On Thu, Aug 28, 2008 at 06:03:14PM +0200, Stefan Kelm wrote:
> We've been helping the German "Toll Collect" system (as
> discussed in this thread as well) setting up and implementing
> their data privacy concept. This concept requires Toll Collect
> to delete almost any data after a certain (quite
> everything forever. With disk prices falling
> as they are, keeping everything is cheaper
> than careful selective deletion, that's for
> sure.
I disagree.
We've been helping the German "Toll Collect" system (as
discussed in this thread as well) setting up and implementing
their data privacy c
On Thu, 28 Aug 2008 17:55:57 +0200
Stefan Kelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toll_Collect is in operation in entire
> >> Germany. It does OCR on all license plates (also used for police
> >> purposes in realtime, despite initial vigorous denial) but
> >> currently is
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toll_Collect is in operation in entire
>> Germany. It does OCR on all license plates (also used for police
>> purposes in realtime, despite initial vigorous denial) but currently
>> is only used for truck toll.
>>
> How well does that actually work? There were many
Sherri Davidoff <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>> Look for general tracking to appear everywhere.
> Anonymous travel is dead. Even for subway riders who still use tokens
> and citizens that bicycle around town, the proliferation of cameras,
> facial recognition technology
On Thu, 28 Aug 2008 10:49:20 +0200
Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 27, 2008 at 12:16:23PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>
> > Finally, the transponders may not matter much longer; OCR on license
> > plates is getting that good. As has already been mentioned, the 407
> > E
On Wed, Aug 27, 2008 at 12:16:23PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> Finally, the transponders may not matter much longer; OCR on license
> plates is getting that good. As has already been mentioned, the 407
> ETR road in Toronto already relies on this to some extent; it won't be
> too much long
On 27 aug, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> Finally, the transponders may not matter much longer; OCR on license
> plates is getting that good. As has already been mentioned, the 407
> ETR road in Toronto already relies on this to some extent; it won't be
> too much longer before the human assist is al
>> The relationship to this list may then be thin
>> excepting that the collection and handling of
>> such data remains of substantial interest.
>
>Actually, it points to cash settlement of road tolls.
That's not unknown. On the Niagara Falls toll bridges, they have an
ETC system where you buy yo
"Steven M. Bellovin" writes, in part:
-+---
| There's a limit to how far they can go with that, because of the fear
| of people abandoning the transponders.
|
| As for usage-based driving -- the first question is the political will
| to do so.
|
| Finally,
> Personally, I don't want to have a history of my travel stored in any
> database. Right now, purchasing a one-time CharlieTicket is a 30 cent
> surcharge per ride, but it is the only way to take the subway in Boston
> without creating a travel history. Privacy in public transportation
> sho
On Wed, 27 Aug 2008 07:10:51 -0400
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Bill Frantz writes, in part:
> -+--
> | In the San Francisco Bay Area, they are using the transponder codes
> | to measure how fast traffic is moving from place to place. They
> | post the times to various
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Look for general tracking to appear everywhere.
Anonymous travel is dead. Even for subway riders who still use tokens
and citizens that bicycle around town, the proliferation of cameras,
facial recognition technology, biometrics and RFID tagging will render
anonymity obs
On Aug 27, 2008, at 7:10 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The relationship to this list may then be thin
excepting that the collection and handling of
such data remains of substantial interest.
Actually, it points to cash settlement of road tolls.
Most likely digital bearer transaction settlemen
Bill Frantz writes, in part:
-+--
| In the San Francisco Bay Area, they are using the transponder codes
| to measure how fast traffic is moving from place to place. They
| post the times to various destinations on the electric signs when
| there are no Amber alerts or o
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ken Buchanan) on Tuesday, August 26, 2008 wrote:
>I think this is a bit different than what Michael Heyman said. TxTag,
>IIRC, was implemented by the same company (Raytheon) that implemented
>the 407 ETR toll system in Toronto. In the case of the 407, there is
>no image recogn
On Tue, 2008-08-26 at 13:22 -0400, Ken Buchanan wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 11:56 AM, Dustin D. Trammell
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > This is the same for the state-wide Texas tag, TxTag[1]. If your tag
> > doesn't register, or you disable or remove it, the toll system can still
> > accur
>> > So, I believe, at least for E-Z Pass, the attack would have to include
>> > cloning the license plate and pictures may still be available whenever
>> > a victim realizes they have been charged for trips they did not take.
The 407 toll road in Toronto uses entirely automated toll collection.
T
On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 11:56 AM, Dustin D. Trammell
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> This is the same for the state-wide Texas tag, TxTag[1]. If your tag
> doesn't register, or you disable or remove it, the toll system can still
> accurately bill you based on your license plate and vehicle
> registra
On Tue, 2008-08-26 at 10:52 -0400, Matt Blaze wrote:
> On Aug 26, 2008, at 10:15, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > So, I believe, at least for E-Z Pass, the attack would have to include
> > cloning the license plate and pictures may still be available whenever
> > a victim realizes they have been charg
On Aug 26, 2008, at 10:15, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 9:24 AM, Perry E. Metzger
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
http://www.technologyreview.com/Infotech/21301/?a=f
From the article: "other toll systems, like E-Z Pass and I-Pass, need
to be looked at too"
A couple years ag
On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 9:24 AM, Perry E. Metzger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Despite previous reassurances about the security of the system,
> Nate Lawson of Root Labs claims that the unique identity numbers
> used to identify the FasTrak wireless transponders carried in cars
> can be cop
On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 9:24 AM, Perry E. Metzger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> http://www.technologyreview.com/Infotech/21301/?a=f
>
>From the article: "other toll systems, like E-Z Pass and I-Pass, need
to be looked at too"
A couple years ago I got a letter from E-Z Pass a few days after I
used
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