- Forwarded message from Andrew Miller amil...@cs.umd.edu -
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2015 11:48:24 -0500
From: Andrew Miller amil...@cs.umd.edu
To: bitcoin-developm...@lists.sourceforge.net
Subject: [Bitcoin-development] New paper: Research Perspectives and Challenges
for Bitcoin and
It's hard to make a cryptocurrency hash that's ASICproof.
Cheap/multisource serve/PC COTS hardware has large memory
size, and intrinsic random access latencies that can't be
much improved upon for physical reasons (embedded memory
is limited in size due to die yield reasons, so large
LUTs are
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/11/newegg-trial-crypto-legend-diffie-takes-the-stand-to-knock-out-patent/
Newegg trial: Crypto legend takes the stand, goes for knockout patent punch
Taking a bet on Whit Diffie, as the trial against patent troll TQP wraps up
Monday.
by Joe Mullin - Nov
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org
http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2013/10/shamir/
Cryptographer Adi Shamir Prevented from Attending NSA History Conference
Categories: Science, Secrecy
In this email message to colleagues, Israeli cryptographer Adi Shamir
recounts the difficulties he faced in getting a visa to attend the 2013
Guys, in order to minimize Tor Project's dependance on
federal funding and/or increase what they can do it
would be great to have some additional funding ~10 kUSD/month.
If anyone is aware of anyone who can provide funding at
that level or higher, please contact exec...@torproject.org
http://www.nature.com/news/researchers-split-over-nsa-hacking-1.13911
Researchers split over NSA hacking
Cryptographers condemn US National Security Agency’s tapping and tampering,
but mathematicians shrug.
Ann Finkbeiner 08 October 2013
The National Security Agency is the largest employer of
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 08:12:16PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
The US only applies to itself. Further, over the air, it's noise, the crypto
is undetectable and unprovable. And it's (guerilla) software, not physical
commercial product. Nor is this the old 'FCC says you can't encrypt
ham bands'
https://www.cdt.org/blogs/joseph-lorenzo-hall/2409-nist-sha-3
What the heck is going on with NIST’s cryptographic standard, SHA-3?
by Joseph Lorenzo Hall [1]
September 24, 2013
(Warning: this is a fairly technical post about cryptographic standards
setting.)
The cryptographic community has
On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 01:12:19PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
On 9/27/13, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote:
I don't see how a ham running a repeater backbone can
prevent end to end encryption other than sniffing for
traffic and actively disrupting it. I'm not sure tampering
with transport
-
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ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org
AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 10:11:33AM -0400, John Young wrote:
Is this conclusion still valid? If so, what could be done to restrict traffic
volume to assure unbreakablility? And how to sufficiently test that.
You need to be able to estimate the rate of information leakage.
This seems to be
https://github.com/ShaneWilton/dissentr
Note: This project was created as part of a 36-hour hackathon - and primarily
as a proof of concept. While the ideas may be sound, and the prototype may work
as designed, the protocols involved in this specific project have not been
peer-reviewed, and
On Mon, Sep 23, 2013 at 11:02:45AM +0300, ianG wrote:
On 23/09/13 07:12 AM, Dev Random wrote:
I've been thinking about this for a while now and I don't see a way to
do this with today's mobile devices without some external help.
The issue is that it's pretty much impossible to delete data
. Unsubscribe,
change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at
compa...@stanford.edu.
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of
list guidelines will get you moderated:
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe,
change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at
compa...@stanford.edu.
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http
http://people.umass.edu/gbecker/BeckerChes13.pdf
Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans ?
Georg T. Becker1
, Francesco Regazzoni2
, Christof Paar1,3 , and Wayne P. Burleson1
1University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA
2TU Delft, The Netherlands and ALaRI - University of Lugano, Switzerland
http://www.mathbulletin.com/research/Breakthrough_in_cryptography_could_result_in_more_secure_computing.asp
Breakthrough in cryptography could result in more secure computing
(9/10/2013)
Tags: computer science, research, security, cryptography
Nigel Smart, Professor of Cryptology
New
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsDrafts.html
Sep. 9, 2013
SP 800-90 A Rev 1 B and C
DRAFT Draft SP 800-90 Series: Random Bit Generators
800-90 A Rev. 1: Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
Deterministic Random Bit Generators
800-90 B: Recommendation for the Entropy
- Forwarded message from Eric Young e...@pobox.com -
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 20:58:20 +1000
From: Eric Young e...@pobox.com
To: Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org
Cc: cypherpu...@al-qaeda.net, i...@postbiota.org, zs-...@zerostate.is,
Cryptography List cryptogra...@metzdowd.com
Subject: Re
Forwarded without permission, hence anonymized:
Hey, I had a look at SEC2 and the TLS/SSH RFCs. SSH uses secp256/384r1
which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the
parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG!
TLS specifies you can use those two curves as
http://www.ietf.org/blog/2013/09/security-and-pervasive-monitoring/
Security and Pervasive Monitoring
The Internet community and the IETF care deeply about how much we can trust
commonly used Internet services and the protocols that these services use.
So the reports about large-scale
-
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
On Mon, Sep 09, 2013 at 01:50:54PM -0500, Nicolai wrote:
On Mon, Sep 09, 2013 at 02:20:35PM +0200, David D wrote:
TrueCrypt can be assumed ok based on Greenwald using it.If Snowden
knew of a hole in TrueCrypt then Greenwald would not be using it. IMO.
I don't think this is a useful
-
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__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org
AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5
the Koblitz
curves).
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...@yahoo.com
To: Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org
Subject: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on BULLRUN
X-Mailer: YahooMailWebService/0.8.156.576
Reply-To: Andreas Davour ko...@yahoo.com
Apropos IPsec, I've tried searching for any BTNS (opportunistic encryption
mode for
IPsec) implementations
go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
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On Thu, Sep 05, 2013 at 10:47:10AM -0700, coderman wrote:
of all the no such agency disclosures, this one fuels the most wild
speculation.
It is reported that the journalists deliberately withheld details
which are available in Snowden's original documents. Somebody
better leak these, fast.
/listinfo/cryptography
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__
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AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489
On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 09:47:09AM +1000, James A. Donald wrote:
On 2013-08-14 6:10 AM, Nico Williams wrote:
- it's really not easy to defeat the PRISMs. the problem is
*political* more than technological.
For a human to read all communications would be an impossible burden.
We're
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
Implemented as a RetroShare plugin.
https://github.com/zeroreserve/ZeroReserve
ZeroReserve
Friend 2 Friend Payment and Bitcoin exchange
Prerequisite for building is a successful RetroShare build and sqlite3.
To build, checkout the sources to the plugins directory of Retroshare and build
...@lists.sourceforge.net
https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-list
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
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.
For those who dislike posting to the The Base, here's an alternative
domain for the same list: https://cpunks.org/mailman/options/cypherpunks
Adam
On Sun, Jul 21, 2013 at 11:07:26AM +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
- Forwarded message from Riad S. Wahby r...@jfet.org -
Date: Sat, 20 Jul
.
Datalove,
KheOps
--
Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing
moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at
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On Fri, Jul 12, 2013 at 10:29:49PM +0300, ianG wrote:
Not to mention, Intel have been in bed with the NSA for the longest
time. Secret areas on the chip, pop instructions, microcode and all
that ... A more interesting question is whether the non-USA
competitors are also similarly friendly.
In case you come across particular hair-raising crypto horrors,
please submit them to the author listed on http://www.cryptofails.com/
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On Sat, Jul 13, 2013 at 01:43:49AM -0400, Patrick Mylund Nielsen wrote:
Heh, might as well just give up. http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html
(I know what you meant, just couldn't resist.)
Certainly a classic, but these days you can really bootstrap
your toolchain in a cleanroom quite
? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing
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http://www.cryptofails.com/
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On Sun, Jun 30, 2013 at 07:09:57PM -0700, Yosem Companys wrote:
Speaking of which...
If you had an extra $2-3K to give to a liberationtech or crypto project,
who do you think would benefit the most?
A BTNS implementation. There aren't any.
___
On Mon, Jul 01, 2013 at 01:31:51PM +0200, Guido Witmond wrote:
The only answer is to take key management out of the users' hands. And
do it automatically as part of the work flow.
You need at least a Big Fat Warning when the new fingerprint
differs from the cached one, and it's not just
On Thu, May 23, 2013 at 09:38:18AM +0200, David Adamson wrote:
Danilo Gligoroski danilo.gligoro...@gmail.com wrote:
1. Indeed these discussions among the security community
2. Eventually some contacts with journalists will help the cause (one live
demonstration on some security/crypto
/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
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__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 05:50:18PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
Isn't exactly that a nice property of a cypherpunks list?
No it is not, it is a way to persuade people to leave, or not join the
listserv.
We have to agree to disagree on that one. A 'punk' of any
kind will tend to thumb his nose at
On Mon, Mar 25, 2013 at 07:03:04PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
But my point actually was b...@al-qaeda.net??? Come on that is watch list
Of course it is pure watch list bait. That's the point.
bait and an invitation NOT to join list blah, whatever it is about.
If you think it's a deterrent,
://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A
, or change password at:
https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
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/=now
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/member/archive/182191/=now
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Eugen* Leitl
message -
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
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8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
are failing now? I bet
thousands, as a self signed certificate is a valid way of encrypting the
traffic.
Please google, remove this requirement.
Source:
http://support.google.com/mail/bin/answer.py?hl=enanswer=21291ctx=gmail#strictSSL
- End forwarded message -
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http
(ob caveat snake oil crypto)
http://www.nature.com/news/quantum-cryptography-conquers-noise-problem-1.11849
Quantum cryptography conquers noise problem
Encoded photons sent a record distance along busy optical fibres.
Zeeya Merali
20 November 2012
Quantum cryptography could keep messages
http://h30565.www3.hp.com/t5/Feature-Articles/Your-GPU-s-Fingerprint-Could-Lead-to-New-Security-Methods/ba-p/8418
Your GPU's “Fingerprint” Could Lead to New Security Methods
by Andy Patrizio (apatrizio) on 29-10-2012 08:00 AM
starlight_dreamstimefree_141720.jpg
In the online world, a World of
back and
forth.
+1.
--
Dan White
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
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8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014
in every new processor from a major
manufacturer.
Agreed.
--
Nick
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/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
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__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779
://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D
/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779
On Fri, Oct 05, 2012 at 10:58:40AM +0200, Guus Sliepen wrote:
1. Measure. Don't speculate.
I found a benchmark here:
https://github.com/cjdelisle/cjdns/blob/master/rfcs/benchmark.txt
So it seems that is not as slow as I suspected: it can forward packets at a
rate of 7 Gbit/s on an
- Forwarded message from Jim Klimov jimkli...@cos.ru -
From: Jim Klimov jimkli...@cos.ru
Date: Thu, 04 Oct 2012 13:44:21 +0400
To: z...@lists.illumos.org
CC: Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org
Subject: Re: ZFS dedup? hashes (Re: [cryptography] [zfs] SHA-3 winner announced)
Reply-To: jimkli
- Forwarded message from Sašo Kiselkov skiselkov...@gmail.com -
From: Sašo Kiselkov skiselkov...@gmail.com
Date: Thu, 04 Oct 2012 15:19:59 +0200
To: z...@lists.illumos.org
CC: Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org
Subject: Re: [cryptography] ZFS dedup? hashes (Re: [zfs] SHA-3 winner
- Forwarded message from Sašo Kiselkov skiselkov...@gmail.com -
From: Sašo Kiselkov skiselkov...@gmail.com
Date: Thu, 04 Oct 2012 15:39:18 +0200
To: z...@lists.illumos.org
CC: Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org
Subject: Re: [cryptography] ZFS dedup? hashes (Re: [zfs] SHA-3 winner announced)
User
- Forwarded message from Jim Klimov jimkli...@cos.ru -
From: Jim Klimov jimkli...@cos.ru
Date: Thu, 04 Oct 2012 19:12:16 +0400
To: z...@lists.illumos.org
CC: Pawel Jakub Dawidek p...@freebsd.org, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org
Subject: Re: [cryptography] ZFS dedup? hashes (Re: [zfs] SHA-3
- Forwarded message from Sašo Kiselkov skiselkov...@gmail.com -
From: Sašo Kiselkov skiselkov...@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2012 15:39:39 +0200
To: z...@lists.illumos.org
CC: Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org
Subject: Re: [cryptography] [zfs] SHA-3 winner announced
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11
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http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/hardware/behind-intels-new-randomnumber-generator/0
Behind Intel's New Random-Number Generator
The random-number generator uses digital circuits to stump the smartest
hackers
By Greg Taylor, George Cox / September 2011
Image: Carl DeTorres
Imagine that
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__
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On Fri, May 25, 2012 at 11:19:33AM -0700, Jon Callas wrote:
My money would be on a combination of traffic analysis and targeted
malware. We know that the Germans have been pioneering using targeted malware
against Skype. Once you've done that, you can pick apart anything else. Just
a simple
http://agtb.wordpress.com/2012/02/17/john-nashs-letter-to-the-nsa/
John Nash’s Letter to the NSA
February 17, 2012 by Noam Nisan
The National Security Agency (NSA) has recently declassified an amazing
letter that John Nash sent to it in 1955. It seems that around the year 1950
Nash tried to
.
http://cr.yp.to/highspeed/neoncrypto-20120320.pdf
cheers,
-Brian
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(yay, Bamford is back from the dead)
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/1
The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch What You Say)
By James Bamford March 15, 2012 | 7:24 pm | Categories: Crypto,
Cybersecurity, Miscellaneous, NSA, Paranoia,
Is anyone aware of a CA that actually maintains its signing
secrets on secured, airgapped machines, with transfers batched and
done purely by sneakernet?
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
ICBM
fingerprints and alerts when one suddenly changes, informing
of a potential MITM in progress?
Thanks.
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__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
http://www.crypto-class.org/
About The Course
Cryptography is an indispensable tool for protecting information in computer
systems. This course explains the inner workings of cryptographic primitives
and how to correctly use them. Students will learn how to reason about the
security of
On Sat, Oct 29, 2011 at 08:10:38PM +1100, ianG wrote:
Is there any particular reason why PCI(e) is preferred as a hardware
interface?
Because that's the only thing server boards typically have.
Plus, PCIe is much preferable to PCI in terms of throughput
(not that makes a bottleneck for a
How safe is the bitcoin cryptosystem and the communication network
against targeted attacks?
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
__
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
On Sat, Jun 11, 2011 at 02:16:55AM -, John Levine wrote:
In article 021ccba9-9203-4896-8412-481b94595...@cs.columbia.edu you write:
http://gcn.com/articles/2011/06/09/bitcoins-digital-currency-silk-road-charles-schumer-joe-manchin.aspx?s=gcndaily_100611
I wouldn't call bitcoins digital
on a large, heavy, clicky IBM keyboard right now...
I stocked up on Model M SpaceSavers and full-size Model M's some
15 years ago. Have moved to Cherry MX (not blues, SteelSeries)
gold crosspoints only a few weeks ago.
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Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org
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