On Tue, Jul 02, 2013 at 12:25:50PM +0200, Adam Back wrote:
> I think it time to deprecate non-https (and non-forward secret
> ciphersuites.) Compute power has moved on, session cacheing works,
> symmetric crypto is cheap.
A reasonable use for the $3k the OP is talking about would be to add
node-t
On 2013-07-04 2:11 AM, Wasabee wrote:
On 03/07/2013 13:31, Michael Rogers wrote:
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On 03/07/13 13:26, danimoth wrote:
Not directly related to remailer, but what about dc nets [1] ?
[1] The Dining Cryptographers Problem:
Unconditional Sender and
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Hi Wasabee,
I'm no expert either but I'll try to answer to the best of my
understanding. I'm CCing Henry Corrigan-Gibbs, one of the Dissent
designers, who will hopefully correct my mistakes. :-)
On 03/07/13 17:11, Wasabee wrote:
> is it really feasib
On Tue, Jul 2, 2013 at 10:07 AM, Adam Back wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 02, 2013 at 11:48:02AM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
>>
>> On 2 July 2013 11:25, Adam Back wrote:
>>>
>>> does it provide forward secrecy (via k' = H(k)?).
>>
>>
>> Resumed [SSL] sessions do not give forward secrecy. Sessions should be
>>
On 03/07/2013 13:31, Michael Rogers wrote:
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On 03/07/13 13:26, danimoth wrote:
Not directly related to remailer, but what about dc nets [1] ?
[1] The Dining Cryptographers Problem:
Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability (David Chaum)
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Announcing the release of a more secure Python wrapper for GnuPG on PyPI.
About this release
- --
This is the first stable release of a module (named 'gnupg' on PyPI)[0], which
originated as a fork of python-gnupg.[1] Several prob
On 30/06/13 at 07:32pm, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> > I'd love to see a revitalisation of remailer research, focussing on
> > unlinkability (which we know many people would benefit from) rather
> > than sender anonymity (which fewer people need, and which is prone to
> > abuse that discourages people
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On 03/07/13 13:26, danimoth wrote:
> Not directly related to remailer, but what about dc nets [1] ?
>
> [1] The Dining Cryptographers Problem:
> Unconditional Sender and Recipient Untraceability (David Chaum)
DC nets have two major drawbacks: the
On 3/07/13 12:37 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
- Forwarded message from Saku Ytti -
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2013 21:35:58 +0300
From: Saku Ytti
To: na...@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Google's QUIC
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15)
On (2013-06-29 23:36 +0100), Tony Finch wrote:
Reminds me of MinimaLT
- Forwarded message from Saku Ytti -
Date: Tue, 2 Jul 2013 21:35:58 +0300
From: Saku Ytti
To: na...@nanog.org
Subject: Re: Google's QUIC
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15)
On (2013-06-29 23:36 +0100), Tony Finch wrote:
> Reminds me of MinimaLT: http://cr.yp.to/tcpip/minimalt-20130522
On Tue, Jul 2, 2013 at 1:52 PM, Ben Laurie wrote:
> On 2 July 2013 16:07, Adam Back wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 02, 2013 at 11:48:02AM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
> >>
> >> On 2 July 2013 11:25, Adam Back wrote:
> >>>
> >>> does it provide forward secrecy (via k' = H(k)?).
> >>
> >>
> >> Resumed [SSL]
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