On 08/27/2013 01:17, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> On Mon, 26 Aug 2013 17:39:16 -0400 The Doctor
> wrote:
>> On 08/26/2013 09:26 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>>
>>> Mix networks are, however, a well technique. Onion networks, which
>>> are related, are widely deployed right now in the form of Tor, and
On Mon, 26 Aug 2013 17:39:16 -0400 The Doctor
wrote:
> On 08/26/2013 09:26 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
>
> > Mix networks are, however, a well technique. Onion networks, which
> > are related, are widely deployed right now in the form of Tor, and
> > work well. I see little reason to believe mix
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On 08/26/2013 09:26 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> Mix networks are, however, a well technique. Onion networks, which
> are related, are widely deployed right now in the form of Tor, and
> work well. I see little reason to believe mix networks would no
On Sun, 25 Aug 2013 23:40:35 -0400 Phillip Hallam-Baker
wrote:
> There has to be a layered approach.
>
> Traffic analysis is probably going to demand steganography and that
> is almost by definition outside standards work.
I'm unaware of anyone who has seriously proposed steganography for
that p
There has to be a layered approach.
Traffic analysis is probably going to demand steganography and that is
almost by definition outside standards work.
The part of Prism that I consider to be blatantly unconstitutional is that
they keep all the emails so that they can search them years later sho
On Fri, 23 Aug 2013 09:38:21 -0700 Carl Ellison wrote:
> Meanwhile PRISM was more about metadata than content, right? How
> are we going to prevent traffic analysis worldwide?
The best technology for that is mix networks.
At one point, early in the cypherpunks era, mix networks were
something of
