Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread yersinia
Sorry for the top posting. Many company are using private social network these days. As usual someone internal to the organization has the right to record and sniff also the private traffic. Don't like ? Well, you can always use services as scrumbls. Perhaps not so secure from a nsa wiretap but

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-05-22 5:00 PM, yersinia wrote: Sorry for the top posting. Many company are using private social network these days. As usual someone internal to the organization has the right to record and sniff also the private traffic. Don't like ? Well, you can always use services as scrumbls.

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
This presupposes custom malware written for the specific target. Not always. It presumes that someone may pack a binary just for a single target - this is however an automated process for lots of malware packages. Highly customized spearphish attacks are unlikely to be detected, but

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread Danilo Gligoroski
ianG wrote: Skype made their reputation as being free and secure (e2e) telephony. The latter was something that many people bought into. It is now the largest telco in the world, by minutes, in no small part because people enjoyed both security as well as free calls to their friends.

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread James A. Donald
Cops just don't put that much work in. On 2013-05-22 5:41 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote: Yes, yes they do: http://www.scmagazine.com/finfisher-command-and-control-hubs-turn-up-in-11-new-countries/article/291252/ That governments attempt to spy on people is not evidence that they any good at

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread Moritz
On 22.05.2013 10:45, James A. Donald wrote: This tells me that not that the police are super terrific hackers who produced customized malware for each person's computer, but that they are your mother. ... your mother, with a bit of monetary power to simply purchase the knowledge and the tools

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
James A. Donald: Cops just don't put that much work in. On 2013-05-22 5:41 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote: Yes, yes they do: http://www.scmagazine.com/finfisher-command-and-control-hubs-turn-up-in-11-new-countries/article/291252/ That governments attempt to spy on people is not evidence

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread Mark Seiden
On May 22, 2013, at 5:59 AM, Jacob Appelbaum ja...@appelbaum.net wrote: James A. Donald: Cops just don't put that much work in. On 2013-05-22 5:41 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote: Yes, yes they do:

[cryptography] Network Insecurity: Losing the Cyber Crime Battle

2013-05-22 Thread John Young
http://cryptome.org/2013/05/cybercrime-battle.pdf ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Wed, May 22, 2013 at 10:07 AM, Mark Seiden m...@seiden.com wrote: On May 22, 2013, at 5:59 AM, Jacob Appelbaum ja...@appelbaum.net wrote: James A. Donald: http://www.scmagazine.com/finfisher-command-and-control-hubs-turn-up-in-11-new-countries/article/291252/ That governments attempt to

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread Florian Weimer
So, the review is not invalid. And, even when Skype changes its model, the review remains valid. There are now features that are incompatible with the design sketched in the report, such as user password recovery and call forwarding. The key management never was end-to-end, and we'd view that

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread Adam Back
You know thats the second time you claimed skype was not end2end secure. Did you read the skype independent security review paper that Ian posted a link to? http://download.skype.com/share/security/2005-031%20security%20evaluation.pdf It is cleary and unambiguously claimed that skype WAS end

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread Florian Weimer
* Adam Back: If you want to claim otherwise we're gonna need some evidence. https://login.skype.com/account/password-reset-request This is impossible to implement with any real end-to-end security. ___ cryptography mailing list

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread Dominik Schürmann
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi folks, we recently wrote a small section about skype with some references: http://sufficientlysecure.org/uploads/skype.pdf Interesting references (from 2005, 2006): http://www.ossir.org/windows/supports/2005/2005-11-07/EADS-CCR_Fabrice_Skype.pdf

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread Adam Back
I dont think your inference is necessarily correct. With reference to the Berson report, consider the skype RSA keypair was for authentication only (authenticating ephemeral key-exchange as described in the paper). The public RSA key is certified by skype as belonging to your identity. They

Re: [cryptography] skype backdoor confirmation

2013-05-22 Thread Adam Back
Indeed it was understood that skype's coding was described as akin to a polymorphic virus. However it was also considered that this was for business reasons to make it difficult for competing products to interoperate at the codec, and protocol level. I notice that those two papers do NOT make

[cryptography] Karacell 3 Cracking Prize

2013-05-22 Thread Russell Leidich
Hi All, Sorry this took so long. Tigerspike is inviting everyone to make up to USD10,000 by being the first to crack our Karacell 3 encryption, using the weakest keys that it supports (121 bits). (Please note that this algo differs in key ways from Karacell (1), released in whitepaper form in