein requiring TPM on PCs The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has recommended that their member banks adopt TPM. Also, Microsoft appears to have actually jumped on the TPM bandwagon, supplying impetous over the tipping point: http://www.pc.ibm.com/us/pdf/idc_compliance_whitepaper.pdf February 2005, Validation of Hardware Security in PC Clients, sponsored by IBM and Microsoft TPM is pretty much required for PC biometric authentication (fingerprints) There are a few more poster children marched out: A large international pharmaceutical company (perhaps different from above) A Large Apparel Manufacturer, mentions Sarbannes-Oxley, and fingerprint access. We're being underwhelmed with hard numbers and numerous examples of enterprise adoption. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
Jon Callas wrote: On Jun 25, 2007, at 7:23 PM, Matt Johnston wrote: On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 04:42:56PM +1200, David G. Koontz wrote: Apple (mis)uses TPM to unsuccessfully prevent OS X from running on non-Apple Hardware. All Apple on Intel machines have TPM, that's what 6 percent of new PCs? To nit pick, the TPM is only present in some Apple Intel machines and isn't used in any of them. See http://osxbook.com/book/bonus/chapter10/tpm/ Their OS decryption key is just stored in normal firmware, unprotected AIUI. Are you discussing how they handle their encrypted swap, encrypted disk (via FileVault) or their encrypted sleep image? I was unaware that Apple had implemented full root file system encryption. They've apparently stopped shipping TPMs. There isn't one on my MacBook Pro from last November, and it is missing on my wife's new Santa Rosa machine. If you want to see if a machine has one, then the command: sudo ioreg -w 0 | grep -i tpm should give something meaningful. Mine reports the existence of ApplePCISlotPM, but that's not the same thing. A positive match looks like this: | +-o ApplePCISlotPM class ApplePCISlotPM, !registered, !matched, active, busy 0, retain count 8 | +-o TPM class IOACPIPlatformDevice, registered, matched, active, busy 0, retain count 6 Regards, Jacob Appelbaum - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine (aka TPM, AMT)
i'd also scrawled: my understanding from a person active in the NEA working group [1] (IETF) is that TPMs these days come along for free because they're included on-die in at least one of said chips. [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: Check again. A few months ago I was chatting with someone who works for a large US computer hardware distributor and he located one single motherboard (an Intel one, based on an old, possibly discontinued chipset) in their entire inventory that contained a TPM (they also had all the ex-IBM/Lenovo laptops, and a handful of HP laptops, that were reported as having TPMs). He also said that there were a handful of others (e.g. a few Dell laptops, which they don't carry) with TPMs. my bad. I'd neglected to add on enterprise-class systems after come along for free (a qualification he did indeed express). WRT to Dell notebooks, that'd be the Latitude models. In fact, with a little searching, i found the Dell pages below [2] that indicate TPM is installed on Dell's D-series enterprise class notebooks. [EMAIL PROTECTED] said: One of the driving forces for TPM adoption going forward will be enterprise remote or distributed management. Of course. And that's the driving force behind the IETF NEA (Network Endpoint Assessment) working group AFAIK [1]. =JeffH -- [1] http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/nea-charter.html [2] http://www.dell.com/content/topics/global.aspx/solutions/en/latitude_highlight ?c=usl=ens=gen ... Trusted Platform Module (TPM 1.1) The TPM, or Trusted Platform Module ships standard on D410, D610 D810. TPM is a security hardware device on the system board that will hold computer generated keys for encryption. It is a hardware-based solution that can help avoid attacks by hackers looking to capture passwords and encryption keys to sensitive data. ... http://www.dell.com/content/learnmore/learnmore.aspx?c=uscs=RC968571l=ens=h ea~id=smartcard~line=notebooks~mode=popup~series=latit~tab=recommendations What is TPM? The TPM, or Trusted Platform Module, is a security hardware device on the system board that will hold computer generated keys for encryption. It is a hardware based solution that can help avoid attacks by hackers looking to capture passwords and encryption keys to sensitive data. When deploying advanced security features like TPM in your environment, the archive and recovery of keys protected by the TPM is critical to avoiding the risk of data loss or inaccessibility in the event of a system failure. The security features provided by the TPM are internally supported by the following cryptographic capabilities of each TPM: hashing, random number generation, asymmetric key generation, and asymmetric encryption/decryption. Each individual TPM on each individual computer system has a unique signature initialized during the silicon manufacturing process that further enhances its trust/security effectiveness. Each individual TPM must have an Owner before it is useful as a security device. TPM Applications TPM is useful for any customer that is interested in providing an addition layer of security to the computer system. The TPM, when bundled with an optional security software package, can provide overall system security, file protection capabilities and protect against email /privacy concerns. TPM helps provide security that can be stronger than that contained in the system BIOS, operating system, or any non-TPM application. Which Dell systems support TPM? The TPM 1.2 security hardware device comes standard on the following LatitudeTM notebook systems: Latitude D420, D620, D820, OptiPlexTM desktop systems: Optiplex 745, 740 and Dell PrecisionTM Mobile Workstations M65, M90. Dell recommends the use of Microsoft® Windows® XP Professional XP Professional operating system with TPM which includes advanced security, mobility and networking features. TPM is currently not supported by Dell on Red Hat® Linux® operating systems. Customers who deploy TPM should also purchase Wave Systems Embassy Trust Suite from Dell Software Peripherals to enable full TPM features including key archival and migration. --- end - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
Peter Gutmann writes: BitLocker just uses the TPM as a glorified USB key (sealing a key in a TPM is functionally equivalent to encrypting it on a USB key). Since BitLocker isn't tied to a TPM in any way (I'm sure Microsoft's managers could see which way the wind was blowing when they designed it), it's not going to be TPM's killer app. Actually BitLocker can use the TPM's measured boot capability for additional security. This requires a TPM-aware BIOS, which hashes the disk's Master Boot Record into the TPM Platform Configuration Registers before executing it, as well as measuring other system software components. The disk encryption key is sealed to the TPM PCR values and the chip won't release it if the boot sequence is different. This means that if you want to attack by, for example, booting from a Linux Live CD or an external USB drive, the chip won't relase the encryption key even if you guess the PIN right. (Some) details at the BitLocker Drive Encryption Technical Overview page: http://technet2.microsoft.com/WindowsVista/en/library/ba1a3800-ce29-4f09-89ef-65bce923cdb51033.mspx?mfr=true Hal Finney - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Hal Finney) writes: The idea of putting a TPM on a smart card or other removable device is even more questionable from this perspective. It's not just questionable, it's a really, really bad idea. TPMs are fundamentally just severely feature-crippled smart cards. That is, they're optimised for doing DRM/secure boot/whatever-you-want-to-call-it, but in practice not much good for doing anything else (even if there are paper and Powerpoint-slide claims to the contrary). So you have something with all the drawbacks of a smart card (external widget that needs to be bought at extra cost and plugged in) and none of the advantages. Possibly with Vista's BitLocker disk encryption we will see more use of TPMs. BitLocker just uses the TPM as a glorified USB key (sealing a key in a TPM is functionally equivalent to encrypting it on a USB key). Since BitLocker isn't tied to a TPM in any way (I'm sure Microsoft's managers could see which way the wind was blowing when they designed it), it's not going to be TPM's killer app. Peter. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
Peter Gutmann wrote: David G. Koontz [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: There are third party TPM modules, which could allow some degree of standardization: As I said in my previous message, just because they exist doesn't mean they'll do anything if you plug them into a MB with the necessary header (assuming you have a MB with the header, and it's physically compatible, and electrically compatible, and the BIOS is compatible, and ...). Which MBs have you plugged one of these TPMs into and had it work? I don't have the luxury of buying tchotchkes to prove a point. (Ya, I have no use for this stuff either). In view of Peters insistence it was worth looking harder. I picked on one motherboard, a Gigabyte GA-P3-DQ6 which has the 20 pin header for the IEI TPM pluggable. After an extensive investigation I found no direct evidence you can actually do as Peter states and roll your own building a TPM enabled system. That includes downloading the BIOS and trying to search it. Found evidence of a TPM driver, no hard proof though. Why the emphasis on doing this as an end user anyway? Heck you should have seen how hard it was to get DVDs to work with Windows98 on an Intel D815 motherboard as an end user. If took the same level of investigation, and I still got lucky. The information necessary is available to OEMs, not generally end users. Looking across various vendors motherboards you see statements in the specifications stating TPM v1.2 support which I'd be inclined to think means BIOS support. I looked for mention of the IEI motherboards, and found distributors, no mention of anyone actually using them other than for industrial use. The Fujitsu-Siemens motherboards with TPM were similarly for industrial use. The idea of system integrity makes sense for say industrial robotics. Wonder if someone thought of using ECC memory? I found a Foxconn motherboard with the same 20 pin connector. Didn't find it on their G33 motherboard (Bearlake). There was no mention of TPM support in any documentation for the G33 board. I downloaded the BIOS for the board with the connector, de-lharc'd it and searched for strings indicating TPM support. Didn't find any references at all. It appears to be an older Phoenix BIOS. Same story for Peter - no proof you could actually use it, worse still, nothing in the BIOS. I found a Supermicro C2SBA mother board (another G33 Bearlake) that you can buy today. TPM enabled, theres a jumper described in the manual to enable TPM, which allows the BIOS page for it to show up. Sounds like solid support. The manual only has the topside layout. The jumper is near the system front edge, and the closest silicon is the ICH9 Southbridge. Note that the LPC bus is on the Southbridge anyway and would interconnect to a TPM chip (as well as BIOS FLASH/ROM), There's a candidate chip near the front panel stuff not to close to the BIOS chip, I couldn't find a high enough resolution photo to read the label. There is no through hole connector footprint for an external TPM manual visible. If I wanted to buy a TPM motherboard today, I could, a brand new one, too. The manual has pictures of the TPM pages in the BIOS console. The BIOS should work. Around $164 in the U.S., real pretty too with all the copper cooling on it. Theres also indication of whitebox integrators using the intel motherboards with TPM in-built. No indications of volume, which is probably the real question. TPM may well end up being present ubiquitously. Smart cards may well end up being present ubiquitously. Hardware RNGs may well end up being present ubiquitously. NIC-based crypto may well end up being present ubiquitously. Biometric readers may well end up being present ubiquitously. Home taping is killing mus... oops, wrong list. Been there, done that, got the tchotchkes to prove it. I've seen zero evidence that TPMs are going to be anything other than a repeat of hardware RNGs, NIC-based crypto, biometric readers, and the pile of other failed hardware silver bullets that crop up every few years. Wait a year or two and there'll be some other magic gadget along to fix all our problems. I found a FIPS 140-2 compliance statement from Phoenix dated July 2006, that mentions all your silver bullets except the biometric readers and encrypting NIC. http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/140sp/140sp709.pdf Someone doesn't think they are all relegated to tchotchkes, just yet. I was surprised to hear Intels random number chip is still marketed, must still be used in Type 1 COMSEC stuff. There is indication that TPM is tied to fingerprint scanners on laptops, they could be a passing fad. It'd be nice to see someone demonstrating spoofing one. Found something else that supports Peters point of view. Found a web page claiming that Intels vPRO doesn't require a TPM chip. It isn't clear how closely aligned vPRO is to DMTF. As far as TPM and DMTF, most of the hits relating to the two can be traced
RE: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
Ian Farquhar writes: [Hal Finney wrote:] It seems odd for the TPM of all devices to be put on a pluggable module as shown here. The whole point of the chip is to be bound tightly to the motherboard and to observe the boot and initial program load sequence. Maybe I am showing my eternal optimist side here, but to me, this is how TPM's should be used, as opposed to the way their backers originally wanted them used. A removable module whose connection to a device I establish (and can de-establish, assuming the presence of a tamper-respondent barrier such as a sensor-enabled computer case to legitimize that activity) is a very useful thing to me, as it facilitates all sorts of useful applications. The utility of the original intent has already been widely criticised, so I won't repeat that here. :) Would that basically be the same as a removable smart card or crypto token? Those do exist and I agree that they have many useful applications. However their purpose is somewhat different from the TPM, which is more specialized. It also shows those interesting economics at work. The added utility of the TPM module (from the PoV of the user) was marginal at best despite all claims, yet it facilitated functionality which was contrary to most user's interests. The content industry tried to claim that the TPM module would facilitate the availability of compelling content - which they tried to sell as it's user utility - but like most of their claims it was a smoke and mirrors trick. At this point we are reduced to speaking hypothetically. The TPM has not provided either much benefit or much harm so far. It has not (AFAIK) been used to protect any content, for good or evil. It has instead only been used as a sort of glorified, non-removable smart card, which indeed does not provide much utility. Consequently, the razor-edged economics of the motherboard and desktop industry has comprehensively rejected TPM except in certain specialized marketplaces where higher profit margins are available (eg. Servers, corporate desktops). The chipset manufacturers have also failed to add this functionality to their offerings to date. Now Vista has added Bitlocker, which arguably adds a user valuable feature for which a TPM module is needed (yes, you can run it without TPM, but it's painful). I wonder if we'll start to see more TPM connectors appearing, or even full TPM modules on motherboards and cores on south bridge dies? I think the focus is likely still to be on laptop systems where the benefits of an encrypted file system are especially high. However if Bitlocker comes down to the lower level Vistas then we may see TPMs start to appear on lower end laptops. Personally, I'd like to see a TPM implemented as a tamper-respondent (ie. Self-powered) module mounted on the motherboard in a socket which allows removal detection. That way you get the flexibility of moving the module, with the safety of a programmed response to an unauthorized removal. Interesting idea, although it's not clear what you would do with it. The TPM architecture is enormously complex but it is entirely focused on binding a TPM to a platform. Breaking that rule would invalidate so much of the TPM design that you might do better starting with a new chip with its own functions and purpose. Hal Finney - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
On 26 June 2007 00:51, Ian Farquhar (ifarquha) wrote: It seems odd for the TPM of all devices to be put on a pluggable module as shown here. The whole point of the chip is to be bound tightly to the motherboard and to observe the boot and initial program load sequence. Maybe I am showing my eternal optimist side here, but to me, this is how TPM's should be used, as opposed to the way their backers originally wanted them used. A removable module whose connection to a device I establish (and can de-establish, assuming the presence of a tamper-respondent barrier such as a sensor-enabled computer case to legitimize that activity) is a very useful thing to me, as it facilitates all sorts of useful applications. The utility of the original intent has already been widely criticised, so I won't repeat that here. :) If you can remove it, what's to stop you plugging it into another machine and copying all your DRM-encumbered material to that machine? It's supposed to identify the machine, not the user. Sounds to me like what you want is a personally identifying cert that you could carry around on a usb key... cheers, DaveK -- Can't think of a witty .sigline today - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
David G. Koontz wrote: I picked on one motherboard, a Gigabyte GA-P3-DQ6 which has the 20 pin header for the IEI TPM pluggable. After an extensive investigation I found no direct evidence you can actually do as Peter states and roll your own building a TPM enabled system. That includes downloading the BIOS and trying to search it. Found evidence of a TPM driver, no hard proof though. Why the emphasis on doing this as an end user anyway? Heck you should have seen how hard it was to get DVDs to work with Windows98 on an Intel D815 motherboard as an end user. If took the same level of investigation, and I still got lucky. The information necessary is available to OEMs, not generally end users. Looking across various vendors motherboards you see statements in the specifications stating TPM v1.2 support which I'd be inclined to think means BIOS support. I found another Gigabyte board GA-N680SLI-DQ6 with TPM, available from Ascent here in New Zealand. I looked at the BIOS for it. It was close to brand new and mentioned it would take loadable drivers and didn't have reference to TPM. This leads creedence to the requirement for OEM access to enable TPM. The TPM driver wasn't available on the download page for the board. This board has the IEI 20 pin connector on it. The IEI page provides no links to documentation. The page shows various software management interfaces that are specific to TPM chip vendors, so I looked for them up. There are three modules based on infineon, atmel and sinosun TPM chips. Looking at the Infineon TPM v1.2 page we see the complete information isn't publicly available. There is no indication of how to do PC-BIOS integration, no in depth datasheet/manual, etc. It's probably not possible to to implement under windows without a partnership. I checked the Atmel site and the public information there was sparse. The Sinosun site has some basic information on management software. These would require your're are in partnership, although I found an advertisement for the Sinosun TPM software management tools ($26.99 US) http://www.orbitmicro.com/global/20pinsinosuntpmmoduleswmanagementtool-p-4385.html Orbit Micro is a system integrator and IEI distributor and probably can provide a white box solution. You're still at the mercy of the Motherboard/PC vendor for BIOS support. The Supermicro motherboard with integrated TPM has a BIOS that is TPM aware.. It probably uses an ST19WP18-TPM-C from Standard Microsystems (Found by searching their FAQ, another board with TPM). There is some information on software development environment: http://www.st.com/stonline/products/families/smartcard/sc_support.htm This compares the three TPM chip versions: http://www.st.com/stonline/stappl/productcatalog/app?path=/comp/stcom/PcStComOnLineQuery.showresultquerytype=type=product$$view=tablequerycriteria=RNP139=1120.0 and prompted examination of the their pdf files, the sections on the back on software. The drivers are actually in ROM on the ST chips, with a flag system for the host BIOS, allowing the same BIOS to work with or without TPM. This may explain some of the lack of visibility in some BIOS images. The windows drivers are embedded, too. The -TMP-C version used by the Supermicro motherboard talks about the use of Embassy Security Center suite from Wave Systems. There is a right to use license transfered with the chip: http://www.st.com/stonline/press/news/year2004/p1499m.htm also mentioned: http://www.tonymcfadden.net/tpmvendors_arc.html#software The last link gives insight into the Atmel software, too. The IEI pluggable TPM module web page shows software interfaces from three different vendors for the three different chips it uses. The Winbond chip is shown being administered by Wave's ESC. No indication of licensing terms. For open source/linux afficionados there's jtpmtools: http://trustedjava.sourceforge.net/ (probably ripe for a tcl wrapper) And information on the Open Trusted Computing web site: http://www.opentc.net (http://www.wavesys.com/products/TPM_Matrix.html describes the currently available TPM products from various system vendors.) - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
On Mon, 25 Jun 2007, Hal Finney wrote: The idea of putting a TPM on a smart card or other removable device is even more questionable from this perspective. A TPM which communicates via an easily accessible and tamperable bus is almost useless for the security concepts behind the Trusted Computing Group architecture. Even if a TPM is soldered to the motherboard it does not mean that unsoldering is an esoteric art. There is a difference between what media hypes about TPM and what TCG technical documents say [1]: It is not expected that a TPM will be able to defeat sophisticated physical attacks. The exception might be if there were additional hardware to encrypt the bus, but that is not part of the standard spec. Encrypted bus requires encryption cores on both ends and key distribution resistant to MitM attacks. I suspect that if you system already has so many crypto blocks in it, it would be cheaper to implement TPM inside. So this would allow a removable TPM but it has to be logically bound to the motherboard via cryptography, presumably something like an encrypted bus. To logically bound TPM to the motherboard it is enough for BIOS `loader' that hashes the rest of the BIOS, to include unique ID of the motherboard into the hash. [1] https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/groups/tpm/TPM_1_2_Changes_final.pdf -- Regards, ASK - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
On Jun 25, 2007, at 7:23 PM, Matt Johnston wrote: On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 04:42:56PM +1200, David G. Koontz wrote: Apple (mis)uses TPM to unsuccessfully prevent OS X from running on non-Apple Hardware. All Apple on Intel machines have TPM, that's what 6 percent of new PCs? To nit pick, the TPM is only present in some Apple Intel machines and isn't used in any of them. See http://osxbook.com/book/bonus/chapter10/tpm/ Their OS decryption key is just stored in normal firmware, unprotected AIUI. They've apparently stopped shipping TPMs. There isn't one on my MacBook Pro from last November, and it is missing on my wife's new Santa Rosa machine. If you want to see if a machine has one, then the command: sudo ioreg -w 0 | grep -i tpm should give something meaningful. Mine reports the existence of ApplePCISlotPM, but that's not the same thing. Jon - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
Peter Gutmann wrote: Ian Farquhar (ifarquha) [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: For example: the Gigabyte GA-965QM-DS2 (rev 2.0) which features security enhancement by TPM. More common (ASUS, Foxconn) was the TPM Connector, which seemed to be a hedged bet, by replacing the cost of the TPM chip with the cost of a socket. Those are actually misleading, since there's no certainty that you'll be able to find anything that'll actually plug into them. That is, not only are the TPM whatever-they-are-that-goes-there's almost impossible to find, but if you do find one there's no guarantee that it'll actually work when plugged into the header. In practice this is just a way of adding the TPM keyword to your marketing without having to actually do anything except include a dummy header on the MB. There are third party TPM modules, which could allow some degree of standardization: http://www.ieiworld.com/en/news_content.asp?id=erbium/projectOBJ00244201news_cate=Newsnews_sub_cate=Product The IEI TPM module is used in their own motherboards and some VIA motherboards. They actively market the pluggable modules. Thinkpads appear to use a different connector: https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-591.pdf 30 pins instead of 20 pins. The Low Pin Count bus is an ISA bus replacement is specified as the TPM interface, and isn't defined for connector use, so a connector pin out isn't standardized. http://www.intel.com/design/chipsets/industry/25128901.pdf (the spec) (For people who don't work with the innards of PCs much, most motherboards have assorted unused headers, sites for non-installed ICs, and so on, as a standard part of the MB. The TPM header is just another one). Peter. In addition to pluggable modules, TPM can also be an assembly bill of materials option, where you have a chip and a few passive components not stuffed for non-enterprise PCs or notebooks. The advantage of a pluggable module would be to allow late binding build configurations when you can't adequately forecast demands. Even the low costs of TPM hardware, patent licenses, BIOS licenses, etc., are probably enough to prevent blanket inclusion in personal computers not intended for enterprise use today. TPM can also be built into chip sets like Intels Bearlake, which removes the hardware cost. TPM may well end up being present ubiquitously. One of the driving forces for TPM adoption going forward will be enterprise remote or distributed management. http://www.dmtf.org/home Doing distributed management with TPM allows some degree of security that would otherwise be missing. Distributed management is the purpose of Intels vPro and iAMT initiatives. Note that the distributed management push is relatively recent, going mainline in the last year or so and may signal an upcoming acceleration in TPM adoption. Also of note is that the membership list for the Distributed Management Task Force contains most of the big name PC sellers. Distributed management can be OS 'gnostic, the driving need is the ability to handle large volumes of software updates and security patches. While some OS's require large volumes of security patches, others are evolving fast enough to require automated updates. We're pretty much guaranteed to see see enterprise adoption across all platforms. Linux supports TPM devices directly, as will Solaris. Apple (mis)uses TPM to unsuccessfully prevent OS X from running on non-Apple Hardware. All Apple on Intel machines have TPM, that's what 6 percent of new PCs? There is a virtual TPM in Xen, IBM would tell you that you can't operate a trusted computer with out a security server for providing virtual TPM storage. They're willing to sell you one and Microsoft doesn't want you to operate Vista virtually without a trustworthy Trusted Platform Module. It may be inappropriate to build a system with absolute trust in TPM to protect intellectual property. There are other architectures that can do better, say a blade server running a virtual copy of an OS. The element providing greater security is removing the potentially malicious end-user from physical access, and not allowing access beyond the virtual machine. Thin clients and web applications come to mind for protecting corporate secrets, too. TPM is predicated on the notion that the corporate universe is comprised of fully capable computers. The idea for Trusted Computing comes mainly from hardware vendors, so the bias isn't surprising. No one likes the idea of TPM on their personal machines,it's really driven by enterprise needs, although you could imagine a market for a service intended to keep your personal Windows PC updated. There can be useful side effects to having TPM on personal computers. TPM could provide secure storage for keys to software or hardware encrypted disk drives, the alternative might imply uncovering the equivalent of master keys over questionable channels during boot up. Secure Disks with hardware
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
David G. Koontz [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: There are third party TPM modules, which could allow some degree of standardization: As I said in my previous message, just because they exist doesn't mean they'll do anything if you plug them into a MB with the necessary header (assuming you have a MB with the header, and it's physically compatible, and electrically compatible, and the BIOS is compatible, and ...). Which MBs have you plugged one of these TPMs into and had it work? TPM may well end up being present ubiquitously. Smart cards may well end up being present ubiquitously. Hardware RNGs may well end up being present ubiquitously. NIC-based crypto may well end up being present ubiquitously. Biometric readers may well end up being present ubiquitously. Home taping is killing mus... oops, wrong list. Been there, done that, got the tchotchkes to prove it. I've seen zero evidence that TPMs are going to be anything other than a repeat of hardware RNGs, NIC-based crypto, biometric readers, and the pile of other failed hardware silver bullets that crop up every few years. Wait a year or two and there'll be some other magic gadget along to fix all our problems. Peter. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
| ...Apple is one vendor who I gather does include a TPM chip on their | systems, I gather, but that wasn't useful for me. Apple included TPM chips on their first round of Intel-based Macs. Back in 2005, there were all sorts of stories floating around the net about how Apple would use TPM to prevent OS X running on non-Apple hardware. In fact: - Some Apple models contain a TPM module (the Infineon TPM1.2); some (second generation) don't; - No current Apple model contains an EFI (boot) driver for the module; - No current version of OS X contains a driver to access the module for any purpose; - Hence: OS X doesn't rely on TPM to block execution on non- Apple hardware. In fact, there is an active hacker's community that gets OS X to run on hackintosh's - an announcement of OS X on a Sony Vaio made the rounds just a couple of days ago. Apparently the only real difficulty is writing appropriate boot and other low-level drivers. Amit Singh, the author of the definitive reference on OS X internals, has written and distributed an OS X driver for the TPM on those machines that have it. For all kinds of details, see his page at: http://www.osxbook.com/book/bonus/chapter10/tpm/ -- Jerry - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
David G. Koontz writes: There are third party TPM modules, which could allow some degree of standardization: http://www.ieiworld.com/en/news_content.asp?id=erbium/projectOBJ00244201news_cate=Newsnews_sub_cate=Product The IEI TPM module is used in their own motherboards and some VIA motherboards. They actively market the pluggable modules. Thinkpads appear to use a different connector: https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-591.pdf 30 pins instead of 20 pins. It seems odd for the TPM of all devices to be put on a pluggable module as shown here. The whole point of the chip is to be bound tightly to the motherboard and to observe the boot and initial program load sequence. Any steps to decouple the TPM and facilitate separating it from a motherboard will only make attacks on its security model easier and make the chip less useful for its stated purpose. The idea of putting a TPM on a smart card or other removable device is even more questionable from this perspective. A TPM which communicates via an easily accessible and tamperable bus is almost useless for the security concepts behind the Trusted Computing Group architecture. (The exception might be if there were additional hardware to encrypt the bus, but that is not part of the standard spec.) The other direction that has been mentioned, putting the TPM onto the CPU die, would make more sense for security, but I don't know of any chips that actually do that. However with the future trend towards increased CPU parallelism and addition of extra cores for additional functionality, it would seem to be a natural extension, if TPMs catch on. I tried hunting through the TCG specs to see if they say anything about this, but it's a maze. Eventually there is supposed to be a Platform Conformance Credential which certifies that a particular platform (e.g. motherboard + associated chips) satisfies some criteria and has gone through a certification process. But I couldn't find anything specific about what security features a trusted platform is supposed to have. The TPM Design Principles doc says: https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/specs/TPM/Main_Part1_Rev94.zip 11.2 RTR to Platform Binding Start of informative comment When performing validation of the EK and the platform the challenger wishes to have knowledge of the binding of RTR to platform. The RTR is bound to a TPM hence if the platform can show the binding of TPM to platform the challenger can reasonably believe the RTR and platform binding. The TPM cannot provide all of the information necessary for the challenger to trust in the binding. That information comes from the manufacturing process and occurs outside the control of the TPM. End of informative comment 1. The EK is transitively bound to the Platform via the TPM as follows: a. An EK is bound to one and only one TPM (i.e., there is a one to one correspondence between an Endorsement Key and a TPM.) b. A TPM is bound to one and only one Platform. (i.e., there is a one to one correspondence between a TPM and a Platform.) c. Therefore, an EK is bound to a Platform. (i.e., there is a one to one correspondence between an Endorsement Key and a Platform.) Here, the RTR is the Root of Trust for Reporting, aka the on-chip Endorsement Key (EK) which the TPM uses to sign platform and software configuration info as part of its Remote Attestation capability. This text would seem to argue against a removable TPM. Here's a quote from one of the PC-related specs: https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/specs/PCClient/TCG_PCClientImplementationforBIOS_1-20_1-00.pdf 1.2.12.1.2 Binding Methods Start of informative comment The method of binding the TPM to the motherboard is an architectural and design decision made by the respective manufacturer and is not specified here. There are two types of binding: physical and logical. Physical binding relies on hardware techniques while logical binding relies on cryptographic techniques. The nature and strength of each method is defined by the TPM's or the Platform's Protection Profile. Example: The TPM is a physical chip soldered to the Host Platform. Here the Endorsement Key is physically bound to the TPM (it's inside it) and the TPM is physically bound to the Host Platform by the solder. The required strength of each binding is determined by the Protection Profile. End of informative comment So this would allow a removable TPM but it has to be logically bound to the motherboard via cryptography, presumably something like an encrypted bus. As Peter Gutmann noted, most TPM systems are relatively expensive business laptops where the chip is sold as a security chip, although in practice it doesn't do much. Possibly with Vista's BitLocker disk encryption we will see more use of TPMs. I saw the other day that Microsoft was about to make BitLocker available to home users (it's only in the high-end Vistas now) but changed their mind at the
RE: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
It seems odd for the TPM of all devices to be put on a pluggable module as shown here. The whole point of the chip is to be bound tightly to the motherboard and to observe the boot and initial program load sequence. Maybe I am showing my eternal optimist side here, but to me, this is how TPM's should be used, as opposed to the way their backers originally wanted them used. A removable module whose connection to a device I establish (and can de-establish, assuming the presence of a tamper-respondent barrier such as a sensor-enabled computer case to legitimize that activity) is a very useful thing to me, as it facilitates all sorts of useful applications. The utility of the original intent has already been widely criticised, so I won't repeat that here. :) It also shows those interesting economics at work. The added utility of the TPM module (from the PoV of the user) was marginal at best despite all claims, yet it facilitated functionality which was contrary to most user's interests. The content industry tried to claim that the TPM module would facilitate the availability of compelling content - which they tried to sell as it's user utility - but like most of their claims it was a smoke and mirrors trick. Consequently, the razor-edged economics of the motherboard and desktop industry has comprehensively rejected TPM except in certain specialized marketplaces where higher profit margins are available (eg. Servers, corporate desktops). The chipset manufacturers have also failed to add this functionality to their offerings to date. Now Vista has added Bitlocker, which arguably adds a user valuable feature for which a TPM module is needed (yes, you can run it without TPM, but it's painful). I wonder if we'll start to see more TPM connectors appearing, or even full TPM modules on motherboards and cores on south bridge dies? Personally, I'd like to see a TPM implemented as a tamper-respondent (ie. Self-powered) module mounted on the motherboard in a socket which allows removal detection. That way you get the flexibility of moving the module, with the safety of a programmed response to an unauthorized removal. Ian. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
On Mon, Jun 25, 2007 at 04:42:56PM +1200, David G. Koontz wrote: Apple (mis)uses TPM to unsuccessfully prevent OS X from running on non-Apple Hardware. All Apple on Intel machines have TPM, that's what 6 percent of new PCs? To nit pick, the TPM is only present in some Apple Intel machines and isn't used in any of them. See http://osxbook.com/book/bonus/chapter10/tpm/ Their OS decryption key is just stored in normal firmware, unprotected AIUI. Matt - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
I agree with Peter here. I also tried to procure a motherboard with a TPM chip - to play with Bitlocker mostly - and came to the same conclusion. I did find a few MBs, mostly from Intel, and a couple of other vendors. All of these were corporate-style MB's, as opposed to the gamer/enthusiast style I needed. For example: the Gigabyte GA-965QM-DS2 (rev 2.0) which features security enhancement by TPM. More common (ASUS, Foxconn) was the TPM Connector, which seemed to be a hedged bet, by replacing the cost of the TPM chip with the cost of a socket. I also went looking for a TPM on some other delivery mechanism (USB stick? PCI card? Anything...) but didn't turn anything up I was actually able to purchase at the time (but maybe not now - see the BCM5751 below). There's a slightly out of date matrix of products here: http://www.tonymcfadden.net/tpmvendors_arc.html I too have heard rumors of TPM functionality being included in either North or South Brigdes, but I haven't seen that happen yet (aside from Intel, few vendors release detailed chipset datasheets anyway). Winbond do have a Trusted IO series of chips which are basically LPC controllers plus the TPM chip (all now not recommended for new designs), and Transmeta did embed the TPM in the TM5800. Apparently Broadcomm also did embed a TPM on their BCM5751 and BCM5751M ethernet controllers. Interestingly, you will find the BCM5751 on several high end motherboards, but the presence of TPM functionality isn't often mentioned. Riii :) Apple is one vendor who I gather does include a TPM chip on their systems, I gather, but that wasn't useful for me. Ian. -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Peter Gutmann Sent: Saturday, 23 June 2007 10:49 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: my understanding from a person active in the NEA working group (IETF) is that TPMs these days come along for free because they're included on-die in at least one of said chips. Check again. A few months ago I was chatting with someone who works for a large US computer hardware distributor and he located one single motherboard (an Intel one, based on an old, possibly discontinued chipset) in their entire inventory that contained a TPM (they also had all the ex-IBM/Lenovo laptops, and a handful of HP laptops, that were reported as having TPMs). He also said that there were a handful of others (e.g. a few Dell laptops, which they don't carry) with TPMs. I've seen all sorts of *claims* of TPM support, but try going out and buying a PC with one (aside from IBM/Lenovo and the handful of others) - you have to look really, *really* hard to find anything, and if you do decide you specifically want a TPM-enabled MB or laptop you're severely restricting your options (unless it's a Lenovo). Unless something truly miraculous happens, TPMs are destined to end their lives as optional theft-discouragement gadgets for laptops (assuming they're running Windows XP, or possibly Vista if you can find the drivers). They've certainly failed to make any impression on the desktop market. Peter. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED] - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
Ian Farquhar (ifarquha) [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: For example: the Gigabyte GA-965QM-DS2 (rev 2.0) which features security enhancement by TPM. More common (ASUS, Foxconn) was the TPM Connector, which seemed to be a hedged bet, by replacing the cost of the TPM chip with the cost of a socket. Those are actually misleading, since there's no certainty that you'll be able to find anything that'll actually plug into them. That is, not only are the TPM whatever-they-are-that-goes-there's almost impossible to find, but if you do find one there's no guarantee that it'll actually work when plugged into the header. In practice this is just a way of adding the TPM keyword to your marketing without having to actually do anything except include a dummy header on the MB. (For people who don't work with the innards of PCs much, most motherboards have assorted unused headers, sites for non-installed ICs, and so on, as a standard part of the MB. The TPM header is just another one). Peter. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: my understanding from a person active in the NEA working group (IETF) is that TPMs these days come along for free because they're included on-die in at least one of said chips. Check again. A few months ago I was chatting with someone who works for a large US computer hardware distributor and he located one single motherboard (an Intel one, based on an old, possibly discontinued chipset) in their entire inventory that contained a TPM (they also had all the ex-IBM/Lenovo laptops, and a handful of HP laptops, that were reported as having TPMs). He also said that there were a handful of others (e.g. a few Dell laptops, which they don't carry) with TPMs. I've seen all sorts of *claims* of TPM support, but try going out and buying a PC with one (aside from IBM/Lenovo and the handful of others) - you have to look really, *really* hard to find anything, and if you do decide you specifically want a TPM-enabled MB or laptop you're severely restricting your options (unless it's a Lenovo). Unless something truly miraculous happens, TPMs are destined to end their lives as optional theft-discouragement gadgets for laptops (assuming they're running Windows XP, or possibly Vista if you can find the drivers). They've certainly failed to make any impression on the desktop market. Peter. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
Peter Gutmann wrote: I've seen all sorts of *claims* of TPM support, but try going out and buying a PC with one Of the 25 business laptop models that HP offers on its site right now, only 5 don't have a TPM installed. -- Ivan Krstić [EMAIL PROTECTED] | GPG: 0x147C722D - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
[EMAIL PROTECTED] said: With TPMs it's a bit different, they're absent from the hardware by default in case you're referring to the TCPA (trusted computing platform alliance) TPM.. my understanding from a person active in the NEA working group (IETF) is that TPMs these days come along for free because they're included on-die in at least one of said chips. I don't recall whether he said it was the network interface (NIC) and/or one of the others. So anyway, he said ...enterprise-class systems (eg Dell Latitudes) mostly all already contain, TPMs and various network gear manufacturers have boxes that speak to them already, and NEA is just trying to standardize the protocols... I've noticed my latitude systems do in fact have a bios option for enabling/disabling their TPMs. (mine are disabled) the way in that IT depts ensure that vic...er...employees don't turn 'em off (as I understand it) is they set the BIOS admin password on their assets (computers) before their give them out. =JeffH - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
Peter Gutmann wrote: -- Snip -- This is very scary. I bet that our Minister of the Interior would love it, though, since he has been pushing a scheme for stealth examination of suspects' computers (called Federal Trojan). Technology like this would be a large first step towards making this possible. [...] - Built in web interface on every machine (port 16994) Apart from all the other things that are wrong with this scheme, * you can't trust the output of netstat anymore; * in other words, what you see with netstat may not be the same as what someone else sees with nmap; and * if the web interface has a vulnerability, you have an unshutdownable vulnerable service running on your machine. Fun, Stephan - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
Peter Gutmann wrote: [...] a register article saying Intel released its new platform Centrino Pro which includes Intel Active Management 2.5. An article with some more info is here: It appears Active Management is a setting that can be disabled normally from the BIOS, like with TPMs today: http://support.intel.com/support/motherboards/desktop/sb/cs-020837.htm I couldn't find a conclusive statement one way or the other, but I expect it'll also be turned off by default for consumer machines. That still leaves a slew of open questions, but makes it less initially alarming, I'd say. -- Ivan Krstić [EMAIL PROTECTED] | GPG: 0x147C722D - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrt Network Endpoint Assessment (was: Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine)
of potential related interest is.. Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and Requirements http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-nea-requirements-02.txt note term remediate/remediation. relevant snippage below. see also.. http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/nea-charter.html =JeffH snip/ 1. Introduction Today, most network providers can leverage existing standards- based technologies to restrict access to their network based upon criteria such as the requesting system's user or host-based identity, source IP address or physical access point. However these approaches still leave the network resident systems vulnerable to malware-based attack, when an authorized but infected system is admitted and the malware is able to spread throughout the internal network. As a result, network operators need a proactive mechanism to assess the state of systems joining or present on the network to determine their status relative to network compliance policies. For example, if a system is determined to be out of compliance because it is lacking proper defensive mechanisms such as firewalls, anti-virus software or the absence of critical security patches, there needs to be a way to safely repair (remediate) the system so that it can be subsequently trusted to join and operate on the network. The NEA technology strives to provide a mechanism to report the configuration of an endpoint for evaluation against network compliance policy. Such a mechanism could offer a useful tool for the network operators' arsenal but should be recognized as not being a complete endpoint compliance solution in and of itself. NEA typically involves the use of special client software running on the requesting system that observes and reports on the configuration of the system to the network infrastructure. The infrastructure has corresponding validation software that is capable of comparing the system configuration information with network compliance policy and providing the result to appropriate authorization entities that make decisions about network and application access. Some systems may be incapable of running the NEA client software (e.g. printer) or be unwilling to share information about its configuration. In these cases the network infrastructure might decide to disallow or limit access to the network. In many cases, the admission decision is provisioned to the enforcement mechanisms on the network and/or system requesting access. The decision might allow for no access, limited or quarantined access (possibly to allow for remediation), or full access to the network. While the NEA Working Group recognizes there is a link between an assessment and the enforcement of the assessment decision, the mechanisms and protocols for enforcement are not in scope for this specification. Architectures, similar to NEA, have existed in the industry for some time and are present in shipping products, but do not offer interoperability. Some examples of such architectures include: Trusted Computing Group's Trusted Network Connect [TNC], Microsoft's Network Access Protection [NAP], Cisco's Network Admission Control [CNAC]). These technologies assess the software or hardware configuration of endpoint devices for the purposes of monitoring or enforcing compliance to an organization's policy. These architectures are not interoperable because they are implemented using primarily non- standards based technologies. The NEA working group is working on defining standard protocols so as to enable interoperability between devices from different vendors allowing network owners to deploy truly heterogeneous solutions. This document describes the requirements for NEA candidate technologies and protocols. snip/ 4. Problem Statement NEA technology may be used for several purposes. One use is to facilitate endpoint compliance checking against an organization's security policy when an endpoint connects to the network. Organizations often require endpoints to run an IT- specified OS configuration and have certain security applications enabled, e.g. anti-virus software, host intrusion detection/prevention systems, personal firewalls, and patch management software. An endpoint that is not compliant with IT policy may be vulnerable to a number of known threats that might exist on the network. Without NEA technology, ensuring compliance of endpoints to corporate policy is a time-consuming and difficult task. Not all endpoints are managed by a corporation's IT organization, e.g. lab assets and guest machines. Even for assets that are
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
=?UTF-8?B?SXZhbiBLcnN0acSH?= [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: It appears Active Management is a setting that can be disabled normally from the BIOS, like with TPMs today: http://support.intel.com/support/motherboards/desktop/sb/cs-020837.htm With TPMs it's a bit different, they're absent from the hardware by default :-). Peter. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Free Rootkit with Every New Intel Machine
Initially I did not believe it, thought it must be hype or hoax. Nope, it is a rootkit in hardware. http://www.intel.com/business/vpro/index.htm : : Isolate security tasks—in a separate : : environment that is hidden to the user : : : : [...] : : : : Perform hardware and software inventory on : : PCs—even if they don't have management : : applications installed or they are powered : : down, which increases reporting accuracy for : : licensing, maintenance contracts, and audits. : : : : Deploy software patches to PCs more : : efficiently—even if they are powered down or : : their OS is inoperable, without disrupting or : : slowing down the user's workflow. (The last paragraph means without the user knowing, and even if the user is doing his best to stop you) - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
